Friday, 29 November 2024, Homburg, The Saarland, Germany: The first Childhood House of Saarland opened ceremoniously in the presence of The Saarland’s Premier Anke Rehlinger, HM Queen Silvia of Sweden and Dr. Oskar Prinz von Preussen, Grand Master of the Johanniter Order.
The first Childhood House/Johanniter Child Protection Competence Center in Germany is located at the University Clinic of The Saarland.
“Children are not just adults of the future. They are our here and now! We must uphold their rights and support every child to the best possible way to grow up as a strong and self-determined individual”, emphasized Queen Silvia of Sweden during the opening.
The World Childhood Foundation, founded by her, is advocating for a childhood free from sexual violence and abuse worldwide. The Childhood House offers affected children after a suspicion of abuse a trauma-sensitive environment as well as professional support through medical, psychological and legal support.
Premier Rehlinger stressed: “Protecting children is a collective task. The Childhood Home provides a central point of contact for traumatized children and is an important step in improving the protection of children and young people from violence” as per a statement published by the Saarland State Chancellery on social media.
National Member for Spain Mr José de la Mata Amaya was elected Vice-President of Eurojust today. Mr de la Mata (62) will serve a four-year mandate and work closely with the recently elected new Eurojust President Mr Michael Schmid and fellow Vice-President Ms Margarita Šniutytė-Daugėlienė, to represent the Agency and oversee its management. The new Vice-President of Eurojust will take up his duties on 18 December.
Commenting on his election by his fellow National Members in the College of Eurojust, Mr de la Mata said: “It is a great privilege and responsibility to be elected by my peers as Vice-President of Eurojust. It will be an honour to lead together the collegial work of the Agency over the next four years. Our Agency will continue to collaborate with the judicial authorities of Member States, the European institutions and other agencies in the fight against criminal networks, which are increasingly operating on a global scale. We will also continue to develop our relations with international organisations, regional networks and judicial partners outside the EU. Through this coordinated approach, we will contribute to the common objective of guaranteeing our fellow citizens effective justice after due process, in an environment that enables security and allows the development of rights and freedoms for all.”
The new Vice-President of Eurojust is a Spanish judge. He started working for the judiciary in 1987 as an investigative judge in Algeciras and Cádiz and as a judge in criminal trials in Las Palmas. He later served as a judge in the Court of Appeals of Las Palmas and Madrid, and in the High Court of Justice in Madrid. From 2015 until becoming National Member for Spain at Eurojust in December 2020, Mr de la Mata served as judge at the Central Investigative Court No 5 of the National Court.
Furthermore, Mr de la Mata worked at the Spanish General Council of the Judiciary from 1993 to 2001, as Director of the Department for Continuing Training of Judges and later as Director of the International Relations Department. From 2003 to 2009, he was Legal Advisor at the Constitutional Court, and between 2009 and 2011 Director General of Modernisation at the Spanish Ministry of Justice and Secretary-General of the Administration of Justice.
The new Vice-President has been Contact Point for Spain in the Network of National Experts on joint investigation teams and is Contact Point for Spain in the European Judicial Network. He speaks Spanish and English.
Mr de la Mata replaces the National Member for Slovenia Mr Boštjan Škrlec, who decided not to run for a second mandate. The two Vice-Presidents of the Agency carry out duties entrusted to them by the President of the Agency and represent or replace him.
As a new Vice-President, Mr de la Mata will also be a member of the Executive Board of Eurojust, which assists the College of the Agency in its management functions and oversees the preparatory work of the Administrative Director, Mr Vincent Jamin. The College is the final body responsible for the organisation and operation of Eurojust, consisting of all National Members and a representative of the European Commission, with the exception of Denmark.
International operation takes down another encrypted messaging service used by criminals. It is not the first time and will not be the last time that authorities are able to read criminals’ messages in real time
Authorities are staying on top of the encrypted messaging services that criminals use to undertake their activities. A joint investigation team (JIT) involving French and Dutch authorities has taken down another sophisticated encrypted messaging service, MATRIX. For three months, authorities were able to monitor the messages from possible criminals, which will now be used to support other investigations. During a coordinated operation supported by Eurojust and Europol, the messaging service was taken down by Dutch and French authorities and follow-up actions were executed by their Lithuanian and Spanish counterparts.
MATRIX, a messaging service made by criminals for criminals, was first discovered by Dutch authorities on the phone of a criminal convicted for the murder of a Dutch journalist in 2021. A large-scale investigation into the messaging service was initiated.
It was soon clear that the infrastructure of this platform was technically more complex than previous platforms such as Sky ECC and EncroChat. The founders were convinced that the service was superior and more secure than previous applications used by criminals. Users were only able to join the service if they received an invitation. The infrastructure to run MATRIX consisted of more than 40 servers in several countries with important servers found in France and Germany.
Cooperation between the Dutch and French authorities started through a JIT set up at Eurojust. By using innovative technology, the authorities were able to intercept the messaging service and monitor the activity on the service for three months. More than 2.3 million messages in 33 languages were intercepted and deciphered during the investigation.
