Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami proscribed as a terrorist group and the European Court

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami proscribed as a terrorist group and the European Court

(Part II)

Is Hizb ut-Tahrir a political or a religious movement? Is it inciting or justifying terrorism? Is it anti-Semitic?

By Willy Fautré, Human Rights Without Frontiers

HRWF (24.01.2024) – On Thursday 18 January, the UK proscribed the British branch of the Islamist movement Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) under the national Terrorism Act.

British Home Secretary James Cleverly who was the initiator of the parliamentary move then tweeted “I have made the decision to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK. Their promotion and encouragement of the abhorrent attacks perpetrated by Hamas goes against everything our country stands for. Belonging to and inviting support for this group will be a criminal offence.”

Noteworthy is that previous attempts to ban the movement under Tony Blair and David Cameron had been unsuccessful because the charges could not be legally and convincingly substantiated on the basis of their literature. Only Hizb ut-Tahrir’s public support of Hamas’ attack in Israel on 7 October last tipped the balance in the opposite direction as Hamas is proscribed as a terrorist organization in the UK and is under EU sanctions.

It is however not uninteresting to have a closer look at some complaints concerning Hizb ut-Tahrir filed with the European Court of Human Rights, the arguments developed by the conflicting parties and the decisions taken by the Court.

Nafik Ashirov and International Memorial v. Russia (application no. 25246/07)

On 14 February 2003, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation declared 15 organizations, including Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al-Qaeda, to be terrorist organizations. Their activities were prohibited on the whole territory of Russia.

The Supreme Court then described the Islamic Liberation Party (“Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami”) as “an organization aiming to eliminate non-Islamic governments and establish Islamic rule on a global scale by re-establishing the ‘World Islamic Caliphate’, initially in regions with a predominantly Muslim population, including Russia and the CIS countries.

Main forms of activity: militant Islamist propaganda, combined with intolerance to other religions; active recruitment of supporters, purposeful work to split society (primarily propaganda with powerful financial reinforcement).”

About the context of the ban

This witch-hunt taking place less than a year and a half after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States was then understandable to identify potential threats, prevent any terrorist attack as well as guarantee the public security of the Russian citizens and institutions.

Moreover, in the context of the two wars (the Chechen Wars) led by Russia against separatist movements in Chechnya, the 15 Islamic organizations were suspected of wanting to overthrow the existing constitutional system and create an “Islamic State” in the North Caucasus. To support its ban, the Russian Supreme Court even referred to a list of foreign terrorist organizations of the U.S. Department of State at that time, approved by the Congress after the 9/11 terrorist attacks of Al-Qaeda in the United States.

The plaintiffs

On 8 June 2007, a complaint was filed with the European Court of Human Rights by two plaintiffs.

Nafik Ashirov, the first applicant, was born in 1954 and was living in Moscow. He was an imam but he was not a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir. As the chairman of the Religious Board of Muslims of the Asian part of Russia, he prepared a report on Hizb ut-Tahrir’s literature. This was a request of a non-governmental organisation representing several members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in criminal proceedings which wanted to know whether the movement’s literature advocated an extremist version of Islam. The report stated that “the prosecution of Russian citizens on the sole basis of some statements about Hizb ut-Tahrir’s brochures and teachings was wrong and breached the right of Muslims to freedom of expression of religious beliefs. It was also wrong to characterise the religious beliefs of the followers of [Hizb ut-Tahrir] as extremist, let alone terrorist”.

The second applicant was the famous human rights organization “International Memorial,” which endorsed the report and published it on its website.

Memorial was founded during the fall of the Soviet Union to investigate the human rights violations and other crimes committed under Joseph Stalin’s rule. As of December 2021, Memorial encompassed over 50 organizations in Russia. After the Russian “Foreign Agent Law” was passed in July 2012, Memorial came under increasing government pressure. On 21 July 2014, the Memorial Human Rights Centre was declared a “foreign agent” by the Ministry of Justice. On 29 December 2021, the Moscow City Court liquidated the Memorial Human Rights Centre, referring to a decision of the Supreme Court of Russia on the previous day.

On the same day, the European Court of Human Rights applied an interim measure to halt the forced dissolution of Memorial. Despite this warning, the dissolution was confirmed by the Russian Court of Appeal on 5 April 2022.

In 2022, Memorial was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize along with Belarusian human rights activist Ales Bialiatski and the Ukrainian human rights organization Centre for Civil Liberties.

It is important to recall what is Memorial, as this prestigious organization took sides with Hizb ut-Tahrir.

The accusations

On 20 February 2006 a deputy Moscow City prosecutor issued a warning to Mr Ashirov, considering that his report “promoted the ideas of Hizb ut-Tahrir and provided a justification for its terrorist activities”.

On 26 February 2006 a similar warning was addressed to the executive director of International Memorial for publishing the materials of a banned terrorist organization on its website, thereby aiding and abetting its terrorist activities. He ordered the executive director of International Memorial to remove Mr Ashirov’s report from the website within three days. International Memorial did that immediately.

On appeal, the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow found that the warnings had been lawful and justified.

The assessment of the European Court

The Court recognized that Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology was clearly contrary to the values of the European Convention of Human Rights but Mr Ashirov’s report was “not laudatory of Hizb ut-Tahrir” and “did not contain any direct or indirect calls for violence or a justification of violence, hatred or intolerance, let alone any calls to commit a terrorist offence, vindication or justification of terrorism.”

The Court noted that “the Supreme Court’s decision banning Hizb ut-Tahrir was taken in the absence of the public or representatives of the organisation, and the decision banning Hizb ut‑Tahrir was never officially published.”

The Court also considered that “by publishing Mr Ashirov’s report on its website and thereby drawing attention to a matter of public interest, International Memorial exercised its role of a public watchdog.” 

In its ruling, the Court declared the complaint about the alleged violation of the right to freedom of expression admissible and held that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in respect of both applicants. Il also held that Russia was to pay 2500 EUR to each applicant, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, and EUR 4,785 in respect of costs and expenses for the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre.

Last but not least, what is also shocking in this case is that, after the filing of the complaint in Strasbourg in 2007, the European Court of Human Rights took 16 years to come to a decision (!) It is only on 17 January 2023, in the context of Russia’s War on Ukraine and far away from the global geopolitical situation in the early 2000 years, that justice was finally but only theoretically done. This very delayed ruling is indeed equivalent to a denial of justice as a year ago it totally remained unnoticed and is unenforceable.

Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (application no. 31098/08)

 

In January 2003, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior issued a decision prohibiting Hizb ut-Tahrir’s activities in Germany, relying on the provisions of the Law on Associations. It also ordered Hizb ut-Tahrir’s assets to be confiscated. The Ministry considered that Hizb Ut-Tahrir was a foreign private association operating on an international scale and that there existed no sub-organization in Germany.

Germany’s arguments

According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir were directed against the principle of peaceful settlement of international conflicts and the movement advocated the use of violence as a means to achieve its political goals.

Basing its decision on a number of their printed publications and leaflets as well as on their website, the Ministry concluded that it denied the State of Israel the right to exist and called for its destruction as well as for the killing of Jews.

In the Ministry’s view, Hizb ut-Tahrir was not to be considered a religious or philosophical community because it pursued political objectives, advocating an “active Jihad” targeting Islamic States and calling for the overthrow of their governments.

About the application

The application against Germany’s ruling was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 25 June 2008.

The first applicant, Hizb ut-Tahrir, was an unincorporated association which did not inform the Court of any registered address. The second applicant, Mr Shaker Hussein Assem, was an Austrian national living in Germany and the third to seventeenth applicants were members or supporters of the first applicant residing in Germany and Romania. 

All 17 applicants complained about the ban imposed on Hizb ut-Tahrir’s activities and about the confiscation of its assets. They relied on Articles 6 (right to a fair trial), 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), 10 (freedom of expression), 11 (freedom of assembly and association), 13 (right to an effective remedy) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to the Convention.

The assessment of the European Court

In its ruling on 12 June 2012, the European Court observed that the German Federal Administrative Court had carefully analysed a substantial number of written public statements made by Hizb ut-Tahrir and its representative in the proceedings before the Court.

It found that Hizb ut-Tahrir called for the violent destruction of the State of Israel and for the banishment and killing of its inhabitants. In particular, its representative, Mr Assem, had repeatedly justified suicide attacks in which civilians were killed in Israel, and neither he nor Hizb ut-Tahrir had distanced themselves from that position during the proceedings before the Court.

In view of those statements, the Court considered that Hizb ut-Tahrir attempted to deflect the right to freedom of assembly and association under Article 11 from its real purpose by employing that right for ends which were clearly contrary to the values of the European Convention, notably the commitment to the peaceful settlement of international conflicts and to the sanctity of human life.

In conclusion, the Court held in particular that under Article 17 (prohibition of abuse of rights) of the European Convention on Human Rights, it was impossible to derive from the Convention a right to engage in an activity aimed at destroying any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. Hizb ut-Tahrir could therefore not rely on Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) to complain about the ban on its activities.

For these reasons, the Court by a majority declared the application inadmissible.

Some concluding reflections

Hizb ut-Tahrir defends a political agenda that is incompatible with the values of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights. In the light of its literature, it is perceived as a potential threat by governments of Muslim-majority countries as well as democratic states although up to now it has not used violence to come to power anywhere but nobody knows how it could change in the future.

Russia, Germany and the United Kingdom have banned or proscribed Hizb ut-Tahrir on security concerns at the specific time of their respective decisions.

Russia in the aftermath of the large-scale 9/11 terrorist attacks starting in the United States and against the background of its wars against separatist forces in the Muslim majority territories of Northern Caucasus.

Germany because of the indelible memory of the Nazi Holocaust, the anti-Israel agenda and the perceived anti-Jewish genocidal intentions of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which might one day awaken the demons of its past.

The United Kingdom because of the rising tide of anti-Israel and anti-Jewish feelings which suddenly emerged in the massive demonstrations in favour of Hamas, as an alleged defender of the Palestinian cause despite its terrorist attack in Israel, against the backdrop of the war in Gaza Strip.

These three countries highlight the fact that nowadays Hizb ut-Tahrir groups do not pursue the same political purposes everywhere. In Russia, notorious human rights organizations like ‘Memorial’, Nobel Peace Prize in 2022, and others find them harmless in Russia and take sides with them when they are persecuted by Putin’s regime.

If Hizb ut-Tahrir activists or groups break the rule of law in Germany, the UK or any other EU country, they can be prosecuted and sentenced in fair trials for their illegal activities.

Is banning, proscribing or prohibiting Hizb ut-Tahrir enforceable and sufficiently efficient? Isn’t it counter-productive? Shouldn’t vigilance, prevention and prosecution, in accordance with the proportionality principle, be a more efficient way to move forward nowadays? Of course, tomorrow might not be the same as nowadays if a Hizb ut-Tahrir group somewhere is instrumentalized and financed by other forces…

UK: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami proscribed in the United Kingdom

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
UK: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami proscribed in the United Kingdom

(Part I)

Is Hizb ut-Tahrir a political or a religious movement? Is it inciting or justifying terrorism? Is it anti-Semitic?

By Willy Fautré, Human Rights Without Frontiers

HRWF (23.01.2024) – On Thursday 18 January, the UK proscribed the Islamist movement Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party), which the European Court of Human Rights had in previous decisions identified as a political organization and not a (new) religious movement in Islam, as some organizations sometimes did when defending their members arbitrarily or not arrested and imprisoned.

On 15 January, British Home Secretary James Cleverly had submitted an order to parliament to proscribe Hizb ut-Tahrir under the UK’s Terrorism Act. The secretary called the group “an antisemitic organization that actively promotes and encourages terrorism, including praising and celebrating the appalling 7 October attacks.”

The accusations of anti-Semitism and terrorism are rejected by the British Centre of Hizb ut-Tahrir and are not endorsed by all observers of and researchers about Hizb ut-Tahrir.

Hizb ut-Tahrir, the 80th movement proscribed as an international terrorist organization by the UK

Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if they believe it is concerned in terrorism, and it is proportionate to do. For the purposes of the act, this means that the organisation:

  • commits or participates in acts of terrorism
  • prepares for terrorism
  • promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism)
  • is otherwise concerned in terrorism

The official text of the UK’s decision says:

“Hizb ut-Tahrir is an international Sunni Islamist political organisation which was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Sheikh Taquiddin an-Nabhani. Hizb ut-Tahrir has a footprint in at least 32 countries, with its headquarters and Central Media Office (CMO) based in Beirut, Lebanon. The CMO runs Hizb ut-Tahrir’s central propaganda website hizb-ut-tahrir.info.

Hizb ut-Tahrir’s stated long-term goal is to unify Muslims worldwide and establish a Caliphate ruled under Islamic (Shari’a) law. Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain is the official branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK and was established in the UK in the 1980s. The UK government assess that Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain is a component branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir but is afforded autonomy to interpret and approach Hizb ut-Tahrir’s global strategy according to its local environment.

The UK government assess that Hizb ut-Tahrir, including its national branches, is currently concerned in terrorism, and meets the ‘promotes and encourages’ limb of the statutory test. A number of articles were posted online on Hizb ut-Tahrir’s central media website (and third party websites), attributed to several of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s branches, which celebrated and praised the 7 October 2023 attack by Hamas and associated events. The content of these articles, many of which refer to Hamas as ‘heroes’ and encourage further terrorist activity, constitute the promotion and encouragement of terrorism.”

For the last two decades, Hizb ut-Tahrir had faced the prospect of being labelled and proscribed as a terrorist group in the UK.

Tony Blair and David Cameron threatened to proscribe it when they were in power. But Home Secretary James Cleverly did what many before him in government had failed to do – with support from all parties and no opposition from MPs or members of the House of Lords during the parliamentary session confirming the ban. Statements and actions of the British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir about Hamas’ terrorist attack against Israel on 7 October offered the Home Secretary an ideal opportunity to get a political consensus.

From midnight on Friday 19 January, the group was classified as a terrorist group and banned from organising in the UK. Belonging to or promoting Hizb ut-Tahrir is now punishable by up to 14 years in prison, according to the official statement.

In the last twenty years, several countries have banned Hizb ut-Tahrir for its ideology, its statements and its positions: Germany, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, several Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, with many members arrested for alleged attempts to instigate coups in Muslim-majority countries.

However, the group is known to be active in Australia, Canada and the United States as well as in dozens of other countries, including Kuwait, Tunisia, Lebanon, India and Kenya.

Some considerations

Concerning the ban of the British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a question arises “Do the ban and possible sentences respect the proportionality principle with regard to the charges related to terrorism?

Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in 1953 when Israel was still a young state and has a history of not using or promoting violence but times change and so does the geopolitical environment.

We, at Human Rights Without Frontiers, consider that Hizb ut-Tahrir activists are not eligible for the status of victims of violations of religious freedom when carrying out political activities because it is identified by the ECtHR as a Muslim political movement, not a religious community. In our Database of FORB Prisoners in Russia and other countries, we do not include their members. While we contend they cannot be considered FORB prisoners (Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights), we consider they can be prisoners of conscience or political prisoners if they are arbitrarily arrested and sentenced to prison terms despite non-violent activities and no incitement to violence.

Kissinger in “The Age of AI And Our Human Future”

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Kissinger in “The Age of AI And Our Human Future”

By Ambassador Arben Cici

Three of the world’s most accomplished and deep thinkers come together to explore Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the way it is transforming human society—and what this technology means for us all.

In the book “The Age of AI And Our Human Future” Henry A Kissinger, Eric Schmidt, Daniel Huttenlocher, together consider how AI will change our relationships with knowledge, politics, and the societies in which we live.

In seven chapters they analyze almost all the fields of the current world society. Especially the 5th one, “Security and World Order”, is focused on the historical importance of security as a fundamental objective for organized societies. The authors highlight the Cold War era when major powers developed technologically advanced militaries but refrained from using them against each other or smaller nations. The advent of artificial intelligence (AI) now poses challenges that could complicate modern strategy beyond human comprehension.

The authors stress that nations must acknowledge the security dimensions of AI. They caution that if the United States and its allies hesitate in embracing AI technologies, it might not lead to a more peaceful world. As AI brings transformations that challenge traditional security concepts, there’s a necessity for defining AI-related strategic doctrines before these changes become inevitable.

Drawing parallels with the development and use of nuclear weapons, the authors note that despite efforts to develop nuclear weapons, there has never been a clear strategic doctrine or moral principle for their use. The Cold War witnessed various strategies to manage the threat of nuclear war, including the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD).

Two contemporary challenges discussed in this chapter are cyber conflict and AI. The authors emphasize the difficulty of conceptualizing arms control measures for cyber weapons due to the ambiguity surrounding terms like cyberattack and cyberwar. They highlight the paradox that the greater a society’s digital capacity, the more vulnerable it becomes to cyberattacks.

The introduction of nonhuman logic through AI to military systems is seen as transformative, introducing a layer of incalculability. AIs can make decisions faster than humans, and their use in weapons systems expands tactical options and enables unconventional targeting. AI has a dual-use nature, being applicable to both military and civilian domains.

The authors express concerns about the public nature of AI development, allowing countries to copy and transmit it. The opacity of AI-driven strategies may lead to the belief that AI assistance is necessary to understand adversaries’ capabilities and intentions. This poses challenges to the quest for reassurance and restraint.

“An Old Quest in a New World” is called a sub-chapter deeply addressing the transformative impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on global security. The authors stress the need for major technologically advanced countries to recognize the profound changes AI brings, comparing it to the significance of the advent of nuclear weapons. They propose the establishment of national bodies to consider the defense and security aspects of AI, emphasizing the importance of competitiveness, research coordination, and the prevention of unwanted escalation.

The authors argue that the primary AI powers, particularly the United States and China, should acknowledge the reality of this strategic transformation. They suggest that “whatever other contests and emerging period of rivalry US and China should seek consensus that they will not enter into a technologically advanced war with each other” and propose the creation of units within each government to monitor and report on potential dangers, fostering dialogue to avoid unintended crises.

Highlighting the paradox of international relations, the chapter emphasizes the balance between a power’s drive to maximize its security and the need for a sense of responsibility to maintain general peace. It discusses the challenge of adapting long-held strategic logic to the AI age, emphasizing the importance of preventing AIs from undertaking irreversible actions faster than human decision-makers can intervene.

The authors outline six primary tasks for leaders in controlling arsenals that include conventional, nuclear, cyber, and AI capabilities. These tasks involve (1)regular communication between rival nations about the forms of war they wish to avoid (as their predecessors did during the Cold War), (2)revisiting the challenges of nuclear strategy (as former secretary of state, George Schultz told Congress in 2018 about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, “ I fear people have lost that sense of dread”), (3)defining doctrines and limits for cyber and AI powers, (4)conducting internal reviews of command-and-control systems, (5)creating methods of maximizing decision time during heightened tension and extreme crises (In a crisis, human being must bear final responsibility for whether advanced weapons are deployed), and (6)considering efforts to limit the proliferation of military AI (If a disruptive and potentially destructive new technology is permitted to transform the militaries of the world’s most inveterately hostile or morally unconstrained governments, strategic equilibrium may prove difficult to attain and conflict then uncontrollable).

It emphasizes constantly the duty of technologically advanced countries to remain at the forefront of AI research and development but also underscores the importance of understanding limits. It stresses the need for discussions among major powers on cyber and AI weapons to establish a common vocabulary and mutual restraint on the most destructive capabilities. The authors argue that history will not forgive a failure to set limits as humanity competes in creating new, evolving, and intelligent weapons in the era of artificial intelligence.

In conclusion, this exceptional book provides a comprehensive exploration of the challenges and responsibilities posed by AI not only in the realm of global security but also in all aspects of the current society and our life.

Three of the world’s most accomplished and deep thinkers are calling and ringing the alarm bell, as well, for international cooperation, diplomacy, dialogue, and ethical considerations to navigate the complexities of this transformative technology and ensure its responsible use for the preservation of humanity not its destruction. Their call is not a fatalistic but realistic, and at the right time.

“We are in a new phase of human history. We have not possible way to avoiding it. The only choice we have is to use it constructively or be engulfed by it”.

Henry Kissinger on the AI.

About the author:

Ambassador Arben Cici

Ambassador Arben Cici, is a Professor of International Relations in the Mediterranean University of Albania, Pro-rector for International Relations, he is leading the Albanian Diplomatic Forum. Former Ambassador & Foreign Policy Adviser of the President of Albania.

Never fit for the split: Korean peninsula in 2024 – Forecast

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Never fit for the split: Korean peninsula in 2024 – Forecast

Barely two weeks into 2024, tensions on the Korean Peninsula are rapidly escalating. On one hand, North Korea has declared it will no longer pursue unification as long as Seoul sticks to a strategy centred around the “collapse of the DPRK’s regime,” “unification by absorption,” and “unification under liberal democracy.”

