New Carnegie Foundation board member Prof. Carla Sieburgh

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New Carnegie Foundation board member Prof. Carla Sieburgh

The Carnegie Foundation, owner and manager of the Peace Palace, welcomes Civil Law Professor Carla Sieburgh as a new member of its board. The professor was appointed to the board by royal decree, effective February 1, 2026. Sieburgh officially began her duties at the board meeting on February 16, 2026, and will be responsible for the legal portfolio for the coming years.

Academic Expertise and International Experience

Prof. Sieburgh is a leading legal scholar with extensive experience in the judiciary, academia, and international legal cooperation. From 2017 to 2024, she served as a justice of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands and, in that capacity, as an extraordinary State Councillor at the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State. She was also a member of the Commission on Legal Uniformity, in which the highest Dutch courts collaborate on consistency between civil and administrative law.

In addition to her judicial career, Carla Sieburgh has a long academic record. She has been a professor of civil law at Radboud University Nijmegen since 2003 and a research professor of civil law at Radboud University Nijmegen since 2010. Since 2010, she has been a member of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. Her academic work largely takes place in an international context and includes publications in the fields of European and private law. Partly on her initiative, Sieburgh, together with a diverse group of international researchers, created the lus Commune Casebook European Law and Private Law , which combines European law and private law.

In the field of international law, Sieburgh holds various administrative and advisory positions. For example, she represents the Netherlands on the Governing Council of UNIDROIT (International Institute for the Unification of Private Law) and chairs the Asser Advisory Council.

Involvement in the mission of the Peace Palace

Carla Sieburgh’s career has been characterized by collaboration and connecting diverse experts and disciplines. For example, she served not only as a justice at the Supreme Court but also as a liaison officer between civil, criminal, and tax law, a role in which she brought together different perspectives to arrive at joint solutions. Sieburgh is looking forward to applying her experience and expertise to the Peace Palace:

I am deeply aware of the vital importance of the institutions housed in the Peace Palace – the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Hague Academy of International Law, and the Library – for both public and private international law. It is a special privilege and a responsibility to contribute to good governance, social responsibility, the sustainable preservation of cultural heritage, and the support of the goals and values ​​of these institutions.

Carnegie Foundation Board

The Carnegie Foundation board consists of six members who are jointly responsible for the management and maintenance of the Peace Palace and for supporting the institutions located there. Prof. Carla Sieburgh was appointed to the board by royal decree effective February 1, 2026, and was officially welcomed at the board meeting of February 16, 2026. She succeeds Els Wesseling-van Gent, whose term of office expires. The board thanks her for her valuable dedication and commitment during this past period.

A Special Waitangi Evening

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A Special Waitangi Evening

By John Dunkelgrün

It is a little-known fact that within the venerable rowing club Njord in Leiden, there is a unique circle called the Waka Crew (het Waka Gezelschap). To understand its origin, one must travel back in time. On February 6th, 1840, the British Crown signed an agreement with over 500 Māori chiefs at Waitangi on New Zealand’s North Island. The Treaty of Waitangi, unique in colonial history, is seen as the founding document of New Zealand.

Since Dutch explorer Abel Tasman discovered the islands in 1642 – who famously declined to set foot on land following a less-than-amicable reception – the Māori population has grown from about 50,000 before first contact to nearly one million today. Today, they make up almost 20% of the nation. While challenges in government relations remain, the Māori population is still growing, and their economy is doing well. Their culture and language (te reo Māori) are both protected and celebrated. Ambassador Frater even started her speech in Leiden with an introduction in te reo Māori.

A Legacy of Reciprocity

Throughout the colonial era, European institutions amassed large amounts of cultural artifacts, often obtained under dubious circumstances. This prompted the well-known Dutch author W.F. Hermans to call the British Museum “the world’s largest pirate chest.” In the late 20th century, a global shift in perspectives caused former colonies to start requesting the return of their treasures.

The Wereldmuseum (formerly the Museum voor Volkenkunde) maintains a deep interest in the cultures of Oceania. This relationship reached a turning point in 2005 when the museum returned a Toi Moko – a mummified tattooed head – to the Te Papa Tongarewa Museum in Wellington. In a gesture of profound gratitude and partnership, New Zealand granted a 100-year loan of a specially commissioned, elaborately carved Waka taua (war canoe). Named Te Hono ki Aotearoa, the vessel was crafted by the legendary Sir Hekenukumai Busby. To facilitate paddling practice, a smaller canoe was also gifted.

The Waka Crew at Njord

To master the art of paddling and maintaining the craft, a group of Njord members formed the Waka Crew. Each year, members travel to New Zealand to participate in the Waitangi Day celebrations on February 6th. There, they immerse themselves in te reo Māori, learn traditional Haka dances, and study the sacred customs surrounding the Waka.

To welcome the new Ambassador, H.E. Ms. Charlotte Frater, the Waka crew invited her and her family to the Njord boathouse on the Oude Rijn in Leiden. Welcomed by President Cees Huige, the party received an in-depth guided tour. Ms. Chris Buijvoets, a veteran Waka Crew member and acting captain (Tāhimana), shared her experiences living and working with Māori. Over the years, these bonds have become so strong that she now considers her New Zealand counterparts as family.

The Waka Club President Mr. Cees Huige welcome H.E. Ms. Charlotte Frater, Ambassador of New Zealand.

More Than a Tool

In honor of the visit, the Ambassador, adorned by a traditional feathered cloak of importance (a kakalu huru huru), presented Njord with a ceremonial paddle (hoe). This beautifully carved piece was created specifically for the Netherlands by master carver Mr. Billy Harrison.

“Paddles are much more than just tools to move across the ocean or a canal,” the Ambassador explained. “They are a symbol of leadership, partnership, and forward momentum. A hoe represents the idea that progress is only possible when people paddle in unison.”

The strong bonds between New Zealand, the Waka crew, and Njord could not be better represented than by this magnificent hoe, which unites two maritime nations whose histories and identities are deeply tied to the sea.

NATO 3.0 or the Forced Maturation of the Transatlantic Relationship

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NATO 3.0 or the Forced Maturation of the Transatlantic Relationship

Alliances that survive are not the most comfortable ones, but those that adapt

By Corneliu Pivariu

I personally experienced, during my full professional activity, the post–Cold War period in which NATO adapted to new conditions and in which numerous theories circulated claiming that the North Atlantic Alliance had become obsolete and was on the path to disappearance. Then, as now—although today’s geopolitical conditions are far more complex—I expressed the view that the Organization possesses the capacity and resources to adapt to concrete realities and to maintain its relevance.

The advance signals of the Munich Security Conference (MSC) sent a clear strategic message from Washington: the NATO operating model of the past three decades is considered exhausted. What we are witnessing is not an American withdrawal from Europe, but a redefinition of roles within the Alliance, in a multipolar context marked by simultaneous strategic constraints.

The message was conveyed explicitly by Elbridge Colby[1], one of the principal architects of contemporary strategic thinking in Washington, who represented the United States at the NATO Defense Ministerial meeting held on 12 February 2026, in advance of the MSC.

His intervention can be read as a doctrinal proclamation rather than a situational or conjunctural statement.

  1. From NATO 1.0 to NATO 3.0: an Explicit Strategic Periodization

Colby proposes—implicitly and explicitly—a three-phase periodization of the North Atlantic Alliance:

NATO 1.0 – the Cold War period

Characterized by hard strategic realism, credible deterrence, a clear distribution of responsibilities, and the explicit expectation that European allies contribute substantially to their own defense. This was the NATO of Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan.

NATO 2.0 – the unipolar American moment and the post–Cold War era

A phase defined by enlargement, “out-of-area” operations, relative European disarmament, and an increasingly structural dependence on American military capabilities. European territorial defense was largely externalized.

NATO 3.0 – a return to realism in a multipolar context

The proposed new architecture assumes a Europe that becomes the primary conventional defender of the continent, supported by the United States’ strategic, nuclear, and global power-projection capabilities. Conceptually, NATO 3.0 is closer to NATO 1.0 than to the model of the past three decades.

This distinction is essential: it is not a revolution, but a historical correction.

“Partnerships, Not Dependencies” – the Key Phrase of the New Doctrine

One of the core ideas of Colby’s discourse is the formulation: “We want partnerships, not dependencies.”
This marks a turning point in the transatlantic relationship:

  • The United States no longer accepts the role of permanent substitute for European conventional capabilities;
  • Europe is called upon to assume primary responsibility for its own security;
  • The American guarantee remains, but it is redefined as strategic support, not as a structural crutch.

The message is not anti-European. On the contrary, it is a call for the maturation of the Alliance and for moving beyond the logic of comfortable dependency.

  • The Implicit Response to the MSC Report: America Is Not Dismantling the Order, but Recalibrating It

Colby’s speech must also be read as an indirect response to the Munich Security Conference report, which portrays the United States as the “elephant in the room” of the international order, accused of destabilizing existing rules.

Washington, however, conveys a different message: the post–Cold War order is no longer sustainable, and artificially preserving it would generate even greater strategic risks. NATO’s recalibration is presented as an act of realism, not abandonment.

European Resonances at the MSC: von der Leyen, Macron, and Merz between Autonomy and Responsibility

The message transmitted from Washington at the Munich Security Conference did not go unanswered in European capitals. The interventions of French and German leaders confirmed that Europe is beginning to internalize—albeit with different nuances—the logic of NATO 3.0.

The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, articulated at Munich a strong appeal for Europe to turn its own defense mechanisms into operational realities. She explicitly called for “bringing to life” the EU’s mutual defense clause[2], emphasizing that the obligation of mutual assistance can no longer remain merely a theoretical principle of the Lisbon Treaty, but must become a functional instrument of collective security. In the same vein, von der Leyen supported European strategic independence, stating that Europe “has no other option” than to assume responsibility for its own security as a credible pillar within the Euro-Atlantic Alliance.

Emmanuel Macron: Strategic Autonomy as Responsibility, Not an Alternative to NATO

In his MSC address, the French President reiterated the theme of European strategic autonomy, but in a more pragmatic formulation than in previous years. Macron stressed that autonomy should not be understood as separation from the United States, but as the assumption of a genuine European capacity for action—including military action—when the continent’s security interests are directly threatened.

Within the NATO 3.0 framework, this position becomes complementary to the American vision: a more militarily capable Europe does not weaken the Alliance, but enhances its credibility. Macron emphasized the need for robust European conventional capabilities, a functional defense industry, and the overcoming of strategic fragmentation among member states.

Friedrich Merz: German Realism and the End of Strategic Ambiguity

Friedrich Merz’s intervention marked an important clarification of Germany’s position. Merz explicitly acknowledged that a European security model based on military underinvestment and the outsourcing of defense to the United States is no longer sustainable. Germany, he argued, must accept that economic leadership inevitably entails security leadership.

His message was one of realism: increasing military expenditures, rebuilding conventional capabilities, and assuming a more active role on the eastern flank are no longer political options, but conditions of European credibility within NATO. In this light, Germany is not rejecting NATO 3.0, but beginning to position itself as one of its continental pillars.

Europe between Lost Comfort and Strategic Maturation

Taken together, the positions of Macron and Merz indicate a slow but significant convergence: Europe understands that the era of unconditional strategic protection has ended. Differences in discourse persist, but the direction is common—strengthening internal capabilities as a prerequisite for relevance within the Alliance.

In this sense, NATO 3.0 is not merely an American construct, but the framework within which Europe is compelled to resolve its own strategic ambiguities. MSC 2026 thus marks not only a doctrinal shift, but the beginning of a European re-assumption of continental security. One can only hope that the distance from declarations to concrete action by European leaders will not be as long as it has too often been in recent years.

Implications for Europe and the Eastern Flank

For European states, the message is direct and quantifiable:

  • growth in real conventional capabilities, not merely declarative budgets;
  • emphasis on ground forces, ammunition stocks, logistics, and integrated command structures;
  • the relaunch of the European defense industry as a security asset, not merely an economic one.

For the eastern flank—including Romania—the transition to NATO 3.0 entails:

  • greater operational responsibility;
  • deeper integration of territorial defense into Alliance planning;
  • the reduction of the illusion that security is exclusively an “imported” product.
  • What NATO 3.0 Means for Romania

Within the NATO 3.0 architecture, Romania’s relevance is not determined by political declarations, but by the measurable capacity to contribute to the defense of the eastern flank.

  • Defense budget: Romania allocates approximately 2.5% of GDP to defense (above the NATO 2% benchmark), but the major challenge remains transforming expenditure into operational capabilities—forces, ammunition, maintenance—rather than merely acquisition programs.
  • Active forces: approximately 65,000–70,000 active personnel, a significant portion of whom are engaged in guard, support, or administrative missions. NATO 3.0 emphasizes high-intensity combat-ready ground forces, not merely symbolic presence.
  • Reserves: fewer than 50,000 trained reservists, with a still limited mobilization and training system. Under NATO 3.0 logic, the reserve becomes a critical element of deterrence, not a bureaucratic annex.
  • The Black Sea: Romania has approximately 245 km of coastline, hosts critical NATO infrastructure, and serves as a gateway for regional energy and commercial security. Control and protection of this space become primary missions, not secondary ones.
  • Defense industry: a limited contribution to GDP (under 0.5%), with restricted ammunition production and maintenance capacities. NATO 3.0 requires industrial resilience, not mere imports.

In NATO 3.0, Romania matters to the extent that it can resist, deter, and sustain allied efforts in the short and medium term. The difference is not made by the percentage of GDP, but by real combat capability, mobilization, and continuity.

NATO 3.0 does not penalize small states, but it tests—without leniency—their real capacity to contribute to their own defense.

Elbridge Colby’s discourse and the European echoes at the Munich Security Conference mark the closure of a historical stage in NATO’s functioning. The post–Cold War model—based on asymmetrical responsibility and European strategic comfort—is no longer considered sustainable in a multipolar environment characterized by strategic competition and simultaneous pressures across multiple theaters.

NATO 3.0 does not announce an American withdrawal, but a realistic redefinition of the transatlantic relationship. Washington maintains its role as the strategic pillar of the Alliance, but conditions this position on Europe’s assumption of primary responsibility for the continent’s conventional defense. The focus thus shifts from status to capability, and from declarations to performance.

The positions expressed in Munich by European leaders indicate a gradual acceptance of the loss of strategic comfort. Differences in discourse persist, but the direction is clear: without real military capabilities, a functional defense industry, and political will, European influence within the Alliance will inevitably be limited.

For Romania and the eastern flank, this transformation has immediate relevance. NATO 3.0 does not penalize small states, but it exposes—without leniency—their real limits. Strategic relevance no longer derives exclusively from positioning or loyalty, but from the ability to resist, deter, and sustain allied efforts in the initial phases of a crisis.

In this sense, NATO 3.0 is less a promise and more a test. For those who adapt, it can become an opportunity for consolidation. For others, the risk is not exit from the Alliance, but marginalization within it.

Brașov, 16 February 2026

[1] Elbridge Colby (b. 1979) graduated from Harvard College, where he studied history, and subsequently attended Yale Law School, earning a Juris Doctor degree. His academic background combines a classical humanistic education in strategic history with elite legal training, characteristic of the American strategic establishment. He is one of the leading contemporary theorists of American strategic realism.

Colby served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development at the U.S. Department of Defense (2017–2018), where he was among the principal architects of the National Defense Strategy that established the return of great-power competition as the central axis of U.S. security policy.

He is the author of The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (Yale University Press, 2021), a seminal work for the doctrine of deterrence by denial and for the rebalancing of security responsibilities between the United States and its allies. Colby is associated with the realist school of American foreign policy and explicitly advocates a more balanced distribution of security burdens within alliances, emphasizing Europe’s assumption of primary responsibility for the conventional defense of its own continent in a multipolar geopolitical context.

[2] Ursula von der Leyen stated that Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union, which provides for the obligation of mutual defense in the event of aggression, must be implemented in practice, not remain merely a legal formula. She emphasized that this clause is not optional, but constitutes a real obligation of the Member States, and that Europe must acquire the capability and credibility necessary to activate it effectively in practice.

Bangladesh Elects New Prime Minister

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Bangladesh Elects New Prime Minister

By Sazzad Haider

In the National Parliamentary elections of Bangladesh on 12 February, the moderate party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), achieved a significant victory over the Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami. The BNP secured more than 200 of the 300 parliamentary seats.

Consequently, the chairman of the winning party, Tarique Rahman, is set to assume the role of Prime Minister shortly.

On August 5, 2024, a major political upheaval—akin to a tsunami—shook Bangladesh. Following the downfall of Sheikh Hasina’s government during the so-called Rain Revolution in July 2024, the country entered a period of instability. Islamic fundamentalist factions gained prominence during this time. An interim government was subsequently established, headed by Dr. Muhammad Yunus.

Dr. Yunus quickly faced criticism for several of his decisions, including the appointment of several students to his cabinet. Despite numerous pledges, he failed to curb nepotism. As a result, mob justice, killings, looting, and vandalism became increasingly common. A culture of impunity emerged, marked by detentions without trial. Economic growth suffered, and concerns grew regarding the quiet rise of Islamic fundamentalism within the administration. Rather than moving promptly toward elections, fundamentalist groups began advancing various demands, including reforms aimed at prolonging Dr. Yunus’s rule. In contrast, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party consistently advocated for the restoration of democratic governance through early elections.

Foreign powers also exerted pressure on Dr. Yunus to organize elections. Consequently, elections were scheduled for 12 February. The Bangladesh Awami League, a major political force in the country, was barred from participating through an executive order.

Tarique Rahman is now poised to assume the office of Prime Minister. His father is recognized as one of the heroes of Bangladesh’s Liberation War and later became a widely respected president before being assassinated during a failed military coup in 1981. His mother, Khaleda Zia, served as Prime Minister and was one of the most prominent political figures in the country’s history.

After spending 17 years in exile in London, Tarique Rahman returned to Bangladesh on 25 December. He is currently considered one of the most popular political leaders in the country.

Having recently celebrated his 61st birthday, some commentators suggest that he has entered the later stage of his political career.

Tarique Rahman began his political journey within the BNP as an ordinary member, dedicating himself to strengthening the party’s grassroots structure. He consistently supported his mother, Khaleda Zia, in her leadership of the party during politically turbulent times. Police crackdowns on her rallies were frequent, and she was at times placed under house arrest by the government of Hussain Muhammad Ershad. Numerous restrictions were imposed on the Zia family during these years.

Like many members of prominent political families, Tarique Rahman had opportunities to pursue education and establish himself abroad. However, he chose instead to align his future with the BNP. After briefly engaging in business, he committed fully to politics, working closely with grassroots leaders and activists rather than seeking elite political status.

When the BNP came to power in 1991, various factions proposed that he assume significant party positions. Nevertheless, he continued working at the grassroots level without holding official office. After the Awami League returned to power in 1996, the BNP faced renewed political pressure and internal challenges. During this period, Tarique Rahman worked discreetly to strengthen the party’s organizational capacity. His efforts were reflected in the BNP’s strong performance in the 2001 National Assembly elections, which brought the party back to power. Although he could have assumed a ministerial role or joined the party’s highest policymaking body, he did not immediately pursue such positions.

In subsequent years, he rose to the post of Senior Joint Secretary General of the BNP.

During the military-backed government in 2007, Tarique Rahman was arrested. It was reported that he provided a written undertaking not to engage in future political activities, after which he was permitted to travel abroad for medical treatment. He received treatment at Wellington Hospital, a private institution in St John’s Wood, London.

On 25 December, following 17 years in exile, Tarique Rahman returned to Bangladesh and addressed what was described as one of the largest public rallies in the country’s history. Speaking before a massive crowd, he pledged to build a secure and stable Bangladesh—a message that resonated strongly with supporters. Many observers view this rally as confirmation of his current political prominence, following the passing of his mother, Khaleda Zia.

It is anticipated that, under his leadership, relations between India and Bangladesh may improve. Following Dr. Yunus’s rise to power, India reportedly halted visa issuance for Bangladeshi citizens, and tensions between the two countries became more visible. Tarique Rahman is also expected to adopt a more conciliatory approach toward the Bangladesh Awami League in an effort to promote national political stability.

Printed Magazine – 2025

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Printed Magazine – 2025

Download the printed magazine here.

From Solidarity to Partnership

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From Solidarity to Partnership

Ambassador Vusi Madonsela Reflects on 30 Years of South Africa’s Constitutional Democracy

In 2026, South Africa marks a defining milestone: 30 years since the adoption of its democratic Constitution. Widely regarded as one of the most progressive rights-based constitutions in the world, the 1996 Constitution not only ended decades of institutionalised apartheid but also laid the foundation for a society built on human dignity, equality, and freedom.

This anniversary offers an opportunity to reflect on South Africa’s remarkable democratic journey, and to revisit the international solidarity that helped make it possible. Few relationships illustrate this more clearly than that between South Africa and the Netherlands—a connection shaped by historical ties, principled opposition to apartheid, and a shared commitment to human rights.

In this special interview, H.E. Mr. Vusi Madonsela, Ambassador of South Africa to the Netherlands, reflects on the profound significance of the Constitution as a living instrument for justice, the symbolic importance of Nelson Mandela’s first visit abroad to the Netherlands, and the evolution of bilateral relations into a mature strategic partnership. He also highlights South Africa’s achievements over the past three decades and delivers a powerful message to younger generations on safeguarding freedom, democracy, and the rule of law in an increasingly complex world.

This year marks 30 years since the adoption of South Africa’s Constitution. From your perspective as Ambassador, what does this milestone represent for South Africa today—both domestically and on the global stage?

The adoption of the Constitution of South Africa of 1996 was a watershed moment in the history of our country. It ushered in a new democratic dispensation that is based on protection of, respect for, promotion and full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all the people of South Africa.

This milestone marks 30 years of freedom for all the people of South Africa, which represents an epochal change underlying the transition of the Constitution from a “transformative” document to a “living” instrument for social, political and economic justice. It is for this reason that the Constitution remains South Africa’s “North Star” which guides its domestic policies and how same policies find extended expression through the country’s international relations policy positions. It is for this very reason that South Africa always advocates for human rights driven diplomacy and carves its role as a global mediator.

Nelson Mandela’s first official visit abroad after his release was to the Netherlands, a powerful symbolic gesture. How do you interpret the significance of that visit, and how has Dutch support influenced South Africa’s democratic journey?

Tata Nelson Mandela (affectionately known as Madiba) paid a visit to the Netherlands in June 1990, just four months after his release from prison. Against the backdrop of the famous statement by the Dutch Queen, Her Majesty Juliana, who told the Prime Minister of apartheid South Africa, Mr Daniel François Malan, in 1949 that she would “never set foot in his country as long as apartheid reigned”, Madiba’s visit was a deeply emblematic move which served as a profound acknowledgment of the role played by the Dutch in both our country’s painful history and its struggle for freedom and democracy. Queen’s Juliana’s stance marked a major royal objection to the apartheid regime.

It was also never lost on Madiba that in 1961 the Netherlands became the only Western country to vote in favour of an anti-apartheid resolution at the UN, which also saw a burgeoning Netherlands Anti-Apartheid Movement which actively isolated apartheid South Africa. Clearly, the prioritisation of an early visit to the Netherlands was both deliberate and purposeful. Madiba honoured the Dutch citizens who fought against apartheid while planting a seed for fostering a new, cooperative relationship based on human rights. In his own words, Madiba described the historic visit as a “transformation of international solidarity into a “partnership for peace and development”.

Crisply put, the success of that visit serves as a powerful reminder of what humanity can really achieve when the international community unites against oppression.

During the struggle against apartheid, the Netherlands played a visible role in supporting freedom and justice for South Africans. How do you see this legacy reflected in today’s bilateral relationship between South Africa and the Netherlands?

The legacy of the Netherlands’ support for the people of South Africa’s protracted struggle against apartheid remains visible today through a special relationship that has evolved from moral solidarity into a strategic, multi-sector partnership. Today, our shared history is reflected in several key pillars of our bilateral relations which are governed through a Joint Commission for Cooperation (JCC), co-chaired by our Foreign Ministers.

One of the highlights of these deep bilateral pertains Trade and Investment which has created economic Interdependence between the two nations. The Netherlands has become one of South Africa’s largest trading partners in the EU and a top source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

In addition to the foregoing, since the start of the democratic transition in 1994, the Netherlands continues as a key partner to South Africa’s post-apartheid government, in a range of areas which include, but are not limited to: Education; Arts and Culture; Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation; Digitisation and Cyber Security; Environment and Climate Change; Agriculture; Water Management; Green Energy and Just Energy Transition Partnership; Finance; Social Development, Migration, Human Rights Advocacy; and Addressing Colonial Legacies.

Despite global and domestic challenges, South Africa has reached this constitutional milestone with resilience. What achievements over the past three decades do you believe deserve greater international recognition?

Firstly, over the past 30 years South Africa has achieved a stable transition from apartheid to constitutional democracy, based on the Constitution that is heralded as one of the most progressive rights-based instruments in the world.

As part of its fight against the stubborn legacy of apartheid, which still manifests in high levels of extreme poverty among the historically excluded sections of the population, South Africa has implemented one of the most comprehensive social protection systems in the developing world. South Africa’s safety net specifically targets the elderly, persons with disability and children from poor families.

South Africa has also rolled out a system of free basic education for learners from poor families. South Africa has also put together a National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NFSAS) which enables South African students from poor families to access opportunities to pursue their studies in South Africa’s higher education institutions.

In recent times, following the covid-19 pandemic, South Africa has also extended its social safety net to provide social relief of distress to South Africans of employable age who either lost employment or are unable to enter the labour market due to the lingering impact of the pandemic on the economy. In addition, based on credible statistical data, South Africa has also built the largest HIV and AIDS treatment programme in the world, thereby saving millions of lives.

Based on its highly developed economic infrastructure, the most level of industrialisation on the continent and the size of its economy, South Africa has established itself as a leading African voice in global affairs and a key player in BRICS.

Looking ahead, what role do you see for South Africa–Netherlands cooperation in strengthening democratic values, multilateralism, and people-to-people ties in the years to come?

The partnership between South Africa and the Netherlands is evolving from what is normally described as a traditional donor-recipient relationship into a strategic “partnership of equals”, focused on mutual interests and shared global responsibilities.

Undoubtedly, the dynamic cooperation between the two nations is poised to deepen through the strategic partnerships I have already alluded, leveraging of their shared democratic values and strong historical ties. Therefore, the two nations will continue to work on deepening people-to-people ties through initiatives like the internationalisation of education, which take the form of academic and scientific exchanges through strong partnerships between universities and research institutions that foster innovation. The work will also include cultural and social cooperation through active engagement in arts, culture, and social development, as well as cultivating technical cooperation by working together on migration management, social security, and skills development.

Evidently, the deepening relationship has rapidly moved towards a mature, strategic partnership that is firmly based on mutual interest, technological collaboration, and shared responsibility in a complex global landscape. The two nations are working collaboratively on promoting multilateralism and advocating for the reform of institutions of global governance, which include the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council.

Finally, on a more personal note, as Ambassador to the Netherlands, what message would you like to convey to younger generations in both countries about safeguarding freedom and constitutional values?

As South Africa’s Ambassador to the Netherlands, also accredited to the International Organisations and International Courts based in The Hague; as a lawyer by profession and former Director-General of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, my message to the youth in both our nations and the world is rooted in the active protection of human rights and democratic institutions, as well International law and the International Courts that administer and apply it.

The youth must be vigilant against the erosion of constitutional guarantees. Freedom is never a permanent “given.” As can be gleaned from many ongoing developments around the world today, even in established democracies, constitutional values must be actively defended against contemporary threats which often assume the form of the shrinking of civic spaces, misinformation, disinformation.

Drawing from South Africa’s history of struggle against apartheid and the role played by international solidarity in bringing an end to apartheid in our country, I sincerely believe the youth ought to appreciate the importance of the indivisibility of freedom. As the future belongs to them, the youth must recognise that a denial of rights to one person anywhere diminishes the freedom of all across the globe. Against this background, I encourage the youth in both nations and across the globe to see justice as a universal, rather than local, responsibility.

Finally, I wish to stress that no individual is above the law and that the trust placed in present and future leaders comes with a profound responsibility to adhere to ethical conduct and the rule of law – especially international law to safeguard international peace and security.

EUR 306 million money laundering network

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EUR 306 million money laundering network

Following investigations into a criminal group suspected of laundering at least EUR 306 million of illicit profits from drug trafficking and other crimes, 13 people have been arrested in France and Romania. Investigations coordinated through a joint investigation team at Eurojust revealed that the group had been operating in France and Romania between 2018 and 2024.

Consisting of dozens of members operating from Romania and France, the criminal group is suspected of having laundered illicit profits from crimes such as drug trafficking. They set up a sophisticated international operation involving multiple legal entities in France, which they took over and used to channel large sums of money into their own bank accounts. The group also created a financial circuit involving the issuance of false invoices for services between legal entities, thereby reducing those companies’ taxable income. 

In Romania, the group invested part of its illicit profits in real estate across the country. To hide their identities, they made investments in the names of others in their entourage. 

To enable the French and Romanian authorities to exchange evidence on the group’s activities and take joint action, Eurojust set up and funded a joint investigation team. 

The investigation culminated in a joint action day on 3 February, coordinated from Eurojust’s premises in The Hague. The coordinated operation led to the arrest of 13 suspects and the seizure of over EUR 400 000. During 24 house searches in France and Romania, the authorities seized jewellery, luxury watches and mobile phones.

The actions were carried out by the following authorities:

  • France: Investigative Judges – Financial Division. Tribunal Judiciaire de Paris – PNACO (National Prosecutor’s Office Against Organised Crime) BRIF (Financial Investigation Unit – Prefecture de Police)
  • Romania: Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice; Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism; Cluj Territorial Service and Central Structure; Directorate for Combating Organised Crime; Maramures Organized Crime Service; Bistrita-Nasaud Organized Crime Service; Cluj Mobile Gendarmerie Group; Special Intervention Brigade of the Gendarmerie

The Next Era of Nuclear Arms Control

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The Next Era of Nuclear Arms Control

By Marco Rubio, US Secretary of State

During the Cold War, few negotiations proved as complex as those between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit and reduce their vast nuclear arsenals. They required trust between adversaries who had little reason to believe each other’s words, and they relied on intricate, constant systems to verify compliance. American statesmen persevered and reached a series of agreements first with the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation that left the United States safer.

Everything has its season though and yesterday, New START expired. Arms control advocates and many voices in the media have tried to cast the expiration as a sign that the United States is initiating a new nuclear arms race.

These concerns ignore that Russia ceased implementing the New START treaty in 2023, after flouting its terms for years. A treaty requires at least two parties, and the choice before the United States was to bind itself unilaterally or to recognize that a new era requires a new approach. Not the same old START, but something new. A treaty that reflects that the United States could soon face not one, but two, nuclear peers in Russia and China.

China’s rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal since New START entered into force has rendered past models of arms control, based upon bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia, obsolete. Since 2020, China has increased its nuclear weapons stockpile from the low 200s to more than 600 and is on pace to have more than 1,000 warheads by 2030. An arms control arrangement that does not account for China’s build-up, which Russia is supporting, will undoubtedly leave the United States and our allies less safe.

President Trump has been clear, consistent, and unequivocal that future arms control must address not one, but both nuclear peer arsenals.

Our call for multilateral nuclear arms control and strategic stability talks, presented today in Geneva, reflects the principles President Trump has laid out.

First, arms control can no longer be a bilateral issue between the United States and Russia. As the President has made clear, other countries have a responsibility to help ensure strategic stability, none more so than China.

Second, we will not accept terms that harm the United States or ignore noncompliance in the pursuit of a future agreement. We have made our standards clear, and we will not compromise them to achieve arms control for arms control’s sake.

Third, we will always negotiate from a position of strength. Russia and China should not expect the United States to stand still while they shirk their obligations and expand their nuclear forces. We will maintain a robust, credible, and modernized nuclear deterrent. But we will do so while pursuing all avenues to fulfill the President’s genuine desire for a world with fewer of these awful weapons.

We understand that this process can take time. Past agreements, including New START, took years to negotiate and were built upon decades of precedent. They were also between two powers, not three or more. However, just because something is hard does not mean we should not pursue it or settle for less.

No one understands that difficult deals are often the only ones worth having more than President Trump, who has repeatedly underscored the awesome power of nuclear weapons and his desire to reduce global nuclear threats. Today in Geneva, we are taking the first steps into a future where the global nuclear threat is reduced in reality, not merely on paper.

We hope others will join us.

About the author:

Marco Rubio was sworn in as the 72nd Secretary of State on January 21, 2025. The Secretary is creating a Department of State that puts America First.

From Caracas to Washington: Maduro’s Capture and the Domestic Logic of the 2026 Midterms

Diplomat Magazine
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From Caracas to Washington: Maduro’s Capture and the Domestic Logic of the 2026 Midterms

How a cross‑border “law‑enforcement” action is being absorbed into America’s election calendar

By Yixuanchen Yu(於奕轩宸)

On January 3, 2026, the United States announced that, in an operation codenamed “Absolute Resolve,” it had taken Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, into custody in Caracas and transported them to the United States for judicial proceedings. Washington has framed the episode as a law‑enforcement action tied to previously filed indictments rather than a conventional military intervention. US briefings have emphasized the scale of the mission—reportedly involving more than 150 aircraft and special‑operations forces—while many international reactions have centered on sovereignty and the use‑of‑force questions that such a precedent raises.

It is natural to read the episode primarily as geopolitics: a striking display of American operational reach in the Western Hemisphere and a signal about Washington’s priorities in its near abroad. Yet the event also illustrates a parallel dynamic in US politics: a persistent domestic demand for narrative. In an electoral system that runs on a two‑year clock, major foreign‑policy actions are quickly incorporated into agenda‑setting for the next nationwide contest—not necessarily as the sole driver of policy, but as a powerful lens through which policy is justified, contested, and explained to voters.

The institutional mechanics make the electoral context hard to ignore. In the US separation‑of‑powers system, shifts in congressional control can materially reshape a president’s governing room: legislative throughput, budget negotiations, oversight investigations, and the durability of foreign‑policy initiatives all become more contested. Today’s margins are narrow. Reuters reported on February 1, 2026 that Republicans hold a slim 218–213 edge in the House and a 53–47 advantage in the Senate. With “thin majorities,” the political meaning of any national event—economic volatility, public‑safety shocks, or an external crisis—can be amplified in key districts and states.

That is why the political significance of Maduro’s capture cannot be assessed only by operational facts. It also depends on how the episode is narrated at home, who uses it to narrate, and whether it generates persuasion beyond a party’s core coalition. Recent campaign practice suggests that mobilizing the base is rarely the binding constraint. The binding constraint is persuading voters who are both risk‑sensitive and cost‑of‑living–sensitive—and who have become increasingly skeptical of politics that feels performative, destabilizing, or permanently crisis‑driven.

Early resource commitments underscore how high the stakes are perceived to be. Reuters has reported that the pro‑Trump super PAC MAGA Inc. has amassed a war chest approaching $300 million for the 2026 cycle. On the Democratic side, Reuters has also reported that House Majority PAC launched a $50 million fund aimed at winning back the House. These sums are not just about fundraising; they are signals that both parties already treat 2026 as a decisive test of governing capacity and political direction.

Within that mobilization environment, the rhetoric of prominent Republican‑aligned figures—Vice President J.D. Vance and entrepreneur Elon Musk among them—should be read primarily as election‑cycle positioning rather than as purely diplomatic commentary. Their messaging tends to frame 2026 as the moment when voters will decide whether the administration’s broader approach can be sustained. For campaign strategists, the value of such language is that it compresses complex geopolitics into intuitive frames about order, control, and the balance between costs and benefits.

From a political‑science perspective, the domestic effects of “Absolute Resolve” are likely to run through three channels. First is agenda and salience: high‑profile external actions can temporarily elevate national‑security narratives and give the executive branch more agenda control, though the durability of that effect depends on whether affordability pressures remain dominant. Second is competence signaling: the perceived clarity of objectives, the handling of escalation risk, and the management of downstream consequences will shape whether swing voters read the episode as evidence of control or volatility. Third is economic expectations: Venezuela’s energy resources matter to global oil markets, and oil prices matter to American electoral politics because they feed directly into perceived inflation and household budgets.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to assume a durable “rally effect.” Under high polarization, national events often consolidate existing identities more than they convert voters across camps. For any administration, the decisive question is not whether supporters become more energized, but whether persuadable voters can be convinced that external risks are being managed while tangible domestic outcomes remain on track.

Seen in this light, Maduro’s capture is both an international event and a domestic competition over governance narratives. It will appear in campaign advertising, fundraising appeals, and field scripts; it will also feed into congressional oversight and courtroom debates about legal authority and precedent. Whether it yields durable electoral returns will depend less on the drama of a single operation than on voters’ aggregate judgment about costs, order, and the credibility of governance. The 2026 midterms will be the clearest test of that judgment.

About the author: Yu Yixuanchen is a US‑based scholar of electoral politics and international relations.

Launch of the Central Europe Forum for FORB in Washington DC

Diplomat Magazine
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Launch of the Central Europe Forum for FORB in Washington DC

By Willy Fautré & Hans Noot, Director and Associate Director of Human Rights Without Frontiers

HRWF (07.02.2026) – On 4 February, Human Rights Without Frontiers (HRWF) sponsored the launch of the Central Europe Forum on FORB which took place in the framework of the International Religious Freedom (IRF) Summit from 2 to 5 February in various places in Washington DC.

The Forum was held after the IRF Roundtable in the Kennedy Caucus Room of the Russell Senate Office Building in Washinton DC. Over 20 people were present in the room and more than 50 had registered online. The launch event had been planned for one hour but had to be prolonged due to the interest of the participants.

The speakers of the first panel were:

·       Jan Figel (Slovakia), former EU Special Envoy on Freedom of Religion or Belief

·       Peter Zoehrer (Austria), FOREF Europe

·       Kristyna Tomanova (Czechia), InterBelief Relief

·       Attila Miklovicz (Hungary), University of Pécs

In the second panel, the floor was given to the international advisers of the Forum:

·       Greg Mitchell, co-founder & co-chair of the IRF Roundtable with Nadine Maenza

·       David Burrows, a practising criminal defence solicitor for over 30 years and Member of the UK Parliament between 2005 and 2017, working with MP Fiona Bruce, former UK Special Envoy for FORB

·       Dr. Brandon Taylorian, a Research Fellow at the University of Lancashire in Preston, UK. Brandon achieved his PhD in 2025.

Welcoming remarks (excerpt) by Hans Noot, chair of the Forum and the second panel

“The Central Europe Forum for Freedom of Religion or Belief has been designed as a region-focused, evidence-based platform addressing FoRB issues in Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slowakia. It is intentionally rooted in civil society and expert engagement. The Forum is not owned, directed, or dominated by any single religious or belief community, nor is it a state-sponsored initiative. Its purpose is to provide reliable analysis and structured dialogue that can inform policymakers and parliamentarians across the political spectrum, both within the region and internationally.

Experts in relevant fields are invited to present their findings by invitation, with a focus on concrete situations and measurable impacts. The core objective of the Forum is to help bridge the persistent gap between commitments made at the OSCE, European Union, and United Nations levels, and their practical implementation at national and local levels.

Meeting four times per year in a rotating format, the Forum operates as a space for informed, honest, and pragmatic engagement. Discussions are guided by evidence, protected by Chatham House Rules when appropriate, and oriented toward tangible outcomes rather than consensus for its own sake. As a forum, its primary function is to share verified information that enables responsible actors to make informed decisions and take meaningful action.

It is a pleasure to welcome all of you who are present here in Washington, as well as those joining us remotely. The hybrid format reflects both the international character of this initiative and our intention to remain accessible and engaged across borders.”

State recognition of religious or belief communities and media: two sources of discrimination. Introductory remarks to the first panel of the Forum chaired by Willy Fautré

“Freedom of religion or belief is not only violated abroad, in countries like China, Iran, Russia… It is also an issue in democracies.

State recognition of religious and belief communities

In Europe, one of the mechanisms generating unequal treatment of religious and belief communities, discrimination, stigmatization, intolerance and hostility is the system of state recognition of religions. Many countries, including in Central Europe, have a tiered discriminatory system.

In the upper category, historical religions having full access to their religious rights but also being granted privileges. In one or several lower categories, other religious and belief communities with fewer rights and considered less respectable. Due to discriminatory laws and administrative obstacles, they are often unable to accede to the top category. 

Others are not even recognized by the State as religious or belief groups worth benefitting from the protection of Article 18 of the ICCPR despite the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. They are identified by the derogatory term of “cult” and the media abuses this word.

The media

We defend the freedom of the media and journalists. They are victims of all sorts of political repression in non-democratic countries and they can rightly complain about their increasingly shrinking space of action due to the intrusion of commercial actors and private interests in democratic countries.

However, media and journalists can also be servants of brutal sensationalism because sensationalism sells, and it sells well. When the impact of their work is based on thorough investigation and unbiased analysis, it is a scoop and it is laudable. But when the facts are distorted, manipulated or even fabricated, just to sell, it is a perversion of their information mission because they disfigure the nobility of their profession. And not only that. They cause a lot of damage in the lives of many people that they have stigmatized because of their unconventional beliefs, whether they are philosophical, spiritual or religious. 

Entrepreneurs have gone bankrupt, teachers have been fired, psychologists have lost their clients, fathers or mothers have lost some of their parental rights, couples have divorced. Some adhered to the anthroposophy and the education system of Rudolf Steiner like former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl who sent his children to Steiner schools. Some were members of the Scientology like Tom Cruise. Some were Jehovah’s Witnesses like the famous tennis players Serena and Venus Williams.

Unscrupulous media outlets did not criticize and stigmatize such people and their religion because they were famous and could have retaliated by taking them to court but they “courageously” did with anonymous, vulnerable and defenceless believers of the same movements.

It is important to monitor the work of media and journalists when they cover issues related to religious groups and to restore the truth of the facts. It is particularly essential when the victims cannot defend themselves. We at Human Rights Without Frontiers in Brussels help them in their defence.¨

Some prominent figures in the attendance participated in the debate, chaired by Hans Noot:

Mr Eduard Heger, former Prime Minister of Slovakia

Ms Fernanda San Martin Carrasco, the Director of the International Panel of Parliamentarians for Freedom of Religion or Belief (IPPFoRB) 

Two members of the Swedish Parliament

James Lankford from the World Bank,

Mervin Thomas, Founder President of Christian Solidarity Worldwide CSW)

and many other personalities who attended the IRF Roundtable.

Further reading about FORB in this country on HRWF website

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