The messages that were intercepted are linked to serious crimes such as international drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and money laundering. Actions to take down the service and pursue serious criminals happened on 3 December in four countries. In France, one suspect was arrested, and his house searched. In Spain, two suspects were arrested following a European Arrest Warrant from the Netherlands and six houses were searched. Six houses were searched in Lithuania. The main servers in France and Germany were taken down. During the operation EUR 145 000 cash was seized and EUR 500 000 in cryptocurrencies, as well as 4 cars and over 970 phones. A freezing order was put on a villa in Spain with an estimated value of EUR 15 million.
Criminals using the messaging service are alerted to the interception by the authorities through a splash page. Through legal requests, authorities will now be able to access the messages for their investigations.
The cross-border investigation into MATRIX is a clear example of the importance of international cooperation to fight serious organised crime. By working together in a JIT, Dutch and French authorities were able to exchange information and evidence swiftly and execute joint actions. To support investigations into the illegal activities enabled by this communication platform, an Operational Task Force (OTF) was established at Europol in June 2024 between the Netherlands, France, Lithuania, Italy and Spain. This taskforce played a key role in monitoring criminal activity on the platform. Europol’s OTF will also provide assistance with independent follow-up investigations stemming from intelligence gathered during the live phase of the operation. German authorities supported the operation with their technical expertise. Spanish authorities have been working with their French and Dutch counterparts since the early stages of the investigations.
The encrypted communication landscape has become more fragmented following the takedown of several services such as Sky ECC, EncroChat, Exclu and Ghost. Criminals, in response to the disruptions of their messaging services, have been turning to a variety of less-established or custom-built communication tools that offer varying degrees of security and anonymity. While the new fragmented landscape poses challenges for law enforcement, the takedown of established communication channels, shows that authorities are on top of the latest technologies that criminals use.
The following authorities were involved in the actions:
France: JUNALCO National Jurisdiction against Organised Crime; OFAC National Police Cybercrime division
Netherlands: Team High Tech Crime of the National Investigations; Special Operations (NIS) of the Netherlands Police; Netherlands Public Prosecution Service (National Office)
Germany: Frankfurt am Main Public Prosecutor General’s Office – ZIT; German Federal Criminal Police, Serious and Organised Crime Division
Italy: National Antimafia Directorate (D.N.A.); Central Directorate for Anti Drug Services (D.C.S.A.)
Lithuania: Prosecutor General’s Office; Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau
Spain: Central investigative Court 1 and 5 of Audiencia Nacional; Invesigative Court 1 of Marbella; Spanish National Police
Justice Must be Secured for Hundreds of Thousands of Victims and Survivors of the Assad Regime
Marking Human Rights Day
The Hague, 10 December 2024 – Events now unfolding in Syria have renewed hope among the families of an estimated 150,000 people who are missing as a result of the conflict. Some families have already experienced the joy and relief of being reunited with relatives who have been held in incommunicado detention. In the coming days, we hope that more prisoners will be released and reunited with families and that over the longer term their rights to justice and truth will be secured.
On Friday, as news came from Syria hour by hour, the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) held a conference in The Hague that brought together representatives of CSOs and International Organizations working on the issue of missing Syrians. One of the participants, Batoul Karbijha, the co-founder of the Families of Missing Asylum Seekers association, spoke eloquently about the need for victims of disappearance and the families of victims to tell their own story. She stressed that the narrative of what has happened to tens of thousands of Syrian families should not be dictated by others.
In many cases, this is a narrative of resilience and courage in the face of unimaginable odds.
Karbijha established the association of missing asylums seekers after the disappearance of her sister Maysoon, who went missing – at the age of just 20 – in August 2014 while attempting to cross the Mediterranean from Libya to Italy. She was among 170 Syrians who disappeared in the same incident and whose fate remains unknown.
Karbijha pointed out that organizations have been collecting data on missing Syrians for years but that these efforts will not bear fruit without a clear and agreed strategy among different Syrian and international agencies. “When we talk about migration, we know where mass graves are; we have data from the families but we are not connecting the data.”
It is imperative in the light of what has now taken place in Syria, that all stakeholders cooperate. This cooperation will make it possible to set in place an effective missing persons process capable of addressing the huge number of cases related to Syria. Such a process will make use of genetic science and database technology hopefully within a new Syrian legislative and institutional framework. It will have the support of authorities inside and outside Syria and it will sustain momentum through the direct engagement of families of the missing.
For justice to prevail in Syria, steps must be taken now – in the midst of present events – to protect evidence that will shed light on the circumstances in which people were detained, the charges or the absence of charges that were brought against detainees, the conditions of detention and – in cases where detainees have not survived – the circumstances of death. Places where executions and other human rights violations have occurred are crime scenes. They must be sealed and in due course examined, to protect the truth and bring those responsible for crimes to justice.
Today – International Human Rights Day – there is a window of opportunity to take a giant step forward in accounting for Syria’s missing, including those who have disappeared in the mass displacement, at home and abroad, caused by the conflict.
Working with Syrian families of the missing and Syrian civil society organizations, ICMP has collected data from more than 76,200 relatives from Syria who have reported more than 28,200 missing persons. ICMP has also received reports concerning the location of 66 sites of mass graves in addition to two detention sites, through ICMP’s Online Inquiry Center (OIC) Site Locator and encourages those with information to use these resources to help find the missing.
ICMP looks forward to enhancing its cooperation with the UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons in Syria as it becomes fully operational. And, in the light of what has happened in recent days, ICMP looks forward to working with all stakeholders in Syria to ensure that the present opportunity to bring truth and justice to victims of enforced disappearance and their families is not missed.
On International Human Rights Day it is important to underline the fact that effective action can be taken quickly. Batoul Karbijha has spent years working with various organizations, investigating her sister’s disappearance. She and tens of thousands of Syrians have sought the truth – it is incumbent on all of us to work constructively and cooperatively to help them uncover that truth and to help them secure justice.
The Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) has charged Hashim Thaçi with obstruction-of-justice offences, pursuant to a confirmed indictment.
Mr Thaçi was in the Detention Facilities of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers when served with an arrest warrant and has been charged with three counts of obstruction of official persons in performing official duties, four counts of violating secrecy of proceedings and four counts of contempt of court.
He will appear before a Pre-Trial Judge of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in relation to the additional crimes he is charged with.
The SPO also arrested Bashkim Smakaj, Isni Kilaj and Fadil Fazliu in Kosovo, pursuant to an arrest warrant and transfer order issued by a Pre-Trial Judge of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, for attempted obstruction of official persons in performing official duties and contempt of court.
Messrs Smakaj, Kilaj and Fazliu have been transferred to the Detention Facilities of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague and will also appear before the court without undue delay.
Hajredin Kuçi has been summoned to appear at the Specialist Chambers where he is charged with two counts of contempt of court.
The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) provided operational and logistic support to the SPO, and the Kosovo Police provided operational support.
The SPO takes obstruction of justice extremely seriously and will continue to investigate and to prosecute anyone and everyone involved.
The Hague, 7 December 2024: Events now taking place in Syria are changing, by the hour, the nature of a conflict that is more than a decade old. This has a direct impact on efforts to account for the estimated 150,000 people who are missing as a result of fighting and human rights violations in Syria and as a result of forced displacement and migration.
Media reports this week describe the opening of prisons and other places of detention by advancing opposition forces. Detainees who have been held incommunicado for years – in some cases for decades – have been liberated.
The release of detainees has brought unspeakable relief to victims of illegal detention and their families, in Syria and in the worldwide Syrian diaspora, as well as for other nationals, such as the families of Lebanese detainees. It must be accompanied by an effort to protect evidence so that this relief can be translated into long-term justice. Present events have created an opportunity to account for the missing and to advance measures to bring justice to victims and their families – it is therefore crucial that documentary and other evidence are safeguarded as prisons and places of mass detention are opened and also in the event that clandestine and burial places are found. Places where executions and other human rights violations have occurred are crime scenes. They must be sealed and in due course documented, to protect the truth and bring those responsible for crimes to justice. The International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), working with Syrian families of the missing and Syrian Civil society organizations, has collected data from more than 76,200 relatives from Syria who have reported more than 28,200 missing persons.
ICMP has also received reports concerning the location of 66 sites of mass graves in addition to two detention sites, through ICMP’s Online Inquiry Center (OIC) Site Locator and encourages those with information to use these resources to help find the missing. ICMP looks forward to enhancing its cooperation with the UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons in Syria as it becomes fully operational to support efforts to find the huge number of missing persons.
ICMP’s Syria/MENA Program is supported by Germany, the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom.
Geopolitical context of Venezuela / Latin America and the Caribbean
ByJorge Marinho, Júlio Ventura and Lourenço Ribeiro
With Hugo Chávez’s election to the Presidency of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in 1999, this country ceased to align itself with the U.S., having forged relations with China, Cuba and Russia (Creutzfeldt, Alvarado February 16, 2024). From the days of Chávez’s presidency to the present, with Maduro, China has been a key ally for Venezuela (Deri November 13, 2024). The way current Sino-Venezuelan relations are regarded, in the U.S., is reflected in the following title of a “Georgetown Security Studies Review” article: A Dangerous Alliance: China, Venezuela, and the Twilight of Democracy in Latin America (Deri November 13, 2024). Countries such as China, Iran and Russia are considered adversaries of the U.S. and supporters of current Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro (Annual ThreatAssessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community February 5, 2024, pp. 5 / 29). General Laura Richardson (March 12, 2024, p. 2) stated that China and Russia strategically competed with her country in Latin America and the Caribbean. In this regard, General Richardson (March 12, 2024. p. 2) specifically mentioned Venezuela.
According to Isbell (March 10, 2008), from the dawn of this century, Latin America’s geopolitical relevance has asserted itself, mainly due to its energy resources. Proof positive is that, in 2023, Venezuela had the world’s largest crude oil reserves (Country Analysis Brief: Venezuela February 2024, p. 5). Venezuelan natural resources also include natural gas, gold, diamonds, iron, bauxite, among other minerals (Venezuela: Facts and Figures). Venezuela is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
In Latin America, which is known as the backyard of the U.S., the Russians, Chinese and Iranians have been more welcome than the Americans (Isbell March 10, 2008). This is a situation that the U.S. has been unable to reverse (Isbell March 10, 2008). With the end of the Monroe Doctrine, this nation turns its gaze toward Asia, chiefly to China (Isbell March 10, 2008). When it comes to rivaling China and Russia, this reduced U.S. interest and lack of action relative to Latin America and the Caribbean is a strategic error that needs to be urgently corrected, according to some analysts (Kroenig, et alii February 12, 2024). To this end, a Rand Corporation study recommends that the U.S. carefully monitor what’s going on in Latin America and the Caribbean and that it get ready to deal with a variety of emerging threats from countries hostile to the U.S., such as Venezuela (Chindea, et alii 2023, p. vi).
