“In the multipolar era, security no longer depends solely on the strength of alliances, but also on the wisdom with which they adapt their objectives to a world in constant transformation.”

By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu

The NATO Summit in Ankara (7–8 July 2026) takes place against a strategic backdrop marked by the convergence of profound transformations in the international security environment. Beyond implementing the decisions adopted at the Hague Summit, the meeting in the Turkish capital represents an important stage in the adaptation of the North Atlantic Alliance to a far more complex strategic landscape, where competition with the Russian Federation coexists with instability in the Middle East, the growing strategic importance of the Black Sea region, the consolidation of Turkey’s strategic role, and the redistribution of responsibilities between the United States and its European allies.

This article examines the principal dimensions of this transformation, highlighting the geopolitical significance of holding the summit in Ankara, the implications of the Israeli-Iranian conflict for NATO’s agenda, the evolution of transatlantic relations, the prospects for Ukraine’s accession, and the consolidation of the Black Sea region as one of the emerging centres of gravity of Euro-Atlantic security. Particular attention is devoted to Romania’s position, the mandate approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence, and the need to reconcile Allied solidarity with the consistent promotion of national interests.

The central argument of this study is that the Ankara NATO Summit should not be interpreted solely through the individual decisions it is expected to adopt, but rather as the manifestation of a broader process transforming the Alliance into an organisation capable of managing multiple, interconnected strategic challenges simultaneously. In this new environment, NATO’s success will depend not only on strengthening its military capabilities but also on preserving political cohesion and on the ability of member states to contribute actively to defining and advancing common strategic interests.

One year after the NATO Summit in The Hague (24–25 June 2025), and against the backdrop of an international environment undergoing accelerated transformation, the leaders of the Alliance’s thirty-two member states will gather in Ankara for a meeting whose significance extends far beyond that of a routine summit. While NATO summits in recent years have been dominated almost exclusively by the Alliance’s response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the meeting in the Turkish capital takes place within a far more complex strategic environment, in which NATO is called upon to address simultaneously the challenges originating from Eastern Europe, the Black Sea region, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific.

The conflict between Israel and Iran, Turkey’s strategic repositioning, the acceleration of Europe’s defence transformation, increasing pressure to redistribute responsibilities between the United States and its European allies, and the intensifying strategic competition between Washington and Beijing have considerably expanded the agenda of the Ankara Summit. Consequently, the meeting will assess not only the implementation of the decisions adopted at The Hague[1] but also NATO’s ability to adapt to a multipolar world characterised by the simultaneous emergence of multiple centres of power and increasingly interconnected crises.

It is equally significant that the summit is being hosted by Turkey. In recent years, Ankara has consolidated its position as an indispensable actor within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture by capitalising on its unique geographical location at the crossroads of Europe, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, by rapidly developing its defence industry, and by maintaining the capacity to engage simultaneously with states and actors that are themselves strategic competitors. From this perspective, the selection of Ankara as the host city also constitutes implicit recognition of Turkey’s growing importance within the Alliance.

For Romania, the summit carries particular significance. Its strategic position on the Black Sea, its logistical role in supporting Ukraine, the ongoing development of military infrastructure, and the responsibilities it has assumed on NATO’s Eastern Flank give Bucharest a direct stake in the decisions to be adopted. The mandate approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence confirms Romania’s continued commitment to NATO. At the same time, it should place greater emphasis on the need to promote national interests firmly and consistently within an Alliance that is itself undergoing a profound process of transformation.

The central thesis of this article is that the NATO Summit in Ankara will not be remembered because of a single spectacular decision, but because it confirms a structural transformation of the Alliance. NATO is evolving from an organisation focused primarily on safeguarding the Euro-Atlantic area into an alliance required to respond simultaneously to challenges arising across multiple strategic theatres while redistributing responsibilities between the United States and its European allies. Within this new strategic configuration, Turkey is consolidating its role as a geopolitical pivot, while Romania should demonstrate that it is capable of combining the credibility of a reliable Ally with the consistent and determined promotion of its own national interests.

1. NATO After The Hague: From Political Commitments to Strategic Implementation

The NATO Summit in Ankara cannot be understood independently of the decisions adopted shortly beforehand in The Hague. Whereas the meeting in the Netherlands was dominated by the adoption of ambitious political and financial commitments, Ankara will constitute the Alliance’s first real test of its ability to translate those commitments into concrete action. In this sense, the two summits should be viewed as successive stages of the same process of strategic adaptation.

This orientation has also been confirmed by recent statements made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who emphasised that the Ankara Summit should be a summit of “implementation and delivery”, with the focus shifting from adopting new political objectives to the concrete execution of the decisions taken at The Hague. From this perspective, Ankara 2026 appears less as a summit of declarations than as one dedicated to strategic execution.

The decisions adopted at The Hague reflect a profound paradigm shift. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance is calling upon its member states not only to increase defence spending but also to develop an industrial base capable of sustaining a prolonged military effort, strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure, accelerate the production of armaments and ammunition, and adapt regional defence plans to a security environment characterised by simultaneous and multidirectional threats.

The commitment to allocate 5% of GDP to defence and security represents far more than a simple increase in military expenditure. It reflects recognition that the current strategic environment requires a long-term effort comparable in scale to the periods of peak strategic competition during the Cold War. At the same time, the emphasis placed on strengthening the defence industrial base demonstrates that the lessons of the war in Ukraine have been understood: technological superiority cannot be sustained without an industrial capacity capable of supporting high-intensity warfare over an extended period.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s visit to Washington ahead of the summit, together with the subsequent messages issued by the U.S. administration, further confirms that Ankara will serve as the first test of the renewed transatlantic relationship following The Hague Summit. Accordingly, the meeting is intended not merely to assess the implementation of technical decisions but also to reinforce political consensus on the redistribution of responsibilities between the United States and its European allies in an increasingly complex strategic environment.

Thus, Ankara 2026 may be interpreted as the moment of consolidation of what might be described as NATO 3.0. NATO 1.0 was the Alliance of the Cold War, centred on deterring the Soviet Union and ensuring the collective defence of the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO 2.0 was the Alliance of the post-Cold War unipolar era, primarily focused on enlargement, crisis management, and out-of-area operations. NATO 3.0 represents a return to deterrence and collective defence, but within a far more complex strategic environment in which Europe is expected to assume a greater share of conventional defence responsibilities, while the United States increasingly reallocates its strategic attention toward global competition.

2. Ankara 2026 – A Summit of Leaders in Transition

The NATO Summit in Ankara will bring together not only heads of state and government but also leaders at different stages of political consolidation or transition. In the United Kingdom, the recent change of government has reduced London’s capacity to promote long-term strategic initiatives. In France, domestic political difficulties have narrowed the President’s room for manoeuvre. In Germany, the new governing coalition is still defining its priorities in the fields of security and defence. At the same time, the United States continues its process of recalibrating the transatlantic relationship. In Romania, the government was dismissed through a vote of no confidence approximately two months ago, and no parliamentary majority has yet emerged to endorse a new executive.

Against this backdrop, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and Turkey, as the host nation, will shoulder an additional responsibility: not only managing the official summit agenda but also preserving the Alliance’s political cohesion at a time when several of its principal member states are undergoing significant domestic political change.

Paradoxically, at a time when the international security environment is becoming increasingly dangerous, NATO’s principal challenge is not the lack of military power but the preservation of coherent and sustained political will within the Alliance. Ankara 2026 will test precisely this capacity for cohesion.

3. Turkey – A Pivot of the New Euro-Atlantic Strategic Architecture

The selection of Ankara as the host of the 2026 NATO Summit is neither a mere organisational decision nor simply the result of the customary rotation among Allied member states. Rather, it reflects a strategic reality that has become increasingly evident in recent years: Turkey has consolidated its position as an indispensable actor[2] within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and in the simultaneous management of multiple geopolitical theatres characterised by competition and conflict.

Turkey’s geographical location, its control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits[3], its status as NATO’s second-largest conventional military power, and the remarkable development of its defence industry have endowed it with a role that neither the United States nor Europe can any longer afford to ignore. Whereas a decade ago Ankara was frequently portrayed as NATO’s “difficult ally,” recent developments demonstrate that it has become one of the indispensable pillars of regional security, capable of influencing simultaneously developments in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Syria, Iraq, and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Over recent months, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has consistently conveyed the same strategic message regardless of the audience he addressed. His speech delivered during the ceremony marking the transfer of a military vessel to Romania, his address to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Ankara, and his statements regarding the Alliance’s future all shared a common theme: the necessity of strengthening national defence capabilities, reinforcing the domestic defence industry, and establishing Turkey as a provider of security rather than merely a beneficiary of NATO’s security guarantees. This consistency suggests the existence of a coherent strategic vision and a long-term project regarding Turkey’s international role.

At the same time, relations between Ankara and Washington are entering a new phase of recalibration. President Donald Trump’s statement that he would attend the summit “out of respect for Erdoğan” goes well beyond a simple diplomatic courtesy[4]. It reflects recognition that direct dialogue with Ankara has once again become essential for the effective functioning of the Alliance and for managing regional strategic challenges. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s visit to Washington prior to the summit likewise confirms the importance attached to preserving transatlantic cohesion at a time when American strategic priorities increasingly extend beyond the European theatre.

The summit also takes place against the backdrop of unprecedented tensions between Turkey and Israel. Diverging positions over the conflict in Gaza, differing approaches toward Iran, and the recent decision by the Israeli government to recognise the Armenian genocide have further widened the political distance between Ankara and Jerusalem. For the United States, this development further complicates the strategic equation, as Washington must simultaneously manage relations with two indispensable partners, each playing a critical role within its respective geopolitical sphere. Israel remains America’s principal ally in the Middle East, while Turkey constitutes NATO’s strategic pivot at the intersection of Europe, the Black Sea region, and the Muslim world.

From this perspective, the NATO Summit in Ankara acquires significance that extends well beyond its official agenda. It also represents implicit recognition that Euro-Atlantic security can no longer be constructed exclusively from the perspective of Central and Northern Europe. The Black Sea, the Middle East, and NATO’s Southern Flank have become inseparable components of the same strategic equation, with Turkey occupying the centre of this emerging configuration.

Under these circumstances, Ankara 2026 will confirm not only the continuity of NATO’s commitments but also the profound transformation of Turkey’s role within the Alliance. From an ally often perceived as unpredictable, Turkey is evolving into a strategic actor without whose contribution NATO can no longer effectively manage the simultaneous challenges originating from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the wider Black Sea basin.

A decade ago, the central question was whether Turkey was drifting away from NATO. Today, the strategic question is fundamentally different: Can NATO achieve its objectives without Turkey’s decisive contribution? Developments over recent years strongly suggest that the answer is no.

4. The Eastern Flank[5] and the Black Sea – One of the New Centres of Gravity[6] of European Security

Russia’s war against Ukraine has fundamentally transformed Europe’s security architecture. For nearly three decades following the end of the Cold War, the Alliance’s attention was directed primarily toward crisis management and expeditionary operations. Today, however, collective defence has once again become NATO’s core mission. Within this new strategic configuration, the Eastern Flank constitutes the Alliance’s principal theatre of deterrence and defence.

Within this broader framework, the Black Sea region has acquired unprecedented strategic importance. It represents the intersection of the Euro-Atlantic area, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the wider Mediterranean basin, while simultaneously serving as one of the Russian Federation’s principal avenues for projecting military and political power. Control of maritime routes, the security of critical energy infrastructure, and the preservation of freedom of navigation have transformed the Black Sea into an area of vital strategic interest for both NATO and the European Union.

For Romania, these developments entail additional responsibilities. As a Black Sea littoral state and NATO’s principal strategic anchor on the south-eastern sector of the Eastern Flank, Romania is no longer merely a beneficiary of the Alliance’s security guarantees but has become an essential contributor to the stability of the entire region. The expansion of military infrastructure, the modernisation of the armed forces, enhanced military mobility, and closer cooperation with Allied partners are gradually are gradually transforming Romania into a logistical and operational hub of strategic importance. In this context, the mandate approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence ahead of the Ankara Summit confirms that Bucharest will support the strengthening of deterrence and defence posture on the Eastern Flank, the reinforcement of security in the Black Sea region, the development of strategic infrastructure, and the deepening of the transatlantic relationship. These objectives reflect both Romania’s national interests and its contribution to the Alliance’s collective security.

At the same time, Romania must make more effective use of its geostrategic position. The Ankara Summit offers an opportunity to reaffirm the role of the Black Sea as a priority area for Euro-Atlantic security and the need for additional measures regarding maritime surveillance, air and missile defence, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the development of military mobility in the region.

