ICCās jurisdiction over Egypt
What Iran Really Wants
Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era.
Foreign policy is a critical component in the lives, conduct, and governance of all nation-states. But it has become even more significant in recent years as interstate relations have grown ever more complex. The inexorable rise in the number of international playersāincluding multilateral organizations, non-state actors, and even individualsāhas further complicated policymaking. Mean- while, the ongoing process of globalizationāhowever conceived and defined, whether lauded or despisedāhas brought its inescapable weight to bear on the foreign policies of all states, whether large or small, developed or developing. Since its establishment by a popular revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has grappled with these challenges. The post-revolutionary foreign policy of Iran has been based on a number of cherished ideals and objectives embedded in the countryās constitution. These include the preservation of Iranās independence, territorial integrity, and national security and the achievement of long-term, sustainable national development. Beyond its borders, Iran seeks to enhance its regional and global stature; to promote its ideals, including Islamic democracy; to expand its bilateral and multilateral relations, particularly with neighboring Muslim-majority countries and nonaligned states; to reduce tensions and manage disagreements with other states; to foster peace and security at both the regional and the international levels through positive engagement; and to promote international understanding through dialogue and cultural interaction. IRAN IN THE MULTILATERAL ERA Since the end of the Cold War and the demise of the bipolar world in the early 1990s, the global order has undergone a major structural transformation. But a firm new order has not yet emerged. As was the case during other transitions in the past, the fluid, complex, and un- certain state of international affairs today is extremely perilous and challenging. Previous transitions were usually complicated by military rivalries and even outright war among the dominant powers of the time. Todayās rivalries are similarly quite intense. However, due to a number of factorsāthe substantially changed global environment, changes in the nature of power, and the diversity and multiplicity of state and non-state actorsācompetition these days mostly takes a non- military form. The concept of power itself, traditionally measured in terms of military might, has changed substantially. New forms of influenceā economic, technological, and culturalāhave emerged. Concurrently, changes at the conceptual level have brought the cultural, normative, and ideational components of power to the fore, making power more accessible to a larger pool of actors. Moreover, the gradual rise of multilateralism in the wake of World War II has elevated the importance of international norms and consensus. Despite such substantial changes in the architecture of the world order, remnants and beneficiaries of the old order have tried to salvage the wreckage of the past. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the emergence in the United States of apocalyptic theories declaring āthe end of historyā or a āclash of civilizationsā represented a hasty reaction to the enemy vacuum created by the end of Cold War and to the rising status of Muslims on the global stage. Through a series of subsequent Islam phobic campaignsāsometimes promoted as official state policy and perpetuated systematically in various forms and guisesāsome in the West tried to depict the Islamic community as a new ideological enemy on a global scale. But rather than experiencing a divergence, the world is now moving toward a state of mutual interdependence. Contrary to the situation in the past, the pursuit of go-it-alone policies by former hegemony or current powers has led to a state of impasse and paralysis. