One of the priority vectors of the foreign policy strategy of neutral Turkmenistan, initiated by the National Leader of the Turkmen people, Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov and now successfully implemented by the President of Turkmenistan Serdar Berdimuhamedov, is the development of broad international cooperation, where special importance is attached to humanitarian ties. From time immemorial, the Turkmen people have been characterized by the principles of peace, good neighborliness and mutual assistance, passed on from generation to generatio
Following the age-old traditions of good neighborliness and humanism of the Turkmen people, the President of Turkmenistan signed an Order to send humanitarian aid to the people of Palestine and, first of all, to Palestinian children, in November of this year on behalf of the Charitable Foundation for Assistance to Children in Need of Care named after the National Leader, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov.
The humanitarian cargo consists of medicines and medical supplies, textile products, including clothing for children and bedding sets, as well as footwear and food products, and other goods.
By consistently implementing a constructive foreign policy, Turkmenistan is making a significant contribution to the deepening of humanitarian cooperation in the regional and global dimensions. This direction is an important aspect of the development of international relations on the basis of mutual understanding, respect and trust.
Israeli families of Hamas victims to be received on Friday November 17 by Karim Khan, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court â request for international arrest warrants
Several victims’ families will be received at the International Criminal Court, where a meeting is scheduled with Prosecutor Karim Khan and his the team of investigators. This visit follows the complaint lodged by eleven families on 3 November (AFP report), in which their lawyer, François Zimeray, called for an international arrest warrant to be issued for the leaders of Hamas.
The complaint set out the criminal charges likely to be brought by the ICC: firstly, crimes against humanity and war crimes; secondly, the complaint emphasised the genocidal nature of the attacks, in line with the objectives claimed by Hamas in its Charter.
Among the victims whose families will travel to The Hague are the mother of a young woman murdered in a ground attack on the “Tribe of Nova” rave party held in the Negev desert, the young daughter of a man living in Ofakim murdered in his home and the well-known peacededicated entrepreneur Eyal Waldman, whose daughter was murdered at the rave party site. For Mr Zimeray, former French Ambassador for Human Rights, “this visit is an important moment for the victims, but also for the Court, in which the families place their trust. We will provide the Prosecutor with the evidence needed to issue an international arrest warrant against the leaders of Hamas”.
By Dr Christophe Bernasconi, Secretary General of the HCCH
On 12 September 2023 the Hague Conference on Private International Law â known as the HCCH â celebrated its 130th anniversary. I would like to take you on a journey through time to explore the history of the HCCH, which started with the opening of the first âHague Conferenceâ on 12Â September 1893 by Tobias Asser, a leading Dutch jurist, scholar, and statesman. As we explore the HCCHâs history, I will invoke the timeless metaphor of a tree to trace the remarkable growth and development of the HCCH, because much like a strong, steady tree, the HCCH has grown and flourished over time, its branches reaching out to connect, its leaves providing protection, its roots firmly anchored in cooperation. Three distinct periods can be distinguished in the growth of the HCCH âtreeâ.
Period 1: 1893-1955 The Kernel â A Dream Becomes Reality
In the beginning there was a dream: Tobias Asserâs dream of bringing experts together to start unifying rules of private international law. In 1893! Asser, the visionary, anticipated that the number of cross-border situations and transactions would increase. He saw the need for private international law unification and the benefits this would bring to States, individuals, and commercial operators. Asser also believed in the power of international collaboration. And so, the HCCH started as a tiny seed planted in the fertile soil of international legal cooperation. A seed that soon started to grow.
During this first period, the Organisation was not permanent. It was âon and offâ, in the sense that in between two so-called âConferencesâ â Diplomatic Sessions â which were often several years apart, not much would happen. From 1893 to 1955, seven such âHague Conferencesâ or âSessionsâ were held, involving a total of 24 States. During this period, nine Conventions and other instruments were adopted.
The name of the Organisation (âHague Conference on Private International Lawâ) was not the only take-away from this period. Tobias Asser, the man who had planted the HCCH seed, was awarded the Nobel Peace prize in 1911. Interestingly, this was not for his role in the two Peace Conferences held in The Hague in 1899 and 1907, but rather for initiating the HCCH. To me, this fact serves as a constant reminder of an important aspect of our work: for there to be lasting peace between nations, there must be peace between people in their cross-border relations; and there must be a clear, predictable, fair, and practical legal framework that governs these cross-border relations. If one thinks of global peace as a puzzle, then private international law is a piece of that puzzle â a small piece perhaps, but an important one, nonetheless.
Part 2: 1955-2000 Setting Down Roots
The year 1955 was a milestone for the Organisation. This is the year in which the Statute of the HCCH entered into force. The Organisation had become permanent, with a Secretariat â the Permanent Bureau â to conduct work in between âConferencesâ. The roots of the Organisation, of our tree, started to grow and deepen. First rather slowly; however, over the years, the roots of the Organisation grew deeper, and during this period, 47 States became Members of the HCCH.
Thirty-three Conventions and other instruments were developed during this time, including the 1961 Apostille Convention, which may well be the most successful HCCH Convention, both in terms of the number of Contracting Parties â currently 126 and counting â and the number of actual applications: with well over 30Â million Apostilles issued around the world each year, the Apostille Convention is undoubtedly one of the most applied legal cooperation Conventions. Other HCCH Conventions from this period with a significant practical impact are the Service and Evidence Conventions, the Child Abduction and Adoption Conventions (the latter two also being Conventions with currently more than 100 Contracting Parties) as well as the Child Protection Convention. The last three Conventions, incidentally, all have a crucial human rights dimension: they provide States with a framework that enables them to give real effect to the basic principles enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
This second period led to 481 so-called treaty actions, i.e., ratifications, accessions or other instances in which a Convention would come into effect in a State, which underscores that the HCCH developed steadily. The sapling continued to grow, slowly maturing into an adult tree.
Period 3: 2000-current day Branching Out
Today the HCCH is a well-established, far-reaching tree which is flourishing and providing many benefits. Just as a mature tree offers shade, protection, and fruits, the HCCH offers a wealth of practical advantages to people and commercial operators across the globe, and to the international legal community as a whole.
In this most recent period, seven Conventions and other instruments have been adopted, including the Choice of Court, Child Support, and the Judgments Conventions, as well as the HCCH Choice of Law Principles, the first âsoft lawâ instrument of the HCCH. These may all be slightly younger branches, but they are important to keep the HCCH tree healthy and growing.
In the last 23 years there have been 526 additional treaty actions. As a result, there are now more than 1â000 instances in which an HCCH Convention has been brought into effect in States and other Contracting Parties around the world â an impressive expression of the HCCHâs practical and effective multilateralism, all the more so when one considers that it would take more than 31,830 bilateral agreements to establish the same network of treaty relations!
A crucial development during this third period has been the elevation of the principle of consensus to a fundamental, strategic guiding principle for the HCCH. In fact, since the year 2000 not a single vote has been taken during negotiations or in relation to the HCCHâs Work Programme. Putting consensus at the heart of our core discussions has undoubtedly been crucial for the branching out of the HCCH, for bringing more States to the table, and ensuring that their interests are taken into account. Universality, inclusiveness, and consensus are the key strategic principles on which the further growth and development of the HCCH rests.
Today, the HCCH is not only rooted in The Hague but also in Buenos Aires (since 2005) for Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Hong Kong (since 2012) for Asia and the Pacific. Considering the important contributions of these Regional Offices, I continue to hope that one day, a new root in the form of a Regional Office for Africa will start to grow, which would greatly help to strengthen and develop the strategic principles of universality and inclusiveness.
In Conclusion
One hundred and thirty years is obviously a long period to look back on. The rich history of the HCCH is a reminder of the collective responsibility of the Members of the HCCH, Contracting Parties to the Conventions, judges, practitioners, academics, and, of course, the Permanent Bureau to make sure the HCCH tree remains in good health. It is our responsibility to look after the HCCH and to promote it: by seeking new Members and Contracting Parties; by developing Conventions, and possibly other instruments, which respond to real, practical needs; and by continuing to support the proper implementation and operation of existing Conventions.
The story of the HCCH is not just about Conventions and rules, though. It is ultimately one about people. Committed people, who, like arborists, nurture the tree through the years. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the many experts and delegates from Members and Contracting Parties, to the colleagues of the PB â both past and present â who have contributed to the HCCHâs success. The 130th anniversary of the HCCH is a testament to the enduring value of international cooperation and diplomacy in the field of law. The HCCHâs historic milestones, including this yearâs celebration of the 1000th treaty action, remind us that progress is not measured solely in tree-rings, but in the impact made on the lives of people around the world. With the continued support and contributions from all the people involved in its work, the HCCH will keep growing from strength to strength.
The international community should rather energetically and urgently work on a new social contract to tackle new technologies and their disruptive potentials. It is particularly related to artificial intelligence (AI) that must be deployed safely and in conformity with a globally shared ethical standard.
Deepfake, dark web, polarising contents, swarms of bots are expanding all over the cyberterritory. Just recall the events that are still shaking western hemisphere: The 2016 US Presidential elections and Brexit vote are still surrounded with a controversy. Their outcome is frequently connected with an alleged leak of personal data from a worldâs leading social platform to an Analytic agency to reportedly manufacture votersâ choices. On the other side, the state (and non-state) actors have deployed huge quantities of motion-tracking and facial-recognition cameras to commodify continuous streams of intimate data about citizens, ostensibly to prepare them for a bonus-malus behavioural grading system.
The bold and commercially promising alliance between the AI and data-ified society has switched most of the contents of our societal exchanges towards the cyberspace. These new masters are already reshaping the very fabric of our realities.
No wonder, our common anxieties are on a rise; Are we losing control to an algorithmic revolution of nanorobots? Is the AI escaping our traditional modes of understanding and collective action? Confidence in our national governance and global stewardship is at breaking point. Popular revolts will follow.
Simultaneously, the AI-powered nano-, geo bio- and info- technologies will tend to weaken, rather than to enforce, global and regional governance mechanisms. The UN and similar regional multilateral settings do face a wide range of interconnected challenges. Let us briefly elaborate on some.
The AI and Deepfake
The AI is essentially a dual-use technology. Its mighty implications (either positive or negative) will be increasingly hard to anticipate, frame and restrain, or mitigate and regulate.
The so-called Deepfake is a good example. Presently, the advanced algorithmic AI programs have reached the stage to easily alter or even manufacture audio and video images by creating impersonations which are practically identical to its original. Deep-learning facial recognition algorithms can already, with an astonishing accuracy, copy eye-motion, trace and simulate variety of facial expressions or even synthesize speech by analysing breathing patterns in combination with a movement of tongue and lips.
Once released by a state or non-state actor, such artificial interventions could be easily maliciously utilised for a wide range of impacts: political campaigns, racketeering, peer pressures and extortive mobbing. It is not hard to imagine such a fake video triggering public panic (e.g., if displays non-existent epidemics or cyberattack), mass demonstrations (e.g., if portrays a high-ranking official in bribing scene or similar grave crime), or forged security incidents that may provoke serious international escalations.
The ever-growing number of actors and their increasing capacitation to influence citizens with doctored simulations could pose the long-lasting detrimental implications for the UN and other International FORAs dealing with peace and security. By corroding the very notion of truth and of a mutual confidence between citizenry and their state as well as among states, the Deepfakes may turn to be the largest disruptive force to our global governing system.
The AI and human predictability
Due to advancements in the Internet of Things (IoT), the AI is already bridging and coupling with a range of other technologies, especially with the metadata provided by the Bio-tech. These mergers pose a significant challenge for global security. Driven by the lucrative commercial prospects or by state security considerations, the AI systems around the world are largely programmed towards the predictability of human behaviour. Quite at reach, they already have accurate and speedy analytics of urban traffic patterns, financial markets, consumer behaviour, health records and even our genomes.
These â still unregulated â AI technologies are increasingly able to channel our behavioural and biological data in a quite novel and rather manipulative ways, with implications for all of us. Neither this spares the youngest among us. For instance, the i-Que boysâ robot or Cayla girlsâ doll transmit voice and emotional data of kids interacting with them (of everyone in their 10 meters proximity radius) and send it back to their manufacturers via the Cloud. This feature led the European authorities to examine automated toys closely and conclude that it violates basic principles of consumer and privacy protection. Similar dolls are still in extensive use all over Arab world and Asia where consumer protection awareness is s/lower or less organised than in the EU.
In several OECD countries, the deployment of the court roomsâ emotional analysis is seriously discussed. In such a scenario, the powerful algorithmic biometrics would measure a level of remorse when witnesses are testifying, and audio-video materials are presented. If once operable, that would be than easily extended by granting corporate (and state) entities to utilise different types of biometrics in assessing the job applicants.
That may furtherly tempt some outcast regimes to force biometric bracelets upon part or even entire populations, and have a real-time and accurate measuring of the popular support they enjoy. (Such bracelets are already heavily advocated in some OECD countries for the prison population, especially for re-convalescent inmates charged with blood delicts.)
Finally, if the humansâ individual or group behaviours can be monitored, hoovered, processed and hence, altered, who (or what) will be a driver of electability â be it of a change or status quo preservation â people or algorithms? If the entire biometrics, emotional data and past behaviouristic history (meta) of all parliamentarians, all political partiesâ protagonists, top military and the key business people is hackable by the national or foreign state or non-state actors â than the sense of democracy, military affairs, security and esp. human rights will be changed beyond recognition. Most probably, beyond return, too.
If the AI has such a potential to penetrate â and even steer â individual and group human behaviours, it inevitably disrupts a very notion of human rights as embedded in the UN Human Rights Charter, as well as of peaceful coexistence, security, prosperity and equality among states as stipulated by the OUN Charter.
New means of social and biometric control will inevitably necessitate us to revisit and reimage the framework currently in place to monitor and implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Notion of independence and inalienable right to economic development, too. This will require a concerted effort from regional developmental FORAs and the UN as universal multilateral system to anticipate and adjust.
The AI: Theatre for future conflicts
Since it reduces jobs in their numbers, configurations and intensities due to automation, the AI is excellently suited for the countries in demographic transition (decline), rather than for the booming demographics of Muslim world, sub-Saharan Africa and of (non-Fareast) Asia. Dramatic shrinking in domestic labour conjecture and forthcoming shift in global manufacturing dependences will especially hit hard the global south. Often enveloped in the âwait-and-seeâ stance, the Global south traditionally has a low trust-rate between its citizenry and government.
Logically, the âpromise of the AIâ to sway large regions and their populations is so immediate and mesmerising, that it already puts its main drivers to a fierce competition. Accelerating competition (with such a disruptive technology) in absence of cooperation (as the best tool to build and maintain confidence) or comprehensive regulation is only one step from a conflict.
The SF-like prospects of ruling âAI-raceâ, thus, are becoming (seemingly) realistic: Powerful state or commercial (technology platforms) actors bitterly competing over our collective data â as a new, cyber currency â to aggregate bio-medical, economic and politico-military supremacy across the globe. The âcyber-colonizationâ â especially of the global south – is increasingly likely. (Hoovering data without any remuneration and monetising it without any warning, data-collection taxation, or remuneration to its proprietor.) Leaders in the AI field are already capable to globally hoover data, are in possession of storing capacities, and will soon master (quantum) computing powers to process and analyse, and potentially control other countriesâ populations and ecosystems.
The answer to AI should be Universal
Quite disturbingly, our societies are far from prepared for deployment of the AI: Be it philosophically or practically, we are still short of a thorough socio-political, legal or ethical considerations. Moreover, the UN and its Agencies â achitectured 75 years before the emergence of these technologies â are in many aspects poorly equipped to offer comprehensive and timely AI governance. Speed of this technological innovation cycle outpaces any administrative response, even as the technological disruptions are becoming apparent to ever larger number of countries. In the near future, they will increasingly come in unpredictable severities and frequencies, and in hard-to-connect contexts.
The new political trends of autarchic âneo-nationalismâ are further trivializing capacity of the multilateral FORAs to play a norm-setting and monitoring-of-compliance role in the global governance of AI. In such a climate, technologically advanced Member States (pressured by their national security or commercial interests) may see little incentive in letting the international FORAs to govern what they perceive as own lucrative and proprietary technology. Thus, collective decision-making mechanisms could sink into the dark of obscure centers of projected power, out of reach or any control.
Having all this in mind, the UN and its Specialised Agencies (including the ITU, UNESCO and UN University), along with variety of regional FORAs hold the answer. That very much includes the developmental segments â especially of global South â such as the African, Asian, Interamerican or Islamic Development Banks as well as regional politico-administrative settings like the OIC, SAARC, ASEAN, AU, to name but few. They have to initiate and navigate their member states, but also participate in steering the world through the universal, OUN bodies.
Letting the AI train to pass without a collective, collaborative form of governance would be a double irreversible setback: Disruptive dual-use technology along with a digital ownership would be handed over to an alienated few to govern it, while the trust in multilateral system (especially within the developing world) would further deteriorate.
Such inaction would inevitably raise the level of planetary confrontation to unfathomable proportions (including new forms, unseen so far), and that on two fronts – within societies and between states. Some would do anything to dominate and rule, while others would do anything to escape the iron fist of goo(g)lag.
For the three gravest planetary challenges (technology, ecology, nuclear annihilation), we need an accurate just and timely multilateral approach. In this struggle for relevance, everyone has its own share of historical (generational) responsibility.
About author:
Prof. Dr. Anis H. Bajrektarevic
Anis H. Bajrektarevic is chairperson and professor in international law and global political studies, Vienna, Austria. He has authored eight books (for American and European publishers) and numerous articles on, mainly, geopolitics energy and technology. Professor is editor of the NY-based GHIR (Geopolitics, History and Intl. Relations) journal, and editorial board member of several similar specialized magazines on three continents. Earlier this year, his 9th book was realised in New York.
This text is based on the Workshop held for the IsDB senior officials. Its content was embargoed for 30 months.
The views expressed in this article are the authorâs own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.
Ljubljana/Vienna, 16 November 2023
Footnote: [1] IFIMES â International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has Special Consultative status at ECOSOC/UN, New York, since 2018. and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal âEuropean Perspectives.â
Link (BSH): Video: Razgovor sa predsjednikom Stjepanom MesiÄem “Kako na osnovu iskustava iz proĆĄlosti graditi bolju buduÄnost?” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9fuTExPixs
I had the pleasure of attending the Diplomats Wine Extravaganza, flawlessly orchestrated by Diplomat Magazine. It proved to be an ideal setting not only to acquaint oneself with wines from lesser-known wine countries in the Netherlands but also to cultivate meaningful personal connections.
My visit held particular significance for me. Since August, I have been actively distributing premium wines from Albania in the Netherlands and am contemplating the addition of wines from Kosovo to my repertoire. Thus, it was truly gratifying that the Embassy of Kosovo extended the opportunity to several Kosovo wineries to showcase their offerings.
The esteemed Ambassador of Kosovo to the Netherlands, His Excellency Dr. Dren Doli, expressed his optimism that more Dutch enthusiasts would discover and appreciate the unique wines from Kosovo.
Wines from Kosovo.
At present, Kosovo boasts approximately 3500 hectares of vineyards, dispersed across five regions, primarily situated in the southwest of the country. The Rahovec wine region stands out as the largest. The conditions for viticulture are optimal, characterized by a mild continental climate with Mediterranean influences, diverse soil types, and a range of microclimates thanks to numerous valleys. Blue grape varieties dominate, constituting over 65% of the plantings.
During the Wine Extravaganza, I was delighted to encounter exceptional wines crafted from indigenous grape varieties such as Vranç and Prokupa, as well as international favorites like Cabernet Sauvignon, Syrah, Chardonnay, Welschriesling, and Muscat.
I had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Bejtullah Hahimurati and Mr. Haziz Tafaj, representing the Kosovan wineries in attendance. I look forward to maintaining a connection with them to stay abreast of developments in the Kosovo wine industry.
Convinced of the potential of Kosovan wines to complement my selection, I invite you to monitor my website, www.noutswijnwereld.eu, for updates on the enticing wines from Kosovo that will soon be available to Dutch wine enthusiasts.
An exclusive wine and spirit experience, Embassies promoted their wine and spirits, exposing their silver tastevin utensils to attract the Dutch market and friends at the fourth edition of Diplomats Wine Extravaganza.
Dr. Mayelinne De Lara, Diplomat Magazineâs Publisher joined by Thomas Kortleve, General Manager of Leonardo Royal Hotel welcome the guests to the Fourth Diplomat Wine Extravaganza on 30 October 2023. It was tasting, walking, wine talk by enologists, experts and enjoying jazz music. The event featured wine tastings, conversations with enologists, experts and jazz music.
H.E. Mr. Ălvaro GonzĂĄlez Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay and Gustavo Morales Bertinat
Cultural Attache, Embassy of Uruguay.H.E. Mario Oyarzabal, Ambassador of Argentina, Renan Villacis, Director Secretariat of the Assembly States PartiesâąInternational Criminal Court, H.E. Andres Teran Paral, Ambassador of Ecuador, Shqipe and H.E. Dren Doli, Ambassador of Kosovo, H.E. Arnoldo Brenes Castro, Ambassador of Costa Rica and H.E. Olivier J.P. Nduhungirehe, Ambassador of Rwanda.
In her welcome remarks De Lara stated âtoday, we are here to celebrate the rich diversity ofwine and spirits from around the world. Each country has brought its finest products, and we have extended invitations to importers, sommeliers, chefs, journalists, diplomats, wine lovers and friends to join us in this extraordinary journey of tasteâ
Mayelinne De Lara continued, Diplomat Magazine, founded a decade ago by diplomats with the mission to support the work of each embassy, and Diplomats Wine Extravaganza, in particular, has proven to be an instrumental force in advancing the wine industry of numerous countries.
Letâs give the floor to the distinguish figures of today, who have made this event possible, the ambassadors: Armenia, Australia, Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay.
Dr. Mayelinne De Lara, Diplomat Magazine’s publisher.Pisco from Peru.
Armenia, alleged to be the worldâs oldest wine producer, her Ambassador Mr Viktor Biyagov in part said the following, as a wine lover I am very glad to see so many people gathered here to celebrate the eternal beverage ever to be created, to get to know the history of winemaking in different countries and to get a taste of the culture of these countries through their wines.
The history of winemaking in Armenia dates back to more than 6100 years ago, when the first production of wine began in a cave near Areni village, in Vayots Dzor province of Armenia, which after thousands of years remains the main wine producing region in Armenia. Recent excavations and scientific research uncovered that the cave of Areni was an ancient ritual site where wine production played an integral part.
Laboratory research conducted by scientists of Oxford and California universities verify that in the face of Areni cave complex we deal with the worldâs oldest and most complete wine production facility, with its wine press, large karases for fermentation and storage, as well as jars of around 6000 years.
Fritz Haring Di Saronno – Netherlands with Dominican Republic’s Ron Barcelo.
And today, millennia later from the very first try, wine production is amongst the biggest booming industries in Armenia, culminating with the annual wine fest, that every year attracts thousands of tourists from all over the world. This is definitely a must try experience in Armenia, which is a unique way to get to know the Armenian culture, rich history and everyday life, all through wine.
Wine is a way of life, a definition of love and the universal language of friendship that gets better with every passing year. It carries the wisdom of the old and the spirit of youth, and whatâs most important, it brings people together.
Today, among a number of gorgeous flavors, you will also taste the Armenian wines, which bear the warmth of our sun, the strength of our earth and the hard work of its producers.
Please help yourself to the best of Armenian wines, generously provided and exhibited by Royal Beverages Group and its General Director Artak Danielyan.
Ambassador Mr Viktor Biyagov.
Armenia stand
The Australian Ambassador Mr Greg French recounted an interesting Australian contribution to the global wine industry was Australiaâs role as a refuge for grape varieties that were threatened in Europe and other parts of the world. This is because much of Australia remained unaffected by the devastating phylloxera parasite that swept through France and other parts of Europe in the late nineteenth century.
Australia thus became home to some of the worldâs oldest producing vines, planted in the 1840âs. âŠ. Another contribution has been the promotion of controlled temperature fermentation in stainless steel tanks.
Mr. Haziz Tafaj and Mr. Bejtullah Haxhimurati are representatives from two of the most famous wineries in Kosovo. Both of them are members of the Enologjia, which is the Kosovo wine association in charge of promoting Kosovo wine in the country and abroad.
Mr.Tafaj represented the Theranda and SHE wines, both coming from the Theranda valley. The name SHE was created to celebrate all the women of Kosovo. Mr. Haxhimurati represented the ILLYRIAN winery and vineyards which are located in the west of the city of Rahovec, also known as the capital city of the viticulture in Kosovo dating back to the I century AD.
H.E. Mr. Jaime Moscoso Valenzuela, Ambassador of Chile. Wines from Chile.
The fourth edition of Diplomat Wine Extravaganza has been vibrant and in an excellent atmosphere. A Burgundian motto: “Jamais en Vain Toujours en Vin”, Never in Vain, Always in wine.
“We are not competing in quantity with the major producers in the region, but we are outstanding in quality.” Said H.E. Mr Roberto Calzadilla Sarmiento, Ambassador of Bolivia during his presentation.
Bolivia, though less renowned than its South American neighbors, boasts a rich colonial history of viticulture with unique small vineyards and wineries. The country’s high-altitude wine industry is remarkable, with about 75 percent devoted to red wine production, including varieties like Cabernet Sauvignon, Merlot, Syrah, Malbec, and Tannat. White grape varieties such as Torrontes, Chenin Blanc, and Riesling are also gaining attention.
Bolivia’s vineyards, many centuries old, are often situated between 1,600 and 3,000 meters (5,250-9,840 feet) above sea level, making it the highest wine-producing country in the world. The Central Valley of Tarija is home to 80 percent of the countryâs vineyards, benefiting from a Mediterranean-like climate with strong winds that protect the grapes from over-ripening. The sunlight at high altitudes concentrates the flavors and aromas of the wines, while cooler nights provide balance and acidity.
While Bolivia’s wine industry remains small compared to giants like Chile and Argentina, it is gaining international recognition, having already won 40 medals in global competitions. The Ambassador of Bolivia, H.E. Roberto Calzadilla Sarmiento, emphasized, “We are not competing in quantity with the major producers in the region, but we are outstanding in quality.” Boliviaâs focus is now shifting toward exportation, marking a new era for its wine industry.
The countryâs viticulture dates back to the 16th century when the Spanish introduced vines to produce sacramental wine. Today, Boliviaâs vineyards retain much of their traditional character, particularly in the Cinti Valley, and continue to offer wines with unique characteristics that are increasingly admired on the global stage.
Diplomat Magazine recently celebrated a significant milestone, marking ten years of publishing in style. The event featured a violin concert by Bomsori Kim, accompanied by the Residentie Orkest, playing pieces from Tchaikovsky & Prokofiev at the grand Amare theatre in The Hague on Friday, November 10th, 2023.
The magazine was established by diplomats, for diplomats, with a mission of supporting diplomatic efforts, promoting their country’s policies and accomplishments.
Over the years, Diplomat Magazine has taken centre stage, a prominent player in diplomatic activities and affairs in The Hague, with both a print and online edition. This 10th year anniversary is just the beginning of their continued success.
Prof. Dr J.A. Bruijn, the President of the Senate of the Netherlands and Diplomat Magazine’s Publisher, Dr. Mayelinne De Lara.
A slate of ambassadors and diplomats attended the festive celebration. The list of attendees is as follows, Ambassadors of: Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Cuba, El Salvador, Egypt, Estonia, Guatemala, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Philippines, Peru, Slovenia, South Africa, and Uruguay. Diplomats of various embassies including Azerbaijan, Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Dominican Republic.
Several notable figures attended the event, including Prof. Dr J.A. Bruijn, the President of the Senate of the Netherlands, H.E. Ms. Sahar Ghanem, the Ambassador of Yemen and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, and the Mayor of Den Haag, Mr. Jan van Zanen. Mr. Sven Arne Tepl, Director of the Residentie Orkest, also gave a speech. All the speakers praised Diplomat Magazine for its indelible contributions. Below are some quotes from their speeches.
H.E. Mr. Hatem Kamaleldin, Ambassador of Egypt, H.E. Ms. Frances Lanitou Williams, Ambassador of Cyprus, H.E. Ms. Marisol Aguero Colunga, Ambassador of Peru, H.E. Dr. Eniola Ajayi, Ambassador of Nigeria, H.E. Ms. Sahar Ghanem, Ambassador of Yemen and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, H.E. Mr. Abdullah Al Harthi, Ambassador of the Sultanate of Oman and H.E. Mr. Lauri Kuusing, Ambassador of Estonia.
The Dean âDear Mayelinne, dear Roy and Diplomat Magazine team, for me and many others, The Hague would be different if you were not here. You play a visible role in the success of diplomacy efforts and making The Hague a place where many diplomats consider their favorite station.
Knowing that you are available and ready to help whenever we need is of a tremendous relief. From me, from fellow current colleagues and many departed ambassadors whom I know would love to be here to share with you this special occasion, congratulations and wish you many many more years to come full of achievements, reflected in numbers and hearts.â
H.E. Ms. Sahar Ghanem, Ambassador of Yemen and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps during her speech.
President of the Senate âI greatly value the meetings I have with you, because it is an opportunity to – for instance â discuss the importance of protecting our rule of law, the state of our politics, and these days also the conflicts that divide many parts of the world.
Dutch diplomat and poet Constantijn Huygens, who lived and worked in the The Hague of the 17th century, wrote – and I have translated it off the cuff, the original is of course far better balanced and poeticâŠ
The times were angry, and are, and will be
I do not see change at hand for the world
Turn around your hourglass, it seems a new being
But it runs as it ran, and itâs all the same sand.
Or, as the French say: tout ça change, tout ça reste la mĂȘme chose.
They are the words of the experienced diplomat. But as the politician that I am, there is no other way than to add hope. Hope that change for the better is coming at last, and hope that conflicts, or in the words of Huygens â anger â one day will be defeated. That hope is what keeps us all going, diplomats and politicians alike! Ladies and gentlemen, to the editors of the Diplomat Magazine I would like to say: thank you for your continuous efforts to open up Dutch society and politics for an international audience.
Please know, that your efforts are highly appreciated! Congratulations are in order on this occasion, but I hope that you will also feel the incentive to continue with your valuable work of bringing the Dutch and international communities closer together.â
Diplomat Magazine’s Publisher, Dr. Mayelinne De Lara and the Mayor of The Hague, the Honorable Jan van Zanen.
The mayor âMayelinne and her staff are a great support to us in that respect. Indeed, the international community in The Hague is well-served with Diplomat Magazine, its website and newsletter which, together, provide an effective communication platform. A very important platform for The Hagueâs diplomatic circles.Therefore, in addition to our congratulations, a word of wholehearted thanks is certainly due here.
A word of thanks, on behalf of the municipality, for Diplomat Magazineâs contribution to The Hague, international city of peace and justice. A contribution we should certainly not underestimate. I very much hope that you will carry on with this magnificent and important work. It makes The Hague a city of even greater international allure.â
H.E. Mr. Roberto Calzadilla Sarmiento, Ambassador of Bolivia, one of the founders of Diplomat Magazine.
Diplomat Magazine’s 10th Anniversary concert. Residentie Orkest, Amare Theatre, Nov 10, 2023. The Hague.
Kosovo Embassy Tweeted â Diplomat magazine has become an indispensable part of our daily routine and a resource for diplomats based in The Hague. Keep inspiring positive changes. Happy anniversary.
Indeed, one decade down; ten years is just the beginning. Without any question, it has been a splendorous evening!
Thursday, 19 October 2023, Oslo, Kingdom of Norway: At the Royal Palace in central Oslo, His Majesty King Harald V of Norway welcome for his accreditation the non-resident Ambassador of the Kigndom of Bahrain, Abdulla Abdullatif Al Shaikh Abdulla at 11:30am. The latter is based out of Berlin, Germany, and conveyed to the Norwegian monarch the best regards from his counterpart His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa as well as of Bahrain’s Crown Prince and Prime Minister, HRH Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa.
During his stay in Norway, Ambassador Abdulla held meetings at Stortinget (the Norwegian Parliament) with amongst others, Ine Eriksen SĂžreide, Chair of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. At the headquarters of the Foreign Ministry he met with Aslak Bron, Deputy Secretary-General of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Matthijs Raustol, Deputy Director-General for Regional Affairs at the ministry. Ambassador Abdulla likewise presented copies of his credentials to the ministry’s Director-General for Protocol, Cultural Relations and Consular Affairs, Tone Allers.
Ambassador Abdulla’s professional commenced in 1981 with a position at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, marking the beginning of a long and successful career in diplomacy. The first notable international appointment came in 2000, serving until 2005 as the Deputy Head of Mission at the Bahrain Embassy in London.
In 2006 he was appointed as the Consul General of the Kingdom of Bahrain to Switzerland, a role held concurrently with several key ambassadorial positions; these included being the permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the United Nations offices in Geneva and Vienna.
In 2008, Abdulla Abdullatif Abdulla was appointed as the Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Austria, further solidifying his experience and expertise in international diplomacy and relations. Following this, in 2009, he received a Royal Decree appointment him as an Undersecretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a position they held with distinction until 2017. He began his ambassadorial tenure in Germany on 8 March 2018 after presenting credentials to Federal President Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier.
From Germany, Ambassador Abdulla is accredited as non-resident top envoy to the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia and Norway.
Ever since man became one with the sea, maritime expenditures and strategies have been elaborated, debated, and deployed. Its history can be traced down through the years since, with varying emphases, interpretations, and terminology.
Historically, navies and ships have commonly been the military-diplomatic instrument of choice for projecting â explicitly or implicitly â the threat of politics by other means1. The term ânavalâ or âgunboatâ diplomacy may have a modern ring to it can be traced back to the early twentieth century.2
On October 19, 2023, the Pentagon deployed the aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford and its battle group into the eastern Mediterranean, and with the Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier strike gently on its way.
As the advancements in techno-military industries fuel the desire for power and control, the drumbeats of a worldwide war have pounded discreetly over us since the turn of the century. Most recently, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, alongside ongoing tensions between China and the United States and the Israeli-Gaza conflict accelerated its buildup.
It begs the question, is naval diplomacy an effective non-threatening tool to deter the risk of war, or is it a remnant of imperialism whose goal is to assert dominance and order at the expense of lesser nations?
Concepts and Definitions: A false perception of diplomacy?
While viewed as an effective way to deter the risk of war in the short term, naval diplomacy is âthe application of naval capabilities in pursuit of national objectives during cooperation and competition below conflictâ. 3
However, some experts find the term as being too narrow, emotionally charged, and burdened by colonialism.4 While theoretical aspects of its political use point to the necessity of a clear distinction from a mere ânaval presence,â which is deemed insufficient as a focal point in a theory of naval diplomacy.5
Military power plays a crucial role in diplomacy, but it’s important to recognize that there are additional dimensions of power at play. 6
The general implications of the use of military presence serve a largely symbolic role such as signaling interest and physically demonstrating support to one’s allies. It can also signal changing perspectives and changing commitments, depending on their manipulation. Its objective is to constrain the opposition’s role in a crisis which can include everything from showing the flag to establishing a false sense of security and order.
On the other hand, naval diplomacy is defined as “the use or the threat of limited naval force in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the stateâs territory or jurisdictionâ.7
The foregoing definition has divided acts of naval diplomacy into two specific categories: cooperative and coercive. Its main component resides in its intent to influence behavior. The lower limit of its spectrum of activity is nonthreatening in nature and the upper limit of spectrum falls short of the state of war but can include violence8.
Yet, it raises the question of when an act of influence crosses into an act of violence and whether such provocative activity can still be legitimately classified as diplomacy.
Diplomacy is distinguished from the broader idea of foreign policy in the sense that, “diplomacy involves means and mechanismâ including a wide range of techniques.
Military diplomacy, on the other hand, is defined as a set of activities carried out by the representatives of the defense department, as well as other state institutions, aimed at pursuing the foreign policy interests of the state in the field of security and defense policy. 9
This involves gathering intel on the armed forces and the security situation in the receiving state, organizing working visits of representatives of the defense authorities and peaceful stay of the military units of the sending state in the receiving state, and more importantly supporting business contracts with arms and military equipment between the sending and the receiving state.
This distinction sets military diplomacy apart from related phenomena like naval or coercive diplomacy.
In the context of its nature, naval diplomacy is not â unlike military diplomacy â a form of âdiplomacyâ in the sense of a non-violent instrument for the pursuit of foreign policy based mainly on negotiations, but it is in fact a specific method of the use of military force â primarily as an instrument for intimidation.
The Counterproductive effect of Naval Diplomacy on neighboring countries
As Prussian King Frederick the Great once said âDiplomacy without arms is like music without instrumentsâ.
The intersection of force and diplomacy is one of many important topics in the fields of history and international relations10. Examining their conjunctions brings academic specialties together and broadens the scope of how nations interact.
The use of âlimited naval forceâ is inherently a political concept because the threat of force is not limited by the size or characteristics of the ships involved. Consequently, no category of actions can be labeled as a safe threshold. The acceptance of all concerned parties of an act of force as limited rather than an act of war is independent of objective, motive, or international law.11
Introducing naval forces into an already existing crisis is often viewed as highly provocative and requires a delicate approach.12 Hence the term âdiplomacyâ in naval diplomacy underscores the need to stabilize the conflict, supplementing the fighting connotation of naval use.
But one must question whether its presence is prepositioned or projected into the crisis.
Warships and navies represent symbols of national sovereignty and power, and for having, not only a defense value but also a symbolic and supportive value such as diplomatic envoys. A military commander quickly learns that diplomacy is not solely the province of diplomats.
This way of action can be counterproductive. Not only can it fail to produce desired political effects but can also cause unintended and unforeseen damages.
The harsh reality is that an aggressor nation, usually a more powerful or resourceful state, which uses its force of arms, produces a fait accompli and thus in the process, from the victimâs viewpoint, commits illegalities and violates its sovereignty. The victim nation is not left with an abundance of choices. It must either accept or react to the new situation.
Domestic political factors, although complex, must be considered and should not be minimized by political leaders.13 Naval diplomacy, then, must take account of a stateâs political, historical, economic, and military world view the policy environment, the decision-making processes, and internal pressures that shape the parameters and likelihood of what can be achieved.14
No one can deny that detaching the military carries housing devastating air wings and sends a powerful deterrence message to any nation that seeks to disrupt the rules-based international order.
Therefore, naval diplomatic tactics must not only be an act not intended to start a war, but also one calculated not to incite a response or worse create an everlasting resentment that could potentially broaden into a regional conflict in the long term.
Neocolonialism Resentment: Naval Diplomacy in the Middle East
As explained beforehand, naval diplomacy tends to offer short-term solutions, its “last resort” nature, its simplicity, and the gap between its idealistic objectives and practical outcomes illustrate its temporary effectiveness.
In order to be durable in the long term, it must be complemented by comprehensive foreign policy strategies that address the underlying issues driving international conflicts.
The use of sea power in âachieving world dominationâ was already a generally accepted concept during the Cold War. Sergey Gorshkov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, used the term âlocal wars of imperialismâ to encapsulate his interpretations of this Western strategy.15
By pursuing economic opportunities in the regionâs oil fields, the United States challenged Britainâs position and became a dominant power in the Middle East during the 1920s. But it must be said that Americaâs determination to lead, combined with an incomprehension of the region, has been the principal problem in American foreign policy.
Washingtonâs unwavering support for Israel in its collision with its Arab neighbors seems to underline a US instinct for the solution of problems by force. Washington was and still is a vital provider of military, economic; and political aid. It bore a key responsibility for Israelâs prolonged assault during the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s, and similarly in Gaza in 2008. These expeditions did not go unnoticed as they aroused widespread condemnation.16
Most Arab countries are absolutely convinced that American foreign policy towards the Near and Middle East is Jewish foreign policy and that the American press, and a large part of the government, are very much under the dominance of Zionists. Many individuals still think that American diplomacy is not only dollar diplomacy but oil diplomacy and that United States foreign policy is dominated by one family the Rockefellers.17
A few days back, retired General Frank McKenzie emphasized that the carriers and the flying squadrons [in the Mediterranean] give the president âoptionsâ. These options demonstrate the United Statesâ assertive stance in the intricate and tragic Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
While the Biden administration maintains that its primary objective is to warn Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies against getting involved in the conflict, it has also conveyed back-channel messages to Qatar, indicating its seriousness about using force if necessary. Bidenâs decision may inadvertently set in motion a process of escalation.
More generally, the reliance upon naval fleets reflects the pragmatic orientation of American diplomacy inadequacy upon fanatical nation-states such as Iran. And while with most Middle Eastern states, diplomatic relationships follow a pattern, the volatile dynamics of dealing with sovereign states necessitate a more strategic and nuanced approach.18
This comes at a time when the region is currently in the midst of a change, presenting unique prospects for peace and prosperity after long decades of war and insecurity. While Saudi Arabia and Iran engaged in on-off talks, with Beijingâs mediation, to ease their bitter rivalry, and reduce conflicts, the United States finds itself no longer as influential a player in the region.
About the author:
Mr Robin Makaron
Robin Makaron is a Lebanese citizen in Paris, holds degrees in Law and Economics and a master’s in International Law from Pantheon-Sorbonne University. He’s preparing for the French Bar exam. His father, a diplomat with a doctorate in Public Law, served in various high-ranking positions worldwide, shaping Robin’s interest in global affairs.
Notes
1 Mandel, Robert. âThe Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy.â International Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 1, 1986, pp. 59â76. 2 As documented by the Oxford English Dictionary. 3 Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare (1 April 2020): 25. 4 J. J. Widen (2011) Naval DiplomacyâA Theoretical Approach, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22:4, 715-733 5 Richard G. Colbert, Kenneth R. McGruther Naval War College Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (September-October 1974), pp. 3-20 6 Drab L. Defence diplomacy â an important tool for the implementation of foreign policy and security of the state. Security and Defence Quarterly. 2018;20(3):57-71. doi:10.5604/01.3001.0012.5152. 7 J. Cable, Gunboat diplomacy, 1919â1991: political applications of limited naval force (third edition), Basingstoke: Macmillan/IISS, 2016, p. 14. 8 Naval Diplomacy beneath the waves: Study of the coercive use of Submarines Shirt of War by Brent Alan Ditzler (December 1989), Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School 9 PhDr. Erik Pajtinka, Military Diplomacy and Its Present Functions, 2016 10 WEAVER, MICHAEL E. âThe Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force: An Example from the Cuban Missile Crisis.â Diplomatic History, vol. 38, no. 1, 2014, pp. 137â81. JSTOR, 11 James Cable, “Gunboat Diplomacy,” International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, vol. III, p. 1135. 12 Richard G. Colbert, Kenneth R. McGruther Naval War College Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (September-October 1974), pp. 3-20 13 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (London: Croom Helm; New York: Crane Russak, 1977), p. 31. 14 Edward Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power, Studies in International Affairs, no. 23 (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974), pp. 6â8 15 Rowlands, Kevin (2012) “Decided Preponderance at Seaâ: Naval Diplomacy in Strategic Thought,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 65: No. 4, Article 9. 16 Alexander, A. (2011) America and the Imperialism of Ignorance: US Foreign Policy Since 1945, Google Books. Biteback Publishing 17 McClintock, R. M. âTHE ART OF DIPLOMACY: A Lecture Delivered at the Naval War College on 17 September 1964.â Naval War College Review, vol. 17, no. 5, 1965, pp. 56â71. JSTOR 18 Thomas M. DiBiagio, Law, Force & Diplomacy at Sea, by Ken Booth, 12 Md. J. Int’lL. 121 (1987)
Eurojust coordinates operation at request of Swiss authorities
At the request of the Swiss authorities, Eurojust has coordinated several actions against an online fraud network in EU Member States, Georgia and Ukraine. This has led to searches and the freezing of bank accounts in over 20 countries.Â
Investigations into the investment scam started in October 2019, following a complaint from a victim to the Swiss authorities. This uncovered fraudulent call centres and websites of alleged financial trading companies in Ukraine, and later also in Georgia. The investigation was temporarily suspended due to the war in Ukraine. At the end of 2022, however, targeted actions were taken in 23 countries, where places were searched and bank accounts and assets were frozen.
The investigations revealed that most of the victims were Swiss and German investors. The perpetrators allegedly used over a hundred websites, posing as serious investment companies, offering financial transactions in cryptocurrencies and trading options. After potential investors showed interest, they were approached over the phone and lured into making considerable investments that were subsequently lost.
Given the complexity and scale of the scam, it is difficult to estimate the exact amount of the loss and the number of victims, but investors have lost at least several million euros. Eurojust has been providing support to the case since December 2020, helping to set up a joint investigation team into the fraud between the Swiss and Ukrainian authorities.
Three coordination meetings were held to organise a coordinated action day, during which judicial measures were taken to freeze and seize the suspectsâ bank accounts and assets. The Swiss and German authorities cooperated closely in the early phase of the coordination via Eurojust and Europol.
Europolâs European Financial and Economic Crime Centre provided analytical support to the operations, while the European Cybercrime Centre, along with its Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce, facilitated coordination among the countries involved.
The following authorities cooperated on a mutual legal assistance basis:
Switzerland: Public Prosecutorâs Office of the Canton of Bern; Police of the Canton of Berne
Belgium: Federal Public Prosecutorâs Office; Investigative Judge Court of 1st Instance Brussels
Bulgaria:Â Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office
Cyprus: Cyprus Police
Czech Republic: Metropolitan Public Prosecutorâs Office Prague
Georgia: Prosecutor Generalâs Office
Germany: Bavarian Central Office for the Prosecution of Cybercrime at Bamberg Public Prosecutor Generalâs Office
