Hungary to ban pro-democracy groups and media outlets receiving US aid

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Aljazeera  – Hungary is leading a crackdown on NGOs and media outlets operating in the country that receive funding from the US and other international sources.

An ally of US President Donald Trump, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban said his government was going “line by line” through organisations that have received financial assistance from the US.

Under Orban, Hungary has for years enacted crackdowns on NGOs and the country’s independent media, passing laws that critics argue seek to stigmatise and hinder groups that provide protection for women and minorities, offer legal and human rights assistance, and expose official corruption.

“Now is the moment when these international networks have to be taken down, they have to be swept away,” Orban said. “It is necessary to make their existence legally impossible.”

Trump’s decision to dismantle the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the agency charged with delivering humanitarian assistance overseas, has only emboldened the Hungarian president. He has praised Trump’s slash of funding, claiming such aid had been used to fund organisations that sought to “topple” his government.

Orban said people who work for organisations that received USAID funding could be considered “agents”.

“All money coming from America should be made public, and those who receive it should have sanctions enacted against them,” Orban said.

In 2023, Orban’s right-wing government launched the Sovereignty Protection Office, an authority tasked with investigating organisations and media outlets it deems to be exerting foreign influence.

Under Orban, Hungary has been accused by numerous local and foreign bodies of grave democratic backsliding, with the EU withholding billions in funding to the country as a result.

Source: News Agencies

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Syria – A Larger Lebanon or Even More, a Signal for Major Geopolitical Changes in 2025, Including a “Green Light” for Border Modifications Worldwide?

“When politicians play with the pencil on the map, the drums of war begin to beat.”

Otto von Bismarck

By Corneliu Pivariu

I Brief History

Syria, under French mandate after World War I, gained independence in 1945, subsequently experiencing a highly turbulent political and social period marked by numerous military coups until 1970, when General Hafez Al-Assad seized power through a coup. A referendum in the spring of 1971 legitimized his leadership, establishing an autocratic rule based on the military and secret services, widely supported by his Alawite coreligionists (a minority), who held the most important positions in the power structures.

The natural passing of Hafez Al-Assad in 2000, one of the longest-serving heads of state in the Middle East, was linked by many analysts to the beginning of Syria’s decline in regional influence. His successor, his son Bashar, assumed power instead of his elder brother Basel, who had been groomed for leadership but died in a tragic car accident in Lebanon. Retaining his father’s loyal supporters, Bashar managed to stay in power for nearly 24 years, until December 8, 2024, when he fled to Moscow.

Ultimately, the London-trained ophthalmologist failed to effectively manage the external and internal challenges he faced, exacerbated by severe mistakes made by his close circle and the shifting geopolitical landscape. The phrase popular in Damascus in the 2010s—”The West needs Bashar al-Assad more than Bashar needs the West”—gradually lost its validity due to the regime’s serious errors and changing international attitudes toward Damascus.

II. Syria and the Arab Spring

In Syria, the Arab Spring (or rather, the Arab Winter) emerged later than in North Africa, where protests and political upheavals began in 2010. The onset of Syrian unrest, which gradually escalated into a long and bloody civil war[1], is traced to March 15, 2011, following earlier protests in Dara, a southern Syrian city near the Jordanian border. The Assad regime mishandled these protests, employing heavy-handed repression, particularly through the Republican Guard led by Bashar’s brother, Maher Al-Assad. Popular discontent was further fueled by the presence of several hundred infiltrators from abroad, carrying passports from a neighboring country, between January and March 2011. This signaled an external decision to remove Assad, reinforced by substantial financial and material support from Arab states such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Despite the regime’s powerful secret services, which recruited followers from an early age, protests became violent across nearly the entire country. Armed intervention against demonstrators led to the radicalization of the movement. Due to Syria’s unique social situation and the government’s intelligence operations, opposition groups fragmented into various factions, including armed groups like the Free Syrian Army, which failed to unify into a single force. Extremist organizations such as Daesh (ISIS) exploited the ensuing chaos to seize control of different regions.

The situation was further complicated by the involvement of international actors such as Russia (from 2015), Iran (from the beginning, both militarily and through Hezbollah), Turkey, and the U.S.-led coalition, each pursuing distinct geopolitical interests.

Mass desertions weakened the Syrian army, which, except for its elite commando units and the Republican Guard, was generally poorly trained. Alongside foreign military presences—Russia and Iran being crucial in securing strategic areas—the regime also established local paramilitary formations such as the Shabiha (“ghosts”), primarily composed of Alawite minorities who maintained control, especially along the coast, where their population was significant.

To survive, the regime employed all available means, from airstrikes using fragmentation bombs to chemical weapons. Prisons became overcrowded with opposition members detained for the slightest act of defiance.

From a demographic perspective, the war was catastrophic, causing over 500,000 deaths, more than 6 million external refugees, and around 4 million internally displaced persons. Material destruction is difficult to estimate, with figures reaching approximately $300 billion.

Between 2011 and 2023, the Syrian economy shrank by 85%. The regime survived largely due to Iranian support, estimated at $2-6 billion annually. Another financial lifeline was the production of Captagon, an illicit drug known as the “jihad drug,” generating over $10 billion for the Assad regime.

In late November 2024, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham[2] (HTS) – Organization for the Liberation of the Levant, which controlled Syria’s northwestern Idlib region, launched an offensive against key strategic points, capturing Aleppo within days, followed by Hama, Homs, and finally Damascus.

The Syrian Civil War formally ended on December 7, 2024, following a meeting in Doha involving Arab foreign ministers and the Astana Process for Syria. They signed a Joint Declaration[3] endorsing a ceasefire based on UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

On December 8, 2024, Bashar al-Assad fled from Damascus to Latakia and was evacuated to Moscow from Russia’s Hmeimim military airbase.

III. The Fall of the Assad Regime, Current Developments, and Perspectives

The fall of the Assad regime was driven by a combination of internal and external factors that reached a critical point towards the end of 2024. Nevertheless, the regime demonstrated remarkable resilience, though the worsening economic and social crisis heightened the risks of regime change. Key external factors included Israel’s desire to capitalize on developments in Gaza and Lebanon to minimize Iran’s influence in Syria, as well as the situation of the Russian Federation, which, being engaged in the conflict in Ukraine, was unwilling to intensify its military support for Bashar al-Assad, thereby accepting his departure within a broader geopolitical context.

The Assad family was not entirely caught off guard[4], having taken precautions from the early years of the civil war to secure a comfortable life in Russia. Bashar shared his plans to flee Syria with almost no one, misleading his advisors, officials, and even relatives about his real intentions. His brother, Maher—commander of the Republican Guard—departed by helicopter to Iraq and then flew to Moscow.

On December 8, the armed opposition announced the fall of the regime, and the acting Prime Minister, Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, declared his willingness to hand over power to a transitional government.

On December 10, Ahmed al-Sharaa[5], the emir of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), who became the de facto head of state, appointed Mohammed al-Bashir as Prime Minister of the Salvation Government. Initially consisting of 12 members from the previously established government in Idlib, the cabinet was expanded by six members on December 21, and the first female minister was appointed a day later. On December 30, Maysaa Sabreen was appointed as the first female governor of the Central Bank of Syria, having previously served as the first deputy governor of the bank during the latter part of the Assad regime.

On January 29, 2025, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) held the “Victory Conference” in Damascus, officially naming Ahmed al-Sharaa as interim president. He was tasked with forming an interim legislative council to draft a new constitution.

In a five-minute speech, Sharaa outlined his five priorities: resolving the power vacuum; maintaining civil peace and preventing acts of revenge[6]; rebuilding state institutions, particularly the military, security, and police forces, to ensure public safety; revitalizing the economy by rebuilding human resources, agriculture, industry, and the service sector; and regaining Syria’s regional position by establishing foreign relations based on sovereignty, respect, and mutual interests. Aware of the difficulties ahead, al-Sharaa remarked, “The first moment of victory can be the first moment of defeat.”

In defense, initial steps were taken as 18 larger and around 50 smaller armed factions agreed to dissolve and integrate into the new army. However, two armed factions in the south, from Suwayda and Daraa, as well as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which control a significant area in northeastern Syria, have not yet accepted integration. The SDF, of Kurdish origin and allied with the U.S., maintains ties with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and is considered a terrorist organization by Turkey, which seeks to eliminate it.

Economic reconstruction is estimated to take at least ten years for Syria’s GDP to return to its 2010 level ($80 billion), compared to just $10 billion in 2023. In 2019, reconstruction costs were estimated at approximately $400 billion, likely exceeding $500-600 billion today.

The new Minister of Economy has promised a transition to a free, competitive economy, abandoning the centralized control model.

Although the U.S. and the EU are expected to lift most, if not all, economic sanctions, massive investments will be required for reconstruction, making it a fundamentally political issue. Countries financing reconstruction will play a crucial political role in Syria’s future.

Despite expressing interest, Iran and Russia are unlikely to play a dominant role due to their internal and geopolitical circumstances. Given Syria’s new power dynamics, Turkey is in the most advantageous position. Turkish exports to Damascus were worth $2 billion in 2023, and given Ankara’s support for HTS, Turkey is likely to become the primary investor in reconstruction. The Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Damascus on December 22, 2024, signaled not only political-military but also economic intentions. By late January 2025, President Erdogan stated that Turkey alone could eradicate terrorist groups in Syria, implying its desire for a leading role in the country.

In this context, the revival of the Turkey-Qatar gas pipeline project, first proposed in 2009 and abandoned due to political difficulties, including the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, is worth noting.

The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani’s visit to Damascus on January 30, 2025—the first by an Arab head of state since Assad’s fall—further underscores Qatar’s interest in Syria’s future. Apart from general discussions on post-war collaboration, Qatar provided 200 MW of electricity, with plans for gradual expansion.

Another crucial issue is securing Syria’s oil supply, which was 90% dependent on Iran before deliveries ceased following Assad’s fall. Additionally, Hezbollah’s oil trafficking routes from Lebanon were bombed by Israel, forcing Syria to seek alternative sources. Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and even Iraq are being considered for this purpose.

Iran evacuated its personnel from Syria shortly before the regime’s fall but remains open to cooperation with the new authorities. Iran still has significant influence through its supporters in Syria, which it can leverage to advance its interests.

Although initially stating its intention to maintain good relations with Moscow, the new Syrian government has annulled Russia’s 49-year lease of the Tartus naval base. A visit by Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister to Damascus in late January failed to resolve the issue, and Russian military equipment has begun to be evacuated by sea. However, Syria will need to maintain some level of normal relations with Russia, considering their historical ties and future dependencies. Syria’s external debt to Russia exceeds $15 billion, primarily for military procurement, and its armed forces rely on Russian technology, making a shift to alternative suppliers a long-term process. Moreover, Russia’s long-standing advisory presence in Syria’s security and defense sectors remains a strategic advantage for Moscow.

The U.S. has shown interest in Syria’s developments, evidenced by a State Department delegation’s visit to Damascus shortly after Assad’s fall. The U.S. maintains around 2,000 troops in northeastern Syria, supporting the SDF, a stance opposed by Turkey. After December 8, 2024, the U.S. reportedly expanded Ain al-Assad airbase in western Iraq to serve as a logistics hub for American bases in the region. Additionally, it allegedly secured agreements for three new bases in Damascus, Daraa, and Quneitra, while expanding the Hasakah base.

I personally believe that the regime change in Syria was linked to the changes underway in the Washington Administration, in order to align with the new intentions of the Trump administration in the Middle East, with Syria potentially playing an important role in the security architecture envisioned by the new American administration for the region.

Israel was an active participant in the evolution of the situation in Syria and took advantage of the circumstances that emerged after December 8, 2024, to carry out over 400 air strikes against Iranian targets, Hezbollah, and the Syrian military—destroying missile and ammunition depots, striking the most important points of Syria’s anti-aircraft defenses and radar installations, and sinking a large part of the Syrian military fleet. Israel justified its actions as preventive, to ensure that the respective weaponry and military equipment would not be captured by terrorists. Furthermore, immediately after December 8, it proceeded to completely occupy the heights of the Golan as well as Mount Hermon (2,814 m), the highest in the area, overlooking Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. “It is extremely important from a strategic point of view. There is no substitute for mountains,” explained Efraim Inbar, Director of the Institute for Strategy and Security in Jerusalem (JISS). Although Israel officially declared that it would not retain these territories, I doubt that it will not, in the not-too-distant future, proclaim the annexation of the entire Golan plateau and maintain control over Mount Hermon, where it could install specialized equipment for military electronic reconnaissance (if such equipment has not already begun to be installed).

At present, I do not believe that Israel has established a long-term policy towards the new regime in Syria, given the multiple possible political scenarios regarding the developments in that country. Potentially, a normalization of relations between Syria and Israel could open new economic prospects, particularly in the energy sector for Israel.

Ahmad al-Sharaa and the interim government established in Damascus face particularly heavy and complex challenges both domestically and internationally. The transition period is estimated to last around three years, after which a new constitution must be approved by referendum, followed by elections in the fourth year. The issues that the new government will confront are very different from the administration of a region such as Idlib, where errors were also made.

Regarding the medium- and long-term evolution of the situation in Syria, I believe it can be grouped into two main scenarios, each with several variants: either Syria remains within its current territory—with some modifications in the Golan area that will be entirely annexed by Israel—or Syria is partially or completely divided (the latter being the least likely variant), depending on the evolution of the internal situation and the negotiations between various regional powers and global actors.

In the event of a division, Turkey is best positioned, as it would like to bring under its control the area in the north, from immediately north of Latakia, through Aleppo and along the Euphrates to the border with Iraq. The coastal area, where the Alawite minority is predominant, could declare independence and come under the umbrella of Moscow, thereby saving its maritime bases in the Mediterranean. Jordan, as a maximalist plan, might lay claim to expand its territory even as far as Damascus, taking into account the historical traditions of the Hashemite dynasty, or only as far as Daraa and Suwayda. This, too, will depend on developments in Gaza.

Of course, Israel will take the entire Golan as well as Mount Hermon.
Will Ahmad al-Sharaa, at the age of 43, be able to successfully lead Syria through the transition period and subsequent reconstruction? Determination alone is not enough; the way in which internal and external factors will interweave, as well as how he will seize emerging opportunities, will determine the final outcome of Syria’s evolution in the first half of the 21st century.

IV. Brief Conclusions

The fall of the Assad regime in less than a month after nearly 14 years of civil war is a clear indication that regional and global geopolitical shifts in the second quarter of the 21st century will be more significant than before. The possibility of border modifications worldwide is no longer far-fetched.

In the Middle East, Israel and Turkey emerge as the main winners, though each faces internal and external challenges.

Syria’s situation remains highly complex and open to various possibilities. The new government must tackle a deepening economic and social crisis while preventing a descent into factional conflict, reminiscent of Lebanon’s historical turmoil.

Syria’s developments will shape new regional and global power balances, potentially becoming the new litmus test for Middle Eastern and even global geopolitics.

Brașov, Romania, February 3, 2025


[1] For details on the evolution of the Syrian civil war, see also Corneliu Pivariu – Current Geopolitics, Unveiled in 200 Episodes, pp. 259-267; Current Geopolitics. Significant Episodes 2011-2014, pp. 236-253; Major Moves on the Geopolitical Chessboard 2014-2017, pp. 355-390; Geopolitics Before and After Covid-19, pp. 243-246.

[2] Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a Sunni Islamist politico-military organization that emerged in January 2017 through the merger of several Syrian Sunni opposition military factions. Previously, in 2011, HTS was known as Jabhat al-Nusra and was affiliated with Al-Qaeda. It also had ties with the Islamic State, but these affiliations were severed with the formation of HTS. The organization has been designated a terrorist group by the UN, the US, Turkey, the EU, and other states. HTS controlled the northwestern region of Syria, known as the Idlib region, as well as parts of the Aleppo area, including the Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey. It established a Salvation Government composed of 10 ministers. The organization has received increased support from Turkey over the past year, including drones, military instructors, and weaponry. Additionally, it benefits from support from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, other Arab and non-Arab countries, and wealthy opponents of the Assad regime who have taken refuge abroad.

[3] The foreign ministers of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, as well as the Russian representative, participated in the Astana Process.

[4] According to the Financial Times, as early as 2019, the extended Assad family purchased 19 apartments in Moscow’s modern commercial center, valued at $40 million. The US State Department estimated in 2022 that the Assad family’s wealth was approximately $2 billion, spread across numerous accounts, shell companies, real estate portfolios, and tax havens. A Syrian intelligence officer told a Turkish publication that, before his departure from Syria, Bashar al-Assad had transferred $135 billion out of the country. His eldest son, Hafez, now 22 years old, is currently preparing for his doctorate in Moscow

[5] Ahmed al-Sharaa, known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani (born October 29, 1982), was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to a Syrian Sunni family from the Golan region. At the age of six, he returned with his family to Damascus. Shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, he joined Al-Qaeda in Iraq, where he fought for three years before being captured by American forces and imprisoned in various locations from 2006 to 2011. His release coincided with the start of the Syrian civil war, during which he established the Al-Nusra Front to support Al-Qaeda’s fight against Bashar al-Assad’s Ba’athist regime. In 2013, he was placed on the US State Department’s terrorist list, and four years later, a $10 million reward was set for information leading to his capture. In December 2024, the reward was canceled following his meeting with a US State Department delegation visiting Damascus.

On July 28, 2016, al-Sharaa announced that Al-Nusra was severing ties with Al-Qaeda and renamed the organization Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS). In January 2017, he formed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) by merging with other groups. He prioritized combating Al-Qaeda and Daesh to improve relations with the West, particularly with Turkey, and succeeded in controlling most of the Idlib region, which he governs through the Syrian Salvation Government.

[6] Reports have already surfaced of summary executions of approximately 35 people in central Homs and another 10 people in the Alawite area, from which the Assad family originates.

Tourism Malaysia

By Roy Lie Atjam

Utrecht, 8 January 2025—Tourism Malaysia showcased the country at the 54th Vakantiebeurs holiday fair, a key event for promoting Malaysia to the Dutch market. Held from 8 to 12 January 2025 at Jaarbeurs in Utrecht, this is the largest travel fair in the Benelux region.

Tourism Malaysia collaborated with the Sarawak Tourism Board and local operators like Pangea Travel and Miki Travels to position Malaysia as a top holiday destination.

H.E. Dato’ Roseli Abdul, Ambassador of Malaysia together with team Tourism Malaysia The Hague and co-exhibitors.

Representatives from Mulu National Park and Mike Bikes highlighted thrilling activities available in the country. With over 70,000 visitors last year, Vakantiebeurs provides excellent networking opportunities for the travel industry.

The event’s consumer days inspire the public with valuable holiday planning information. The Tourism Malaysia Pavilion featured engaging activities, including cooking demonstrations and cultural performances. Daily presentations offered insights into Malaysia, while a Malaysia-themed quiz allowed attendees to win exciting prizes.

Welcome Remarks H.E. Dato’ Roseli Abdul, Ambassador of Malaysia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

On the trade day, Tourism Malaysia’s booth was proudly inaugurated by H.E. Dato’ Roseli Abdul, the Ambassador of Malaysia in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This year, the fair is set to host over 60 industry partners for a remarkable soft launch, including airlines, tour operators, travel agents, and travel media representatives. Tourism Malaysia confidently showcased a diverse range of destinations and products from across the country, with a special emphasis on Kuala Kubu Bharu—a hidden gem renowned for its adventure and heritage.

The Sarawak Tourism Board, in partnership with Mulu National Park, effectively highlighted the park’s extraordinary offerings, including its prestigious status as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Ms. Sharifah Hafsya, Director of Tourism Malaysia The Hague during the product briefing.

Pangea Travel, a local co-exhibitor, proudly launched the Pangea Foundation, a non-profit initiative aimed at supporting impactful projects. During the event, attendees were introduced to KOPEL, a Malaysian-based project dedicated to preserving the natural environment around the Lower Kinabatangan and improving the livelihoods of local communities in the region.

According to preliminary statistics, Malaysia welcomed 77,117 Dutch tourists between January and November 2024, marking a 22.4% increase compared to the same period in the previous year. The Netherlands continues to be a key market for Malaysia, with an average length of stay of 9.9 nights in 2023, reflecting the potential for further growth.

The Tarik Demo- Malaysia’s beloved pulled Milk Tea.

With the recent launch of the Visit Malaysia 2026 (VM2026) campaign, Malaysia aims to boost international tourist arrivals, projecting 35.6 million arrivals and RM147.1 billion in tourism receipts by 2026.

Celebrating the Inspiring Power of Women’s Literature

By Francesco  Cortese

Celebrating The Truly Inspiring Power of Women’s Literature to emphasize the accomplishments of an exceptionally vibrant 2024, the Embassy of the Republic of Kosovo, in partnership with Carabela Books and the Dutch-Albanian Foundation, successfully hosted a poetry night last December at its premises in The Hague. This remarkable event, titled “Voices of Her Own: Albanian Women’s Literature Across Borders,” celebrated the significant contributions of Albanian women poets as they assert their presence in national and European cultural arenas.

The evening commenced with a powerful opening speech from H.E. Mr Dren Doli, Ambassador of Kosovo in the Netherlands. Moderated by the esteemed Albana Shala and Mirza Adami—two influential figures within the Kosovo-Albanian diaspora in the Netherlands—the event highlighted a compelling lineup of authors and their impactful works.

Albanian women authors from Kosovo, Albania, and the diaspora—Blerina Rogova Gaxha, Olimbi Velaj, Erenestina Gjergji, Vlera Kastrati, and Ervina Halili.

Five distinguished Albanian women authors from Kosovo, Albania, and the diaspora—Blerina Rogova Gaxha, Olimbi Velaj, Erenestina Gjergji, Vlera Kastrati, and Ervina Halili—showcased their vital contributions to contemporary literature, honoring a rich heritage and diverse perspectives.

The first segment of the event was highly engaging, with poets delivering powerful readings of their works alongside other artistic expressions, such as music production and cinematography. The poetry readings in both Albanian and English not only captured the original musicality of the pieces but also ensured the international audience grasped their meanings and messages clearly.

Following the readings, a robust panel discussion unfolded, diving into the deeper aspects of the poets’ work. The dialogue examined their motivations for writing, the profound influence of Albanian heritage on their artistry, and the obstacles faced by women writers navigating the regional literary landscape.

What a lovely evening it was for the Kosovar diaspora in the Netherlands and their international friends! It created such a warm and welcoming atmosphere for everyone to come together. As the evening  went on, the vibe got even more relaxed and cheerful, allowing everyone to connect and enjoy this special moment.

To top it all off, the gathering wrapped up with a reception, featuring a delightful wine-tasting experience and traditional dishes from the Kosovar cuisine. It was the perfect way to celebrate the amazing contributions of Albanian women to literature!

USA and Cuba reach historic agreement

President Biden has announced that the U.S. will remove Cuba from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. This decision is part of an agreement, facilitated by the Catholic Church, where Cuba agreed to release 553 political prisoners, but their nationalities have not been specified in the reports.

While the deal has been widely regarded as a diplomatic breakthrough, it has sparked criticism from Republican lawmakers, who argue that the move could be easily reversed by a future administration. The agreement marks an important moment in U.S.-Cuba relations, with potential implications for regional diplomacy and human rights though its long-term impact remains to be seen amid political tensions in both countries.

Lebanon’s Political Shift

New Leadership Emerges Amid Challenges

Today, January 15, 2025, Lebanon has undergone a significant political change with the election of President Joseph Oun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. This new leadership team faces an uphill battle to address Lebanon’s multifaceted crises. Key priorities include post-war reconstruction, maintaining the fragile ceasefire, and implementing overdue economic reforms to stabilize the country’s faltering economy. The appointments of Oun and Salam also mark a symbolic reduction in Hezbollah’s dominance, offering hope for renewed political balance and progress.

President Joseph Aoun is a Maronite Christian with a nonpartisan stance. The Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, is a Lebanse politician, academic, jurist and a diplomat, he served in The Hague as a judge for nine years at the International Court of Justice. In 2024 he was elected the 27th ICJ president becoming the first Lebanese judge to hold this position. PM Salam was from 2007 to 2017 ambassador of Lebanon to the UN during this time he held the position of President of the UN Security Council and Vice Presdiente of the General Assembly, before been appointed as Lebanon’s new Prime Minister. His nomination was confirmed by President Joseph Aoun after securing the support of 84 out of 128 lawmakers. This marks a significant shift in Lebanon’s political landscape, especially following recent conflicts involving Hezbollah.

Salam is considered a reformist and impartial candidate, tasked with leading the country out of its prolonged political and economic crises. His appointment comes after President Joseph Aoun’s election.

Rizal day at Philippines’ Embassy in The Hague

The Embassy held a wreath-laying ceremony at the Embassy’s Kalayaan Hall and the Rizal Courtyard on December 30 in honor of the 128th anniversary of Dr. Jose Rizal’s martyrdom, in collaboration with the Hague Chapter of the Knights of Rizal.

In his speech Ambassador J. Eduardo Malaya emphasized that Jose Rizal’s ultimate sacrifice for the welfare of our nation and our people continue to inspire us as we also constantly do our own share to serve our beloved country, wherever we are.”The Hague chapter commander of the Knights of Rizal Sir Anton Lutter, KCR emphasized the close cooperation between the Embassy and the Knights of Rizal in propagating Rizal’s works and the historical connections between the Filipinos and the Dutch people through Rizal’s affinity and admiration for the renowned Dutch writer Eduard Douwes Dekker (pen-name Multatuli) who wrote about the colonizers’ excesses in the then Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia).

