Alan Tieger has received the 2023 M.C. Bassiouni Justice Award for his exceptional work as a prosecutor in some of the most consequential international criminal law cases of the past three decades.
Mr Tieger, who has been a senior prosecutor at the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) since 2017, was given the award in recognition of his service as a prosecutor of international crimes since 1994. The jury commended inter alia his exemplary standards of meticulous, tireless and uncompromising professionalism, as well as his outstanding advocacy skills and courtroom decorum.
The M.C. Bassiouni Justice Award is granted every year by the Centre for International Law Research and Policy.
Mr Tieger is a US national with extensive experience both from the US and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), that he joined in 1994, as well as the SPO. Mr Tieger was involved in many of the ICTY’s most significant cases, including its first trial, that of Duško Tadić, and its final trial, that of Ratko Mladić.
Before joining the ICTY, Mr Tieger served as a federal prosecutor in the Civil Rights Division Criminal Section of the US Department of Justice from 1987 to 1994, prosecuting cases of racial violence and police brutality nationwide, including the Rodney King case.
At the SPO, Mr Tieger has focused primarily on the Thaci et al. investigation and trial.
Mr Tieger has previously received numerous awards for his domestic and international criminal law work, including the US Department of Justice Distinguished Service Award, the Attorney General’s Commendation for Service to the United States and International Justice, the AAJLJ Pursuit of Justice Award, the Bosnia Charter of Justice Award, and the Award of Recognition-Certificate of Appreciation of the City of Sarajevo.
TASHKENT, Dunyo IA. Thomas Fasbender, political observer and head of the geopolitics department of Berliner Zeitung, interviewed Uzbek political scientist Kudratilla Rafikov, reports Dunyo IA correspondent.
We present to your attention the full text of the interview, in which the Uzbek political scientist through the prism of history subtly reveals important factors that have influenced the modern development of Uzbekistan.
– Mr. Rafikov, I have long had the desire to write about Uzbekistan and to understand more deeply the processes taking place in this country. This country, located in the center of Eurasia, can rightfully be considered not only the geopolitical but also the civilization center of the continent.
In my opinion, the two great epochs that emerged on this land in the distant past – the Islamic Renaissance and the Timurid Renaissance – have contributed something incredibly important to world culture and science, not only for the peoples of the East or the Islamic world, but for the entire history of humankind. However, the land, which was the cradle of powerful empires and civilizations, remained at the mercy of social and political cataclysms for several centuries, experiencing the heavy burden of colonialism.
But my question is not about the distant past. I would like to talk about the present day of your country, how the state and society have coped with the difficulties of post-independence reconstruction. In particular, I am interested in why a dangerous stagnation, perhaps even deeper than in the Soviet period, still dominated the consciousness of the political elite, and society as a whole.
Why did this happen? Why, even after gaining sovereignty, did the country remain faithful to the old ideological attitudes for almost a quarter of a century, until today, when we are having this conversation? As far as I understand, society and the political elite still face difficulties in conceptualizing and renewing their own identity. What are the reasons for this? How have feelings of independence, nationwide identity, and nation-state relations evolved since the so-called “dawn of freedom”?
Another point: why, more than a quarter of a century after independence, is the characteristic of “New” added to the name of the state of Uzbekistan? What was the reason for this necessity?
–It is very difficult to answer it in a few words. That’s because the subject is complex: It’s highly controversial – the subject of metropolises and colonies.
The truth, however unpleasant, is that this vast region, at the crossroads of South and North, West and East, has for many years been classified as a ‘periphery’ (unfortunately, there are still those who think so). But did it really deserve such a characterisation? That, of course, is another matter.
Let’s not get distracted from your question. I can’t remember who said it, but someone once said: “The history of mankind is the history of wars.” I am deeply struck by this sentence, not only by its elegant construction, but also by the poetics of its meaning. The idea behind it is clear: Since wars and invasions are an integral part of history, there will always be rulers and oppressed.
In fact, as I mentioned earlier, many scholars have thought about and researched this particular part of history. One of them was Edward Wadie Said, a professor at Columbia University, an American scholar of Palestinian (Arab Christian). In his most famous work Orientalism, he quotes Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: “They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.”
According to Said’s Orientalism, the West presumes the East cannot talk about itself, cannot introduce itself, cannot present itself, but needs others to talk about it, to present it, and therefore needs the help of European scholarship. Orientalism was a scientific movement whose analogue in the world of politics was the Orient’s colonial accumulation and acquisition by Europe. The Orient was, therefore, not Europe’s interlocutor, but its silent Other’, explains Said. In a broad sense, when discussing the colonial and post-colonial period, it would be fair to say that this study deservedly characterizes our socio-political history to the present day, as far as possible.
Speaking more broadly about the colonial and postcolonial periods, research in this area helps to understand our social and political history as well as the current state of society. Although our region, located in the center of Eurasia, is not at the epicenter of the topic, such as the Arab East, about which Said writes, it has nevertheless been “orientalized” to a significant extent. This is due to the fact that for a century and a half our land lost its independence twice. Moreover, others have spoken for us in presenting us to the world, and we have long remained the “silent other” in the face of the dominant powers.
Let’s look at the first part of your question: Why did this happen?
The reasons for this can be divided into objective and subjective. Perhaps that is why many researchers argue that the process of nation-state and nation-building in our region, particularly in Uzbekistan, is still ongoing. We can partially agree with this opinion.
Formally, the Uzbek political nation created in the first half of the last century was presented to the world as a nation with history, culture, language and other identification codes. However, this nation was never able to overcome colonial boundaries. Soviet ideology sought to subordinate all signs of national identity in the republics to a common “Soviet” concept. The concept of “Soviet man,” which reached its peak in the 1970s and 1980s, deepened the incorporation of Central Asian national societies into Soviet cosmopolitanism.
As you rightly noted, even almost 25 years after independence, we have not been able to get out from under the influence of this concept. Why? Because perestroika, which began at the end of the Soviet period, as well as the socio-political changes of the 1990s were perceived by the state as a serious threat. When the social environment pushed for a rethinking of political and ethnic identity, the state suppressed any manifestations of national, religious and political sentiments. It became the only rigid “player” in the socio-ideological sphere, as in Soviet times, but without ideology.
Communist ideology, which was abandoned in the early 1990s, was replaced by fear of any new ideas and thoughts. A peculiar, even more conservative concept than the Soviet one – a cautious and even fearful view of religion, national identity, and history – was formed in society. Its crudest form manifested itself in an insistent denial of society’s connection to the Turkic and Islamic heritage.
In a country where almost 90% of the population is ethnic Uzbek and practicing Islam, identity has begun to be reflected in the image of a citizen realizing abstract ideas, such as: “Uzbekistan is a state with a great future”. However, these ideas failed to take root in society due to their utopianism, like communist ideals, and failure both ethnically and ideologically.
This peculiar conservative way of building a nation-state and society after independence led not only to internal political isolation, but also to alienation from neighbors and economic and social protectionism, which physically isolated us and in a sense weakened us. The policies pursued towards our neighbors slowed down the process of nation-state and nation building. As the life of the region changed, the refusal to renew showed the state’s penchant for the legacy of colonial ideology.
During the first 25 years of independence, the issues of nation-state building and nation formation did not receive due attention. That is why many analysts, assessing the transition period that ended by 2016, concluded: “Mirziyoyev inherited a heavy political and economic legacy”. This opinion is quite fair.