From this perspective, Ankara 2026 may also mark a shift in the Alliance’s approach. If, during the first years of the war, attention focused primarily on the north-eastern flank and on military support for Ukraine, recent developments demonstrate that Black Sea security must be addressed in an integrated manner, as part of the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area.

For Romania, this is not merely a strategic opportunity, but also a responsibility. Its favourable geographical position must be leveraged through concrete initiatives and active participation in shaping the Alliance’s policies for the Black Sea region.

Recent events in the Black Sea confirm that Romania is directly experiencing the effects of the war, an issue to which we shall return.

5. Ukraine – Between Consolidated Support and NATO’s Strategic Responsibility

More than four years after the launch of Russia’s invasion, support for Ukraine remains one of NATO’s principal priorities. The military, financial, and political assistance provided to Kyiv has demonstrated the Alliance’s unity and its capacity to respond to a major challenge to European security. The Ankara Summit is expected to unequivocally reaffirm this commitment and approve new measures aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s defence capacity and developing institutionalised mechanisms for long-term cooperation.

However, the question of Ukraine’s accession to NATO continues to be approached with caution. Despite broad political support for Kyiv, it is unlikely that the Ankara Summit will issue a formal invitation to join the Alliance or establish a concrete timetable for this process. Such an approach does not reflect a weakening of solidarity with Ukraine, but rather stems from the strategic responsibility the Alliance bears toward its own security and cohesion.

NATO enlargement is not merely a political act, but one of the most consequential strategic decisions the Alliance can take. Any new accession entails collective security obligations with long-term effects and requires the full consensus of all member states. For this reason, the assessment of such a decision cannot be shaped solely by the political context of the moment, but must rest on a rigorous analysis of its military, legal, and strategic implications.

From this perspective, NATO’s solidity and cohesion represent a strategic asset superior to any individual decision regarding the Alliance’s enlargement. History shows that alliances are weakened not only by external pressure, but also by insufficiently grounded decisions or by compromises that undermine internal unity. Precisely for this reason, each stage of the enlargement process must strengthen NATO, not merely increase the number of its member states.

Consequently, Allied leaders are expected to maintain the current formula of support: continued military and financial assistance, the development of institutional cooperation, and the deepening of interoperability between the Ukrainian armed forces and those of NATO, without assuming commitments that could generate divisions within the Alliance. In the current strategic context, this approach reflects not a lack of political will, but the maturity of an organisation that evaluates its decisions through the lens of their long-term consequences.

For Romania, continued support for Ukraine is a natural strategic option, determined both by the geographical proximity of the conflict and by its direct interest in maintaining stability in the Black Sea region. At the same time, we believe that this support should be better aligned with Romania’s real capabilities and the country’s economic situation, without losing sight for a single moment of the fact that the first priority is its own people.

The experience of recent years also demonstrates that solidarity must be accompanied by reciprocal responsibility. The recent incident in the Port of Constanța, caused by a Ukrainian maritime drone that reached Romanian territory uncontrolled, highlighted the need for more effective mechanisms of notification, coordination, and responsibility-sharing among partners. Romania has the legitimate right to request that any incident affecting its security be treated with the utmost seriousness and transparency by the Ukrainian authorities.

This approach does not diminish support for Kyiv in any way. On the contrary, it expresses the fundamental principle of a mature alliance: solidarity and responsibility can function only together. A durable strategic partnership requires not only mutual support, but also full respect for the legitimate security interests of all states involved.

The Ankara Summit has the opportunity to reaffirm this balance. NATO must continue its firm support for Ukraine, but without adopting decisions that could affect the Alliance’s unity or create long-term vulnerabilities. In the current international context, the most important security guarantee for Ukraine, for Romania, and for all member states remains the existence of a strong, united Alliance capable of making strategic decisions on the basis of a comprehensive assessment of their consequences.

In this sense, Ankara 2026 will send a message that goes beyond the Ukrainian file: NATO’s strength lies not only in its military capabilities, but also in the maturity of its decision-making process. Enlargement remains a legitimate objective, but it must reinforce collective security, not create additional risks for the future.

6. The Middle East and NATO’s New Strategic Equation

If the war in Ukraine has compelled NATO to rediscover the importance of collective defence in Europe, recent developments in the Middle East demonstrate that Euro-Atlantic security can no longer be analysed exclusively through the prism of the Alliance’s eastern frontier. The conflict between Israel and Iran, attacks on energy infrastructure, threats to freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, and the expanding activities of non-state actors have confirmed that stability in the Middle East directly affects Europe’s economic and strategic security.

Under these circumstances, the NATO Summit in Ankara will be the Alliance’s first high-level meeting after the direct military confrontation between Israel and Iran. Even if the Middle East does not officially feature among the main items on the agenda, it is difficult to imagine that Allied leaders will not examine the strategic implications of these developments for Euro-Atlantic security. The lessons of the conflict extend beyond the regional framework and concern the protection of critical infrastructure, energy security, air and missile defence, the resilience of logistics chains, and cooperation among Allies in crisis situations.

In this context, Turkey’s position acquires particular relevance. Located at the intersection of Europe, the Black Sea, and the Middle East, Ankara is the only NATO member state capable of influencing developments in all these strategic areas simultaneously. Its relations with Arab states, the dialogue it maintains with various regional actors, and its capacity to project stability in the Alliance’s southern neighbourhood give it a role that extends far beyond the strictly military dimension.

At the same time, the summit takes place amid heightened tensions between Turkey and Israel. Divergences over the conflict in Gaza, differing positions toward Iran, and the recent decision of the Israeli government to recognise the Armenian genocide have widened the political distance between Ankara and Jerusalem. These developments further complicate the regional security architecture and oblige the United States to manage relations with two essential strategic partners, each of distinct importance to American interests. While Israel remains Washington’s principal ally in the Middle East, Turkey is indispensable for the security of NATO’s south-eastern flank and for the stability of the Black Sea region.

The recent visit of the President of Israel to Bucharest, which took place shortly before the summit, may also be interpreted through this strategic lens. Romania is one of the few Allied countries that maintains strong relations with both Turkey and Israel, while simultaneously benefiting from a well-established Strategic Partnership with the United States. This positioning provides Bucharest with a distinctive diplomatic profile and may enable it to contribute to strengthening dialogue in a region characterised by growing tensions.

Within this new strategic environment, NATO is called upon to demonstrate that it is capable of managing challenges originating simultaneously from multiple strategic directions. Whereas in the past the Alliance’s priorities were addressed sequentially, according to the evolution of individual crises, today’s reality requires an integrated approach. Strategic competition with Russia, instability in the Middle East, security in the Black Sea region, and the challenges arising from China’s emergence as a global strategic competitor can no longer be treated as separate issues, but rather as interdependent components of the same international security environment.

From this perspective, the Ankara Summit marks a genuine paradigm shift. NATO is no longer confronted with a single dominant crisis, but with the necessity of managing multiple theatres of strategic competition simultaneously. The Alliance’s ability to preserve its political unity and military coherence under such circumstances will become one of the principal determinants of its credibility throughout the coming decade.

Ankara 2026 will demonstrate whether NATO can remain effective in a world where strategic challenges no longer emerge sequentially but overlap and reinforce one another. The Alliance’s capacity to operate simultaneously across multiple strategic theatres will become one of the principal measures of its relevance in the emerging international order.

7. Europe and the Redistribution of Responsibilities Within the Alliance

One of the most significant transformations within NATO in recent years concerns not only its adaptation to new threats but also the redefinition of the balance of responsibilities between the United States and its European Allies. The war in Ukraine, developments in the Middle East, and the intensifying strategic competition between Washington and Beijing have accelerated a process that began several years ago: Europe’s assumption of a substantially greater share of responsibility for its own security.

This evolution does not signify a weakening of the American commitment to NATO. The United States remains the principal guarantor of Euro-Atlantic security and the Alliance’s leading provider of strategic capabilities. At the same time, however, successive messages from Washington have made it increasingly clear that responsibility for the security of the European continent must, to a much greater extent than in the past, be assumed by the European Allies themselves.

The Hague Summit institutionalised this strategic orientation through the adoption of unprecedented financial and industrial commitments, unparalleled since the end of the Cold War. Increased defence investment, the development of Europe’s defence industrial base, enhanced military mobility, and greater resilience of critical infrastructure all reflect a fundamental shift: Europe must become capable of making a substantially greater contribution to collective security, without this being interpreted as an alternative to NATO or to the transatlantic relationship.

In this regard, information emerging ahead of the summit indicates that the European Allies have succeeded in meeting almost all of the conventional capability requirements established under NATO’s new Regional Plans. Remaining shortfalls are concentrated primarily in strategic domains such as heavy airlift, intelligence, surveillance, and certain long-range capabilities, where the contribution of the United States continues to be indispensable. This development confirms the ongoing strengthening of the European pillar of the Alliance while fully preserving Washington’s essential role.

From this perspective, the Ankara Summit will constitute the first real test of whether the political commitments undertaken at The Hague can be translated into concrete implementation. Reaffirming previously agreed objectives will not be sufficient. Allied leaders must demonstrate both the political will and the institutional capacity to accelerate the development of the defence industrial base, eliminate bureaucratic obstacles, and strengthen technological cooperation among member states.

Within this process, the defence industry has become one of the fundamental pillars of collective security. The lessons of the war in Ukraine have demonstrated that technological superiority must be supported by an industrial base capable of sustaining the continuous production of ammunition, military equipment, and advanced weapons systems. Consequently, strategic competition will increasingly take place not only between armed forces, but also between economies, industrial capacities, and rates of technological innovation.

For Romania, this transformation creates significant opportunities. Increased defence investment and the development of joint projects within both NATO and the European Union could contribute to the modernisation of Romania’s national defence industry and to its integration into European defence supply chains[7]. At the same time, these opportunities can be fully realised only through a coherent national strategy, sustained investment, and the development of industrial partnerships capable of generating genuine long-term capabilities.

In this context, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s visit to Washington ahead of the Ankara Summit acquires particular significance. It confirms the Alliance leadership’s determination to preserve a strong transatlantic relationship at a time when the United States is calling upon its European Allies to assume greater responsibilities. This is not a question of diminishing transatlantic solidarity, but rather of adapting it to a strategic environment in which Washington must simultaneously manage competition with China, European security, and developments in the Middle East.

The Ankara Summit will, in all likelihood, confirm this new stage in the evolution of the transatlantic relationship. The United States will remain NATO’s principal security guarantor, but the Alliance’s long-term success will increasingly depend on Europe’s ability to become a stronger, more capable, and more responsible strategic contributor. What we are witnessing is not the weakening of the transatlantic bond, but rather its maturation through a more balanced distribution of responsibilities.

For Romania, this transformation entails far more than meeting defence spending targets. It requires strengthening the country’s strategic profile within the Alliance, capitalising on its position on the Black Sea, and actively contributing to the development of future Euro-Atlantic security and defence policies.

8. Romania at Ankara – Between Allied Solidarity and the Assertion of National Interest

For Romania, the NATO Summit in Ankara represents far more than a routine Alliance meeting. It offers an opportunity to reaffirm the role that our country plays within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture while simultaneously testing Bucharest’s ability to promote its own national interests in a strategic environment undergoing rapid transformation.

The mandate approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence before the summit confirms the continuity of Romania’s strategic orientation. Strengthening the transatlantic relationship, reinforcing NATO’s deterrence and defence posture on the Eastern Flank, enhancing security in the Black Sea region, continuing support for Ukraine, and increasing national defence capabilities constitute the principal objectives that Bucharest will promote during the Ankara meeting. These priorities are fully consistent with Romania’s fundamental security interests and with NATO’s current strategic evolution.

At the same time, the summit takes place under particular domestic political circumstances for Romania. The mandate is fully legitimate, having been approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence and represented at the highest constitutional level by the President of Romania, who bears essential responsibilities in foreign policy and national security. Nevertheless, the participation of caretaker ministers[8], including the Minister of Defence, inevitably reduces the political weight of the Romanian delegation during the informal consultations and negotiations that accompany such high-level meetings[9]. In strategic diplomacy, legal legitimacy is indispensable; however, influence is also determined by the ability of interlocutors to commit politically the governments they represent over the medium and long term.

This situation places additional responsibility upon the President of Romania, who must make full use of the authority vested in his office to advance the country’s strategic interests and strengthen Romania’s profile within the Alliance. In the current regional environment, Romania’s position on the Black Sea, the logistical infrastructure developed in recent years, and its consistent contribution to the security of the Eastern Flank provide strong arguments for an active role in shaping NATO’s future strategic direction.