From the early 21st century, compared to the period subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s interest in Latin America has grown, for several reasons, among them relations with the U.S. taking a downturn (Jutten October 2024, p. 2). Russia also exploits, in its favor, the left’s political triumph, in several countries in said region, including Venezuela, along with anti-American discourse from various Latin-American political leaders (Jutten October 2024, p. 2). Venezuela can be regarded as a country which engages in anti-American diplomatic initiatives in the region’s organizations to which it belongs (Carothers, Feldman December 13, 2023).
Since 2016, Latin America has been present in Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) (Jutten October 2024, p. 2). In 2023, while mentioning Venezuela, the FPC highlights the forging of ties between Russia and Latin America and the Caribbean, together with various regional political and economic organizations (TheConcept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation March 31, 2023). This is related to Russia’s goal of setting up a multipolar international system, while prioritizing doing away with remnants of dominance from the U.S. and other non-friendly States in global affairs (The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the RussianFederation March 31, 2023).
Russian President Putin is committed to diminishing U.S. global influence, even in the Americas. This is why Venezuela is particularly relevant (Vicenzino February 2, 2019). Recently, while directly addressing Venezuelan President Maduro, in Kazan, Russia, Putin underscored the lasting and solid relations between their two countries (Meeting with President of Venezuela Nicolas Maduro October 23, 2024). On that same occasion, Maduro reaffirmed Venezuela’s willingness to keep on cooperating with the Russian State in many areas (Meeting with President of Venezuela Nicolas Maduro October 23, 2024). A few days later, on November 7, 2024, Russia strengthened ties with Venezuela in the spheres of intelligence, counter-espionage and energy (PVDSA and RosneftMonopolize the Bulk of New Venezuela-Russia Agreements November 8, 2024). Russian Deputy Prime Minister Chernyshenko regarded Venezuela as a strategic partner and powerful ally of Russia in Latin America (PVDSA and Rosneft Monopolize the Bulk of New Venezuela-Russia Agreements November 8, 2024).
From the standpoint of various experts, the Primakov Doctrine has guided relations between Russia and countries in Latin America and the Caribbean: Russia needs to get involved with the U.S.’s neighbors in response to American interference in nations Moscow considers to be in its sphere of influence (Ziemer, et alii July 25, 2024). Said response includes the military domain, for instance in the context of the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine (Ziemer, et alii July 25, 2024). There are those who regard a Russian warship moored at a Venezuelan port, in August 2024, as a reciprocal measure relative to U.S. support of Ukraine (Levaggi, Rouvinski August 15, 2024). In several aspects, including military ones, Russia’s backing of Maduro can not only remain in place but even further strengthen, despite Russia’s being committed in an armed conflict with Ukraine (Levaggi, Rouvinski August 15, 2024). In Ellis’ view (September 15, 2024), Russia’s current power-projecting capabilities are not as pronounced as they were during the Cold War years, with military limitations due to the conflict with Ukraine. However, Putin decided to send military resources to Latin America and the Caribbean, so that, along with its partners, such as Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, Russia can show its adversaries in that part of the world that it constitutes a threat to regional security (Ellis September 15, 2024).
As part of Latin America and the Caribbean, a significant aspect of Chavism is the creation of regional organizations, such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and the Union of the South American Nations (UNASUR), for the purpose of minimizing U.S. influence in that geographical area (Creutzfeldt, Alvarado February 16, 2024). This was regarded by China as an opportunity to start wielding greater influence in said region (Creutzfeldt, Alvarado February 16, 2024). According to Margaret Myers (May 7, 2020), China’s success in Latin America depends on its relations with regional organizations and their ability and efficiency. With both Chávez and Maduro, Venezuela has contributed toward China’s involvement in those organizations (Creutzfeldt, Alvarado February 16, 2024). In 2023, China’s President Xi Jinping asserted his nation’s backing of regional integration of Latin American and Caribbean countries (Barrios, Rio June 23, 2023). In June 2024, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stressed that Venezuela can rely on China to have a greater role in Latin America (Arain June 5, 2024). China attributes a high degree of importance to its ties with Venezuela (Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular PressConference on July 29, 2024). China’s Belt and Road Initiative includes Latin America, which has the U.S. worried (Chiodi, Anh March 18, 2022).
China’s military ties with several Latin American countries and, particularly, with Venezuela are a reality (Roy June 15, 2023). China is referred to as a major supplier of military hardware to Venezuela (Vidarte, Díaz August 1, 2024). However, according to a Rand Corporation study, China does not start off by raising the military aspect of its cooperation with Latin America, for several reasons, including a limited Chinese expeditionary capability and lack of resources, namely on the part of the Navy, to operate in the Western Hemisphere, even for a reduced period of time (Chindea, et alii 2023, p. 40).
Iran seeks to strengthen its ties with various Latin American countries, including Venezuela (Iran Congratulates Venezuela on Successful Presidential Election July 29, 2024). Venezuela’s relations with Iran, which date back to before the 1979 Iranian Revolution, stepped up with President Chávez, enabling Iran to establish a diplomatic and commercial expansion in Latin America (Rendon, Fernandez October 19, 2020). Currently, Iran counteracts U.S. pressure to overthrow President Nicolás Maduro (Rendon, Fernandez October 19, 2020). The alliance between Iran and Venezuela aims to overcome the difficulties experienced by these two countries, due to U.S. sanctions imposed upon them (Iran Congratulates Venezuela on Successful Presidential Election July 29, 2024). In 2023, then-Iranian President Raisi stated that his country’s relationship to Venezuela is a strategic one, as he underscored that the two States have common interests and enemies (Gamba, Mehdi June 13, 2023). According to Amal Mokhtar (April 2024, p. 64), Iran is looking to forge alliances against the U.S. In the military sphere, Iran has provided missiles, drones and other equipment to Venezuela, thereby contributed toward increasing this Latin American country’s power-projecting capabilities in its region (Prince October 24, 2024). In Mokhtar’s view (April 2024, p. 64), Latin American countries’ growing interest in engaging in military cooperation with Iran has left the U.S. concerned.
Media / psychological warfare
Influence operations can be regarded as instruments that governments use as part of strategic geopolitical competition (Sin, et alii December 2021, p. 3). These operations can be carried out by both state and non-state actors (Rasheed April 2024, p. 5). Influence operations include psychological, political, subversive, economic and technological means, for the purpose of affecting the security and governance of a given targeted country (Rasheed April 2024, p. 5). Said operations, comprising many common aspects with both psychological and information operations, amount to a sphere of intelligence that is currently an essential tool for pursuing certain geopolitical goals, without directly involving military force (Rasheed April 2024, p. 5). Faruk Hadzic (February 11, 2021) even uses the expression “psychological geopolitical warfare”.
The title of an article by Puhr and Kupfer (January 17, 2023) reveals that which is at issue with the subject matter under analysis: Media in the Geopolitical Crossfire. Psychological operations can include conveying a message, via specific media, so as to influence a target audience (Kaprisma 2020, p. 225). The latter can comprise a large number of people or a single individual; in order for a certain message to reach them, the sender can use traditional media and, in the Internet age, social media, text messaging and email, with a great deal of precision. In part, the power of psychological operations results from progress in the field of information and communication technologies, chiefly from the start of this century (Rashi, Schleifer May 9, 2023).
According to Parezanovic and Prorokovic (2024, p. 43), psychological operations and international relations are currently inseparable. Political warfare encompasses psychological warfare (Coombs April 21, 2021). This type of activities, which seeks to discredit political adversaries and sway foreign affairs through disinformation, for instance, can take place even under circumstances not regarded as warfare (Uppal August 2, 2020).
In 2007, then-President Chávez stated that the U.S. was using psychological warfare for the purpose of overthrowing his government (Chavez Warns of ‘Resistance War’ Against U.S. June 25, 2007). Hugo Chávez added that his country was also being the target of both media and political warfare (Carroll June 26, 2007). Specifically, Chávez asserted that the U.S. television station CNN was part of that nation’s psychological warfare, in order to create instability on Venezuelan soil (Venezuela Chávez: CNN May Be Instigating My Murder November 28, 2007). (Said TV station considered their journalism pieces to be objective (Venezuela Chávez: CNN May Be Instigating My Murder November 28, 2007)).
Ernesto Villegas, Venezuela’s Information and Communications Minister in 2012-2013, pointed out that, by taking the topic of then-President Chávez’s health, transnational media mounted a psychological war bent on destabilizing his country (Fraga January 7, 2013). In 2014, President Nicolás Maduro threatened legal action against the local and international press, on the grounds that such media were involved in psychological warfare that sought to create political instability in Venezuela (Wyss September 18, 2014). Some two years later, Maduro went on a Venezuelan public television station to announce that he was considering the possibility of legal action against Spanish media, accusing them of setting up ongoing psychological war against his government (Scharfenberg June 2, 2016). Venezuela’s current President stated that, presumably, the U.S. was vested in psychological warfare to try to remove him from power (US ‘Childish’ in Conducting Foreign Policy, Says Venezuela’s Maduro January 30, 2019).
On September 25, 2024, in New York, at the United Nations General Assembly, Venezuela’s Minister of People’s Power for Foreign Affairs stated that the U.S. sparked psychological wars against countries such as his own, for the purpose of causing instability (Statement Delivered by H.E. Mr. Yvan Gil Pinto September 25, 2024). In that same regard, recently, as reported by Xinhua, China’s news agency, Venezuelan President Maduro gave a speech as part of the 19th Anniversary of the Strategic Operational Command of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces, giving rise to news under the following headline: U.S. Resorts to ‘Psychological Warfare’ Against Venezuela: Maduro (September 27, 2024). This head of state stressed that the main component of the hybrid war affecting Venezuela is psychological in nature, and that its power goes by way of not only traditional media but also social media (U.S. Resorts to ‘Psychological Warfare’ Against Venezuela: Maduro September, 27 2024).
Professor Esther Mobilia’s analysis
In an exclusive interview for this article, Professor Esther Mobilia, Director of the Central University of Venezuela’s International Relations Department, pointed out that Latin America is currently not a foreign policy priority for the U.S., especially considering the Trump Administration. The interviewee thinks that, during the presidential campaign, said region was relevant only as concerns domestic policy and national security. Mobilia asserted that, under President Joe Biden, the U.S. administration sought to resume ties with Latin America, without ceasing to disseminate democratic values or antagonizing Venezuela. In this regard, Esther Mobilia added, however, that relations between the U.S. and Venezuela were guided by a sort of coexistence without significantly escalating tensions but under prevailing rhetorical pressure.
Professor Esther Mobilia highlighted the following Venezuelan foreign policy interests: in the economic sphere, closer relations with China; in the geopolitical domain, cooperation with Russia; furthering the anti-American agenda. However, these keystones may vary. This is because, according to this expert, Venezuela’s foreign policy is influenced by this nation’s need to seek international backing, following the July 28, 2024 elections, and to obtain international recognition of Maduro’s victory. Mobilia underlined that Venezuela’s priority, on the international stage, is to see Nicolás Maduro recognized as President. In Professor Mobilia’s view, relative to the international acceptance of Venezuela’s latest presidential election results, for the Biden Administration, more than U.S. pressure on President Maduro, it would be preferable for Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Colombia, to wield influence instead of the U.S. This way, according to the interviewee, the U.S. would avoid narratives that include an aspect known to Latin American republics in the past: American interventionism.
Esther Mobilia stated that, in October 2024, Venezuela made a heavy-handed attempt to join BRICS, since, relative to said organization, it aimed to gain support from one of the fastest-growing economies, in the last few years. This scholar explained that Brazil was against Venezuela joining BRICS because, regarding the latter’s last presidential election, Brasilia does not recognize the results pointing to Maduro as President.
As for Brazilian President Lula da Silva and Venezuela’s President possibly vying for leadership in Latin America, Mobilia emphasized that Caracas does not have the resources to rival Brazil and that, in terms of political leadership, Nicolás Maduro lacks charisma to stir up the masses.
From Esther Mobilia’s standpoint, Venezuela’s territorial aspirations / claims regarding Essequibo (Guyana) serve to draw the community’s attention away from the issue of presidential elections, including disqualifying certain significant opposition candidates. This expert considered that, with said aspirations / claims, the idea is also to promote the national sentiment of Venezuelans: that which has always been regarded as being at issue is the loss of a territory that has historically belonged to Venezuela. Mobilia pointed out that Guyana chooses a narrative in which it appears as the weaker side, whereas Venezuela is portrayed as the interventionist State. The way this scholar sees it, the issue of legitimacy and the lack of recognition of the results of Venezuela’s recent presidential election will restrict any type of Venezuelan claim regarding Essequibo.
Esther Mobilia feels that, with Donald Trump’s upcoming presidency starting in January 2025, the issue of Taiwan and rivalries with China will be more present in U.S. foreign policy. From this interviewee’s standpoint, the U.S. will use public diplomacy instruments to keep constraining Venezuela; however, in relation to this Latin-American country, the interests of U.S. oil companies can lead to careful management of the situation. Still, as Mobilia underlined, recent statements from some members of Trump’s new cabinet point to the possibility of Venezuela being even more pressured with new sanctions.
Professor Esther Mobilia’s analysis also concerned media-related aspects. In this expert’s view, Venezuelan public diplomacy mechanisms currently try to portray the government as being dynamic, inclusive and democratic and showing an alternative face relative to that which can be considered traditional Chavism while in power until 2013. Mobilia noted that, within the context of public diplomacy, Venezuela not only uses television networks (for instance, Telesur) but also hired personalities to bolster a certain image, through paid advertising and social networks. At media level, while this amounts to strategies that various governments put into practice, its effectiveness, as concerns Venezuela, according to Mobilia, is not as great as Caracas would like. As per Professor Esther Mobilia, this discrepancy is due to disseminating news and reports from reputable international organizations that paint a different picture of the Venezuelan administration.
Conclusion
Venezuela’s current geopolitical positioning is linked to a crucial development: in 1999, Hugo Chávez’s victory in presidential elections. This President was against U.S. hegemony in Latin America and the Caribbean, until his death in 2013. This opposition to the U.S. somehow continued with Venezuela’s next President, Nicolás Maduro, from 2013 to the present.
Another aspect currently influencing Venezuelan foreign policy is the issue of international recognition of Maduro’s victory in the last presidential elections, on July 28, 2024. However, there are those who maintain that U.S. pressures in relation to the results of said elections are managed in order for Venezuela to keep the door from completely closing off to U.S. companies interested in Venezuelan crude oil reserves. On top of the geographic location, Venezuela’s natural wealth, including energy and mineral resources, is attractive to several foreign powers. In reality, countries’ interests are present in international relations.
