By Barend ter Haar. The words of Abraham Lincoln to honour the soldiers that sacrificed their lives in order “that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth” were spoken at Gettysburg, but these words apply as well to the countless soldiers that died for the cause of democracy in the following 150 years. Democracy has become such a sacrosanct concept that even the harshest dictatorships, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, call themselves a democracy. But what is democracy? Was it democracy to give the British people the opportunity to vote about membership of the European Union after providing them with contradictory information about the consequences of leaving? Was it democracy to ask the opinion of the Dutch people about an Association Agreement with Ukraine for improper reasons? (The committee that took the initiative admitted that it did not care at all about Ukraine but wanted to use the referendum to destroy the European Union or drive the Netherlands out of the EU.) Is it democracy when Dutch ministers shy away from telling the people that the Netherlands is giving up (for very good reasons) part of its sovereignty to the European Union because that would incite people to vote for anti-European parties? (See my column Who dares to be honest? [1]) Obviously, if politicians believe that voters cannot be trusted with the truth, democracy is seriously at risk. For a democracy to function it is essential that a government respects the people and takes them seriously, not only those that have voted for that government, but all people. Furthermore, in order to exercise their democratic rights properly, people should be informed as fully as possible. Democracy is a form of conflict management within states, just as diplomacy is a form of conflict management between states. Both therefore usually lead to a compromise between different views and different perceived interests. That is certainly the case when a decision requires both agreement between and within states. Democracy is a living system of government that can only prosper by being reinvented again and again. It can be strengthened by a referendum if a question can be answered by a simple yes or no. However, democracy is undermined when people are made to believe that a complicated question that involves the interests of different countries can be satisfactorily answered by a referendum in one of these countries. Neither the future of the relation between the EU and Ukraine, nor the future relation between the United Kingdom and the EU can be based on a simplistic yes or no. [1] https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/who-dares-be-honest

By Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic. A freshly released IMF’s World Economic Outlook brings (yet again, for the sixth year in a row, and for the third time this year only) no comforting picture to anyone within the G-7, especially in the US and EU. Will the passionately US-pushed cross-Atlantic Free Trade Area save the day? Or, would that Pact-push drag the things over the edge and mark an end of the unionistic Europe? Is the extended EU conflict with Russia actually a beginning of the Atlantic-Central Europe’s conflict over Russia, an internalization of mega geopolitical and geo-economic dilemma – who accommodates with whom, in and out of the Union? Finally, does more Ukrainian (and Eastern Europe) calamities pave the road for a new cross-continental grand accommodation, of either austerity-tired France or über-performing Germany with Russia, therefore the end of the EU? For whose sake Eastern Europe has been barred of all important debates such as that of Slavism, identity, social cohesion (eroded by the plunder called ‘privatization’), secularism and antifascism? Why do we suddenly wonder that all around Germany-led Central Europe, the neo-Nazism gains ground while only Russia insists on antifascism and (pan-)Slavism? Before answering that, let us examine what is (the meaning and size of) our Europe? Where, how and – very importantly – when is our Europe? For example, is the non-EU Europe the existent but invisible world, sort of the dark side of the moon? Or, is that something more? Beyond the ancient Maastricht and Schengen: the Roman Hadrian Wall and Limes Line there was no world at all. There was only (an instrument of) the Silk Road – that antique WTO, isn’t it? Hence, is this unionistic condominium the best of Europe, or Europe itself? Is the EU an authentic post-Westphalian conglomerate and the only logical post-Metternich concert of different Europes, the world’s last cosmopolitan enjoying its postmodern holiday from history?[1] Is that possibly the lost Atlántida or mythical Arcadia– a Hegelian end of history world? Thus, should this OZ be a mix of the endemically domesticated Marx-Engels grand utopia and Kennedy’s dream-world “where the weak are safe and the strong are just”? Or, is it maybe as Charles Kupchan calls it a ‘postmodern imperium’? Something that exhorts its well-off status quo by notoriously exporting its transformative powers of free trade dogma and human rights stigma[2]–a modified continuation of colonial legacy when the European conquerors, with fire and sword, spread commerce,[3] Christianity and civilization overseas – a kind of ‘new Byzantium’, or is that more of a Richard Young’s declining, unreformed and rigid Rome? Hence, is this a post-Hobbesian (yet, not quite a Kantian) world, in which the letzte Mensch expelled Übermensch? Could it be as one old graffiti in Prague implies: EU=SU²? Does the EU-ization of Europe equals to a restoration of the universalistic world of Rome’s Papacy, to a restaging of the Roman-Catholic Caliphate? Is this Union a Leonard’s runner of the 21st century, or is it perhaps Kagan’s ‘Venus’– gloomy and opaque world, warmer but equally distant and unforeseen like ‘Mars’?[4] Is this Brussels-headquartered construct, the 20th century’s version of Zollverein with standardized tariffs and trade, but of an autonomous fiscal policy and politics? Thus, is the EU a political and economic re-approachment of sovereign states or maybe just an(other) enterprise of the borderless financial capital? Ergo, would that be a pure construct of financial oligarchy whose invisible hand tacitly corrupted the Maastricht Treaty as to web-up a borderless, limitless, wireless and careless power hub, while at the same time entrenching, silencing and rarefying labour within each nation state? Is this a supersized Switzerland (ruled by the cacophony of many languages and enveloped in economic egotism of its self-centered people), with the cantons (MS, Council of EU) still far more powerful than the central government (the EU Parliament, Brussels’ Commission, ECJ), while Swiss themselves –although in the geographic heart of that Union – stubbornly continue to defy any membership. Does it really matter (and if so, to what extent) that Niall Ferguson wonders: “…the EU lacks a common language, a common postal system, a common soccer team (Britain as well, rem. A.B.) even a standard electric socket…“? Kissinger himself was allegedly looking for a phone number of Europe, too. Baron Ridley portrayed the Union as a Fourth Reich, not only dominated by Germany, but also institutionally Germanized. Another conservative Briton, Larry Siedentop, remarked in his Democracy in Europe that it is actually France who is running the EU ‘show’, in the typical French way – less than accountable bureaucracy that prevents any evolution of the European into an American-style United States. Thus, Siedentop’s EU is more of a Third Bonapartistic Empire than possibly a Fourth German Reich. The Heartland or Rimland? After all, is the Union yet another virtue out of necessity, as Brzezinski claimed, that after centuries of colonial overstretch and of mutual destructions (between protagonists in close geographic proximity), Europe irreversibly lost its demographic, economic and politico-military importance, and that the early EU was more of an attempt to rescue a nation state than it was the quest for a true enterprise of the European Community building? Despite different names and categorizations attached, historical analogies and descriptions used, most scholars would agree upon the very geopolitical definition of the EU: Grand re-approachment of France and Germany after WWII, culminating in the Elysée accords of 1961. An interpretation of this instrument is rather simple: a bilateral peace treaty through achieved consensus by which Germany accepted a predominant French say in political affairs of EU/Europe, and France – in return – accepted a more dominant German say in economic matters of EU/Europe. All that tacitly blessed by a perfect balancer– Britain, attempting to conveniently return to its splendid isolation from the Continent in the post-WWII years. Consequently, nearly all scholars would agree that the Franco-German alliance actually represents a geopolitical axis, a backbone of the Union. However, the inner unionistic equilibrium will be maintained only if the Atlantic-Central Europe skillfully calibrates and balances its own equidistance from both assertive Russia and the omnipresent US. Any alternative to the current Union is a grand accommodation of either France or Germany with Russia. This means a return to Europe of the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries – namely, direct confrontations over the Continent’s core sectors, perpetual animosities wars and destructions. Both Russia and the US has demonstrated ability for a skillful and persistent conduct of international affairs, passions and visions to fight for their agendas. It is time for Brussels to live up to its very idea, and to show the same. Biology and geopolitics share one basic rule: comply or die.   Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic,  is professor in international law and global political studies, based in Austria. Vienna, 08 JUN 2016 / Contact: anis@bajrektarevic.eu   ^[1] One of the greatest historians of our age, Sir Toynbee, gives an interesting account of our civilizational vertical. He clas-sifies as many as nineteen major civilizations: Egyptian, Andean, Sinic, Minoan, Sumerian, Mayan, Indic, Hittite, Hellenic, Western, Orthodox Christian/Russian, Far Eastern, Orthodox Christian/main body, Persian, Arabic, Hindu, Mexican, Yucatec, and Babylonic. Further on, there are – as he calls them – four abortive civilizations (Far Western Christian, Far Eastern Christian, Scandinavian, Syriac) and five arrested civilizations (Polynesian, Eskimo, Nomadic, Ottoman, Spartan). Like to no other continent, majority of them are related (originating from or linked) to European proper. ^[2] Lately, it looks like a Gay-rights Jihad at many places. The non-selective, but massive push without premeditation on the key issue here: whether homosexuality should be either tolerated behavior or promoted life-style, has to be urgently revisited and (re-)calibrated. As it stands now, this Gay-rights Jihad serves neither the human/behavioristic rights nor a worrying birth-rates decline. The European demographics is far more of a serious and urgent socio-economic problem. Why? It is closely related to the emotional-charge inflammable triangular issues – identity, migration and integration, and by it triggered (to say: justified) right-wing anti-politics. ^[3] Is globalization the natural doctrine of global hegemony? Well, its main instrument, commerce –as we know – brings people into contact, not necessarily to an agreement, even less to mutual benefits and harmony…Or, “If goods cannot cross borders, armies will” is the famous saying of the XIX century French economist Frederic Bastiat, so often quoted by the longest-ever serving US Secretary of State Cordell Hull. ^[4] ”No venue has been created in which an EU-wide public opinion might be formed… European Parliament elections are not truly European because they are 27 different elections with different electoral systems after campaigns in which national issues predominate… Under present procedures, both the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council are selected in private meetings of heads of governments..”, says former Irish Prime Minister John Bruton. Bruton, J. (2013), How real is the danger of an EU collapse?, EU Journal Europe’s World 23(13) 2013, Brussels    

By Jan Dop. Introduction Embassies and Consulates have to deal with the Dutch when they represent their country in the Netherlands. Embassies and Consulates, however, enjoy a special status because they are considered to rule under their own flag and not under that of the country of residency. Nevertheless, on occasion they do have to deal with Dutch law, for example with regard to their locally hired personnel working in the Netherlands, when buying or selling property (residence, Embassy) or concluding any other commercial contract. This chapter will discuss the limits of diplomatic immunity and how said limits are defined, the consequences of the diplomatic status and the situations in which Dutch law will apply. Definitions Embassy An Embassy is the representation of a particular state in another state. Most states have their Embassy in the Netherlands located in The Hague, where the Dutch government is seated. The Ambassador The Ambassador is a diplomatic official, assigned (and recognized) to serve as the official representative of a particular state in a foreign state or an international organization. He holds the highest rank in the diplomatic hierarchy. A diplomatic mission headed by an Ambassador is known as an Embassy. Consulate A Consulate (or Consular Office) is predominantly in charge of issues relating to individual people and businesses, in other words, issues outside the scope of inter-governmental diplomacy. A country may have several Consulates or Consulates General in major economic centres to support their economic interests. Diplomatic corps The collective body of all diplomats residing in a particular country is called a diplomatic corps. State immunity Scope of immunity The independent character of a sovereign state conflicts with being subjected to the laws and jurisdiction of another state. For this reason, but also in order to enable states to carry out their public functions effectively, states have (state) immunity. State immunity refers to the right or privilege of being exempted from the existing power or jurisdiction of another state. National courts do not have jurisdiction over claims against a foreign state, its diplomats and/or diplomatic services. There is no uniform law on state immunity, but there are several conventions, such as the European Convention on State Immunity (ECSI 1972). Immunity of jurisdiction only applies to activities of governmental or public nature, the so-called acta iure imperii. It is not applicable to activities of a private or commercial nature, the so-called acta iure gestionis. This distinction is widely accepted. When immunity cannot be invoked, this does not necessarily mean that a judgement can be executed or property can be seized in full. According to the ECSI for example, a convicted member state will have to comply with the judgement by choice. However, it is not possible to seize property meant for public services. It is not permitted either to attach any goods or financial assets of the foreign state that are intended for public services. It is not clear however, whether bank accounts of diplomatic missions and consular posts can be attached. From numerous court decisions it can be concluded that, in case the bank account only serves the purpose of allowing the diplomatic mission or consular post to function, it cannot be attached. Waiving immunity Immunity from jurisdiction is not absolute. Therefore, the question of immunity only arises when the foreign state refuses to submit to the jurisdiction of the local court. A state is considered to waive its immunity when it appears in court, when it acts as plaintiff or starts a counterclaim, unless, of course, it appears in court to invoke immunity. Foreign states can waive their immunity voluntarily (in advance), both explicitly and silently. When immunity is waived or not applicable, the substantial rules of law applicable by the local or territorial court are fully effective. Immunity of jurisdiction with regard to employment law Almost all employment law issues are considered as acta iure gestionis of the Embassy if the work is performed in the receiving state and the employee has the nationality of the receiving state. Therefore, in most employment matters, state immunity cannot be invoked. This might be different with regard to diplomatic staff or personnel employed directly with the Ambassador. With regard to a state that is not a party to the ECSI, the court will apply international customary law, which considers the conclusion of an employment agreement an actus iure gestionis. Case law shows that the employing state cannot invoke its immunity if the employee has the nationality of the receiving state, if he has permanent residency in the receiving state, and/or if there are convincing connections between the employment and the receiving state. Dutch employment law can therefore also apply to diplomatic missions. The exception with regard to the legal obligation of Dutch employers to obtain a UWV (Employee Insurance Agency) permit in case they want to dismiss an employee, has lapsed since 1 July 2015. Thus, in the event of dismissal of an employee, depending on the reason for the dismissal, either the UWV or the Subdistrict Court will have to be addressed. For more information on Dutch employment law see Chapter 3. Finally, a state can invoke immunity in legal proceedings with regard to the termination of a private (employment) contract if these proceedings interfere with state security. Immunity of jurisdiction with regard to social security Locally hired staff will not be exempt from national insurance and employee insurance, such as state pension (AOW), incapacity for work benefits (WIA), sickness benefits and unemployment benefits (WW). Social security is also compulsory for technical staff, administrative staff and operating staff staying permanently (for longer than ten years) in the Netherlands. Diplomatic staff and staff that don’t have the Dutch nationality and are already insured in the country of origin are exempt from the insurance requirement. The social security requirement also includes the employer’s obligation to comply with the Dutch regulations regarding guidance and reintegration of sick employees. This includes regular contact with the occupational health and safety physician. Failing this, the paying institution, the UWV, may decide that the employer has acted inadequately and thus has to pay the wages of the sick employee not only during the first two years of sickness but also during the third year. Immunity of jurisdiction with regard to commercial contracts A state’s conclusion of a commercial contract is, in principle, an actus iure gestionis and therefore not subject to state immunity. Such contracts may be so closely linked to the interests of a state that they nevertheless fall under state immunity, which is not very common, however. Thus, for instance, an agreement for the supply of computer equipment for the Embassy will, in principle, not fall under state immunity. One exception is, in particular, state security, as a result of which immunity may indeed be applicable to a security software agreement. Immunity of jurisdiction with regard to real estate Embassies and the premises of Ambassadors are inviolable, even if they are not yet utilized. They are on Dutch territory however, and thus Dutch law is applicable to these premises, including real estate law. This is all the more so if the Embassy owns real estate which is not used for diplomatic services. Therefore, it is important to verify in advance whether your intended use of the premises corresponds with the zoning plan (not all villas in Wassenaar may be used as an office) and whether municipal permits are required. Changes to the building that have an effect on the appearance of the premises (cleaning/painting the facade or changing single glazing into double glazing!) require a permit, especially if the premises are a registered monument or part of a conservation area, as is the case with most Embassies. Security measures for Embassies, such as alarms, cameras, fences and/or roll-down shutters, often require a permit. If premises are leased, the owner has to agree to changes before they can be made. The same rules as to other commercial contracts apply to real estate contracts. Disputes with lessees, sellers, contractors and maintenance companies will be examined by a Dutch court according to Dutch law, unless specifically agreed otherwise. Diplomatic immunity Diplomatic immunity is a form of legal immunity to ensure that diplomats are given safe passage and are considered exempt from lawsuit or prosecution under the laws of the receiving state. The rules concerning diplomatic relations are laid down in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR 1961), which also applies in the Netherlands. The VCDR is an international treaty on diplomatic relations and the privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission. According to the Convention diplomatic relations between states and permanent diplomatic missions are determined by mutual consent. The functions of a diplomatic mission include:

• Representing the sending state in the receiving state

• protecting the interests of the sending state and of its nationals in the receiving state

• promoting friendly relations between the sending state and the receiving state

• developing economic, cultural and scientific relations.In general, diplomatic missions and their members and families must respect the principles of Dutch law because their immunity does not extend to legislation itself. Diplomatic immunity only restricts the Dutch authorities in exercising their power with regard to the diplomats’ compliance with Dutch legislation.In addition, according to the VCDR, the territory of the diplomatic mission is inviolable and immune from investigation or taxes (extraterritoriality). Representatives of the receiving state can only enter the diplomatic mission’s territory with consent from the head of the diplomatic mission.The diplomat is also inviolable. The private residence of a diplomat receives the same protection as the premises of the diplomatic mission. In addition, a diplomat is immune from the criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction (not relating to private immovable property or succession) of the receiving state. Immunity does not apply to the diplomat’s professional and commercial activities outside his official functions. The sending state can waive the diplomat’s immunity.Finally, even members of the administrative and technical staff and family members of the diplomatic mission enjoy some immunity, if they are not nationals of or residing permanently in the receiving state.Consular immunity Although Embassies and Consulates, and especially diplomats, enjoy immunity in the Netherlands, there are several situations in which they have to deal with Dutch law. The scope of their immunity depends on the diplomatic nature of their work and the nationality of their employees. Dutch employees are more likely to be subject to Dutch law than foreigners. In general, employees of diplomatic missions enjoy immunity with regard to their official acts, but not with regard to their personal conduct.