Sir Anton Lutter, KCR, and Ambassador J. Eduardo Malaya led the wreath-laying.

Former Ambassador of The Philippines to Holy See Mrs. Grace Relucio Princesa, Embassy officers and staff as well members of the Knights of Rizal-The Hague Chapter, including Sir Steef Klarenbeek, KOR and Sir Guido Ouwerkerk, KR and Mr. Rein Quint attended the ceremony.

Dr Jose Rizal monument at Rizal Courtyard, Embassy of the Philippines, The Hague.

National hero of The Philippines Dr Jose Rizal (1861-1896) literary work played an important role in the quest for independence by the Philippines people. Knowing for his political writings that sparked the Philippine revolution and led to his execution on the 30th December by the Spanish colonial rulers.

As the nation remembers the national hero’s death and martyrdom, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. called on Filipinos to be change agents in his statement.

“As we remember his noble works and honorable life, let us take to heart his words and ideals that awakened the consciousness of our forebears and stirred a national movement for freedom,” he said.

The Attorney General of the Republic of Sudan in The Hague

By Roy Lie Atjam

The Hague, December 2024. The Honorable Mr. Al Fakr Taifur, Attorney General of the Republic of Sudan, visited The Hague. Ms. Omaima Alsharief, Chargé d’Affaires a.i. of Sudan in the Netherlands, introduced the Attorney General, who delivered an important lecture at a briefing. He was accompanied by H.E. Ambassador Othman Abou Fatma, Director of the Human Rights, Women’s Rights, and Children’s Rights Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Honorable Ms. Rauda from the Attorney General’s Office was also in attendance.

Ms. Omaima Alsharief opened the event by firmly emphasizing the importance of addressing the situation in Sudan, particularly regarding what is often called the “forgotten war.” “This issue is overlooked by the international community,” she said, “but we as Sudanese have a responsibility to ensure that the world hears the reality of what is happening on the ground. It is time to speak up and bring this critical matter to light.”

Briefing on Sudan situation,

“I am very happy to welcome the Honorable Mr. Al Fakr Taifur to give you an idea about the important committee that takes responsibility for investigating all violations of national law and international humanitarian law during this crisis,” Alsharief added.

Mr. Al Fakr Taifur opened his session by expressing gratitude to everyone in attendance. Before addressing the main topic, he outlined the legal landscape in Sudan. He highlighted a pivotal constitutional amendment in 2017, which decisively separated the public prosecution from the Ministry of Justice, establishing its complete independence from both the executive authority and the judiciary. This change elevated the role of public prosecution to a position second only to the presidency within Sudan’s state protocol, surpassing even the Council of Ministers. This development, Taifur explained, reflects the Sudanese desire to strengthen the rule of law and enhance justice in the country.

The Honorable Mr. Al Fakr Taifur, Attorney General of the Republic of Sudan.

He further elaborated that the Attorney General, as the head of the committee, ensures its independence and integrity. The committee operates according to national laws and international treaties ratified by Sudan, including international humanitarian law and human rights law.

“In the past, complaints had to be filed within specific territorial jurisdictions in the country,” Taifur noted. “This has been abolished, and an electronic platform has been established where people across Sudan or even outside the country can file their complaints digitally.”

Attorney General Taifur unequivocally asserted Sudan’s commitment to accountability and the eradication of impunity. He announced significant strides made by the National Committee dedicated to investigating crimes and violations of both national and international humanitarian law. This includes issuing arrest warrants and collaborating with the General Secretariat of Interpol to issue red notices for individuals responsible for heinous crimes and atrocities committed since April 15, 2023, particularly in Darfur.

Further, Attorney General Al Fakr Taifur met with the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor, Mr. Karim Khan, at the court’s headquarters in The Hague. Taifur expressed gratitude to the ICC Prosecutor’s Office for inviting him to visit the court and for fostering cooperation. He also attended the final hearings in the trial of Ali Kushayb.

The ICC Prosecutor thanked the Attorney General for accepting the invitation, cooperating with the Prosecutor’s Office, and facilitating visits by court delegations. He emphasized that the ICC remains committed to exploring all avenues to advance justice and strengthen cooperation with Sudan and its judicial authorities in alignment with the principle of complementarity.

During his visit to the ICC, Attorney General Taifur officially attended the trial of Ali Abdelrahman Koshyb. He was accompanied by Ms. Omaima Alsharief, Chargé d’Affaires a.i. of Sudan in the Netherlands, a delegation of diplomats, and Abubakar Ahmed, the crucial liaison between the Sudanese government and the ICC. This visit underscores Sudan’s commitment to engaging with international legal proceedings.

The Sudanese government accuses the UAE of providing weapons to its rival paramilitary force, thereby prolonging the conflict in Sudan. The UAE has denied the allegations and accused the Sudanese government of refusing to negotiate peace with its adversaries.

The Washington Center for Human Rights provides an in-depth analysis of the UAE’s role in the ongoing conflict in Sudan, particularly regarding the actions of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Darfur. The report meticulously details severe human rights violations and war crimes, including ethnic cleansing, sexual violence, and the intentional targeting of civilians.

My Wish for 2025: ‘Embrace Criticism!’

“A Thought and a Smile…”

By Eelco H. Dykstra, M.D.

As your columnist, I have leeway in selecting a topic to write about. Now, as with every year, we tend to ask questions such as:

  • What was your word for 2024?
  • What are your plans in 2025?’

It’s also the time to express what you wish for.

My wish for 2025 is that collectively, we do a better job in ‘Embracing Criticism’.

“Criticism is a compliment because it shows one cares”.

This sentence is straight from a speaking engagement at the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in Amsterdam. The title of my presentation was “A Meta-approach to Knowledge Management”. In it, I used the word ‘meta’ in its meaning of ‘an all-encompassing, overarching umbrella under which all and any entities can unite – instead of compete’.

Knowledge Management (KM) is, simply put, the art and science of how we manage what we have learned, are learning and still can learn. Criticism is an important, even crucial part of this. So, how do we deal with criticism? Do we reject it? Are we open to it? Do we ignore it? Do we learn from it? Do we embrace it?

Criticism is often framed as ‘constructive’ and/or ‘destructive’. While it is true that positive feedback confirms – and makes us feel good about – what we do, say and are, it is actually the negative feedback from which we (can) learn much more. So, when we look at criticism in this way, negative feedback can be remarkably constructive!

Considering criticism as a compliment doesn’t merely allow us to become more open to it, but we might even welcome it as a most desirable tool to improve everything we do, say and are.  

One of the basic requirements for embracing criticism is TIME.

We need time. Time to receive, time to review and time to judge criticism. Do not merely set time aside to be open to criticism but reserve more time to proactively look for and ask for it. Let’s also not forget that while we are sending, we cannot receive and when we speak, we cannot listen.

Another aspect of how to embrace criticism is that we realize that there is a difference between “I DON’T CARE” and “I DON’T MIND”. There are still people out there whose command of English is such that they think that the two expressions mean the same. Well, they don’t. When it comes to dealing with criticism, “I don’t care” signifies that one is unlikely to listen to it. When, on the other hand, we hear “I don’t mind”, they likely will.

A further element needed to embrace criticism, is the realization of the difference between ‘EVIDENCE’ and ‘PROOF’. Again, they are not the same.

Evidence is what is given to a court (of justice…) but it only becomes accepted as ‘Proof’ once the court, upon careful review, has passed judgment.

A next obstacle for embracing criticism is when we confuse FORMAT with CONTENT.

When we don’t like the format or the packaging of criticism, we often use this to justify that we don’t have to listen to it or review it. What we seem to forget though, is that this amounts to an outright refusal to learn. Well, we can all agree that that isn’t very smart…

So, what do we need to embrace criticism in 2025?

  1. Set aside time to collect, review and learn from criticism
  2. When faced with criticism, don’t say “I don’t care”, but “I don’t mind!”
  3. Gather all the evidence you can, because without evidence, there’s zero proof
  4. Ignore the packaging of criticism and instead, focus on its content.   

My wish for 2025 is “Embrace Criticism”.

What’s yours?


About the author:

Eelco H. Dykstra. Photography by Tom Manning

Once dubbed a ‘Global Nomad’ in East Africa, Eelco H. Dykstra is a seasoned international crisis and emergency expert. As a true ‘Prac-Ademic’, he blends – also in his column “A Thought and a Smile” – his innate optimism with knowledge from his practical experience and rigorous fact-finding. 

Aside from being founder/chair of the Daily Impact Emergency Management (DIEM) network and a visiting professor in South Africa, he initiated the ’20/20 Vision’ program for the dual purpose of strengthening value-based resilience and overcoming the obstacles that stand in the way of implementing lessons (to  be) learned. Eelco has been a correspondent, written multiple books and articles and continues to work extensively with media, government, business, NGO’s and community-based initiatives. In short, Eelco is a transdisciplinary and trans-cultural multi-tasker – just like diplomats are.

Among his hobbies are cooking and playing the cello – see picture, taken by Tom Manning, during an impromptu performance with the Soweto Youth Orchestra.

Eelco H. Dykstra Professor (visiting), Adaptation and Resilience, University of South-Africa, UNISA. Chair, ’20/20 Vision’ Program: How do we go from ‘Risk’ to ‘Resilience”? Founder, Daily Impact Emergency Management (DIEM) Network 
www.diem.nu  www.20outof20.vision
 / eelco.dykstra@diem.nu

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Ukraine’s Energy Future: Mapping Opportunities and Challenges for a Sustainable and Decentralised Transition

By Monika Bucha, LL.M. / B.Sc., Legal Affairs & Energy Law at Kelso Institute Europe

In December 2024, Russia conducted its 12th large-scale assault on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure this year, damaging transmission grids and power facilities, especially in the western border regions (BBC News, 2024) From October 2022 to April 2023, 43% of Ukraine’s main power grid was damaged (Poltavets and De Vos, 2024), leaving over a million people without electricity (Meduza, 2024). The inability to operate air conditioning in summer and heating in winter has gravely impacted the health of Ukraine’s citizens.

The decline in energy availability is stark: Before Russia’s full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, Ukraine produced 44.1 gigawatts hours (GWh) of electricity, mainly with nuclear, thermal, and hydroelectric plants (UNHR, 2024). Winter electricity needs stood at 26 GWh. By the winter of 2023-2024, production had plummeted by over 50% to 17.8 GWh, while peak consumption dropped by almost 30% to 18.5 GWh (UNHR, 2024).