Countries strategically rivaling the U.S., such as China, Iran and Russia, back a number of Latin-American and Caribbean nations, in the political, economic and military spheres, assigning Venezuela considerable importance. Said foreign powers also show interest in regional organizations. All this is certainly taken into account by the U.S., even though Washington’s attention may possibly be geared more to the Far East, particularly to China, than to Latin-American and Caribbean countries. This could end up still taking place with the next U.S. Administration, led by Donald Trump, despite not ruling out more sanctions on Venezuela in the future. Nevertheless, the U.S. is actually not keeping still, and, as such, it monitors and is active in Latin America and the Caribbean, for the purpose of countering the negative effects resulting from ties forged by adversary powers with countries in said region. As part of this, the U.S. may, for example, turn to several kinds of actions that are interrelated: influence operations / information warfare / political warfare / psychological warfare. All this can be carried out by state and non-state actors, in order to pursue certain geopolitical goals, through various instruments, such as traditional and social media. This subject matter takes on greater importance in international relations. In publicly disseminated narratives, with a rhetorical component, several senior Venezuelan political officials, such as Presidents Chávez and Maduro, maintained that the U.S. has intended to destabilize Venezuela using both media and psychological warfare.
Through a number of instruments, such as traditional media and social media, Venezuelan public diplomacy currently attempts to portray that nation’s government with an alternative face to traditional Chavism and with an image of dynamism and a democratic nature. The efficiency of said public diplomacy depends on its ability to override a different image of Venezuela that is disseminated by reputable international organizations. Strategic communication is an essential aspect in the sphere of geopolitical competition.
This article results from both bibliographical research and an exclusive interview with Professor Esther Mobilia, Director of the Central University of Venezuela’s International Relations Department.
About the authors:
Jorge Marinho
Jorge Marinho: PhD in Communication Sciences, BA in International Journalism
Júlio Ventura
Júlio Ventura: MA in Political Science and International Relations, BA in Law, member of the European Parliament trainee (Brussels, Belgium)
Lourenço Ribeiro
Lourenço Ribeiro: BA in Sociology, MA student in Public Policy at Iscte – University Institute of Lisbon (Portugal)
The maritime security of the Indian Ocean region (IOR) has attracted increased attention due to the intensifying US-China rivalry. The IOR refers to the Indian Ocean (IO) and 38 states surrounding it. It stands at a crossroads of global trade and energy; hence, its security is vital amid geopolitical competition among the global and regional powers. As an established power, the US identifies China as a threat to regional and international order and seeks to counter it through its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS).
As an emerging power, China claims multilateralism as a replacement for the current world order and leverages its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to achieve its objectives. The US-China rivalry is reshaping the maritime security dynamics in IOR through militarisation. However, the two powers may not resort to an armed conflict due to underlying reasons that necessitate a peaceful coexistence.
The strategic importance of the IOR is paramount. It serves as a vital conduit for global maritime trade, connecting trade destinations across the globe, including the Asia Pacific, South Asia, West Asia, Africa, and Europe. Annually, over 100,000 ships transit the seven strategic straits of the Ocean, facilitating about 80% of the world’s trade. This underscores the critical role the IO plays in global trade and security. The pie chart represents the international average annual trade volume, while Table 1 reveals that 65-70% of global oil trade transits the straits as of mid-2023. The straits of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Malacca remain pivotal, with 43% of China’s oil trade and 18% of the US oil trade passing through them as of September 2024.
By Adrak HussainBy Adrak Hussain
Various task forces of different states are active in the region for collective security against piracy, smuggling, and terrorism, which also serve strategic purposes like dominating the choke points. These forces include the Combined Maritime Force of 38 nations led by the US, which includes Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, CTF 152, CTF 153, and CTF 154; the US Fifth Fleet; EU Naval Force-Operation Atlanta; French Carrier Strike Group (CSG); Indian Navy Task Force; Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Task Force; Pakistan Navy Task Force, TF 86; Iran Navy, IRGC Naval Force; Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force and Littoral Response Group of United Kingdom. The region’s importance justifies the deployment of task forces and requires cooperation for collective security and governance, but the strategies of the US and China speak otherwise.
“Whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia. In the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.”Alfred Thayer Mahan
In the maritime arena of IOR, the US strategy is to maintain its naval dominance, freedom of navigation and trade, control over choke points, and counter China’s rising influence. The US IPS views China as a primary threat seeking hegemony by displacing the US and rules-based international order through BRI and naval modernisation. The US has increased its maritime presence and allied with India, a member of the QUAD alliance, empowering it as a counter-balancing power to China in IOR through agreements like the Logistic Exchange Memorandum of Exchange (LEMOA), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA).
In addition to the already established bases near the strategic straits, the US is seeking a naval base in Bangladesh’s Saint Martin Island in the Bay of Bengal to monitor the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). In short, the primary goal of the US is to counter the so-called Chinese “String of Pearls Strategy”. This strategy, often attributed to China, involves establishing a military and commercial facilities network in the IOR, which could potentially be used to protect China’s maritime trade routes and project its influence in the region.
The maritime strategy of China has significantly evolved to include “Far Seas Protection” besides “Near Seas Defence”. This concept of ‘Far Seas Protection’ refers to China’s strategy of extending its naval presence and influence beyond its immediate maritime borders, particularly in the IOR. However, its strategy in IOR lacks any reference in the 2019 defence white paper titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era”. China aims to secure a critical foothold in IOR through BRI by establishing ports and infrastructure across IOR, including ports in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan.
China has maintained a low naval presence to protect its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) with the help of a single PLAN Task Force and a military support base in Djibouti. However, it conducts naval exercises with regional powers like Pakistan and Iran and extra-regional powers like Russia in the IO, signalling its readiness to cooperate with other states while demonstrating its resolve to protect its maritime interests.