At the same time, the experience of recent years demonstrates that the status of a credible Ally requires not only solidarity but also the firm assertion of national interests. Romania has provided Ukraine with substantial political, diplomatic, logistical, and humanitarian support, making a significant contribution to the collective efforts of both NATO and the European Union. Precisely because of this contribution, Bucharest possesses the legitimacy to request full respect for its own security interests and the establishment of more effective coordination and notification mechanisms for situations affecting Romanian territory and national infrastructure.

The incident in the Port of Constanța, involving a Ukrainian maritime drone that drifted uncontrollably into Romania’s territorial waters, provides a relevant illustration. Beyond the specific circumstances of the event, it demonstrates that Romania directly bears some of the consequences of a war taking place in the immediate vicinity of its borders. In such situations, transparency, timely communication, and the assumption of responsibility should become standard principles governing relations between partners[10]. Romania’s support for Ukraine does not diminish its legitimate right to expect reciprocal respect and responsibility.

The same principle applies to the functioning of the Alliance as a whole. Recent statements by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte regarding the use of Romanian infrastructure in support of American logistical operations have once again highlighted the importance of transparency in the relationship between national institutions and public opinion. Within a democratic alliance, public trust constitutes a strategic asset no less important than military infrastructure or operational capabilities. Allied cooperation should therefore be accompanied by effective public communication capable of explaining adopted decisions and strengthening citizens’ confidence in state institutions.

Against this background, Romania has a clear interest in promoting at Ankara not only the strengthening of NATO’s defence posture, but also the development of more effective mechanisms for Allied coordination, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the management of incidents affecting the security of member states. A strong alliance is founded not only upon solidarity, but equally upon responsibility, predictability, and mutual respect.

Within an alliance of sovereign states, loyalty does not require abandoning one’s national interests. On the contrary, enduring alliances are built upon the ability of each member state to articulate and defend its own interests clearly, thereby contributing to the advancement of the common interest.

The Ankara Summit offers Romania the opportunity to demonstrate that being a loyal Ally is fully compatible with firmly promoting national interests. Indeed, the two reinforce one another. Within a NATO undergoing profound transformation, the credibility of each Ally will increasingly depend not only upon its military contribution, but also upon its capacity to participate actively in shaping strategic decisions and to defend, with responsibility and sound arguments, the interests of its own nation.

9. Ankara 2026 and the Future of the North Atlantic Alliance

The NATO Summit in Ankara will most likely not be remembered for a single spectacular decision or for the adoption of a new Strategic Concept. Its true significance lies in a deeper and less visible process: confirming the Alliance’s adaptation to a strategic reality fundamentally different from that which existed at the beginning of this decade.

Within only a few years, NATO has been compelled to respond simultaneously to high-intensity warfare in Ukraine, the rapid transformation of Europe’s security environment, the expansion of global strategic competition, persistent instability in the Middle East, and the pressures generated by the global redistribution of power. Under these circumstances, the Alliance’s fundamental challenge is no longer confined to defending Allied territory, but extends to its ability to manage simultaneously crises emerging from different yet increasingly interconnected strategic theatres.

From this perspective, Ankara 2026 confirms that NATO is undergoing one of the most significant transformations since the end of the Cold War. The Alliance is simultaneously strengthening its military capabilities, defence industrial base, the resilience of critical infrastructure, and the mechanisms of cooperation between Europe and North America. What we are witnessing is not the emergence of a new alliance, but NATO’s transition into a new stage of development—what may appropriately be described as NATO 3.0—characterised by adaptation to global strategic competition, the redistribution of responsibilities between the United States and Europe, and the simultaneous management of multiple theatres of strategic competition.

Within this new strategic configuration, Turkey is consolidating its status as an indispensable strategic actor; Europe is being called upon to assume greater responsibility for its own security; and the Black Sea region is emerging as one of the new centres of gravity of Euro-Atlantic security. For Romania, this evolution creates both opportunities and responsibilities. Its geographical position, membership in NATO and the European Union, and the experience accumulated in managing regional challenges provide a solid foundation for assuming a more active role in shaping the Alliance’s future security policies.

