By Jasna Samic. Recently it was suggested to forbid carrying all religious signs in the Bosnian courts. In the connection with that, I am following a ‘lament” over « the  Hijab » (“mahrama”, headscarf) for days and cannot believe to which extent the totallitarism started governing in Bosnia (especially Sarajevo), and to which degree the woman’s hair became the main enemy against freedom and democracy, to which measure those ladies hiding their hair started ruling this newly folkloric society, and how much primitivism succeded to force their prescriptions, their « democracy » and their concept of faith and religion (without real understanding), to which level the primitivism and a lack of knowledge cause a fier to all those who do not accept their rules (which are arrogantly by principle of opposite logic called the democratic ones). For days, those “democrates” are calling me a”fashion fashista from the West”, because I am against “Hijab”, that “every Muslim’s duty”. That is why I would like to point out and strongly underline that “Hijab” does not have any connection with a headscarf, especially the way it is being wrapped around the head these days. The expression “Hijab” in Quran means “the veil hiding God”; in another words one can never see and get to know God, because our intellect is too weak for it. This is a well known fact to all teachers (Hodjas) who work in religious schools -“Madressa” in Bosnia, but why they do not say it openly so ? Is it convenient for them that a female person stays as an inferior human being to them? When I was studying Sufism, I myself respected that rule when going to the tekke pf Sinan Agha of Sarajevo. After all, one sincere and poetic explanation for hiding women’s hair was given to me by the rare islamic democrat and  authority, the former Sheikh at Sinan’s tekke, Fejzulah Hadzibajric: “When Angels came down from the sky they got lost in women’s hair, that’s why it has to be hidden”. But what are Angels, or where they are? Most probably they too deserted, or are exiled  from today’s « neophyte society » giving a space to Iblis (and Sotona). A public wearing of headscarfs, especially  “Niqab”(black Saudi Muslim gowns which cover completely woman’s body and face) are the first signs of not obeying to God (Muslim= a person who is submissive to the only God= al-Lah), but of female repentants to males; those are clear signs or warnings to a reinstitution of slavery, especially for women who were oppressed by men from the beginnings of monoteistic religions. Wearing a headscarf (“mahrama” ) and hiding of woman’s hair is not only an islamic obligation, even so in its origin itself. Is it necessary to emphasize that Islam is the youngest monoteistic religion? It is well known fact  that women  are hiding hair and face with a veil in Catholicism, or shaving head and wearing wigs in Judaism. Those habits (and today even more so hiding the whole female’s body)  are transferred from Orient to Balkans and that it could be partially related to Hadiths (Muhammad’s tradition and behaviour) which are quite often apocryphal Even if something is being written in Quran (but it is not) about hiding women’s hair, do not forget that Islam is expecting from believers, as well as from women too, an ultimate humbleness and contrition, to be delicate, not to show off with own religion. In another words by Islam a person who does not go to mosque is not less Muslim than one who does, not to mention a woman who does not wear the headscarf. Is there a chance nowadays that the Bosnian women go further away from those Middle Age darkness from their own deliberate choice to be a slave to a totalitarian male? I am afraid there is no chance for it to happen. Talking about this phenomenon it is important to say that (in this case in the most radical shapes of religion and  Islam) it is a manipulation of broad people joined with foreign currencies, i.e. Saudi Arabis “dukats”. It is a well known fact that today’s Islam is imported directly from Saudi Arabia and that Wahabi and Salafits have more and more success in the whole world in general, so in Bosnia too. Sarajevo is looking today less  like some democratic european secular city, and more looks like a Bedouin village in the middle of a dessert, where a woman is a priori excluded from society and whose primary role is to give a birth to males. First Karadzic and Milosevic opened the door to this foreign Islam in Bosnia by ethnic cleansing (during the war 1992-1995), and after them Izetbegovic with his ambivalent relationship with the state and his  weakness towards the extreme Islam and Muslim country money. Further, it is well known that the first sign of the extreme Islam- Wahabism and Salafism – is headscarf (“mahrama”) , which is wrongly called “Hidjab’ ; after that the other symbols come easy such as “Niqab” (wrapping of women in total black clothes), than male short beards plus short trousers, next to expect would be the excision or clitorydectomia in women, supression of music and paintings (which is a « haram » in Islam), than closing of public schools, burning books and the accepting completely the macabre ideology of the Daesh. This ideology is glorifying death, submission to a male Muslim and hatred towards West. Although there are many reasons for which West could be criticized and regardless how much it is responsibility of the “black Islam”, it can be concluded that still much more rights exist at West than in other countries. Long time ago it was said by Churchill: « Democracy is not good, but there is nothing better than that ». If we can further comment that Muslim in western countries – for ex. in France – were humiliated, why this radical Islam is gaining more and more success in Bosnia ? Why it is not possible to say anything against such Islam?  How come that these foreigners from Saudi Arabia have such a power at Balkans ? What is typical for western countries, it is a hypocrisy in connection with those questions. In Bosnia, this hypocrisy is caused by fear. It is very symptomatic that many Bosnian women who do not agree wearing headscarf , Hijab, (“mahrama”), even more so with this religious exhibitionism at public places (schools, courts etc.) do not have a courage to express their opinion publicly. Yes, those big believers and those satellite followers became so powerful and aggressive that everybody else pertaining a different opinion is being called fasist, non tolerant or scary person. That is being known as a reverse logic or paranoia. We have already seen that before and during the aggression on Bosnia in the 90th, when it was not possible to say anything against extreme Serbs, because you would be labelled as Serbs ennemy. The situation is very similar, except that now we have more and more extreme Muslims who are being identified by all those who do not believe to be extreme, but accusing the others of the same. Christians are scared of not being called “islamophobic” and they are silent. Therefore the slavery to a primitive male, mafia guy or corrupted leaders is being spread in Bosnia. Is it necessary to quote the famous writer who said that the tolerance against non tolerance equalls a crime? The Bosnian society should have decided about the existence of Sharia (in which case almost all politicians should loose both arms), or of a real secular country where finally religion would be separated from the state and consequently all religious signs would be removed  from public places. Jasna Samic Specialist of Oriental languages and civilizations, Jasna Samic taught at the Universities of Sarajevo and Strasbourg, was a Director of research associate to CNRS. She is author of many books written in Bosnian and French.      

On the picture Irina Simon-Renes. By John Dunkelgrün.   Since 2010 Wassenaar has had a unique music festival, the ICMF or International Chamber Music Festival.

It is not only original in concept, but of truly high quality. Now in its seventh year it is the brainchild of Irina Simon-Renes and Liesbeth Hessels. Irina is Romanian and has been living in Wassenaar for seven years. As a teenager while on a concert tour to Cognac in France, her parents, who lived in communist Romania, managed to organise her escape to Berlin. There, with the financial help of a friend of her parents and the parents of a friend, she was able to attend the Lycée Français and the Hochschule der Künste. She was lucky to meet Prof. Thomas Zehetmair, who taught her that music is a beautiful language which needs to be handled very carefully. As a real musician, you are a medium to bring beauty into a world where there is too much ugliness. These lessons have become a red line throughout Irina’s life. She feels compelled to share the beauty of her music. While working with the Bavarian Radio Symphony Orchestra she was thinking of what she could meaningfully do after she moved to Holland with her Dutch husband. Through a daisy chain of chance contacts, she met Liesbeth Hessels. Together with Margaret de Vos van Steenwijk they hatched the idea of the ICMF. This was not just intended to be yet another local music festival, but to bring accessible classical music of world quality to Wassenaar, and also to attract people who may never have attended a live classical music concert. The festival has been a real success story. While the organisation is entirely in the hands of volunteers, they run it very professionally. Each year the program brings surprises and becomes a little more ambitious. Some program elements are chosen specifically to attract young listeners. This year’s program is a good example of that. The first day features a concert at the Rijnlands Lyceum by two young Syrian musicians Shaza Manla (12) and Jawa Manla (19) together with Irina Simon-Renes. The Lyceum students will work two weeks prior to the festival on a variety of activities around Syria as well as on the concept of music and freedom. This year’s festival highlight is a major gala candlelight concert in Castle Duivenvoorde to celebrate the work of the Dutch composer Unico Wilhelm van Wassenaer, who died 250 years ago. Prof. Hans Jeekel of the Erasmus Medical Center Rotterdam will give a lecture on the curative power of music. The traditional concert in the Dorpskerk in Wassenaar offers some of the most special works by Mozart, Prokofiev and Brahms with the principal woodwind players from the Royal Concertgebouw Orchestra and an international string section. The festival ends with a spectacular family luncheon concert featuring Ukrainian percussionist Konstantyn Napolov. Children will sit among the performers. Following the concert they will have the opportunity to try various instruments and even sign up for the Music School B+C Leiden-Wassenaar. It is Irina’s most ardent wish to introduce and welcome children and their parents to the worldwide community of music lovers. The festival is traditionally held in May when the Wassenaar garden city is at its most beautiful. For more information and tickets, go to www.icmf.nl. But hurry, they go fast!        

   By Anna van der Vliet. Tragedy after televised tragedy brought the plight of migrants to the world’s attention in the summer of 2014. Since that time, European  Union has adjusted itself to cope with the largest influx of refugees since the end of the Second World War. Only this month, the number of refugees to Europe surpassed one million people. While member states continue to implement national policies on refugee acceptance and the political world is confronted with stark polarisation in the face of such a crisis, the European Union works to provide overarching policies to ensure that neither their member-states’ sovereignty, the security of Europe , nor the rights of the refugee population are compromised. The European Union is under immense pressure and as such suffers from some organisational weaknesses, as pointed out by the European Council on Foreign Relations. Despite this, the climate remains hopeful. In their October report entitled “EU Global Strategy: Internal and External Challenges on the Refugee Crisis”, the ECFR brought to attention the vital role of trust between EU member states and the institutions managing the crisis response. The situation as is  suffers from a fundamental shortage of such confidence. The Council recommends a renewed commitment to trust, flexibility, and resolve, all of which are instrumental to the EU’s ability to “weather this storm” (ECFR). This trust can be achieved by placing emphasis on both the sharing of intelligence as well as the commitment to realistic financial pledges. The political and economic sacrifices required by the EU are immense. However, amidst the difficult task of settling an estimated three million migrants by 2017, a positive aspect has emerged for member states ready to take on the challenge. The EU has recently published a report regarding the economic effects of the large inflow of immigrants that declares a net economic gain of approximately 0.25% to be had by 2017. The ambitiousness required to overcome the crisis will demand intense cooperation on all fronts, but perhaps as time goes by further economic and socio-cultural benefits will be unearthed. Though the road ahead is long and unpredictable for the European Union and migrants alike, it is up to policy makers continue to seek renewed trust and realistically commit to flexibility to ensure that overcoming the so-called “crisis” can be looked back upon as a high point in international history. Information: International Organization for Migration http://www.iom.int/ http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/eeip/pdf/ip011_en.pdf http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/business/international/european-union-economic-forecast-migrants-refugees.html http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/world/europe/migrant-crisis-europe-million.html    

  The European Commission adopted the European Agenda on Security on 28 April 2015, setting out the main actions envisaged to ensure an effective EU response to security threats over the period 2015-2020. Since its adoption, significant progress has been made in its implementation. This first year since its adoption has also been marked by tragic terrorist attacks around the world and notably on European soil in Paris in November 2015 and in Brussels in March. Against this background, this Memo highlights the actions to be completed as a matter of urgency in view of the current challenges faced, and summarizes the actions already completed. Completed actions since the adoption of the European Agenda on Security On terrorism The European Counter Terrorism Centre (EU ECTC) in Europol was launched on 1 January 2016. The aim is to step up the institutional support to Member States fighting terrorism and radicalisation by facilitating coordination and cooperation between relevant authorities within a secure environment with the highest confidentiality in its communication. As the Commission recalled in several meetings of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, sufficient expertise needs to be made available by Member States. The Commission has proposed an amending budget to increase the ECTC by 25 staff. On border management The Commission revised the Schengen Handbook in line with the need for additional checks against the relevant databases. As a result, today there are more than 66,000 alerts for discreet and specific checks. This is a 300% increase compared to June 2013. In 2015, the Commission made legal and technical improvements to the Schengen Information System (SIS) to provide for real-time communication from officials operating on the ground to the competent services in other Member States. The Commission also distributed an explanatory document to Member States at the beginning of October 2015 to help border guards in the seizing of invalidated documents. In the context of the revision of the SIS already foreseen for 2016, the Commission will look into possible needs to enhance the law enforcement aspect of the SIS. In the meantime, the Commission is urging Member States to make full use of the possibilities to enter into the SIS alerts relating to all measures involving expulsion, refusal of entry or removal from the territory of a