The US-China rivalry and the consequent strategies seriously affect the region’s maritime security. Firstly, it led to the militarisation of the choke points, as indicated by increased surveillance, deployments of naval forces, and alliance building. It will lead to a struggle for a balance of power and nuclear deterrence. Secondly, the rivalry may threaten the freedom of trade in times of tension, which is not in their interest as both powers depend on IO for trade. In addition, the rivalry impacts the strategic calculus of regional states, which could cause an arms race in the IO.
Finally, it decreases the chances of cooperation among the rival powers. However, they have not resorted to a zero-sum game, in which the other party’s loss balances one party’s gain. They undermined the governance and collective security against piracy, smuggling, and terrorism by complicating maritime security. All these factors necessitate a peaceful coexistence for the two powers in IOR.
Since the US dominates the choke points of IOR, China needs to reduce its dependence on them to avoid the choke points dilemma, avoid militarisation, and maintain peace in the maritime domain of IOR. The Littoral States of IO, like Thailand, Myanmar, and Pakistan, can provide alternative paths for Chinese trade that bypass the Malacca Strait. However, Pakistan provides the best alternative as it will significantly reduce the time and cost of transportation for Chinese trade, providing the shortest route to reach the energy-rich Middle East and beyond.
The integration of Iran into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will provide an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz for energy trade between Iran and China. By including Iraq and Syria in BRI and establishing a land route from Pakistan to the Mediterranean, China can also avoid the Bab-el-Mandeb and Suez Canal. In short, Pakistan’s geographical position, better relations with China, and hosting the CPEC provide the best option for China to avoid the US-dominated choke points and reduce the threat to maritime security.
About the author:
Adrak Hussain
Adrak Hussain, pursuing Mphil in strategic studies from national defence university.
Currently working as an intern at DSS branch ISSRA. strategic interests include defence, foreign policy, maritime security, great power strategies and warfare
French and German authorities, supported by Eurojust and Europol, have rolled up a criminal network responsible for transporting equipment used to smuggle migrants to the United Kingdom. An international operation took place on 4 December where five suspects were arrested in France and eight suspects were arrested in Germany.
Investigations into the criminal network uncovered a sophisticated operation across multiple countries. Nautical equipment such as inflatable boats, life vests and engines was purchased in Turkey and then taken to a warehouse in Germany. Human smugglers then picked up the equipment from the warehouse to take it to the coast of northern France. From there, the smugglers used low-quality inflatable boats to smuggle migrants over the Channel to the United Kingdom.
Today’s operation follows a cross-border investigation between French and German authorities, coordinated by Eurojust and Europol. French authorities became aware of the network’s activities and found that most of the suspects to be living Germany. At Eurojust, the authorities worked together to define a strategy to take down the network and arrest the suspects. Law enforcement agencies from France and Germany worked together on this operation through a dedicated Europol Operational Taskforce. A coordination centre at Eurojust on 4 December ensured that authorities were able to cooperate in real time while actions were executed.
Over 500 German officers were deployed in the early hours of 4 December to take down the criminal network and execute European Arrest Warrants and European Investigation Orders from France. During the operations on 4 December, 13 suspects were arrested, including a High Value Target. Authorities searched 15 homes and 10 warehouses in Germany. They were able to seize supplies such as inflatable boats, flotation devices for children, air pumps and engines, as well as electronic devices, arms and cash.
The following authorities were involved in the actions:
France: JIRS Lille (Interregional Specialised Jurisdiction) – Court of Lille; French Border Police.
Germany: Public Prosecutor’s Office Düsseldorf; German Federal Police
On 3 December 2024, the International Criminal Court and the Government of the Republic of Poland have concluded an Agreement on the Enforcement of Sentences.
The President of the Court, Judge Tomoko Akane, and Ms Maria Ejchart, Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Poland, signed the agreement during a plenary session at the twenty-third meeting of the Court’s Assembly of States Parties in The Hague. Under the agreement, persons convicted by the ICC may serve sentences of imprisonment in Poland if so decided by the Court and accepted by the Government of Poland.
Emphasizing that the enforcement of sentences is a crucial element of a well-functioning and complete criminal justice system, President Tomoko Akane thanked Poland for its unwavering support and stated:
“Through today’s signature of an enforcement agreement with the Court, Poland demonstrates once more its strong commitment to international criminal justice and to enabling the proper functioning of the Court in all its aspects. Such voluntary cooperation is all the most important in challenging times and as we see more cases reaching the enforcement stage.”
She also expressed hope that other States Parties will follow the example of Poland and show their support to the work of the Court by signing an agreement on the enforcement of sentences.
Undersecretary of State Maria Ejchart said that: “We do want the conclusion of this agreement to indicate that the Republic of Poland fulfills its international obligations, particularly in the area of prosecuting and punishing international crimes. Let it also be tangible proof of the steadfast support of Poland extended to the Court and the Rome Statute system. By entering into this agreement, Poland demonstrates its unwavering commitment to ensuring the proper functioning of the Court.”
The Rome Statute, the Court’s founding treaty, provides that sentences of imprisonment imposed by the ICC “shall be served in a State designated by the Court from a list of States which have indicated to the Court their willingness to accept sentenced persons”.
Similar agreements on the enforcement of sentences are currently in force between the ICC and Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Mali, Norway, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland .
