By Willy Fautré, director of Human Rights Without Frontiers 

HRWF (07.07.2025) – Vladimir Zelensky signed a decree on the deprivation of citizenship of Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Onufriy, according to the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).

The SBU report says that citizenship has been terminated according to the materials of this special service. “The SBU established that Metropolitan Onufriy voluntarily received Russian citizenship in 2002 but did not report it to the relevant authorities of Ukraine. At the same time, after that, he continued to enjoy the status of a citizen of our state,” the press release says.

According to the SBU, Metropolitan Onufriy maintains contact with the Moscow Patriarchate and “consciously opposed the canonical independence of the Ukrainian church”. The special service blames the Russian Orthodox Church for supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) in full communion with the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow (ROC) before Russia’s aggression war on Ukraine and Metropolitan Onufriy whose official title is “His Beatitude, Onufriy, Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine” disagree with the SBU’s accusations used to justify the deprivation of his Ukrainian citizenship.

Metropolitan Onufriy’s life under the Soviet Union

Metropolitan Onufriy (secular name Orest Volodymyrovych Berezovsky) was born 5 November 1944 in Chernivtsi Oblast (Ukraine) as the son of a priest.

In 1961 he graduated from high school in Chernivtsi. From 1962 to 1964 he studied at the Chernivtsi technical school, after which he worked in construction organizations in that city. In 1966, he joined the technical faculty of the Chernivtsi University but during his third year of study, he abandoned his project because he wanted to study theology. As a Ukrainian, he tried to enter the Odessa Theological Seminary but he was refused for political reasons.

Then, he secretly went to Russia, in the city of Zagorsk, where the famous Trinity-Sergius Lavra and the Moscow Theological Academy and Seminary were located. From 1970 to 1988, he was a member of the Brotherhood of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra, the largest monastery located in the Moscow Oblast, where he carried various obediences at the same time as his studies.

• On 18 March 1971, he was tonsured a monk with the name of Onufriy in honor of St. Onuphrius the Great.
• On 20 June 1971 he was ordained a hierodeacon and on 29 May 1972 ordained a hieromonk.
• In 1984, he was appointed rector of the Transfiguration Church of the Athos representative office in the village of Lukino (Peredelkino station, Moscow region).
• In June 1985, he became the dean of the Moscow Trinity-Sergius Lavra.
• On Christmas Day in 1986, he was elevated to the rank of archimandrite,
• In 1988, he graduated from the Moscow Theological Academy as a candidate in theology.
• On 20 July 1988 he was appointed Father-Superior of the Pochayiv Lavra of the Holy Assumption in the Ternopil Oblast (Ukraine) where he served until November 1990.
• On 9 December 1990 he was consecrated Bishop of Chernivtsi and Bukovina at the St Volodymyr’s Cathedral in Kyiv which at that time was the mother church of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church/ Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC) in full communion with Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow. Since December 2018, the jurisdiction of the Cathedral in Kyiv has been transferred to the newly created Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) in communion with the Patriarch of Constantinople.
• On 24 August 1991, Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet Union, following the adoption of the Act of Declaration of Independence by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. This declaration was later confirmed by a national referendum held on 1 December 1991, with an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians voting in favor of independence. 

Metropolitan Onufriy’s life in the sovereign state of Ukraine until February 2022

• On 23 January 1992, one day after signing a request of the bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexy II for the erection of an autocephalous Church in Ukraine, Onufriy was transferred by then Metropolitan Philaret (Denysenko) to the Ivano-Frankivsk diocese.
• On 7 April 1992 he was restored by the Diocese of Chernivtsi and served in this diocese for 23 years.
• On 28 July 1994 Onufriy was elevated to the rank of archbishop and appointed a permanent member of the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox church (UOC) who was affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).
• On 22 November 2000 Onufriy was elevated to the rank of Metropolitan.
• On 13 August 2014 Onufriy was elected the new primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine of the Moscow Patriarchate, succeeding Metropolitan Volodymyr who had died in the previous month. 
• In February-March 2014, Russia invaded Crimea. In April, the war in Donbas started.

Metropolitan Onufriy’s life since Russia’s agression war on Ukraine

In February 2022, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, along with other local bishops, Onufriy offered the churches of his diocese as shelters from the bombings. He did not publicly condemn clergymen from his church taking sides or collaborating with Moscow Patriarchate. He did not dismiss them from the church nor took any sanction against them but for sure, his clergy is divided on the war issue as some priests are being prosecuted or have been sentenced to prison terms, including ‘in absentia.’ However, he banned from the church his clergymen who joined the “national” Orthodox Church (OCU) rejecting any relations with Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow and joining the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

In February 2023, the press service of the UOC Department for Social and Humanitarian Issues published a press release stressing that UOC priests were delivering humanitarian aid to Ukrainian military in war-affected areas in the Donbas.

According to an April 2023 investigation by Ukrainska Pravda, Onufriy obtained a Russian passport in 1998 and 2002.

He did not deny that but he claimed he then wanted hereby to make true his former dream of living out his last days in the Trinity Lavra of St Sergius in Russia. However, due to “the bad relations between Russia and Ukraine and especially Russia’s war against Ukraine,” his hope had been destroyed and he gave up his Russian citizenship, he said, while adding he spoke out against Russia’s war with Ukraine and condemned Russian aggression. He now declares that he considers himself a citizen of Ukraine only.

Concerning the heavily debated separation of the UOC from the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), Metropolitan Onufriy recalled in an address on 17 May 2025 that back on 27 May 2022, at the Council in Kyiv (Feofaniya), the UOC introduced changes to its Statute aiming at putting an end to their subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate.

“The Council introduced a number of fundamental changes to the Statute on Governance, which confirmed the complete canonical independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and its disassociation from the Moscow Patriarchate,” read the Metropolitan’s statement.

He also emphasized that the UOC independently manages all aspects of its internal and external life, including the appointment of bishops, the establishment of dioceses, and the production of holy myrrh.

He asserted that since 27 May 2022, his Church has not been part any more of the Moscow Patriarchate and he hoped that “the whole family of Autocephalous Local Churches” will acknowledge their “canonical independence.” In addition, he announced that he terminated his membership in the ROC Synod.

The question of independence from Moscow however remains a political issue in Ukraine. As recently reported by the DESS (State Service of Ukraine on Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience), an investigation  is still underway to determine whether the UOC is still affiliated, or not, with the Russian Orthodox Church.

The passport issue might be interpreted by the authorities as a negative element in the public and political debate which is likely to lead to the liquidation of the UOC.

According to the last June survey of the company “Sotsis”, Onufriy among other church leaders was trusted by about 22% of Ukrainians, while the primate of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Metropolitan Epiphany, was trusted by 41%.

According to the same study, 35% of Ukrainians are in favor of the liquidation of the UOC, 10% – for its unification with the OCU, and 30% believe that this church should be left alone.

Published by Human Rights Without Frontiers

More reading

• Ukraine strips Orthodox leader of citizenship links to Moscow
• Zelensky deprived the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Onufriy of his citizenship
• His Beatitude Onuphriy’s citizenship revoked, what is behind Zelensky’s decree

Translating a shared value into shared action

By Knox Thames

Ten years ago, on June 15, 2015, something remarkable happened. For arguably the first time ever, a group of countries decided to work collectively to advance religious freedom for people of different faiths outside their own borders. Throughout history, confessional states have fought for their own. However, in 2015, a new page was turned focused on religious freedom for all. Now, a decade into this experiment, we should reflect on the remarkable progress and the many challenges remaining.

Canadian Initiative, American Partnership

In 2015, with the ISIS depravations against religious minorities coming to light, we saw a need for like-minded nations to band together in defense of the shared value of religious freedom. Canada’s then Ambassador for Religious Freedom, Andrew Bennett, was a key actor, bringing energy and political support. He welcomed partnerships with myself (then at USCIRF) and others. After a series of initial discussions, the effort formally launched on June 15 in Brussels, with Andrew chairing the founding meeting of the International Contact Group on Freedom of Religion or Belief. Many attended, including myself. The city’s international profile hosting the European Union and NATO made it a worthy setting. The Obama administration’s religious freedom ambassador, David Saperstein, joined, as did representatives from key countries like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, all of whom would play future leadership roles.

The International Contact Group, or ICG, served as an incubator for developing and implementing multilateral diplomacy on freedom of religion or belief (FoRB). While diplomats had collaborated around human rights in general, never before had efforts focused solely on freedom of religion or belief. Unfortunately, Andrew did not have much time to lead the effort. In November of that same year, he stepped down after Justin Trudeau’s election as Prime Minister. But the nascent endeavor continued. Andrew passed the baton, inviting me to serve as ICG co-chair (since I had joined the State Department) with Canadian diplomat Giuliana Natale.

The ICG became a place to share information between subject matter experts and diplomats, meeting twice a year, once in Geneva and once in New York. As I highlight in my book, we experimented with different forms of collective action. For instance, in 2017, we coordinated statements on social media denouncing the house arrest of the Eritrean Orthodox Patriarch and urging his release. While never freed, the government did allow him to attend a mass for the first time in years after the statements. It was a blessing to the Patriarch and a good return on low-cost diplomatic investment.

Larger efforts concerned freeing Asia Bibi in 2018. The Pakistani government refused to let her leave despite being acquitted of blasphemy allegations and released from prison. Through the ICG, we coordinated joint demarches on Islamabad, urging that she be allowed to join her family abroad. With multiple countries all delivering the same message in the same week, the show of force helped convince the military leadership to let her go. We saw how multilateral FoRB advocacy could work in meaningful ways, realizing the benefits of joint action and encouraging more governments to get involved.

When the Trump administration launched a series of ministerial-level meetings in 2018 and 2019, interest grew in elevating multilateral diplomacy to a higher political level. Under the leadership of Sam Brownback, the first Trump administration’s religious freedom ambassador, and a former senator and governor, he wanted something that could punch harder with a higher commitment among actual members. (The ICG was and remains a network.) The International Religious Freedom Alliance was launched in February 2020 with high aspirations. As its Declaration of Principles stated, “The Alliance is predicated on the idea more must be done to protect members of religious minority groups and combat discrimination and persecution based on religion or belief.”

Challenges in a Fraught World

As someone involved in designing the Alliance while co-chairing the ICG, we imported many of the ICG’s proven approaches into the Alliance. Its founding documents highlight a shared commitment to international standards and advocacy cooperation. It stated that the “Alliance intends to advocate for freedom of religion or belief for all” as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and that its members are “willing to publicly and privately object to abuses.” Over the past five years, the Alliance has grown from 27 founding members to over 40, while its name changed to the International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance (IRFBA) and now the Article 18 Alliance. All the while, the ICG continues to meet.

Now, 10 years after the ICG’s founding and five years after the Alliance’s launch, we must ask where to go from here.

The unprecedented level of attention on FoRB is worthy, as repression and discrimination on account of religion or belief continues. While persecution persists, it is undoubtedly less than it would have been without these efforts. However, we must be honest in evaluating whether these networks and meetings make a difference, not just maintaining them for the sake of their own existence. While a proponent of these efforts, meetings for the sake of meetings are the worst of internationalism. But if focused on the mission of religious freedom for all and committed to action, these networks can still serve crucial roles.

A foremost challenge is lessening political attention. The movement in 2015 rode a wave of interest as the ISIS depravities elevated religious persecution in tragically horrific ways. But memories fade. Now, wars in Europe and the Middle East distract policymakers and reduce resources. Talk of religious freedom seems a luxury while ballistic missiles rain down in the Middle East and Russian tanks advance across frontiers. An increasing focus on national interests by the United States and Europe squeezes space for a values agenda while grant money evaporates.

To shore up support, FoRB advocates can articulate how combating religious persecution compliments a hard security agenda while reflecting national values. Religious persecution is not going to fade away just because it fades on the priority list. We know persecution is intertwined with many of the most pressing challenges, directly or indirectly implicated in conflict, migration, and human rights violations. Enlightened self-interest that addresses persecution can make nations safer and more prosperous while lessening human suffering and reducing push factors of migration.

Connected is softening support among voters in democracies. Recent surveys about religious nationalism demonstrate how it is a persistent and common perspective across every region. It is understandable and natural for people to want their leaders to advance their values and look out for their communities. In my experience, most “regular people” outside of world capitals understand how religious freedom for all is the best way to secure a brighter future for their own when explained. It just needs to be explained more. Elected leaders listen to their constituents.

Next Steps

Ten years after the ICG’s launch, an expanding ecosystem of actors are focused on international religious freedom advocacy. Diplomats need not act alone; partnership is crucial. In addition to the ICG and Alliance, others include the International Panel of Parliamentarians for FoRB, the IRF Roundtables, UN NGO FoRB Committees, and various parliamentary groups like the APPGs in the UK, alongside faith-based and confessional organizations. Better coordination among these multiple nodes of activity could realize untapped potential.

Success will require coordinated, but not controlling, action. The ICG and Alliance will likely continue in their separate but adjacent lanes. While perhaps they should merge, the challenge of global persecution is significant enough to justify both, especially if they can delineate complementary (and not duplicative) areas of activity. Both can capitalize on NGO partnerships, which can help maintain, if not expand, high-level government interest. In addition, recruiting new members who fully comply with Article 18 standards will enhance credibility and momentum. We need to move more countries from rhetorical support to actual engagement with offending countries and fragile states where persecution runs rampant. By working in concert rather than in silos, the movement can maximize its reach and impact, even with diminished political and financial support.

For ideas on action, the Declaration of Principles provides a practical framework for how the FoRB ecosystem can respond to violations, outlining three key types of responses: reactive measures, proactive measures, and potential instruments of action. Reactive measures include condemning violence or incitement to violence against individuals or religious sites, whether perpetrated by state or non-state actors. The Declaration also calls for steadfastly responding to persistent violations of the right to manifest one’s religion or belief, such as the misuse of blasphemy laws, denial of legal recognition to religious or non-religious communities, and restrictions on the freedom to change one’s religion or belief. It’s the nuts-and-bolts of FoRB advocacy.

However, getting ahead of the problem is vital, and the Declaration outlines a range of proactive measures aimed at advancing freedom of religion or belief globally. These include promoting respect for diversity, tolerance, and inclusion in line with the Istanbul Process and protecting religious or belief sites from desecration. The ICG and Alliance countries can actively engage with civil society, including religious communities and leaders, while expanding literacy on freedom of religion or belief and related human rights frameworks. Upholding religious freedom alongside other fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression, is also emphasized.

Lastly, the Declaration highlights a spectrum of potential FoRB actions. Possible government responses include joint monitoring and reporting, coordinated demarches, public diplomacy efforts, interfaith engagement, victim support, and targeted sanctions. Governments and civil society can advocate together for prisoners of conscience, legal reform, rejecting religious discrimination in access to education, justice, housing, and employment, and promoting equal citizenship. Investing in civil society, training law enforcement, and supporting human rights defenders are essential steps. When employed strategically across these networks, responses can amplify impact and drive meaningful progress in protecting and advancing religious freedom globally.

A decade into this effort, we must continue to explore how to translate a shared value into shared action. We must expand our arguments for why religious freedom matters inside and outside the human rights agenda. In a time of persistent religious persecution, the ICG and the Alliance are an underappreciated good news story. These networks have helped set captives free and bring change to repressive systems. To protect the gains made, we must bolster these networks to weather government changes and decreased financial support. While religious freedom advocacy has never been easy, the last ten years mustn’t be the high-water mark. Too many lives are on the line.

About the author:

Knox Thames served in a special envoy position during the Obama and Trump administrations focused on religious minorities in the Middle East and South/Central Asia. His book, Ending Persecution: Charting the Path to Global Religious Freedom, was released in September 2025 by University of Notre Dame Press.