On the other hand, South Korea announced plans to further strengthen the US-ROK extended deterrence system aimed at the North, calling for “peace through strength.” Given the starkly different positions held by the two Koreas, prospects for the improvement of inter-Korean relations this year look bleak.

In reality, the escalating hostility between the two nations will likely lead to a rapid deterioration of the security situation on the Peninsula, potentially jeopardizing regional peace and stability.

Unification Policies: Irreversible, Incompatible or Impossible?

Although inter-Korean relations have not progressed in a positive direction over the past four years, North-South ties reached a new low point on December 31, 2023, when Pyongyang announced a change in the country’s unification policy. According to North Korean media KCNA, Kim Jong-un called for a “decisive policy change” in how the North deals with the South. Kim announced the policy shift at the 9th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), held from Dec. 26-30.

According to the North Korean leader, his country’s policy for national reunification has not had its desired effect, instead “the north-south relations have repeated the vicious cycle of contact and suspension, dialogue and confrontation.” He accused South Korea of pursuing “unification by absorption” and “unification under liberal democracy,” with the goal of the “collapse of the DPRK’s regime.” According to Kim, this version of unification sought by the South is not compatible with the North’s version of “national reunification based on one nation and one state with two systems.”

North and South Korea have had their own views on unification ever since the formation of two separate states on the Peninsula in 1948. At that time, it was important for both Koreas to prove their legitimacy as the “true Korean nation.” Particularly in the early years of the Cold War, the main approach was to achieve unification by force. This strategy then changed in the ‘80s with the North proposing the “Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo” and the South presenting its “Unification Formula for the Korean National Community.”

The South Korean version of unification calls for a 3-step process of reconciliation and cooperation, the formation of a Korean commonwealth, and the realization of a unitary state based on liberal democratic values. On the other hand, the North Korean version of unification calls for the formation of two regional Korean governments that implement policies under the direction of a Confederal government.

The North later amended its proposal in 1991 to a “low stage federation”, saying it would be open to allowing regional governments more autonomy. This brought the unification formulas of the two Koreas closer together, with the leaders of North and South agreeing in the June 15, 2000 Joint Declaration that “there are common elements in the South’s proposal for a confederation and the North’s proposal for a federation of lower stage as the formulae for achieving reunification” and that unification would be pursued in that direction.

Nevertheless, important differences remained in terms of what the final version of a unified state would look like. For the South, it would be “one nation, one state, one system, one government” under a liberal democratic system, while for the North it would be “one nation, one state, two systems, two governments,” which would ensure the continuation of the North’s socialist system. The two formulas for unification have not changed much over the years.

Realizing the disparity in their views, Kim Jong Un described inter-Korean relations at the December Plenary Meeting as “relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states,” arguing that “the reality urgently requires us to adopt a new stand on the north-south relations and the reunification policy.”

The announcement by Pyongyang is significant. Although the North is known to use harsh rhetoric and throw insults at the South Korean government regularly, the latest development goes further by announcing a formal change in the country’s policy line concerning unification with the South. This is the first time the North Korean government publicly declares it will no longer be pursuing unification.

North Korea

This situation puts South Korea in a difficult position. Unlike the North, South Korea cannot openly denounce the goal of unification since it is enshrined in the country’s Constitution (Article 4: “The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy.”). South Korean Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho reiterated this stance on Jan. 2, saying the South will continue to “prepare for unification in earnest,” while warning that the North will not be able to overcome the US-ROK ‘wall’ of deterrence.

Although the Constitution calls for unification to be pursued ‘peacefully’, North Korea accuses the South of adhering to the so-called ‘unification by absorption policy’, which would see the North Korean government collapse and the two Koreas reunited by South Korea ‘absorbing’ the North and forming one nation under the South Korean system. Even though each government in the South states its goal of achieving unification through peaceful means, wording used in various unification-related documents over the years rejects the idea of a unified Korean state that includes the presence of the current North Korean governing system.

For example, one 2012 report on unification states that “the authoritarian and totalitarian systems that still remain on the Korean Peninsula must be eliminated,” pointing to the North Korean system. Moreover, regarding the current government, the 2023 Unification Ministry’s White Paper on Korean Unification states that the Yoon administration’s priority is to “denuclearize North Korea” (not the Korean Peninsula), while aiming for “peaceful unification based on a basic free and democratic order.” Meanwhile, the first sentence on the Korea Institute for National Reunification (KINU)’s current homepage states that “The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands,” in accordance with the South Korean Constitution—underscoring the view that sees the South as the only legitimate Korea and the territory in the northern half of the Peninsula as belonging to South Korea.

South Korea

North Korea sees this position as incompatible with its vision for a unified Korea and has therefore given up, at least for now, on the goal of unification. Instead, North Korea will likely prioritize further strengthening its military capabilities while deepening ties with traditional allies such as Russia and China. Regarding the latter, Kim Jong Un mentioned at the Plenary Meeting his plans of “further developing the relations with the anti-imperialist independent countries opposed to the hegemony strategy of the U.S. and the West.” In short, improving relations with South Korea is not on the priority list.

Peace through strength

At present neither side (lately South too) does not seem to be prioritizing unification. The Yoon government has designated North Korea as the South’s “main enemy” and is vowing to double down on its hardline, deterrence-centered strategy in 2024.

“Korea will build peace through strength. It will not be a submissive peace that is dependent on the good will of the adversary,” President Yoon said in his 2024 New Year Address. In terms of what this approach looks like in practice, the South Korean president explained: “We will accelerate our efforts to build a stronger ROK 3K Defense System to defend against North Korean nuclear and missile threats.”

The 3K Defense System refers to the Kill Chain system, the Korea Air and Missile Defense system, and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation plan. The Kill Chain system is particularly controversial as it aims to launch a preemptive strike to remove the North Korean leadership in the face of an imminent nuclear attack.

Unlike the previous Moon Jae-in administration, the Yoon government has taken a more hardline stance toward the North, favoring military deterrence over diplomacy. Pyongyang has made its displeasure at the Yoon administration clear from the beginning, insulting the South Korean president on various occasions and calling his plans for denuclearization of the North in exchange for economic aid “the height of absurdity.”

Since coming to office, President Yoon has prioritized deepening ties with the US and Japan and strengthening deterrence aimed at North Korea. Steps toward the latter were solidified in July when Yoon and US President Joe Biden launched the US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) aimed at strengthening extended deterrence, discussing nuclear and strategic planning, and ‘managing the threat to the nonproliferation regime’ posed by North Korea. Yoon also highlighted the NCG in his New Year’s speech, saying that the US and South Korea have now established a “nuclear-based” military alliance.

The NCG has further driven a wedge between North and South Korea, with Pyongyang seeing it as yet another hostile move by Washington and Seoul. In Kim Jong-un’s opinion, the NCG is “aimed at the joint plan and execution for the use of nuclear weapons” by the US and ROK and is bringing the two Koreas closer to war. The North Korean leader also heavily criticized Yoon’s decision to “complete the enhanced ROK-U.S. extended deterrence system” by the first half of 2024.

South Korea’s Unification Ministry is also echoing the same hardline policy approach. “The government will craft a ‘thicker and more elevated’ deterrence system through the strengthening of the Seoul-Washington alliance in order to brace for Pyongyang’s potential military provocations,” South Korea’s Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho said on Jan. 2. The Unification Minister is known for his hardline stance toward the North, having said in 2019 that unification would only be possible once the North’s government “is overthrown and North Korea is liberated.“

South Korea

Pyongyang’s window of opportunity?

North Korea has repeatedly criticized the Yoon administration, seeing the current South Korean government’s strategy as one more likely to result in conflict than reconciliation. Pyongyang made its stance vis-à-vis the Yoon government explicitly clear on Jan. 2 through a statement made by Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s sister. The message was specifically directed at the South Korean president, with the title of the statement reading “New Year message to the president of the Republic of Korea.”

“The present security situation on the Korean peninsula is so critical that it may be not strange to see the outbreak of war at once, and the security uneasiness has become a commonplace in the ROK. This is entirely ascribable to the ‘merits’ of President Yoon Suk Yeol.” – Kim Yo Jong, Jan. 2, 2024.

Kim Yo Jong strongly criticized Yoon’s “peace by force” approach toward the North and mocked the South’s policy for being counterproductive by giving the North all the justification it needs to further grow its military and nuclear capabilities. “Thanks to the frequent introduction of U.S. nuclear carriers, nuclear submarines and nuclear strategic bombers allegedly to frighten anyone, the DPRK could develop its military capabilities in a reasonable and effective way,” she argued.

She called Yoon’s presidency a “golden opportunity” for North Korea and a “valuable gift,” adding that if the opposition candidate would have won in the 2022 presidential elections, it would have been “a serious trouble to us.”

“The tremendous military muscle we are so satisfied with and trust in may have been hard to be secured in such a short span of time without the military confrontation attitude that Yoon showed so wildly and his clamoring for ‘collapse’ of our country and ‘punishment’.”

Similarly, critics of the Yoon administration’s North Korea approach claim the South’s policy is increasing the risk of conflict, giving North Korea time to further develop its nuclear and missile programs, and making diplomacy impossible. Kim Yo Jong called on Yoon to continue his current policy line, as his current approach is helping “bolster up the military muscle of the DPRK.”

2024 – a rocky road ahead

With unification goals off the table—at least for now—North Korea is likely to take a much more aggressive stance against the South this year. Signs of heightened tensions are already becoming apparent, with South Korea claiming the North conducted live-fire drills near the Western border with the South for three consecutive days over the weekend. In a report published by KCNA on Sunday, however, Kim Yo Jong refuted Seoul’s claims, saying instead that the North “conducted a deceptive operation in order to assess the real detecting ability of the ROK military gangsters” and that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) had in fact detonated “blasting powder” simulating the sound of artillery.

Regardless, the tendency of the South to respond in kind to North Korean provocations does not bode well for the stability of the Peninsula or the wider region. This is especially so now that the 2018 inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement has practically been scrapped. With neither side showing any signs of softening their approach to each other, 2024 will likely see tensions between the Koreas continue to rise, perhaps to new heights.

This year’s presidential elections in the US are also likely to spur increased military actions by North Korea, including a possible nuclear test. Even if Donald Trump is reelected, inter-Korean ties are unlikely to progress in a positive direction this year. The new US president would have to make a major shift in Washington’s North Korea policy, away from a deterrence-centered strategy toward one prioritizing engagement, the resumption of diplomacy, and arms control instead of denuclearization. North Korea will remain uninterested in diplomacy as long as the US’ current policy remains unchanged. The same is true for its stance toward South Korea.

Published by the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies – IFIMES

About the author:

Gabriela Bernal is an East Asia political analyst based in Seoul, South Korea. She is prolifically writing for Asian and western scientific and popular outlets.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.

A record 365 million Christians persecuted worldwide, says Open Doors

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
A record 365 million Christians persecuted worldwide, says Open Doors

The evangelical NGO “Open Doors” publishes its annual Watch List that ranks the 50 countries where Christians face the most extreme persecution. North Korea is still No. 1.

By Matthieu Lasserre

La Croix Int’l (18.01.2024) – Once again, North Korea is the most dangerous place in world to be a Christian, according the latest annual report issued by Open Doors, the non-denominational NGO founded in 1955 to offer support to those persecuted for their faith in Christ.

But in its 2024 Watch List, a yearly ranking of the 50 countries where Christians face the most sever persecution, Open Doors notes that Nigeria alone accounted for 82% of Christians who were killed last year killed because of their faith. The report — which covers the twelve-month period between 1 October 2022 and 30 September 2023 — was unveiled on January 16.  

Of of the 4,998 Christians who died because of their religious affiliation during that period, Open Doors said 4,118 were in the massive West African country. That’s a significantly higher figure than in other nations such as Congo (261), India (160), Uganda (55), Myanmar (34), or neighboring Burkina Faso (31).

Nigeria also ranks third in the number of “targeted” churches, meaning those that were destroyed or closed by authorities. Africa’s most populous country also leads in the unfortunate ranking of the number of Christians who were kidnapped last year (3,300 out of 3,906).

“These abductions target both forcibly converted young married girls and church leaders because it allows for substantial ransoms,” said Illia Djadi, the Open Doors analyst for West Africa.

“When pastors are released, they are so traumatized that they keep a low profile afterward,” she said during a press conference to present the Watch List.

200 deaths on Christmas Day

This insecurity was tragically highlighted on Christmas Day when nearly 200 Christians were massacred in Plateau State in the central Nigeria. The attack, which led to the burning of eight churches, forced thousands of people to flee the region, according to sources on the ground that Open Doors interviewed. According to the NGO’s officials, several survivors reported the perpetrators shouted “Allah Akhbar” during the attack.

“The Sahel jihadist groups are recruiting new members from the Fulani ethnic group, who are Muslim and nomadic, and are suffering from poverty due to the disappearance of herds caused by climate change,” continued Djadi. “Christians are not the only targets, but they are a preferred target for these groups.”

And with instability in countries in the Sahel region, these terrorist groups are proliferating and moving further south. Nevertheless, the number of Christians killed for their faith in Nigeria has decreased this year.

“For the tenth consecutive year, Nigeria is the top country in terms of Christians killed,” the Open Doors analyst affirmed. “Despite this, we have seen that thanks to security measures put in place for elections, this number has decreased. However, after the election period, we saw things resuming with renewed vigor. People on the ground feel abandoned by the West.”

Moreover, with its 200 million inhabitants, a security crisis could constitute a new migration crisis for Europe.

Besides Nigeria, the 2024 Watch List notes the explosion in the number of church closures worldwide, estimated at over 14,000. That’s three times higher than the previous year. China alone is responsible for about 10,000 closures by authorities.

“The period covered by the report coincides with the lifting of health measures in the country,” explained Guillaume Guennec, advocacy director for the Open Doors. “Everything reopened except unapproved churches that did not fit the Chinese government’s sinicization logic of Christianity.”