The experience of recent years also demonstrates that the effectiveness of an alliance depends not only upon the military resources it possesses, but equally upon the quality of its decision-making process, the level of trust among Allies, and the capacity of each member state to contribute responsibly to the achievement of common objectives. Solidarity remains NATO’s cornerstone, yet it can endure only when supported by mutual respect, transparency, and shared responsibility among all participants.

For Romania, the real challenge is not choosing between Allied solidarity and the assertion of national interests. The challenge lies in reconciling the two within a coherent strategy capable of transforming geographical position, political credibility, and military contribution into genuine strategic influence within the Alliance.

The central argument of this study is that the NATO Summit in Ankara should not be interpreted solely through the specific decisions it is expected to adopt, but rather as confirmation that Euro-Atlantic security has entered a new phase in which NATO must simultaneously manage a new phase in which NATO must simultaneously manage interconnected strategic theatres across several geographical regions.

Author’s Note

At the time this article is submitted for publication, discussions on the draft documents for the Ankara Summit have almost certainly already begun within NATO.

This article is intended as a forward-looking strategic assessment. Following the conclusion of the summit, a comparative evaluation will examine the extent to which the assessments and forecasts presented here correspond to the decisions actually adopted in Ankara. Prospective analysis constitutes one of the fundamental instruments of strategic assessment. Its purpose is to identify probable trends before events unfold, rather than to predict them with absolute certainty.

Brașov, 2 July 2026

[1] The decision adopted at the NATO Summit in The Hague provides for a total investment effort equivalent to 5% of GDP by 2035, of which 3.5% is to be allocated to core defence expenditure and up to 1.5% to investments in critical infrastructure, resilience, cybersecurity, and other security-related domains.

[2] The concept of an “indispensable actor” does not imply the absence of alternatives. Rather, it signifies that achieving the Alliance’s strategic objectives would become significantly more difficult, more costly, or less effective without Turkey’s contribution.

[3] The legal regime governing the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits is established by the 1936 Montreux Convention, which assigns Turkey special responsibilities regarding the passage of warships between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea.

[4] This statement carries significance that extends beyond diplomatic protocol. In high-level diplomacy, the public language employed by political leaders often conveys signals regarding the importance attached to a bilateral relationship and to the strategic role of the interlocutor, without necessarily altering the official positions of the parties involved.

[5] The widely used term “Eastern Flank” reflects a geographical perspective centred primarily on Central and Western Europe. In the current strategic environment, where the Black Sea region has become one of NATO’s principal areas of strategic interest and where security challenges originate simultaneously from Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, this designation appears increasingly inadequate. A conceptual framework emphasising the strategic significance of the Black Sea region, or referring to the Alliance’s eastern and south-eastern sectors, would more accurately reflect today’s geopolitical realities.

[6] The growing strategic importance of the Black Sea does not diminish the relevance of other regions, such as the Baltic Sea or the Arctic. Rather, it reflects the simultaneous expansion of NATO’s areas of strategic interest.

[7] The European Union’s SAFE programme remains essential for the modernisation of Romania’s defence sector. However, its current design raises serious questions regarding the actual benefits for the national defence industry. Although part of the procurement package has received parliamentary and governmental approval, Government Emergency Ordinance No. 38/2026, concerning Romania’s participation in the SAFE programme, failed to secure adoption in the Chamber of Deputies and is expected to be reconsidered during the next parliamentary session. Furthermore, the allocation of contracts reveals a significant concentration in favour of foreign companies, particularly the German defence group Rheinmetall, making a more rigorous assessment necessary of the actual level of domestic production, technology transfer, and value added that will remain in Romania.

[8] Under the applicable legal framework, the exercise of ministerial office in an acting capacity is subject to statutory time limitations. Prolonging such an arrangement may affect perceptions of the government’s political capacity to undertake long-term commitments during international negotiations.

[9] This observation refers exclusively to the political dimension of representation and does not affect the constitutional legitimacy of the Romanian delegation’s mandate. In international practice, a representative’s ability to commit his or her government politically over the medium and long term may influence the dynamics of informal negotiations.

[10] For the purposes of this study, national interest is understood as the aggregate of Romania’s enduring objectives relating to security, sovereignty, and national development, rather than as reflecting temporary or partisan preferences in domestic or foreign policy.