Member State. The Commission finalised in May 2015, in close cooperation with national experts, the EEAS, EU Agencies and Interpol, a first set of Common Risk Indicators concerning foreign terrorist fighters, with a view to detect terrorist travel. Common Risk Indicators support the work of national border authorities when conducting checks on persons. To operationalise the Common Risk Indicators, FRONTEX has developed a handbook to support Member States. On radicalisation The establishment of the EU Internet Referral Unit (IRU) at Europol aims to help reduce the volume of terrorist material online. It was launched on 1 July (pilot phase). In its first three months, it has made over 550 referrals. The Commission intends to support the IRU in reaching out to more internet companies, as well as encourage the companies to have adequate arrangements in place to receive referrals from the EU IRU. The Commission launched the EU Internet Forum on 3 December 2015, bringing together Ministers and CEOs of major internet companies and other internet actors. It provides a framework for more efficient cooperation with the industry. The aim is to contribute to (i) reducing accessibility to terrorist material online (removal of content), (ii) making better use of the internet to challenge the terrorist narrative (development and dissemination of counter narratives), and (iii) exploring the concerns of law enforcement on new encryption technologies. Communication between terrorists is increasingly taking place using highly sophisticated encryption techniques. To respond to the requests coming from the EU Internet Forum and from several Member States, internet companies have already implemented significant changes to their Terms and Conditions to take down terrorism propaganda and extremism content from their platform. Moreover, the companies have launched several campaigns at EU level to empower civil society to work on alternative narratives to radicalisation. Beyond the initial participants of the forum, there is high interest from other internet companies to join the action. A roadmap with concrete activities for 2016 is being finalised together with the companies. The Commission has launched in 2015 an initiative in dialogue with the IT companies to tackle online hate speech in accordance with EU law (Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia) and national law, with a view to ensuring that hate speech is expeditiously taken down. The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Centre of Excellence has been operational since 1 October 2015. The aim is (i) to facilitate and enhance the exchange of experiences and cooperation between the relevant stakeholders (inside and outside the EU), in particular through the RAN; (ii) to support the EU and the Member States in their prevent efforts through different support services, practical tools and policy contributions; and (iii) to consolidate, disseminate and share expertise, best practices and targeted research in the field of preventing radicalisation. The RAN Centre has stepped up its support to Member States and to priority third countries. It has been reinforced with a budget of EUR 25 million for the next 5 years. On cross border cooperation A platform bringing together Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) from the Member States is in place. Its purpose is to detect and disrupt terrorist finance and money laundering activities. It meets on a regular basis with the Commission services with a view to enhance cooperation, develop common tools and better identify suspicious financial transactions. They have developed well-performing IT tools for direct information exchange (FIU.NET) among FIUs, that since 1 January 2016 is embedded in EUROPOL, and in particular in its ECTC. On firearms The Commission adopted an implementing regulation on common firearms deactivation standards on 18 November 2015. It will enter into force on 8 April 2016 to ensure that deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable and cover both domestic and cross-border situations in order to fulfil the security objectives. On the external dimension The Commission also took action, in close cooperation with the External Action Service and the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator, to ensure further coherence between internal and external actions in the field of security. Security and counter-terrorism experts have been deployed in the EU delegations of Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Algeria and Egypt. Targeted and upgraded security and counter-terrorism dialogues have been established, in particular with Tunisia, Lebanon, Morocco and Turkey, and concrete action plans are being agreed with those countries. Relevant actions  launched by the Commission which need to be sped up Priorities for implementation Action Plan on Terrorist Financing: On 2 February 2016, the Commission announced a wide range of measures to cut terrorists off from their sources of revenue and to trace them through financial activities. Among the immediate priorities in the Action Plan are measures to enhance the effectiveness of sanctions and asset freezing measures within the EU and in third countries. In the first half of 2016, the Commission will propose targeted amendments to the EU Anti-Money Laundering framework to address emerging terrorist financing risks and potential loopholes. Also this year, the Commission intends to propose EU legislation against illicit cash movements, including possible limits on cash or assets carried or transported across borders. The Commission will also assess the need for additional EU legislation for freezing terrorist assets within the EU and the possibilities to complement the existing EU-US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme. Action Plan on firearms and explosives: The Commission presented on 2 December 2015 an Action Plan on firearms and explosives that called for a number of measures to prevent terrorist attacks such as those that occurred in Paris and Brussels. These include (i) specific actions on the use of detection technology and towards standardising its use (soft targets, critical infrastructures, public areas; (ii) development of innovative detection tools, (iii) strengthening of existing measures and creation of new tools for increasing the security of passengers on international train services; (iv) use of new technologies to reinforce security in rail transport. The Commission has already identified significant gaps in the implementation of Regulation 98/2013 on explosives precursors and is taking action to improve the situation. Dissemination of guidance on soft target protection: In May 2015 the Commission and the EU Airport Police network completed work on an EU Airport Soft Target Protection manual. This manual has been translated into the official EU languages and should be shortly distributed to all the Police forces so that the recommendations can be used to better secure airports against similar attacks to the one that occurred on 22 March 2016. Similar work has been launched in October 2015 by the Commission to develop guidance material on protection against other soft target areas such as rail and metro and other areas (sport stadiums, shopping malls, public garages, transport hubs, etc). The issuance of the Manual will be accelerated and accompanied by adequate training. Detection and protection trials: Detection and protection trials have been launched by the Commission together with several Member States in February 2015 in different operational environments such as airports, train station, sport events and public buildings. New trials are scheduled for May 2016. Dedicated manuals for Member State practitioners have been issued by the Commission together with AIRPOL on airport security and protection. Pending proposals to be adopted by the co-legislators Commission proposal for a directive on terrorism: Following the adoption of the additional protocol to the Council of Europe convention of terrorism, the Commission proposed on 2 December 2015 a directive harmonising the criminalisation of offences linked to terrorist travel, passive training, financing and facilitation of such travel. Following the general approach reached by the Council at the Home Affairs Council on 11 March, the Commission invites the co-legislators to agree on the Commission’s ambitious proposal as a matter of priority. Commission proposal for revised firearms legislation: On 18 November 2015, the Commission presented a proposal for the full revision of Directive 477/91 setting the legal framework on firearms. The revision aims at strengthening rules and reducing the legal uncertainty caused by national divergences, thus facilitating the role of national police and investigation authorities. The adoption by the co-legislators should be a priority for ensuring the high standards of the Commission’s proposal. EU PNR Directive: The agreement found on the Commission’s proposal for a Directive on the use of Passenger Names Record (PNR) data by law enforcement authorities should be formalised as soon as possible by the co-legislators, replacing a set of diverging national rules. Revised Europol Regulation: The final adoption of the revised Europol Regulation, following the political agreement reached between the co-legislators on the Commission’s proposal, will constitute a decisive step towards making Europol a hub for information exchange for law enforcement authorities within the EU and to better support their actions. Border package: The package was adopted by the Commission on 15 December 2015. It proposes the setting up of a European Border and Coast Guard to move towards integrated border management to raise common standards at the external border. It also contains proposals for the modification of the Schengen Borders Code to impose the obligation of carrying out systematic checks at the external borders on all persons, including those enjoying the right of free movement under Union law (i.e. EU citizens and members of their families who are not EU citizens), in order to verify that such persons do not represent a threat to public order and internal security. The discussion in the Council on the package should be sped up under the Dutch Presidency, ensuring the high level of ambition proposed by the Commission. Extension of ECRIS to Third Country Nationals: The Commission proposed on 19 January 2016 to amend