Overall, the NGO estimates that Christians face “very strong” persecution in 78 countries, up from 76 last year. More than 365 million Christians — or one in seven — face extreme persecution worldwide. This is a new record.

Open Doors say the top 10 countries where Christians are most persecuted are North Korea, Somalia, Libya, Eritrea, Yemen, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, Iran, and Afghanistan. It also warns that in the Middle East and North Africa “Christians are becoming less and less at home.”

“It’s worrying when you consider that previous data was collected while ISIS was in that territory,” said Guennec, referring to the rise in blasphemy accusations in Iraq or a new exodus in Syria.

Open Doors has published the Watch List since 1993. The ranking uses a point system based on data collected in the field, “hammer” actions (beatings, murders, church destruction, etc.) and “vice” actions (oppression and restrictions on believers in their private, family, social, civil, or ecclesiastical life). While it is the work of an advocacy group, it is also an analytical tool that’s used by various institutions and the media.

———–

Published by Human Rights Without Frontiers

AI and the protection of copyright and intellectual property

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
AI and the protection of copyright and intellectual property

Policy considerations- Complex technology – simple solutions

By Henri Estramant, LLM

The article highlights major issues surrounding copyright ability policy from an international perspectives, and concludes that despite the hype surrounding AI systems, most legal systems are already adequately equipped with best practices to handle these technological developments.

Most AI experts do not expect AI systems to come even close to human-like intelligence until about 2075[1], and such conjectures are mere speculations. At the moment institutions such as the European Commission[2] do not see it warranted or ethical to grant AI systems legal personhood, a prerequisite for copyright and patent protection. Additionally, act of invention requires the deployment of “human faculties”, even entities with legal personality such as corporations may not be considered as inventors.

Therefore, my general policy recommendations on the subject:

a) The time for an AI system, or Robotic Process Automation (RPA) or a robot to hold uniquely human creative capabilities is still very far off. While it is potentially possible that AI systems will produce material that is crucial for rendering an invention inventive, it is still possible that the human contribution and human conception of the idea that underpins the invention enable the identification of a human inventor under whom to patent, or copyright a work. If AI systems in general are afforded such a prerogative in the future, it ought to be on the basis of granting them ‘individual legal personhood’, which shall require proof of extraordinary ‘creative capabilities’ akin to those of a human, or in simple terms, that the AI system can create ‘original content’ without the need of a human facilitator.

My approach is warranted by the UK’s path, also followed by countries such as Ireland, New Zealand, Hong Kong SAR, India, etc. The UK’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA), section 9(3)[3] states “In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken”.

Moreover section 178[4] of the above mentioned CDPA, specifies that “computer-generated”, “in relation to a work, means that the work is generated by computer in circumstances such that there is no human author of the work”. The latter statement predisposes an exception for whenever a human is not directly involved in the generative process, and can provide flexibility for UN member states to grant copyright to an AI system deemed to fulfill certain requirements that they embed in their respective legal jurisdictions. As a matter of fact, the aforementioned approach is warranted by the UK’s Supreme Court decision Thaler v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks dated 20 December 2023[5] wherein the highest court affirmed that “AI cannot be inventors under current UK patent law”. The Court’s decision hinged on interpreting ‘inventor’ in the Patents Act 1977, strictly for natural persons. This traditional understanding excludes non-human entities like AI. The Court clarified at paragraph 56, that an inventor “must be a natural person,” excluding AI like DABUS.

The ruling implies Thaler’s legal position might have been different had he named himself as the inventor, using DABUS as a tool. This alignment with legal norms could have satisfied Section 13, making DABUS a facilitator rather than an autonomous inventor.

Hitherto the only major jurisdiction, wherein an AI generated content (AIGC) has been afforded direct copyrightability is Beijing, through a judgement of Beijing Internet Court[6] issued on 4 December 2023, but that can still be appealed to Beijing Intellectual Property Court. The latter decision is potentially epoch-making, if it withstands the test of an appeal and taking into account NYU Stern School of Business Professor Arun Sundararajan’s statement that predicts that the world will “follow China rather than the EU[7]” concerning AI regulation. China for instance already requires watermarking[8] for AI-created content. Deepfakes are already explicitly banned in China, that is, making a video mimicking someone else without that person’s consent. Moreover, China requires the registration of all generative AI systems with the Cyberspace Administration of China[9].

The judgement by Beijing Internet Court moreover stands in stark contrastto the case Thaler v. Perlmutter et al, (D.D.C. 2023)[10], issued 18 August 2023, District of Columbia, USA, and that in 2023 was considered the first groundbreaking ruling in the AI age. On the other hand, Beijing Internet Court did stipulate that “AI-generated images should be judged on a case-by-case basis”[11]. The ruling was based upon the image’s ‘originality’, wherein the defendant adapted his work through a plethora of prompts in order to reach “aesthetic choice and personalised judgment”[12], a rationale that follows an approach analogous to the earlier explained UK’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA), section 9(3); further solidifying my best practices policy approach.

b) Taking into consideration public fears of a ‘AI takeover’, global bodies such as the UN should recommend to all member states to assuage such hesitations by safeguarding the status quo that guarantees copyright and patent entitlement linked to the interactions of AI systems with direct human creativity. That is to say, a human being must be enshrined as the innovator and creator of material produced with the aid of AI tools and robots. Albeit the latter approach will be problematic, with people wishing to grant AI personality rights and consciousness, the fact is that generative AI is still subservient to the interaction with the human wit, and shall remain thus for the foreseeable future. Already now we apply artistic creations through licensed products such as PowerPoint or Microsoft Word to our own work, so the copyright for such presentations, or contents is not granted to Microsoft Corporation.

Lately a plethora of media outlets have written articles about the possible ‘awareness’ or ‘consciousness[13]’ of AI systems, however, there is no evidence that such statements hold any accuracy as the technology is not yet so advance.

c) Concerning fair use: Since 2019 in the EU, Article 4[14] of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive permits commercial trade and data mining (TDM), unless the copyright-holder has explicitly opposed it. In the US, the flexible nature of the Fair Use doctrine could potentially encompass newer technologies like TDM, which weren’t contemplated during its formulation. In 2018, amendments to Japan’s copyright law permitted users to analyze copyrighted works for machine learning applications, ensuring the rights holder’s interests were not unfairly compromised. Analogously, Singapore’s Section 244[15] Copyright Act 2021 authorizes the reproduction of copyrighted materials for “computational data analysis” and sharing the results for verification purposes. Meaning that the trend in the developed world is allowing for TDM for innovation while safeguarding the rights of copyright-holders; an approach which should be advocated, for it fosters innovation whilst also covering copyright protection.

About the author:

Henri Estramant

Henri Estramant, LLM is a former consultant at the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology. He is an expert in AI & Crypto Assets regulation. Certified -with Honors- in AI & Law by Lund University. He holds a Master’s of Laws from VU University Amsterdam (International Business Law).

In 2023 he completed the ‘Artificial Intelligence: Implications for Business Strategy’ Executive Education program from MIT Sloan School of Management and the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL). His legal tech expertise has been extensively featured on international media.

[1] 6 V. Müller and N. Bostrom, “Future progress in artificial intelligence: A Survey of Expert Opinion, in V. Müller” (ed.), Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence (Synthese Library; Berlin: Springer 2016), at https://nickbostrom.com/papers/survey.pdf, retrieved 2-IX-2023, 12:15

[2] In its outline of the EU future strategy, the Commission simply ignores the invitation to consider the aforementioned reassessment and does not mention “electronic personhood”; see Artificial intelligence: Commission outlines a European approach to boost investment and set ethical guidelines, at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3362_en.htm, retrieved 2-IX-2023, 13:02

[3] https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/9, retrieved 2-IX-2023, 13:46

[4] https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/178, retrieved 15-IX-2023, 16:01

[5] https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2021-0201-judgment.pdf, retrieved 21-XI-2023, 10:05

[6] https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-trends/article/3243570/beijing-courts-ruling-ai-generated-content-can-be-covered-copyright-eschews-us-stand-far-reaching?campaign=3243570&module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article,  https://the-decoder.de/pekinger-internetgericht-erkennt-urheberrecht-fuer-ki-generiertes-bild-an/, retrieved 5-XII-2023, 11:10

[7] https://www.cnbc.com/video/2023/08/16/the-world-will-follow-china-rather-than-the-eu-on-ai-rules-professor.html, retrieved 16-IX-2023, 9:30

[8] https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/08/29/1078620/google-deepmind-has-launched-a-watermarking-tool-for-ai-generated-images/?utm_campaign=site_visitor.unpaid.engagement&utm_medium=tr_social&utm_source=LinkedIn, retrieved 16-IX-2023, 10:25

[9] http://www.cac.gov.cn

[10] https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2022cv01564/243956/24/, retrieved 16-IX-2023, 11:46 

[11] https://english.bjinternetcourt.gov.cn/topnews.html, retrieved 6-XII-2023, 14:46

[12] Ibid

 [13] How to Tell if Your A.I. Is Conscious:  https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/18/science/ai-computers-consciousness.html, retrieved 18-IX-2023, 18:15

[14] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj,  retrieved 18-IX-2023, 20:47

[15] Singapore Statutes Online: https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/CA2021?ProvIds=pr244-#pr244-, retrieved 20-IX-2023, 11:20

The best way to predict the future is to invent it!

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
The best way to predict the future is to invent it!

By Alexandra Paucescu

“The best way to predict the future is to invent it.” —Alan Kay

There could be no better saying than this one, to fully describe Rona Jobe.

An American with Filipino origins, Rona grew up in sunny California, graduated from prestigious UC Berkeley and then moved to Washington DC to pursue a career, at first focusing on education research and policies and later as a program analyst, working on providing and tracking grant results and successes. 

‘Eventually, I found my way into the consulting world and ended up staying, because it offered a more tangible and faster implementation cycle compared to policy and non-profit work. I enjoyed the fast-paced environment and the quicker feedback loop with clients. I loved solving problems based on research, strategy, and best practices and then implementing them.  But the international twist in my career came when we were posted in Brazil, where I continued to work, albeit remotely and in a limited way. It was during this time that I experienced first-hand how the lack of meaningful and progressive work opportunities for diplomatic spouses impacted our entire community. Back in the U.S., I ventured fully into the world of small business, first helping friends with their marketing and business plans; and then officially joining a small business to help them grow significantly over the next six years. Through that work, I found fulfillment and homed in on my passion for helping drive progress and implementation to other businesses, which I turned into a vehicle to tackle the diplomatic spouse employment opportunity issue. It’s been a diverse and exciting journey.’

Rona Jobe

She is now the CEO of a remote and asynchronous consulting firm, LVL-Up Strategies. ‘One of my proudest achievements has been building a company that supports and aims to address the problem of spousal/EFM (eligible family members) employment within the diplomatic community. LVL-Up Strategies strives to create opportunities for career-progressive work that can be carried from one diplomatic post to another, regardless of location. We hope to make an impact by not only further developing our company infrastructure, but also building an ecosystem for meaningful careers and employment for the diplomatic spouse community. We still have a long way to go, but being able to start this company and continue to build support for diplomatic spouses has made me incredibly proud.’

Rona is also Partner and Corporate Strategist for Smart Settlements, a Washington DC area title and settlements firm. She is relentless in her pursuit of new opportunities, growth, and development. ‘My interests are quite diverse. When I have a moment to myself and have “free time”, I find myself playing music, working out, hiking, cooking, learning new languages, traveling, and playing with Microsoft Excel to model/calculate an idea. These activities bring me joy, inspiration, and a sense of progress, both in my personal and professional life. I draw motivation from the concept of progress, not perfection, and I believe that achieving small victories every day, even in my hobbies, fuels my drive.’

Ever since she has joined the diplomatic circles, she recognized the opportunities but also the downsides of this kind of life. ‘Diplomatic life offers a unique opportunity to connect with people from diverse cultures and introduce them to your own. Being able to immerse myself in different languages and cultures, learning from them, and gaining a deeper appreciation for people’s backgrounds is incredibly eye-opening. I wish more people had the chance to experience it, as I believe it contributes to a deeper understanding of one another.

However, discussing the challenges and sacrifices that diplomatic spouses often face can be considered ‘taboo.’ It’s crucial to recognize that, while the diplomatic lifestyle has its rewards, it also entails significant personal and professional sacrifices for many spouses. Most people think the actual logistics and the move itself overseas would be the most challenging parts of diplomatic life. In my opinion, one of the most challenging aspects is the need to reinvent oneself with each new move abroad. Both diplomats and their spouses experience that, but while diplomats have a position within the embassy, along with the built-in day-to-day support at work, which allows for their identity to stay intact for the most part, spouses often have to give up their own careers, identities, and even their roles in the communities back home.  Learning how to advocate for themselves and knowing what resources are available at post are crucial.

It’s difficult to find and grow a career. Often diplomatic spouses end up filling this void with volunteerism, freelancing, and government employment (if any available), but the options are still highly limited. A great solution to this would be to have programs that encourage and guide employers to hire and retain diplomatic spouses, much easier to do these days, with the advancement of tools for remote work resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic years. Also, there are times when spouses must live separately from partners because of competing interests between work/life/children’s needs and the needs of the mission (also my case these days). And in that scenario, it’s usually the diplomatic spouse who takes on the heavier lift, especially when children are involved. I think that diplomats and their spouses should share more about the challenges they face and look at challenges that others in their community are facing through a more empathetic lens, to foster a more balanced understanding of their lives.’

Maybe hard to believe, but many of the stereotypes circulating in the diplomatic world are often maintained by diplomats as well. In most of the interviews that I have conducted over the last 4 years, I have tried to dismantle, together with my interlocutors, many of these myths and stereotypes, which do us no favors and make our lives more difficult.

Rona Jobe is a great example of a woman who understood that it is in her power to change the narrative and turn things around in her favor, with tenacity and perseverance.

‘Success comes by no accident, but by wit and grit’, she says, strongly reinforcing the importance of hard work and determination in achieving goals.


Rona Jobe, Founder and CEO of LVL-Up Strategies, www.lvlupstrategies.com


About the author:

Alexandra Paucescu

Alexandra Paucescu- Author of “Just a Diplomatic Spouse” Romanian, management graduate with a Master in business, cultural diplomacy and international relations studies.

She speaks Romanian, English, French, German and Italian,  gives lectures on intercultural communication and is an active NGO volunteer.

Statement by Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC on the issuance of arrest warrants in the Situation in Ukraine

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Statement by Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC on the issuance of arrest warrants in the Situation in Ukraine

On 2 February 2024, I submitted applications to Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court for warrants of arrest in the context of the Situation in Ukraine.

Today, two years after my Office opened an investigation, and one year following the issuance of the warrants against Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, the Pre-Trial Chamber has issued additional arrest warrants in relation to the following two individuals:

  • Sergei Ivanovich Kobylash, a Lieutenant General in the Russian Armed Forces who at the relevant time was Commander of the Long-Range Aviation of the Aerospace Force;
  • Viktor Nikolayevich Sokolov, an Admiral in the Russian Navy, who at the relevant time was Commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

On the basis of evidence collected and analysed by my Office pursuant to its independent investigations, the Pre-Trial Chamber has confirmed that there are reasonable grounds to believe that General Kobylash and Admiral Sokolov bear individual criminal responsibility for the following three crimes: 1) the war crime of directing attacks against civilian objects (article 8(2)(b)(ii) of the Rome Statute); 2) the war crime of causing excessive incidental harm to civilians or damage to civilian objects (article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute); and 3) the crime against humanity of inhumane acts under article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute.

In our application, my Office submitted that these individuals bear responsibility for attacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine, including strikes against power plants and sub-stations, from 10 October 2022 until at least 9 March 2023. My Office presented evidence that these strikes were directed against civilian objects, and for those installations that may have qualified as military objectives at the relevant time, the expected incidental civilian harm and damage would have been clearly excessive to the anticipated military advantage.

After reviewing the evidence submitted, the Pre-Trial Chamber has determined that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alleged campaign by the Russian Armed Forces during this period represents a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts against a civilian population, pursuant to a State policy, within the meaning of Article 7 of the Statute, establishing the basis for the finding that they may represent a crime against humanity under article 7(1)(k) of the Statute.

The Pre-Trial Chamber has also found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that these commanders are criminally responsible for committing these crimes jointly or through others, for ordering their commission, and/or for failing to exercise proper control over their subordinates who carried out the crimes.

In our application for these warrants, my Office again underlined that these acts were carried out in the context of the acts of aggression committed by Russian military forces against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine which began in 2014.

I have repeatedly emphasised that those responsible for actions that impact innocent civilians or protected objects must know that this conduct is bound by a set of rules reflected in international humanitarian law. All wars have rules. Those rules bind all without exception.  As I have made clear, these laws cannot be interpreted so as to render them devoid of meaning. This applies to the Situation in Ukraine and applies with equal vigour in all Situations for which my Office has jurisdiction.

I am grateful for the support of many partners of the Office that have allowed us to move forward in the collection of evidence in relation to this work. I wish to express my thanks in particular to the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine whose engagement has been essential in supporting the work my Office has carried out, including on the ground in Ukraine.

I will also continue to seek cooperation from the Russian Federation in relation to the Situation in Ukraine, and ensure my Office fully meets its responsibility pursuant to article 54 of the Rome Statute to investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.

Mechanism Registrar Tambadou signs Memorandum of Cooperation with BiH authorities on registration of judgements of conviction

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Mechanism Registrar Tambadou signs Memorandum of Cooperation with BiH authorities on registration of judgements of conviction

The Hague, 31 January 2024 – The Registrar of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (Mechanism), Mr. Abubacarr M. Tambadou yesterday took part in a signing ceremony with Mr. Davor Bunoza, Minister of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to conclude a Memorandum of Cooperation (Memorandum) on provision of information from judgements of convictions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Mechanism.

Signed at the premises of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH in Sarajevo, BiH, the Memorandum will enable the information on conviction from judgements of the ICTY and the Mechanism for persons who were born in BiH or are citizens of BiH to be registered in the domestic criminal records of BiH.

Speaking at the joint press conference, which was held after the signing ceremony, Registrar Tambadou stated: “Today is a watershed moment for the Mechanism and its predecessor, the ICTY, as it marks a significant chapter in the process of accountability. This Memorandum will ensure that those who committed the most serious crimes under the international law will bear the consequences of their actions beyond their term of imprisonment.”

Commending the efforts of Minister Bunoza in reaching this milestone achievement, Mr Tambadou added that, “while the signing of the Memorandum may only be the first step in many to come, it shows willingness of BiH authorities and the Mechanism to work together to achieve common goals. This Memorandum is a means to an end, and the ultimate end goal is to achieve reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I hope that the actions we have taken today will be immediately followed by an efficient and effective plan of implementation.”

In turn, Minister Bunoza stated that during the past year, right from the start of his mandate, he insisted on resolving this matter, as it creates the preconditions both for reconciliation and for accession to the European Union. 

The Mechanism is responsible for carrying out a number of essential functions of the ICTR and the ICTY, which closed in 2015 and 2017, respectively. These include the supervision of enforcement of sentences, tracking and prosecution of remaining fugitives, protection of victims and witnesses, assistance to national jurisdictions, and preservation and management of the archives. 

Prosecutor Brammertz on Mission to Kigali

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Prosecutor Brammertz on Mission to Kigali

The Hague, 31 January 2024 – Chief Prosecutor Serge Brammertz of the IRMCT Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is on an official mission to Kigali, Rwanda from 30 January to 7 February 2024.

The purpose of the Chief Prosecutor’s mission is to have high-level and technical discussions concerning ongoing efforts to achieve more justice for more victims and survivors of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. 

 In view of the upcoming 30th commemoration of the Genocide, Prosecutor Brammertz is working to bring attention to the fact that more than 1,000 suspected genocidaires remain at large, living in countries across Africa, Europe, North America and elsewhere. That so many suspected perpetrators have fled to third countries and have not yet been prosecuted for their alleged crimes is deeply distressing to the victims and survivors, as well as a significant challenge to the rule of law.

Prosecutor Brammertz is committed to assisting Rwandan and other national authorities to bring these fugitives to justice, wherever they may be found. He will meet with the Minister of Justice, the Inspector General of Police and the Prosecutor General to brief them on the OTP’s efforts to provide a range of investigative and prosecutorial support to national partners, and discuss the ongoing successful cooperation between the OTP and the Rwandan justice sector. The Chief Prosecutor will further meet with representatives of the diplomatic community to discuss how to improve multilateral law enforcement cooperation in locating, arresting and prosecuting fugitive genocidaires currently residing in other countries. 

Finally, Prosecutor Brammertz will meet with representatives of the victims and survivors to discuss the importance of securing more accountability for the crimes committed and their continued vital role in the justice process. He will also celebrate National Heroes Day and join in recognizing those who courageously demonstrated the highest integrity and commitment to the Rwandan people.

1...585960...856Page 59 of 856