The saddest thing, as you said, is that the most important geopolitical point in Eurasia – the largest and most influential country in the region – has become somewhat isolated and detached from the world. The orthodox tendency that kept Uzbekistan within the Soviet concept of the nation-state and nation affected not only the domestic situation but also regional interaction. This tendency in the region inspired ethnic nationalism, which contributed to the alienation of the new republics from each other.
From Uzbekistan to New Uzbekistan. Kudratilla Rafikov and Thomas Fasbender.
–Are you saying that after independence, instead of rapprochement, a paradoxical process of alienation began between the states in the region? Did I understand that correctly?
– Yes, that’s about right. The peoples of the once united region of Turkestan had to face numerous misunderstandings after gaining freedom. In some cases, grievances and resentments escalated into bloody conflicts. These tensions arose over disputes over borders, water, and ethnic supremacy. Most complex, however, was the politicization of what the states had come to regard as part of their national ideology. The history and cultural heritage of the region was monopolized. It was once ironically observed: the history and cultural heritage of the region became a language of mutual hatred.
Unfortunately, today the five states of the region have completely different and sometimes contradictory versions of history taught in schools, although their pasts are unified. For a long time, the processes of nation-state and nation-building in the region developed according to the Soviet method – through denial, confrontation and confrontation.
However, I have somewhat deviated from the topic. We have been discussing the issues of identity, ideology and national thinking. In my opinion, the basis of identity is language, culture, history and historical memory. Naturally, religion also plays an important role. If we consider the situation as a whole, an ideological vacuum is dangerous for both society and the state. In the first years of independence, elements of individualism began to appear in Uzbekistan. The relationship between the state and society weakened: ensuring life and well-being in the Bolsheviks and the rest of the population is not only a matter of the state, but also a matter of the society.
During this period, the Soviet concept of equality disappeared and the standard of living began to depend on everyone’s abilities. Attention to traditions, language, identity, history and national values increased. All this in itself became a kind of ideology – an ideology that the society itself created for itself.
Unfortunately, however, this social impulse – be it economic liberalism, individualism or traditionalism – has not been accepted, revised or supported. On the contrary, it was rejected. As I have said, the political elite of the time feared these processes.
In the first years of independence, the state, distrustful of a society that was searching for its identity, actually hindered this process. National identity, recourse to history and traditions were perceived as a potential threat. Instead, importance was given to Soviet humanistic concepts such as “friendship of peoples,” “internationalism,” and “multinational people,” which were actually borrowed from the old system.
This policy was a conscious and logically justified step. The state was trying to shield a society that was searching for itself amidst the ruins of a collapsed ideology from returning to its historical origins, including family values and ethnicity, which were perceived as a threat of “radical nationalism.” This fear, alas, became not only a permanent element of state policy, but also its hallmark.
A strange idea has begun to take root in society: we deny communist ideology, but at the same time we do not consider it important to address ethnogenesis, culture and values that could tell us who we are. We are not completely conservative, but we are not liberal either. We exist, we are independent. We have a coat of arms, a flag and other symbols of nationhood….
Is it possible to imagine such a contradictory symbiosis in society? The dichotomy that emerged was extremely difficult to understand. Do we aspire to a liberal society or a conservative one? Are we going to live with memories of the Soviet past or turn to a national identity? What stage are we at now? Who are we, what place do we occupy in the region and the world, and what is important in how we are perceived by others? Are we building a nation-state, and how is the question of nation being addressed?
These questions remained unanswered, creating uncertainty in both society and public policy. It was this uncertainty that fueled the negative state protectionism that manifested itself in the economy, domestic and foreign policy, spiritual and ideological life, and in people’s daily lives.
The attempt to close the country from all “influences” in a globalized world was absurd. However, these factors, alas, did not remain mere theory or elitist discourse – they have determined the socio-political life of Uzbekistan for a long time. Identity, traditions, ethnicity, nation and nation-state, attitudes towards historical figures – all this was determined by the dominant regime. And, paradoxically, this policy became a kind of alternative to socialist ideology, which it formally rejected.
The situation was that in the official absence of ideology, its traces were felt everywhere. These elements and other aspects that were left out became the main reason for the stagnation of public consciousness.
In my opinion today, many people who talk about nation, nation-state and identity perceive these issues from a romantic point of view. What is most disturbing, however, is that these topics have not yet been scientifically analyzed.
What does the concept of nation mean in the context of contemporary globalization? Should a nation-state belong to one ethnicity or be an association of citizens of different ethnicities? These questions remain unanswered.
The same applies to the official ideology of the State. Over the previous 25 years of independence, Uzbekistan has not formed clear views on this subject. The reason seems to be that during the years of independence a political culture was not formed – moreover, it was not given the opportunity to develop.
– Could you please tell us what has changed in the country and the region since 2016? Can we talk about the exit from the state of “submission” that you mentioned, referring to Said? And one more thing: you seem to have forgotten to answer the second part of my previous question – where did this unusual epithet “New Uzbekistan” come from in public and political life?
– Indeed, there was a need for this expression, both spiritually and politically. Society and the state began to realize that life could not go on like this. The epithet “New Uzbekistan” became a kind of a call to mobilization, a pointer to the upcoming renewal.
I think it would be right to start with the circumstances in which Shavkat Mirziyoyev found himself when he assumed his duties as head of state. This will help to better understand the essence of the changes that have taken place.
What was the situation at that moment?
To be honest, it was far from enviable. Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s rise to power coincided with a period of global, regional and local crises. Withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, pandemic, consequences of the global economic crisis, regional interstate and cross-border conflicts, socio-economic problems accumulated in the society for many years….
All these challenges coincided as if on purpose with the beginning of Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s presidency. For example, you yourself remember how things were between neighbors in the region 7-8 years ago. Events in Afghanistan, the outcome of which was uncertain, caused serious concern. In addition, the disunity of the countries of the region made even the discussion of a common agenda almost unattainable.
At that time, integration seemed so far away that it was pointless to talk about it. Rather, one had to speculate where and when the next conflict between neighbors would break out. Naturally, such instability in relations met the interests of major external players. The lack of cohesion kept the region in a state of vulnerability and stagnation.
– Let me interrupt you. Listening to your analysis, I had a thought. The term “Eurasian Balkans” often appears in international political literature. You probably know that it is your region we are talking about?
– Yes, if I am not mistaken, this term was first used by Zbigniew Brzezinski. In his famous book “The Grand Chessboard” he explains it in detail. Although his theses are often perceived today as political speculation, the assertion is not unfounded.
Our situation was indeed reminiscent of the Balkans in Europe – with their political and ethnic conflicts, mutual grievances and various contradictions. Recall, for example, Uzbekistan’s relations with its neighbors – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – at that time. Tajik leader Emomali Rahmon had not visited Uzbekistan for almost twenty years. Relations with Kyrgyzstan, where political changes were frequent, also left much to be desired.
This disunity hindered the development of the region, exacerbated conflicts and deprived the countries of the opportunity to jointly seek solutions to pressing problems. During the first period of independence, Uzbekistan’s relations with neighboring countries, including Kyrgyzstan, were never sincere. This also applies to Kazakhstan, with which there were hidden contradictions. Such relations resembled useless disputes about leadership in the region: “Are you better?” or “Am I better?” An atmosphere prevailed in which even the hope of unification seemed unattainable.
It was in such a period of social and political depression, mistrust and disunity that Shavkat Mirziyoyev was elected head of Uzbekistan.
What was to be done in such a situation? Of course, it required a sober assessment of the state of affairs and, if necessary, a readiness to “get off the horse”. Shavkat Mirziyoyev did just that. He began to actively work on restoring friendly relations with neighbors and settling old conflicts.
The result of these efforts was the creation of the Advisory Council of Heads of State of Central Asia in 2018. Although this structure was semi-institutional in nature, it became an important platform for mutual understanding and joining forces after a long period of disunity. Cultural, humanitarian, economic and political ties have been restored between the countries of the region. Most importantly, a positive atmosphere has been created in the region, contributing to the strengthening of its status as a single international entity.
In this context, I can confidently say that Mr. Brzezinski’s predictions, which you mentioned, have not come true. Moreover, I believe that Shavkat Mirziyoyev has “edited” his concept to a certain extent. Today, cooperation dominates in Central Asia instead of competition, and friendship and brotherhood are emerging instead of resentment and enmity.
Let me give you a simple example. This year we all witnessed the Summer Olympic Games held in Paris. Our country’s athletes won outstanding victories. It was especially gratifying to see how our athletes, who climbed the podium, were sincerely welcomed by our brothers from neighboring countries. Social networks were filled with comments and congratulations like: “Long live our brothers! Central Asia – the children of Turkestan – are not inferior to others in anything, we are a great nation!”
Of course, this event did not go unnoticed by people interested in the history and modernity of the region, as well as by specialists. For example, Sergei Abashin, a well-known Russian anthropologist and researcher of Central Asia, noted: “The 2024 Olympics is a landmark event. Not so much by discussing the topics of gender and art, but by the impressive performance of athletes from Central Asian countries, especially Uzbekistan, which won 8 gold medals and came 13th in the overall world rankings (I remind you that in addition to their Olympic achievements, Uzbek chess players have also reached the top positions in the world ratings in recent years). We are witnessing how Central Asian countries are becoming visible, recognizable and important players, to use sports language, on a universal scale and are becoming aware of their own subjectivity. This is a real historical shift in the world and in the former post-Soviet space, which is long-term and not accidental at all.
In this context, it is worth mentioning another remarkable survey conducted by Kyrgyz experts. According to its data, in 2016, even before Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power in Uzbekistan, the majority of respondents in Kyrgyzstan perceived your country as one of the most unfriendly. However, already in 2017, just a year later, the results of a similar survey showed a sharp turnaround: Uzbekistan was among the countries that Kyrgyz residents consider to be the closest and friendliest.
Economic statistics are also eloquent. At the end of 2016, mutual trade between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan totaled just over 200 million dollars. By 2022, this figure has increased several times and reached 1.3 billion dollars.
We should not forget about the past: during the period of independence, bloody conflicts repeatedly took place between citizens of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan amid disputes over water, borders and ethnicity. Today, however, we see dramatic changes.
An example is the statement of the Kyrgyz president in an interview with Radio Liberty: “The way the Uzbek side will take water, which already flows to Uzbekistan, makes no difference to us. It doesn’t matter whether it is by pipeline, aryk route or air. The main thing is that every action is agreed between the parties. From now on, Kyrgyz-Uzbek friendship will be strong. No one can spoil our ties of friendship except God”.
These changes clearly demonstrate that Uzbekistan has moved from a policy of isolation to strengthening friendly and constructive relations with its neighbors.
Where do you think such sincerity and determined political will came from, both among the political elites of the region’s countries and ordinary people?
In my opinion, even these brief examples demonstrate quite clearly what happened in the region after 2016. Moreover, today Uzbekistan does not have a single border dispute with its neighbors. It has built friendly relations with neighboring states both at the bilateral level and within the framework of various structures.
– But it should be taken into account that many of these structures are traditional, such as the SCO, CIS, CSTO, and Uzbekistan has never been a stranger in these organizations….
– I understand you. If you pay attention, in the past, the processes in the political and economic structures of the region were determined mainly by external forces. The influence of their ideological and geopolitical goals was constantly felt. But in the new period, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy vectors have become more diverse.
Formats such as the consultative meetings of Central Asian heads of state or the 5+1 platform emerged due to changes in Uzbekistani politics. These updates have contributed to the emergence of a new practice of joint discussion and common ground in the region.
Today, the concept of regional identity is increasingly heard in the speeches of politicians and leaders of our countries. I consider this a historic achievement. In fact, it is a symbolic reflection of the idea of Turkestan, which was promoted by the Jadids in the 1920s, but which was lost then.
Another important step was Uzbekistan’s joining the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in 2019. This event changed the organization’s agenda and raised its status. For the first time in a century, Uzbekistan officially declared its belonging to the Turkic ethnos. This fact can also be considered an answer to your question about the “search for identity” of the state and society.
– That is true, most of the steps you mentioned do strengthen integration sentiments. However, as you said yourself, there are exceptions to the concept of regional or Turkic identity. For example, Tajikistan, where Persian is spoken, does not participate in the OTS. Why?
– This is indeed a pressing issue. The reasons are well known. Undoubtedly, common history and culture is an important basis for integration. But members of the organization understand that in today’s global world, activities cannot be built solely on ethnic bases or narrow nationalism.
Look at the map. The Turkic world and the countries of the region are located in the central zone of Eurasia. Our ancestors historically played the role of a link between peoples and states. The Great Silk Road passed through these lands, connecting Western Europe with China, the North with the South. Tajikistan is undoubtedly part of this heritage.
Although the language of Tajikistan is Persian, in a cultural and historical sense it is inextricably linked to the peoples of the region. Moreover, in terms of cultural and spiritual heritage, values, including religious motifs, Tajikistan is closer to us than to Iran.
If we talk about the basis for membership, it is worth remembering that Hungary, which actively participates in the activities of the UTG as an observer, speaks the language of the Finno-Ugric group, not Turkic.
I am confident that if Tajikistan is invited to the Organization at least as an observer, this will only strengthen regional solidarity. Of course, this is my personal opinion.
– Doesn’t Uzbekistan’s southern neighbor, Afghanistan, with its geographical location, ethnic and cultural components, have the right to participate in regional processes?
– Of course, by modern geopolitical standards, Afghanistan is part of the region. In addition to its geographical affiliation, this country is home to a large Turkic population. Moreover, a certain part of this country (northern Afghanistan) was called South Turkestan in history. From this point of view, as well as for determining the multi-vector foreign policy of the region, the southern neighbor is extremely important, since its territories are crossed by routes leading us to global seaports.
I think I have spoken about the region in sufficient detail. Now, if you allow me, I will move on to the changes in the social, political and cultural life of Uzbekistan. After all, it is these changes that reveal the essence of the epithet “New” in the name of the country, which you have mentioned more than once.
First of all, it is worth noting that after 2016, the political rhetoric of Uzbekistan changed. This was the beginning of what I call the awareness of one’s own identity, the search for one’s “I”. Think about it: the state has all the attributes that confirm its sovereignty – a flag, a coat of arms, an anthem, money, an army, borders. But, in addition to this, there was always a sense of incompleteness. Imagine that you have everything, but it is not enough. This was the case with us. This suppressed atmosphere, in its essence, resembled Said’s theory (Orientalism). Yes, Uzbekistan as a state had everything except a national identity. It lacked its soul – the very identity that was torn out of it more than a century ago. Without it, the country felt insecure and vulnerable. Now I understand the cry of the soul of our great poet, Jadid and victim of Stalin’s repressions Abdurauf Fitrat: “Oh great Turan, land of lions, what has become of you?..” He cried out in despair to his homeland and his people, regretting their lost heart. A nation without its soul, without identity – does it remain independent or does it become “the other” in the circle of masters? That is why I mentioned Said and his theory of “Orientalism” from the very beginning.
In my opinion, Shavkat Mirziyoyev was deeply aware of this problem from the very beginning. Having become president, he raised topics that had not been discussed in 25 years of independence, and were sometimes even taboo.
An example is the quotes from the inscriptions of Bilge Kagan, which began to sound in political texts. At the Independence Day celebrations, the poem “Guzal Turkiston”, taboo since its writing, was read. Fitrat’s name began to sound more and more often. Hundreds of national figures repressed in Soviet times, including members of the national movement, who were previously called “basmachi”, were rehabilitated by the Supreme Court.
An international conference dedicated to the scientific heritage of the Jadids was held in Tashkent. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev spoke at the UN tribune in the Uzbek language for the first time in the history of Uzbekistan.
The country lifted bans on religious, political and freedom of speech. “Blacklists” were abolished. The use of forced labor, including child labor, in the cotton industry, which had tarnished the country’s image for many years, has been stopped. The “Jaslyk” prison in Karakalpakstan, which had become a symbol of political and religious repression, has been closed.
These steps rightly distinguish today’s Uzbekistan from its past. From an academic perspective, these changes can be characterized as the desire of the state and society for national identity, a departure from colonial and neocolonial pressure.
In my opinion, during the era of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, significant work was done to renew society and abandon the Soviet systems. Let me give you another example that has important socio-political significance.
In Soviet times, as in all the capitals of the union republics, Tashkent had a central square – “Lenin Square”. In this place stood a monumental monument to the “leader of the world proletariat”. After gaining independence, the bronze figure of Lenin was removed, but the square remained almost the same. In place of the pedestal, a globe appeared, in the center of which the word “Uzbekistan” was written in barely noticeable font. The square was renamed, removing Lenin’s name and adding the word “independence”. This is how “Independence Square” appeared.
The meaning of independence, as you can understand, was reduced only to this symbolic change.
In the new conditions, this matter was approached more deeply and seriously. Without denying the significance of this square, the “New Uzbekistan” park was created in the eastern part of the capital. Some people wondered: “Why another complex if we already have Independence Square?” This misunderstanding is due to a lack of understanding of the very essence of the idea.
As I have already mentioned, Independence Square appeared on the site of the former Lenin Square. Its architectural appearance and artistic design remained without a clearly expressed national specificity. This space, in terms of content, was extremely limited. In the center of the square stood a globe with the inscription “Uzbekistan”, symbolizing the emergence of a new state. However, it seems to me that this symbol expressed not so much independence as modesty and even caution in demonstrating it.
But the national identity of our people, with a thousand-year history, is not limited to the period of dependence. We have a glorious past, great heroes, outstanding achievements of science and culture, which are admired by the peoples of the world.
President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, when conceiving the park project, proceeded from these very motives. Today, the New Uzbekistan Park with its grandiose monument is a place where guests and tourists from all over the world, politicians and government leaders come. Its exhibitions cover not only the history of our country, but also the common heritage of the entire region.
Defining regional identity and understanding how people living in this region perceive themselves and their place in the world play a huge role. From this point of view, the rapprochement that is taking place today not only in the economic and political, but also in the cultural and humanitarian spheres, is of paramount importance for mutual understanding between peoples who have lived side by side for centuries.
Especially projects such as the New Uzbekistan Park, due to their content and significance, can become a point of unification of the history of the peoples of the region. Such large-scale ideas are extremely necessary for us today.
I think none of your questions remained unanswered.
– Thank you! I have one more question. Everyone sees that today the geopolitical situation around Central Asia is changing. This also means the emergence of new actors in the region. Naturally, such a situation can create certain inconveniences for the domestic and foreign policies of the two locomotive states – Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. For example, one force can exert pressure, pursuing economic interests, while the other one can strive to maintain these countries in the status of a geopolitical object from an ideological or political point of view. What do you think, if such pressure is exerted on Uzbekistan, what position can the current government – President Mirziyoyev – take?
– A very interesting question. It seems that the President foresaw such questions, since he has repeatedly given a clear and concise answer to this question in his speeches. For example, on December 22, 2023, at a meeting of the Republican Council for Spirituality and Education, Shavkat Mirziyoyev said: “We are all witnessing how powerful centers of the world, which previously defended their goals and interests mainly through diplomacy and politics, have now openly embarked on the path of pressure, confrontation and clashes. Unfortunately, the influence of such large-scale and extremely contradictory processes does not bypass the Central Asian region and our country, which is an integral part of it.”
The same year, during a meeting in the Surkhandarya region, the President gave an answer that directly relates to your question. This is what the head of state said: “These are very difficult times now. Large countries are now saying: “Uzbekistan, whose side are you on? Stop being neutral, go to this side or that side.” They talk about it quite persistently… They themselves say it, and their representatives also call for it, declaring: “We need Uzbekistan in Central Asia. The population of which has reached 36 million people, in three or four years it will be 40 million.” They ask: “Whose side are you on?” How should one answer such a difficult question? There is only one answer – I am only on one side, I am ready to die for my nation, people, the interests of the great future of Uzbekistan.”
Is it possible to give a clearer and more precise answer to your question?
– Thank you. I sincerely enjoyed our conversation very much. I learned a lot about the country that interests me, about its past and present. I especially liked your thoughts about the “lost soul”. Indeed, I had never thought before that the loss of the soul is a direct manifestation of spiritual dependence and slavery. From what I heard, I concluded that today Uzbekistan is finding its identity, its “I” or, as you put it, its “soul”. I think I understood your thoughts correctly.
– Yes, absolutely right! Thank you very much again!
On November 21, 2024, the Embassy of Sudan in the Netherlands held a critical press briefing to address the urgent humanitarian and conflict situation in Sudan. The situation has escalated dramatically since 2023, marked by severe humanitarian crises, widespread violence, human rights violations, and acute food shortages.
This briefing highlighted the immediate need for action. In 2023, Sudan plunged into conflict as long-standing tensions between Army Chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo erupted into a devastating war. The clash between these two powerful factions has been described as an “existential battle,” leading to millions of people fleeing their homes, hundreds of thousands dead, and countless others facing starvation.
Ms. Omaima Alsharief, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Sudan in the Netherlands, delivered a firm update on the dire state of affairs in Sudan, underscoring the struggles and resilience of the Sudanese people. Accompanied by a short video presentation, she engaged openly with the media in attendance.
Ms. Omaima Alsharief, expressed disappointment over the stalled Jeddah talks which were intended to resolve the catastrophic humanitarian situation arising from the conflict between the Sudanese army and its rival paramilitary force.
Moreover, Russia’s recent veto of a United Nations Security Council resolution—co-authored by the UK. and Sierra Leone—calling for an immediate ceasefire is unacceptable, especially as Sudan continues to endure this devastating war.
With no one expecting a complete victory from either side, the pressing question remains: How do we effectively stop the war in Sudan?
When we use a global perspective, we see a beautiful planet on which we can find ample polarization and distrust. When these would further escalate, we might end up living in a world that is increasingly fragmented with low(er) levels of societal cohesion.
Not a very attractive prospect.
High time therefore to build bridges and cross the divides!
Do we perhaps cause fragmentation ourselves because we cannot stop pigeonholing others by race, religion, gender, age, clothing, behaviour, social class, birthplace, or you name it? Do we perhaps cause antagonism ourselves by focusing more on what separates us instead of what unites us?
Well, we don’t know really, do we?
But the following questions do pop up.
How did we end up fragmented and in an antagonistic state?
Who is building bridges?
Who is crossing the divides?
Let’s use that global perspective and take a closer look.
Following WWII, the United States government and its allies created a ‘rules’-based approach to global governance, one that is spearheaded by the United Nations (UN) and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
With a strong focus on economic development and the US-dollar, a ‘Western’ model appeared that produced economic growth, prosperity and ‘stability’ but is now increasingly being questioned and criticized.
Among the reasons for this scrutiny are concerns related to ENVIRONMENT and GOVERNANCE.
ENVIRONMENT
Ever since the Club of Rome’s 1972 report “Limits to Growth”, people increasingly realize that the over-exploitation of our planet’s resources has reached critical levels. Add recent dramatic declines in biodiversity (up to 74%!), the effects of climate change, mass migration and pollution, and it becomes understandable why so many are now talking about the need for a global ‘transition’ and ‘regeneration’.
All around the world, we see a plethora of member-owned communities emerging without centralized leadership. These include Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO’s) but also nature-based, bioregional nodes and communities.
All of them motivated to widen the scope of economy beyond just money and finance. All of them sensing that the question of ‘price’ is secondary to the question of ‘value’.
All of them wanting a world more aligned with ‘laws of nature’ than with ‘laws of man’.
GOVERNANCE
We see a global power shift away from Western geopolitical dominance towards a more multipolar global order. This is largely caused by the emerging BRICS+ network of currently 22 countries – plus another 14 in the waiting room – as well as the lack of an executive mandate for the United Nations.
There are governments that consider the BRICS+ network as an opposing force or as an alternative to Western coalitions such as the European Union (29 members) or NATO (32 members). Criticism from these antagonistic governments includes statements like: “The West only applies international law and norms when it suits their own interests”. Other governments, however, see being part of BRICS+ as an add-on to reduce vulnerability (“strategic hedging”). Examples of the latter include India, Turkey (also a NATO member!), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
All right then, enough “Thought” in a column about fragmentation and antagonism. Let’s move – in the absence of a “Smile” -, to an “Upward Curl” with the two remaining questions: Who is building bridges? Who is crossing the divides?
Well, answering those questions is not that difficult.
Building bridges – between environmental concerns and the challenges of governance.
Crossing divides – between autonomous organizations, private sector, populations, international alliances and national governments.
Well, isn’t that exactly what DIPLOMATS do?
Yes, it is but remember that building bridges and crossing divides in practice – and not just in speeches or on paper… – requires an executive mandate.
So, we end this column with two quotes:
“I have no special talents. I am only passionately curious.” (Einstein)
“It takes a single flame to light many candles.” (Buddha/Gandhi/Tolstoy)
So, dear Diplomats, stay curious, look for an executive mandate – and be that flame!
About the author:
Eelco H. Dykstra. Photography by Tom Manning
Once dubbed a ‘Global Nomad’ in East Africa, Eelco H. Dykstra is a seasoned international crisis and emergency expert. As a true ‘Prac-Ademic’, he blends – also in his column “A Thought and a Smile” – his innate optimism with knowledge from his practical experience and rigorous fact-finding.
Aside from being founder/chair of the Daily Impact Emergency Management (DIEM) network and a visiting professor in South Africa, he initiated the ’20/20 Vision’ program for the dual purpose of strengthening value-based resilience and overcoming the obstacles that stand in the way of implementing lessons (to be) learned. Eelco has been a correspondent, written multiple books and articles and continues to work extensively with media, government, business, NGO’s and community-based initiatives. In short, Eelco is a transdisciplinary and trans-cultural multi-tasker – just like diplomats are.
Among his hobbies are cooking and playing the cello – see picture, taken by Tom Manning, during an impromptu performance with the Soweto Youth Orchestra.
Eelco H. DykstraProfessor (visiting), Adaptation and Resilience, University of South-Africa, UNISA. Chair, ’20/20 Vision’ Program: How do we go from ‘Risk’ to ‘Resilience”? Founder, Daily Impact Emergency Management (DIEM) Network www.diem.nuwww.20outof20.vision / eelco.dykstra@diem.nu
Chinmoy Krishna Das, who heads the Bangladesh Sammilit Sanatan Jagran Jote, is not a prominent leader among the Hindus of Bangladesh – nor is a member of the controversial Hindu organization ISKCON – he has actually been expelled from this organization due to various charges. Prior to the political change in Bangladesh last August, he was not a topic of discussion. After August, he suddenly emerged on the scene and, called for protecting Hindus, held numerous programs that spread communal hatred. This led to fears of widespread conflict and violence in this non-communal Bangladesh, a country known for its communal harmony. Consequently, Bangladesh had no choice but to take action against such a man.
Bangladesh’s relations with neighboring India is strained. Indian BJP led government (According to Bengal Bengal CM Mamata Banerjee “the Centre has a different perspective on a particular religion and is vindictive towards one religion.”) sought to pressure Bangladesh by using Chinmoy as a pawn. Therefore following Chinmoy’s arrest the Indian Ministry of External Affairs demanded the release of him, who was accused in a criminal case and faced charges of moral turpitude. Bangladesh perceived this statement as interference in its internal affairs. It is worth noting that Hasina, who is a fugitive in India, has sought Chinmoy’s release in line with India’s demands. The statement indicates that Bangladesh will not be able to judge whether Chinmoy is a criminal or not. Hasina’s statement suggests that either Chinmoy is acting on behalf of followers or he is directly associated her, with the agenda of inciting communal unrest to benefit the Awami League and protect Indian interest.
Hasina made some other unproven allegations in her statement, saying, “A temple was burnt in Chittagong. Earlier, mosques, mazars, churches, monasteries and houses of the Ahmadiyya community were attacked, vandalized, looted and burnt”.
India has offered refuge to a tyrannical leader like Sheikh Hasina, primarily for its own strategic interests. Over the past fifteen years, Hasina has entered into numerous agreements with India that prioritize Indian benefits at the expense of her own nation’s welfare. Even if Sheikh Hasina is unable to regain power, she can still be utilized to exert pressure on Bangladesh in favor of Indian interests. The BJP government in India is actively pursuing this agenda. In addition to providing political asylum to Hasina, India is enabling her to engage in activities detrimental to Bangladesh. The BJP has ascended to power by exploiting communal tensions and is now once again attempting to undermine the communal harmony within Bangladesh.
Das was allegedly linked to the acid attack on army and police personnel in the Hazari Lane incident in Chittagong in November 2024. Other charges against him include occupying a pond belonging to BNP vice chairman Mir Mohammad Nasiruddin in Hathazari, Chittagong.
In 2023, Das was also accused of child sexual abuse, for which ISKCON’s UK-based International Child Protection Office ordered him to stay away from anyone under the age of 18. He was also temporarily suspended from the organization and banned from performing religious rituals. At a press conference in 2024, Hrishikesh Gourango Das, a member of ISKCON Bangladesh’s child protection team, said that several children had accused Chinmoy Das of abuse, and that he had been suspended from the organization and the position of Pundorik Dham for three months to investigate the matter. In July 2024, he was expelled from ISKCON for violating organizational discipline during his tenure as divisional organizational secretary for Chittagong.
The officials of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs are recognized globally for their astuteness. However, these officials overlooked the criminal conduct of Chinmoy prior to making such statements. By aligning with a child abuser and an individual who has unlawfully appropriated others’ property, India is inadvertently providing support to criminals from another nation. For India to foster positive relations with Bangladesh, India must grasp the true circumstances at hand.
About the Author:
Sazzad Haider, Photographer Habib Raza.
Sazzad Haider is Writer & journalist, lives in Dhaka, Bangladesh. He is Editor-in-Chief of Diplomatic Journal.
After World War I, the Allied powers, mainly Great Britain and France, cut the Ottoman Empire down to size and divided the spoils into countries with British or French oversight. Messrs Sykes and Picot did this in an office far away with their infamous ‘lines in the sand’. They used pencil, paper, and rulers with little regard for the realities on the ground. Because the Arab-Jewish problem could not be immediately solved, Britain was given the mandate over roughly what is now Israel and the West Bank, and lines were drawn to mark Jordan, Libanon, Syria, and Iraq. There had been serious discussion about a homeland for the Jews in part of the mandate but very little for the different peoples, tribes, and religions in the area.
In 1920, in the treaty of Sèvres between the Allies and Turkey, it was decided that there would be a separate country for the Kurds, but the resolution was never ratified. The Kurds are an ancient people of over 30 million who have their own languages and cultures. They are spread out over parts of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, where they are second-rate citizens if not actually persecuted. Since then, over one hundred thousand of them have been murdered, tortured, or incarcerated, mainly by Turkey. The Kurds, more than anyone in the area, would merit their own country. Yet, there are no demonstrations anywhere with “FREE KURDISTAN” banners, or with “ERDOGAN MURDERER”.
Following the collapse of the Assad Dictatorship, Israel took the precaution of destroying much of the military installations in Syria and almost all of its navy, which had been used to ship Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. The media, the UN, and several countries immediately accused Israel of abusing the situation while ignoring that, at the same time, the Turkish airforce bombed Kurdish areas in Syria, killing hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians.
It is cynical to see politicians, academics, and other people proclaim that what their government is doing to help Israel is ‘NOT IN THEIR NAME’ without a word about Turkey, Hamas, or Teheran.
A new policy brief by Asser researcher Dr. Niki Siampakou explores the case of post-war Sri Lanka, where transitional justice mechanisms have failed to address crimes committed by terrorist groups, among other actors. Upon close inspection, the reasoning lies not in the inherent capacity of transitional justice tools, but rather in the unique context of Sri Lanka. The country currently lacks the required conditions for transitional justice to succeed.
It has been fifteen years since the 26-year civil war (1983-2009) ended in Sri Lanka, in which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was defeated by the government. Since then, the country has been struggling to address violations and deliver justice to victims of the war.
There are some notions of transitional justice, but the results are severely inadequate. Memorial initiatives have often resulted in arrests, arbitrary detentions and skewed interpretations of the Tamil community. There has been a multiplication of truth-seeking mechanisms while disregarding the needs of victims. The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) has continuously been misused by authorities, but the newly proposed Counter Terrorism Bill also fails to meet international human rights standards. The current approach impends the analysis of the root causes, perpetuates stigma and power relations, and blocks conversations on conflict resolution while repressing activists and civil society actors.
Transitional justice
The United Nations (UN) defines transitional justice as ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.’ Its four pillars are justice, truth, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence.
Transitional justice tools have produced favourable results in several places dealing with terroristic violence, including Northern Ireland, the Basque country, and Colombia. Since the mechanisms have been used in many contexts, following dictatorships, conflicts, and the consolidation of democratic societies, they are characterised by their flexibility.
Therefore, the current failure to deliver justice in Sri Lanka is not due to the inherent incapacity of transitional justice mechanisms, but rather the absence of certain required conditions. This policy brief identifies four necessary conditions for the application and success of transitional justice in a post-war and post-terroristic violence context: 1) a holistic approach where trials, truth-seeking initiatives, reparation programmes, and non-recurrence measures complement each other; 2) victims’ trust in the process through consultations and engagement with the communities; 3) independent and impartial mechanisms’ 4) political will and government engagement. All four conditions are missing in Sri Lanka.
A new approach to transitional justice in Sri Lanka
Following her analysis, Siampakou proposes several recommendations that can contribute to successful transitional justice mechanisms in Sri Lanka. The first is adopting a holistic transitional justice process, which will include truth-seeking initiatives, prosecutions, reparations, and guarantees of non-recurrence; they should complement each other and guarantee victims’ inclusion.
The second is conducting an in-depth examination and analysis of the situation before the rise of terrorism and the beginning of the civil war and the grievances that led to it. This helps avoid simplified narratives and the perpetuation of stereotypes and biases regarding minorities and vulnerable groups.
The third is to suspend the establishment of the new Commission for Truth, Unity and Reconciliation as well as review the reports of the past truth commissions and implement their key recommendations. Finally, she recommends repealling the PTA, and amending the new Counter Terrorism Bill in accordance with international human rights law while ensuring that any new counter-terrorism legislation meets international due process and fair trial standards.
Read the full policy brief here to see all the recommendations and the current context of Sri Lanka.
About Dr. Niki Siampakou:
Dr. Niki Siampakou, Asser Institute.
Niki is a joint research fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) and the Asser Institute. At Asser, she is part of the research strand ‘In the public interest: accountability of the state and the prosecution of crimes’. Her work focuses on the appropriate legal responses against violent extremism and terrorism, with a particular focus on (inter)national criminal justice and human rights considerations.
In this interview, researcher Dr. Niki Siampakou discusses her areas of expertise, including transitional justice and victims of terrorism. She hopes to raise awareness about victims’ rights, which should be accounted for in counter-terrorism policies. Read more.
In the recently published book ‘Children’s Rights, “Foreign Fighters”, Counter-Terrorism: Children of Nowhere,’ Asser senior researcher Rumyana van Ark and her co-authors call for policymakers to incorporate a more child-centric approach to counter-terrorism. ‘We want to redirect the conversation away from the (potential) wrongdoing of the parents, and on to one of the most vulnerable groups in the world’. An interview.
Tell us about your book? ‘The book focuses on the children of (alleged) foreign terrorist fighters who are currently still residing in camps in Syria and Iraq after the fall of the Islamic State (IS).
The plight of the children continues to be overlooked and underexplored in contrast to that of the adults when it comes to the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon. More often than not, the children are mentioned with reference to the alleged behaviour of their parents rather than as individuals who have their own agency and who are afforded special protections under international law, namely under the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child. My co-authors and I strongly felt that there was a gap in the literature that had to be rectified.
The underexplored and multi-layered vulnerability of the children was at the core of our choice to adopt a children-centric approach. While the children’s current predicament is partially linked to the (alleged) activities of their parents, it is also driven by the lack of sufficient care by their countries of origin or nationality in terms of supporting their return, rehabilitation and reintegration. Hence, we sought to redirect the discourse away from the parents, and on to what is one of the most vulnerable groups in the world; a group currently living in a very contained space with extremely limited basic resources.’
You worked on this book for more than 3 years. What was the most challenging and most rewarding part of the process? ‘Timing was definitely the most challenging aspect. Our original plan was to conduct in-person workshops in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Australia, to capture the views from local non-governmental organisations (NGOs), regional and international organisations involved on the ground, practitioners, and legal professionals working with families stuck in the camps. However, the first lengthy COVID-19 lockdowns began across all three countries just as we were signing the book contract and making preliminary workshop plans. This meant that we had to make many adjustments and switch to virtual small group meetings, on top of balancing the other numerous impacts of lockdowns on everyday life.
As a result, it took longer than expected to complete the book. In hindsight, however, the extended timeframe of this project was probably a blessing in disguise. We had more time for deeper reflection on the subject matter and were able to incorporate new and ongoing developments. For instance, as we were still finalising the book, the European Court of Human Rights delivered its long-awaited judgement on a case against France regarding repatriation obligations, which allowed us to feature it heavily in our discussions.
Additionally, there were plenty of rewarding moments along the way. The conversations we had were incredibly insightful. From the legal representatives of the women and children hoping to return to their countries of nationality, to the NGO practitioners and security service personnel on the ground, everyone enriched our knowledge and offered additional perspectives on the camps’ conditions and the plight of the children living there. They also strongly emphasised the need to make the children’s voices heard and how critical it is to advocate for the children’s return home – a standpoint that truly stayed with us. It motivated us to keep ploughing through. Furthermore, it pushed us to think more pragmatically about how to convince our target audience to step out of the security lens thinking and into child-centric thinking.’
What were some of your findings from this project? ‘Our first finding is that governmental reasoning against repatriating alleged foreign terrorist fighters and their families does not hold up once you critically reflect on the available national security toolkits. For a number of Western states including the UK, the Netherlands and Australia, the core justification is not having the capacity to address the operational, security, and societal complexities that come from repatration and post-repatriation processes. A recurring question for them is, how do you publicly justify the active repatriation of someone who might pose a security threat?
However, if you look at the criminal justice frameworks in place, the immigration law frameworks, and the specific counter-terrorism measures, you see a different picture. These countries and many others have extensive and multilayered sets of measures to address individuals who engaged in terrorism activities or are suspected of doing so. Moreover, the childcare and safeguarding practitioners in states such as the Netherlands, Australia and the UK would rather have the children back, especially since they have the capacity and measures to do so; they are just waiting for the children’s return.
Where states have completed repatriations, thus demonstrating that they do in fact have the operational capabilities to repatriate, a number of them have engaged in a categorisation of vulnerabilities, specifically in Europe. In other words, they have only repatriated “particularly vulnerable children”; in earlier years, it was only vulnerable orphaned children.
Within the context of the international legal framework protecting children, this is more of a publicity statement than a valid legal argument. The protections afforded by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child clearly indicate that all children are to be considered vulnerable. They should not be subject to discrimination on any basis, and they deserve special protections compared to adults by nature of their age, and their needs in terms of support, decision-making, protection, and more.
Therefore, all children in the camps are vulnerable by virtue of being children, which makes repatriations based on subjective assessments of vulnerability a political rather than objective decision. By picking and choosing who you repatriate, you create a scale of vulnerabilities that only focuses on children at the intersection of several vulnerabilities. We argue that this is equivalent to choosing the children that are going to cause the least amount of public consternation. When repatriating orphans for example, no further explanation is required over their parents, who may pose a security threat.
Stepping into the shoes of governments, aside from the indisputable moral reasons, there are also security-oriented reasons to repatriate the children. Leaving the children behind in the squalid conditions of the camps creates ample propaganda material for terrorist organisations targeting individuals or children for radicalisation and recruitment. The message of ‘look how much your own country cares about you’ writes itself. Further, for children either socialised and/or radicalised into violence and violent extremism, repatriation offers the best chance of successful deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration.
In the book, we also acknowledge that there may be children in some very particular familial and peer group circumstances who grow up into adults who seek a life of violence. However, that is a very, very small droplet in the sea of children that desperately need help. And if the evidence after some of the returns is any indication, returning to their home country makes a huge difference in a matter of months. The things many of us take for granted, such as easy access to clean water, heating, a solid roof and mainstream education, create positive impacts almost immediately. These factors combined with tailored reintegration programming allow many of the returned children to catch up with their peers within a year, in terms of education and societal involvement. If states genuinely want to reduce national security risks associated with alleged foreign terrorist fighters and their families, it is in their best interests to return the children home.’
What do you hope to see following the book’s release? ‘We hope to reorient the conversation towards a more child-centric approach rather than the dominant security-oriented approach. We must look beyond what is perceived as a potential and undefined future security threat and focus on the children of alleged foreign terrorist fighters. We must see them as children in desperate need of help, as rights holders who are extremely vulnerable, as individuals who deserve a life where basic necessities are not extremely scarce. In other words, we hope these children can enjoy their childhood and simply be children, instead of having to struggle daily for survival.
This is also why we make references to other European states that have made significant progress in terms of reintegration and rehabilitation, such as Kosovo. Despite being a very small and less wealthy country, Kosovo has practically repatriated everyone and successfully reintegrated most of the children. It means repatriating and reintegrating the children is possible, what we need is governments’ willingness.’
Rumyana van Ark, Senior ASSER Institute rechercher.
Dr Rumyana van Ark is a Senior researcher in international law and (counter-) terrorism at the T.M.C. Asser Instituut within the research strand ‘in the public interest: accountability of the state and the prosecution of crimes’. She is also the coordinator of all counter-terrorism related research and project activities at the T.M.C. Asser Instituut. Her research focuses on the evolving relationship between the individual (terror suspect) and the state following acts of terrorism.
Her book co-authors are Prof. Devyani Prabhat (Bristol University) and Dr. Faith Gordon (Australian National University).
Read more: [New publication] Excessive judicial deference as rule of law backsliding: When national security and effective rights protection collide There is growing deference of domestic and international courts to the executive in national security cases, a trend that undermines the rule of law and weakens human rights protections. With the steady rise of populism and politics of fear and division, the threat of insecurity has been hyperinflated and exploited to justify national security measures. Through an analysis of key case law, including from the European Court of Human Rights, this article explores how supranational human rights courts can counteract this erosion and argues for stronger safeguards to ensure accountability and the protection of individual rights. Read more.
[Interview] Asser researcher Rumyana van Ark: ‘How the legacy of the War on Terror continues to cast a deep shadow 20 years post 9/11’ Since 9/11, the prevention and pre-emption of acts of terrorism became a priority for governments worldwide, both at domestic and international levels. This led to a transnational counter-terrorism campaign known as the ‘War on Terror’. 21 years on, counter-terrorism expert, Rumyana van Ark, investigates the legacy of this political and legal paradigm, and its implications on human rights, humanitarian law, counter-terrorism, and armed conflict. Read more.[Interview] Counterterrorism expert Christophe Paulussen critisises citizenship stripping for terrorists and calls for evidence-based approach In an interview with Dutch media organisation De Kanttekening, counterterrorism expert Dr Christophe Paulussen calls for a more evidence-based approach to counterterrorism policy. In the article, Paulussen reflects on plans to revoke the citizenship of convicted terrorists, according to the Coalition Agreement (‘Hoofdlijnenakkoord’) presented in May 2024. “A dangerous trend”, according to Paulussen, who calls the plans “purely symbolic politics” and “muscle-flexing rhetoric”. Read more.
Par S.E. M. François Alabrune, Ambassadeur auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas et Représentant permanent auprès de l’Organisation pour l’interdiction des armes chimiques et des Institutions juridiques internationales à La Haye.
À l’origine de ma vocation et de mon ouverture au monde, mes parents ont beaucoup compté. Mon père, originaire du centre de la France, le premier de sa famille à faire des études supérieures, est parti jeune en Argentine, pour faire du commerce. Il est ensuite devenu diplomate et a servi en Inde, en Australie, aux États-Unis, en Haïti, en Belgique et au Canada. Ma mère, originaire du Nord de la France, a aussi travaillé pour le ministère des affaires étrangères français en Belgique et au Royaume-Uni, avant d’épouser mon père. C’est ainsi que je suis né au Canada, à Halifax.
Au cours de mes études de droit et de sciences politiques, j’ai eu notamment la chance de suivre les cours de deux grands juristes: Gilbert Guillaume et Ronny Abraham, qui ont été jurisconsultes du ministère des affaires étrangères puis juges la Cour internationale de Justice. J’ai eu ensuite la chance de travailler avec eux, notamment lorsque je devins adjoint auprès de Ronny Abraham. Dans les activités consultatives en droit international que j’ai menées pendant 20 ans, en particulier en tant que jurisconsulte du ministère pendant huit ans, leur approche du droit international, basée sur une analyse rigoureuse des faits et du droit, et la recherche de la clarté, m’a beaucoup marqué. J’ai été aussi influencé par ma collaboration avec d’autres grands juristes, tels que les professeurs Prosper Weil ou Alain Pellet.
J’ai beaucoup appris également grâce aux interactions constantes avec mes collègues jurisconsultes d’autres pays ainsi qu’à l’occasion de mes affectations à la Représentation auprès de l’Union européenne à Bruxelles, à la Mission auprès des Nations Unies à New York, comme Conseiller juridique, puis comme Consul général à Québec, Ambassadeur auprès de l’OSCE à Vienne puis Ambassadeur aux Pays-Bas. Ce furent autant d’occasions privilégiées de m’ouvrir à d’autres cultures et manières de penser.
J’ai commencé ma carrière à un moment de grand développement du droit international. La fin de la division du monde en deux blocs rendait possible et nécessaire l’élaboration de nombreux traités multilatéraux et bilatéraux. J’ai eu la chance de participer à la négociation de plusieurs, par exemple dans les domaines du contrôle des armements, de la lutte contre le terrorisme, du droit de la mer, de la justice pénale internationale.
L’expérience la plus marquante a sans doute été ma participation aux négociations sur le Statut de la Cour pénale internationale à partir de 1997. Une telle institution pouvait paraitre utopique à l’origine. Son élaboration fut une extraordinaire aventure collective qui a imposé la recherche de solutions originales, notamment pour concilier des traditions juridiques différentes. Travailler au sein du comité de rédaction de la Conférence de Rome sous la présidence du grand juriste égyptien Cheriff Bassiouni fut en particulier une expérience unique.
La participation à de très nombreuses procédures contentieuses, devant la Cour internationale de Justice, la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme, la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne, des tribunaux d’arbitrage, le tribunal international du droit de la mer, m’aura donné la possibilité d’exercer la fonction d’avocat de mon pays mais aussi de nouer avec les juges des relations étroites. Celles-ci m’ont permis de mesurer les exigences de leurs fonctions et les conditions du bon fonctionnement des juridictions.
À la Haye depuis deux ans, je poursuis mon engagement au service du droit international, tant en apparaissant devant la Cour internationale de Justice et en suivant de près son activité, mais aussi en ayant préparé et présidé une partie des travaux du troisième congrès des membres de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage, en coopérant étroitement avec la Cour pénale internationale, notamment dans le cadre de l’Assemblée des États parties, en apportant un soutien constant à l’Académie du droit international et à d’autres institutions juridiques internationales (Mécanisme international appelé à exercer les fonctions résiduelles des Tribunaux pénaux, chambres spécialisées pour le Kosovo, HCCH – Conférence de La Haye de droit international privé, Eurojust…).
Être ambassadeur à la Haye, capitale du droit international, offre le privilège de participer quotidiennement à une communauté juridique et diplomatique d’une exceptionnelle qualité intellectuelle et humaine. Je rends hommage à ce titre à ses membres et aux autorités néerlandaises pour leur engagement inestimable.
Je suis très honoré d’avoir été choisi comme candidat aux prochaines élections de juges à la Cour internationale de Justice par le Groupe français de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage, présidé par le Juge Ronny Abraham, et après consultations de Cours suprêmes, Universités et Sciétés savantes en France.
Le droit international fait face à des défis considérables mais il revêt, en particulier grâce à la Cour internationale de Justice, une importance croissante pour l’unité et la survie de la communauté humaine. Servir ce droit, en particulier à la Haye, est l’honneur de ma vie.
Some food for thought on the occasion of the Belgium’s King’s Day reception on 15 November 2024 in The Hague
Ambassador Olivier Belle’s Thought-Reflecting Speech on King’s Day
During the reception celebrating King’s Day on 15 November 2024 in The Hague, H.E. Ambassador Olivier Belle, Permanent Representative of Belgium to International Institutions in The Hague, captivated the audience with a memorable and visionary speech. Addressing the challenges facing multilateralism and the rise of “multiparticularism,” his remarks sparked reflection among attendees. Diplomat Magazine is proud to share this remarkable allocution, ensuring it reaches a wider audience and continues to inspire dialogue on the future of international cooperation.
It has been an intense year for the Permanent Representation of Belgium to the International institutions established in The Hague. For the near future, the permanent representation has many projects to contribute efficiently to the work of those international institutions as well as to save multilateralism. We say “save”, because multilateralism is facing a difficult period. Multilateralism’s golden age seems far away. Today, we have reached a point where confidence in the capacity of multilateral bodies to deal with global challenges is fading.
Why and how have we entered such troubled waters ? Various elements have played a role. The growing influence of the private sector in many fields of sovereignty has reduced the ability of States to continue to play the leading role in addressing challenges of general interest. The field of general interest itself has been conquered by initiatives inspired by particular interests. And this evolution led naturally to a new way of doing, thinking and perceiving politics. States seems to disappear behind a small group of leaders surfing on social networks.
So we live in a new environment where multilateralism is slowly being replaced by multiparticularism. Particular interest seems to override general interest. It seems to be a natural consequence of the current state of the world characterised by fear, violence, harsh competition, scarcity of resources, gaps of development, environmental degradation, etc… The question is whether multiparticularism can help address the many challenges facing the planet, and not just humanity. We may doubt this given the state of international relations.
Multilateralism proved to be an adequate tool. But it is only a tool. And a tool is only useful if one can use it properly and when one knows precisely what needs to be built. It is not multilateralism which is in crisis. Perhaps it is our imagination that leaves to be desired. It is maybe a kind of fatalism which inspired a sort of intellectual decline. Perhaps a clear understanding of general interest is lacking. It is therefore time to try to regain a certain sense of the general interest, to figure out in which areas it should guide our action, and to honestly share the political will to tackle the challenges the planet is facing together. And for this, multilateralism will remain the best tool.