To mitigate the impact, Ukraine has received emergency from Poland, Romania and Slovakia (Polityuk, 2024). This assistance was facilitated by the synchronisation of Ukraine and Moldova’s grids with the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) (European Commission, 2024). Just two days after the initial attack on February 22, 2022, Ukrainian grid operators were able to disconnect from the Russian grid and synchronised with the European grid three weeks later (Casey, 2024). However, the commercial capacity is limited, and European electricity prices exceed those of Ukraine’s domestic market (Yulia, 2022), prompting a need to reconsider Ukraine’s energy strategy.

Ukraine heavily depends on imported oil, coal and natural gas

Before the war, Ukraine’s energy needs were met through a mix of domestic production and imports. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), Ukraine’s total energy supply in 2022 comprised coal (21.7%), nuclear (26.5%), natural gas (25.1%) and oil (18.6%). Renewables, excluding nuclear – despite their huge potential (#Renewables4ukraine, 2024) – accounted for a minor share, with the remaining 8.1% coming from hydro, geothermal, biofuels, and waste (IEA, 2024a).

In 2022, while Ukraine was self-sufficient in nuclear energy production, it relied heavily on imported oil (83%), coal (50%) and natural gas (33%). Data by the Ukraine’s State Fiscal Service indicated that in 2018, the largest share of oil was imported from Belarus (38.7%) and Russia (37.3%) (IEA, 2021). Prior to the Russian invasion in February 2022, the IEA had already highlighted the significant risk of an oil supply shortage if Russia were to disrupt the Ukrainian oil market, prompting initial steps towards energy diversification.

Decentralised energy production to secure reliability of supply

In 2024, the IEA outlined ten actions to bolster Ukraine’s energy security for the upcoming winter. Notably, action three emphasises that large energy assets are particularly susceptible to attacks, making decentralisation a strategic advantage. Accelerating the deployment of smaller-scale gas-fired combined heat and power plants, alongside solar PV and wind systems, supplemented with batteries and other storage technologies, is crucial for enhancing the resilience of the energy supply (IEA, 2024b).

Since the onset of the war, Ukraine has experienced a significant increase in the importation of diesel generators to provide backup power, with hundreds of units arriving daily from international allies and donors (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2024). However, as demand has surged, generators have become both costly and environmentally detrimental. Consequently, many municipalities are opting for solar PV panels, battery systems, and heat pumps at hospitals and other critical infrastructure sites as more sustainable, cost-effective alternatives (Adbullah, 2023).

Ukraine could become a testing ground for decentralised energy production

The Ukrainian government (2023) recently declared that building a decentralized and diversified energy system—one that is more resilient against military attacks or natural disasters and can enhance energy security while facilitating the transition to renewable energy sources (RES)—will be a key priority. This initiative resonates with the public sentiment, as over 80% of Ukrainians believe in maximizing the use of RES and that distributed energy generation could significantly strengthen the nation’s energy independence (Ecoaction, 2022). While this new system is in its early days and far from formalized, with the right support it could become a testing ground and model for Europe’s energy transition.

To also promote a just and inclusive energy transition, the Civil Society Energy for Resilient Ukraine project is facilitating the formation of renewable energy communities (Citizen Energy for Ukraine, 2024). These communities are groups of citizens who collectively own and operate renewable energy projects, thereby enhancing local energy independence, reducing costs, and aiding the decarbonisation of the energy system. However, a recent report from Razom We Stand (2024) also flags that current laws fail to define “decentralised electricity generation” and do not regulate energy storage systems or small distribution systems. Simplifying access to the grid is essential for more of these secure projects, it says (Birol, 2023).

Outlook: A Green Energy Marshall Plan for Ukraine

Ukraine’s journey towards a sustainable energy future is marked by both significant challenges and substantial opportunities. The Current Prime Minister, Denys Shmyhal, and various international bodies have voiced strong support for a just transition in Ukraine’s coal regions, underpinned by inclusivity and sustainability. Notable international assistance has been provided, including aid from the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and commitments to support structural changes in the energy sector (Borell, 2024). Additionally, initiatives such as the Ukraine Energy Support Fund are dedicated to fostering territorial energy developments (Energy Community, 2024).

While there is theoretical support for a sustainable transition, a lack of investor confidence is stalling immediate progress. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion, foreign direct investment in Ukraine plummeted from USD 6.5 billion in 2021 to just USD 570 million in 2022, as reported by the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies. Concerns about physical risk to assets are particularly acute in the energy sector, where Russia’s targeted destruction of energy facilities further complicates the acquisition of bank financing (Januta, 2024).

To support a green and sustainable energy transition in Ukraine, it is crucial to eschew investment projects that could trap Ukraine in lock-in situations and instead promote a new, decentralised approach to energy transition. Campaigners were calling for a “Solar Marshall Plan” ahead of the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin which took place in June 2024. The demand partner countries help by providing cheaper loans through financial aid; more technical know-how and skilled workers; and battery storage technologies (Limb, 2024). The time to set the direction for Ukraine’s energy future is now.

For further information

Kelso Institute Europe: https://kelso-institute-europe.de/about-us/

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