the EU system for the exchange of information on criminal convictions to render it more effective for the exchange of criminal records of Third Country Nationals. The Commission invites the co-legislators to agree on the Commission’s proposal as a matter of priority. Current challenges and related actions? Member States have the primary responsibility to ensure security on the ground. Action at EU level must focus on where we can bring added-value to the action of the Member States. In that regard, the Commission has devoted significant efforts under the European Agenda on Security to address the main challenges for an effective and sustainable action at EU level to fight terrorism and organised crime: (1) the exchange of information between Member States’ law enforcement authorities and with the EU Agencies, and (2) the issue of the inter-operability of relevant databases and information systems. A number of actions are being undertaken to address these challenges: Communication on stronger borders: The Commission is working on a Communication, which will build on the synergies between the European Agendas on Security and Migration. It will present a way forward on how technology and information exchange systems could develop in the next five years to ensure that border guards and police officers have the necessary information at their disposal in order to effectively manage external borders and ensure internal security. It will urge the better application and implementation of existing EU instruments, maximising the benefits of existing EU measures and, where necessary, delivering new and complementary actions. It will highlight the need to achieve a more joined-up, inter-agency and cross-sectoral approach, which is coordinated at the nexus of different threats, actions and policies. Information exchange for law enforcement purposes: In view of the importance of cross-border information exchange for law enforcement purposes within the EU and the challenges that such exchanges raise, the Commission continues to prioritise the enforcement of the existing Prüm framework (an information exchange tool that can offer automated comparison of DNA profiles, fingerprint data and vehicle registration data) as a matter of urgency. The first EU Pilots were sent at the end of 2015. A more systematic use of Interpol’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database is also a high priority, in line with JHA Council Conclusions from November 2015. Action plan on SIS and foreign terrorist fighters’ movements: The Council Presidency, in close cooperation with the Commission, is preparing an action plan to be issued by the end of the current Presidency on the use of SIS in relation to foreign terrorist fighters and to address important operational difficulties. Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats; the Commission and the High Representative will soon present a Joint Communication to address hybrid threats more effectively with a coordinated response at EU level by using EU policies and instruments, to build on European solidarity, mutual assistance and the full potential of the Lisbon Treaty.  

By Samantha Brletich. The Kazakhstan snap Parliamentary elections were held on 20 March 2016. The snap elections were called amidst economic turmoil and fears that the Kazakhstan government would lose voter and public confidence because of the economic situation in Kazakhstan. The elections will solidify autocratic President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s rule over the country and make it appear that he has the unwavering support of the people of Kazakhstan. Reports of crackdown of dissent suggest otherwise. The crackdowns, aimed at political dissidents and non-conformists to President Nazarbayev’s policies, is a way to control civil unrest and silence critics which is a longstanding criticism of the Nazarbayev Administration. The elections did not generate significant differences in the country’s political landscape which has remained relatively unchanged since Nazarbayev gained power in 1989. Arguably, the elections are part of Nazarbayev’s attempts to make Kazakhstan appear as a democratic country and are part of “managed democracy.” The elections are being held against the backdrop of a failing economy, fluctuating tenge, low oil revenue prices and the oil market crash, political dissent, and Nazarbayev’s need to be reaffirmed by the people of Kazakhstan. The election will also show regional countries that Kazakhstan handle economic problems and is a reliable partner. Nazarbayev’s victory was predictable and negative implications stemming from a minor Parliamentary mix-up are non-existent. A Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) mission monitored the elections. Kazakhstan’s past elections have fallen short of international standards citing lack of competitive candidates and corruption. As many as 234 candidates from the following six parties vied for 98 available parliament seats: the ruling Nur Otan party and the Party of President Nursultan Nazarbayev (127 candidates), Ak Zhol (35 candidates), Auyl (19 candidates), the Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan (22 candidates), the Nationwide Social Democratic Party (23 candidates) and the Birlik party (eight candidates). Over 1,000 candidates are running for seats in the lower Parliament. Not much has changed as the other parties platforms do not vary that greatly. Political parties are prohibited from forming blocks. According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the results of the March 20, 2016, parliamentary elections show, “that three parties will have seats in the Majlis[:]Nur-Otan got 82.15 percent of the vote; Ak Zhol, 7.18 percent; and the Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan took 7.14 percent.” These results are similar to the 2012 Parliamentary elections which highlights the lack of political variety and true democracy in the country. The elections were hailed a success by regional organizations, the SCO and the CIS. The ODIHR did not agree as Kazakhstan has a long way to go to fulfill its democratic agreement. International observers were not surprised at the results. As early voting commenced on Sunday, the Kazakh Central Election Committee, stated that the elections were transparent. The OSCE have been heavily involved as “the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission opened in Astana on17 February, with an11 member core team and 28 long-term-observers deployed throughout the country.” Whether or not the elections will expedite the reforms or guarantee implementation, the economy continues to slow. If Nur Otan retains its majority in Kazakhstan’s Parliament, the speed of implementation would not be effected. The snap elections directly are not being held to give the government a mandate on “100 steps.” The legitimacy of “100 steps” is derived from the President and support from Parliament and the overall willingness to reform Kazakhstan. Fifty-nine laws have already entered into force citing information from the Astana Times. The snap elections center on economic recovery and political change. The snap elections are supported by the Majlis, and the miners and metallurgists to allow for “further implementation of reforms,” under Plan of the Nation (or “100 Steps”) and to “understand how we work in a new way, what laws should be adopted to meet the requirements of a market economy,” according to the Kazakh BNews news portal. The Head of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan (APK) stated elections will benefit the country politically and economically. Kazakhstan’s People’s Democratic Patriotic Party, known as “Aul” Party, also supports the snap elections. Support from Aul makes the elections and the decision not so one-sided appear pluralistic. The Astana Times, published astonishing, but not surprising, poll results about voting in a new Majlis and reforms: “92 percent of citizens believe the early elections make the public more confident the new reforms will be implemented.” Other poll results are similar. Recently, on 12 January 2016, protests were held in Astana against the Kazakh Bank and the falling tenge. In response, the Kazakh government offered powdered mare’s milk on the global market which “can generate product worth $1 billion (a year)” to mitigate declining global oil prices. Another recent incident was the firing of the Sovereign Wealth Fund manager, Berik Otemurat, stated Kazakhstan’s National Oil Fund would run out in the next six or seven years. The National Oil Fund, often used as an emergency fund, has fallen 17% from $77 billion since August 2014 and the government is withdrawing about according to the Wall Street Journal. The tenge strengthened slightly in February after the currency declined after the government began to float the currency and the country is still experiencing weakened GDP growth. By mid-March the tenge has recovered by 10%. Two activists in Kazakhstan, Serizkhan Mambetalin and Ermek Narymbaev, were convicted and sent to prison for two and three years respectively for Facebook posts “inciting national discord” (Article 174 of the Criminal Code) and the “authorities claimed the clips amounted to a ‘serious crime against peace and security of humankind’ ” according to Human Rights Watch. The two men were arrested in October 2015 and their trial began 9 December 2015. A third activist, Bolatbek Blyalov, has movement restricted for three years and cannot “[change] his place of residence or work, or [spend] time in public areas during his time off.” The punishment for the three activists violates many of Kazakhstan’s international commitments. On 22 February, the head of the Union of Journalists of Kazakhstan National Press Club, Seitkazy Matayev, was arrested on charges of corruption—accused of tax evasion and embezzlement of funds. According to TengrinNews, “the state anti-corruption agency said Matayev was detained along with his son Aset Matayev who heads the private KazTAG news agency.” Seitkazy Matayev was President Nazarbayev’s press secretary from 1991 to 1993. The Committee on Protecting Journalists reported that the Mateyevs sent statements to Adil Soz (a local press group) indicated harassment by city and state authorities began in January 2016. There was also a recent protest in Almaty on 18 March 2016 about the incarceration of activist Yermek Narymbayev, one of the facebook activists, jailed for incitement ethnic strife (Kazakhstan Criminate Code Article 174). Kazakhstan repeatedly has fallen short of commitments for democratic reforms (particularly press freedoms) and instead has strengthened Nazarbayev’s soft authoritarianism. Edward Schatz categorizes Kazakhstan as a soft authoritarian regime that engages in managed information and “[discourages] opposition and [encourages] pro-regime authorities.” Information management, according to Schatz, is not only through media, but by staging “many events to convey information dramatically.” Nazarbayev has a history of staging political events. Applying this notion to snap elections, Kazakhstan’s citizens know of the economic troubles. Snap elections are unnecessary to highlight the problem and snap elections give the impression the government is actively handling the problem and that political change is imminent. Kazakhstan does consider itself a democracy and whether or not Kazakhstan’s democracy meets international standards will be revealed once institutions are strengthened. The Kazakhstan-based Astana Times calls the 20 March elections the first step towards returning “to the levels of growth and prosperity we experienced.” Constitutional reforms may give more power to the lower house, redistributing more power from the strong Presidential system the country now has (in theory). Poor economic conditions are simple a pretext for squashing dissent and reducing political opposition. The poor economic conditions should be viewed as an opportunity to engage and strengthen civil society, establish dialogue between the government and non-governmental organizations, strengthen financial institutions, and explore alternatives in the energy sector. The crash of the commodities and oil markets presents Kazakhstan a unique opportunity to diversify its economy. The elections also present the opportunity to implement electoral reform as Nazarbayev has not picked a successor which greatly increases political instability and the possible formation of a power vacuum. Kazakhstan during its time as the Chair for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has failed to live up to its democratic obligations. The early Presidential elections of April 2015 showed that democratic reforms have yet to materialize. However, failure of democratization (all-encompassing to include media and political rights) and constant criticism has not stopped Kazakhstan from taking on the role of an international mediator on many high-profile conflicts—Iran and Syria—and from becoming a reliable and cooperative economic, trade, and security partners to its neighbors. Kazakhstan’s slow rise on the stage fuel autocratic behaviors. Kazakhstan’s elections, while varied, reflect Kazakhstan’s wavering commitment to democracy and lack of party pluralism. Snap elections and early Presidential elections provide an opportunity for Kazakhstan to slowly implement electoral reforms and most importantly media reforms. Kazakhstan’s Election Law is weak as it does provide for equal party distribution and fails to provide a concrete and non-ambiguous criteria for campaign finance. About the author: Samantha M. Brletich is a researcher and writer specializing in Central Asia and governance, security, terrorism, and development issues. She possesses a Master’s in Peace Operations Policy from George Mason University in Virginia, United States. She works with the virtual think tank Modern Diplomacy specializing in Central Asia and diplomatic trends. Her work has appeared in multiple publications focused on diplomacy and Central Asia respectively. She is currently an employee of the U.S. Federal Government.

On 20 September 2015, shortly after his 64^th birthday, H.E. Ed Kronenburg, Ambassador of the Netherlands to France, completed The Hague Peace Marathon. H.E. Mr Kronenburg has been the Dutch Ambassador to France since 2012. He has held diverse official postings, including functions in the European Commission, NATO and the Service of the Royal House of Orange. The Ambassador has been running since 1999. His first great marathon was that of New York, which he since completed on several occasions. Other marathons under his belt include events in Berlin, Paris, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Enschede, the Zuiderzee Marathon, Monschau and the Slachte marathon in Friesland. 2015 was the first time he had participated in a marathon in The Hague. He told the Marathon Newsletter that he hoped for good weather and was looking forward to an enjoyable event. He was particularly enthusiastic about the initiative to persuade more ambassadors to participate, telling the Marathon Newsletter that The Hague Peace Marathon “highlights the international character of the City of Peace and Justice.” He added that he hoped his own example would encourage other diplomats to run. The fact that Stichting The Hague Marathon organises this run as the Peace Marathon was much to the Ambassador’s liking. He observed that the need for peace and mutual goodwill is greater now than ever, given recent events in Europe. The Ambassador’s message to participants in the forthcoming Peace Marathon is simple: “Be well prepared at the start, and enjoy the event to the fullest.”