Conclusion The VCDR is not applicable to foreign Consuls and members of their staff. The consular mission falls within the scope of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR 1963), which confirms that Consuls and their staff enjoy immunity with regard to their official acts, but not with regard to their private acts.   About the author: Jan Dop is partner and Head of the Embassy Desk at Russell Advocaten. He advises and represents corporations, entrepreneurs and HR departments in corporate and commercial matters. Jan Dop, LL.M. (jan.dop@russell.nl).      

By Mr. Raphael  Mgaya, Advocate,  Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Tanzania. Fiscal regimes refer to laws and regulations governing taxation of a particular industry. The designing of a good fiscal regime for petroleum industry is challenging due to the high capital expenses involved, exhaustibility of petroleum resources and the volatility of revenues. The petroleum fiscal regimes are embodied within the hierarchy of laws namely, the Constitution, legislations, regulations and contracts, with the Constitution being the most superios in the hierarchy and contract being the least superior. The main elements of the oil and gas fiscal regimes in Tanzania are: royalty, cost recovery, profit sharing, state participation, bonuses, statutory taxes and fees. These elements are briefly discussed below: Royalty: This is a payment given to the resource owner. This is required under Section 113 of the Petroleum Act, 2015 (PA). Royalty is on sliding scale depending on the area where the hydrocarbon is being exploited with the rate being 12.5% onshore and shelf areas and 7.5% in the offshore areas. Royalty is charged on gross revenue.

Cost recovery: The PSA Contractor recovers the costs from the Cost Oil/Cost Gas. The cost recovery limit is 50% of the annual production net of royalty both onshore and offshore. The recoverable and non-recoverable costs are itemized under Annex D of each production sharing agreement (PSA) and the Model Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), 2013. Annex D is used for the purposes of audit and control of costs. Some costs are not recoverable under the PSA such as financing charges, bonuses, costs related to arbitration, costs that were incurred prior to signing PSA, costs incurred due to gross negligence or willful misconduct of the Contractor/Licence holder. Profit Sharing: Profit oil and profit gas is the amount of oil or gas remaining after royalty and cost recovery has been deducted. This amount is shared between the national oil company (NOC), the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (on behalf of government) and the Contractor on pre-agreed proportions. The profit sharing is on the sliding scale with the share of the government increasing with increase in the size of production tranches. The MPSA 2013 contains benchmarks for profit sharing which are not binding (See figures below)

Tranches of Daily Production (BOPD)	NOC Share	Contractor Share
0-12,499	70%	30%
12,500-24,999	75%	25%
25,000-49,999	80%	20%
50,000-99,999	85%	15%
100,000- and above	90%	10%

 

Tranches of Daily Production (MMSCFD)	NOC Share	Contractor Share
0-19.99	60%	40%
20-39.99	65%	35%
40-59.99	70%	30%
60-79.99	75%	25%
80- above	80%	20%

  Fig. 1 Profit Oil Sharing Tranches (Onshore), MPSA 2013 Fig. 2 Profit Gas Sharing Tranches (Onshore), MPSA 2013 State participation: The state may elect to participate through the NOC upon commercial discovery. The State participation is not less than 25% (Section 45 of the PA). The MPSA 2013 sets out the modus operandi on State participation. The state participation has a long history. The state participation in the petroleum commercial activities is crucial for the reasons that it enables the State to assert its sovereignty over the strategic resources, promote transfer of technology to locals, promote employment of locals and increases the revenues flow to the State.

The State participation can be financed through many different ways such as paid up equity on commercial terms; paid up equity on concessionary terms; carried interest with repayment; tax swapped for equity; free equity; and equity in exchange for non cash contribution. In Tanzania, paid up equity on commercial terms and the carried interests with repayment are the most common. Bonuses: These are upfront payments to State. Bonuses are front-end loaded taxes they are considered as regressive from the point of view of the investor. Bonuses were initially introduced by Article 11 (c) of the MPSA 2013. The same is provided in PA under Section 115 and Section 116. The signature bonus rate is not less than $2.5million and production bonus is not less than $5million. Bonuses are not recoverable under the PSA but they are deductible for tax purposes. Domestic Market Obligation (DMO): Licence holder and Contractor are obliged to satisfy domestic market on pro rata basis with other Contractors (PA, Section 98 (1)). Both the Natural Gas Policy 2013 and the PA require that the natural gas price for supply in the domestic market should be determined based on the strategic nature of the project (PA, Section 99). Corporate Income: Resident Company is taxed at 30% on its worldwide income. A non-resident is taxed 30% on its Tanzanian sourced income. A new company is taxed at 25% if is listed on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) and at least 30% of its shares is held by general public. Annual Fees: The PA states that the amount of fees is to be prescribed in the regulations. The fees includes: Annual fees, Acreage rentals, and training fees which is currently is USD 400,000 as per the MPSA, 2013, and research fees. The actual training fees differ from PSA to PSA depending on the rate agreed at the entering into the PSA. The new rental fees as proposed by the new MPSA 2013 are: Initial period: USD 50 per sq.km; First extension USD 100 per sq.km; and Second extension USD 200 per sq.km. Ring fencing: Contract expenses are ring fenced within the Contract Area. The recoverable Contract expenses must have been incurred prior to the commencement of production. Activities in different contract areas are treated as separate operations and are taxed separately as per Section 20 of the Finance Act 2013, Section 118 PA 2015, Section 19 of Income Tax Act, 2004, Article 12(c) MPSA 2013. Capital Gain Tax: This applies in case of corporate reorganization and acquisition of assets. Transfer of shares subject to Capital Gain Tax at the rate of 30% of turnover. Since July 2012, indirect share transfer maybe taxed. The change of owner ship by 50% is treated under the Income Tax as a realization of asset/liabilities. Farm-out/Farm-in Fees: The MPSA 2013 introduces special fees for Farm-out and Farm-in arrangement: For the first USD 100mil: 1%; for the next USD 100mil: 1.5%; and for every dollar thereafter: 2%. This is not applicable to the existing PSAs. It applies to future PSAs which will be signed on the basis of the MPSA 2013. Withholding Tax: This is the amount of a service or goods provider’s pay withheld by the taxable entity and sent directly to the government as partial payment of income tax. The rate is 5% from payment of resident providers of technical or management services. Dividend is taxed 10%, but 5% for companies listed at DSE or in case 25% shares owned by residents. Value Added Tax (VAT): VAT is a pass through tax that applies at every transaction point. The rate is 18% of all taxable goods and services. All suppliers of goods and services with turnover at least TZS 40 million must be registered for VAT purposes. The oil and gas exploration companies are exempted from the VAT to extent provided in their respective PSAs. Other Taxes and Fees: Goods imported or exported in connection with oil and gas exploration activities are exempted from import and export duties. Stamp duties is payable in case of transfer of property or in case of assignment of rights under lease agreement at the rate of 1% of the turnover. Currently, the PAYE is payable at the rate ranging from 12% to 30% of the basic salary for resident employees and for non-resident employee the rate is between 15% employment income and 20% on the total income. The new rates of PAYE will be effective from 1 July 2016 where the minimum rate will be 9%. All employers with at least 4 employees are obliged to pay 5% of gross wage bill as a skill development levy chargeable under Section 14 (2) of the VETA Act. Worker’s Compensation fund became effective since July 2014. All private sector employers have to contribute to the Fund a rate 1% of annual wage bill as per the Workers’ Compensation Act, 2008. The employers also have to make contribution to pension funds of the employee’s choice. Service levy is also payable by companies at the rate of 0.3% to the municipal authorities of turnover or sales as per the Local Government Finance Act, 1982. Generally, there are several tax reliefs that are provided to oil and gas companies. These include the capital allowances and other reliefs provided under tax laws and bilateral agreements. So far the United Republic of Tanzania has entered into double taxation treaties with various countries including Canada, Denmark, Finland, India, Italy, Norway, South Africa, Sweden and Zambia.   The author is an Advocate of the High Court. He holds an LLB (Hons), LLM (Int’l law), LLM (Oil and Gas law); MBA (Corporate Management). He can be reached through: raphael.mgaya@gmail.com or consult@mgaya.lawyer              

By doc. dr Jasna Čošabić. IT law or cyber law or internet law, is evolving in giant steps. On its way, it has many challenges to meet and a lot of burdens to cope with. Being a part of international law, it is though specific in its nature, mode of implementation and protection. While the classic international law deals with classic state territories, state jurisdictions, with a clear distinction between national laws, the IT law is uncertain about the state jurisdiction, earthbound borders, rules and proceedings regarding any dispute arising on internet. However, with a fast development of information technology, the number of legal contracts and businesses on internet rises, requiring the fast response by legal order in terms of regulating and protecting it. From the time internet emerged, each entity operating on internet provided for its own rules. With the IT becoming more complex and demanding so were the rules. We therefore say that internet is self-regulated, with no visible interference by state, apart from criminal activities control. Some authors even call the internet private legal order where stateless justice[1] apply. Justice usually needs a state, which is a supreme authority, having the monopoly of violence, or the legitimate use of physical force. But speaking in internet terms, self-regulation has evolved, with the state interferece being mainly excluded. The form of entering into online contracts gets simplified, mainly requiring just a mouse click by ‘I agree’ or ‘I accept’. The quantity of such legal interactions increases. It is often simpler and more convenient to purchase goods via internet, e-commerce blumishes. Parallely to Single Market, the European Commission, the Junker’s Commission, has started to boost a Digital Single Market in 2015, which would provide growth of digital economy. It’s aim is to provide the EU citizens equal online access to goods and services, making a parallel world to a conventional or a non-digital one. The Commission has just, on 25 May 2016, presented a package of measures in that regard with the objectives of advancing EU data protection rules, reform of telecoms rules, copyright, simplyfying consumer rules for online purchases, providing the same online content and services regardless of EU country, etc. However, what happens if a dispute arises from an online legal interaction. Which court is in charge? In which state? Under what fees? The law has always provided for a procedural protection of obligations entered into by various types of contracts. The usual protection belongs to courts. Court proceedings may sometimes be time-consuming, barry expensive fees, and are usually non-voluntary for at least one party to the proceedings. That usually brings the use of multi-level proceedings, recourse to remedies and ends in compulsory enforcement proceedings. With the development of trade, especially of trade which crossed the state borders, there emerged a system of solving disputes before a non-judicial bodies, arbitration. Arbitration became a convenient way of solving disputes arising from contracts that involve a cross border element. The very important segment, which was not present in conventional court proceedings, is voluntarity of parties which agree even prior to any dispute that might arise, about an arbitration body which would be in charge, in case a dispute happens. The arbitration become institutionalised, like the Paris ICC Arbitration, New York International Arbitration Center, etc.. However, many forms remain non-institutionalised, which include impartial experts in the area of dispute, who with the help of parties, and implementing various forms of mediation and arbitration, aim to resolve the issue. This way of settling cases became very well accepted, as the parties voluntarily agree to arbitration rules and therefore enforcement of any such decision becomes more acceptable to parties and usually deprived of a compulsory element. So not many arbitration awards face compulsory enforcement by courts, which is otherwise provided by the New York Convention[2]. However, with the emergence of online trade, there also came a question of solving any such dispute that might arise from online trade, whether the subject of such trade are goods or services. It is more natural for parties who enter into their contract online, to solve the dispute online. In February 2016 the European Commission has launched an Online Dispute Resolution Platform (ODR)[3] in order to provide for the structured and institutionalized recourse to resolving legal disputes arising on internet. It is designed to bring together the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) entities by member states, which fulfill certain quality conditions, provided in the Directive on consumer ADR. [4] The European Parliament and the Council of the EU have adopted two key documents in respect of online dispute resolution (2013), i.e. the Directive on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and Regulation on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes. [5] The parties to the proceedings are a consumer, being a natural person, acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft or profession, and resident in the Union, and a trader, a natural or legal person, privately or publicly owned acting for purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession. The fees of the proceedings are supposed to be minimal or none. The length of proceedings should not exceed 90 days. Comparing to court proceedings, which are often lengthy and costly, this makes a good alternative. Each trader is obliged to make visible the link to ODR platform, informing and enabling thus the consumers to initiate the proceedings in case of dispute. The online dispute proceedings are to be led by key principles[6] that ADR must fulfil including expertise, independence and impartiality, transparency including listing of ADR entities, natural persons in charge of ADR, the average length of ADR procedure, the legal effect of the outcome of ADR procedure including penalties for non-compliance, the enforceability of the ADR decision, if relevant. ADR proceedings must be effective, available and accessible with duration of up to 90 days except in highly complex disputes. But the question which arises after every dispute is solved, is the enforcement of its outcome. While the EU has just recently put forward the ODR platform, creating common principles of procedure for alternative dispute resolution entities joining the platform, there are already some good examples of self-regulated dispute resolution bodies. Some of the most succesful models include Pay Pal, CyberSettle, and Domain dispute resolution-UDRP. CyberSettle, the world’s first online claim settlement company which was launched in late 90’s and pattented in 2001, invented the ‘double-blind bid’ dispute resolution process, which includes two parties each making three offers and three demands in dispute resolution, in separate ‘blind’ submissions. The CyberSettle automatically choses the closest middle solution. PayPal profiled a system of chargeback, upon the complaint by the customer to his credit card issuer, in case, for example, of not receiving the ordered goods. PayPal holds the funds until the issue is resolved. UDRP (Uniform Domain-Name Resolution Policy) was designed to protect Trademarks from registering the same or similar domain names by non-owners of Trademarks, or cybersquatting. The common ingredient of these success stories is that the above ODR bodies themselfes provided for an efficient system of enforcement, i.e. the self-enforcement. The self-enforcement is considered to be the simplest and best way of enforcing a decision arising from an online dispute. Self-enforcement is possible with the support of technology. Another good incentive for enforcement is a trust the trader enjoys in the digital market. The impairment of the trust in the trader, would automatically scale down his position in the digital market. If a trader holds a Trustmark, as a guarantee of his quality, losing it for not complying with an online dispute resolution decision, would put him in a disadvantaged position, and would certainly make him obey the decision. Moreover, disclosure of list of traders not complying with ADR/ODR decision might be detrimental to their reputation, which speaking of online traders, plays very important role in geting trust from the consumers in digital market. Furthermore, social networking on internet enable the information to spread fast, which as a result may lead to a drop of trader rating. The trust is, speaking of online business, of utmost importance. Digital market is more sensitive and depending upon acceptance by the public then regular market. It responds quicker and any flaw is easily transmitted via internet. It lacks the physical assesment and therefore it is more reliable on written information. The market rules will certainly define that it is better for a trader to comply with the ODR decision, then to get an unfavourable reputation. E-commerce and e-business relies significantly on trust that it has built towards the custommers. A custommer is much more careful when entering an online shopping site then entering a real shopping mall. It is still early to have a case-law resulting from running of the ODR platform, as it has just been released in February 2016. However the move by the European Commission to bring the self-regulation and self-enforcement under certain unified rules, shall certainly bring results. The platform is currently applicable in EU member states, except for Croatia, Luxemburg, Poland, Romania and Spain. The remaining 23 member states reported to the Commission a wide list of ADR bodies, which may operate under different names, ombudsman, mediator, arbitrator, etc. This is a huge step in moving from the conventional court system, in cases that originated in online interactions. That gives another unified form to the online legal order that has been creating spontaneously and hectically from the time the internet spread as a tool. The European Commission, representing the key governing functions of the EU, made a move towards bringing online system of running businses, especially B2C, more secure and more convenient for the consumers. The enforcement of ADR decision should therefore not be uncertainty of online dispute resolution proceedings. In that regard, it should be stressed that a milestone judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, Hornsby v. Greece (1997), provided that it would be ‘illusory of a Contracting State’s domestic legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party’. Accordingly, all procedural guarantees would be purposeless without protecting for the implementation of the result of the proceedings. Although the ODR proceedings are not judicial proceedings, often being left without state control, ammounting thus to stateless justice as referred to above, it would be unimaginable that the decision ending the online dispute resolution, remains with no effect in praxis. It would make the whole concept of online dispute resolution useless and deprived of its advantages, such as availability, fast resolution, small or no fees, and would eventually bring parties to the court, with all the shorcomings when online disputes are at stake, such as long proceedings, high fees, time-consuming, duty of appearing of parties in person, but with a certain enforcement. Accordingly, in order for the online dispute resolution to endure and evolve, as a breakthrough in IT law, the enforcement of its outcome, must not be compromised. About the author: doc. dr Jasna Čošabić is a professor of IT law and EU law at Banja Luka College, Bosnia and Herzegovina jasnacosabic@live.com   [1] See Ortolani Pietro, The Three Challenges of Stateless Justice, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 2016, 0, 1-32, Oxford, p. 6 [2] The Convention on the Recognition of Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 [3] https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/odr/main/index.cfm?event=main.home.show&lng=EN [4] Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR) [5] Regulation (EU) no 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR) [6] Directive on consumer ADR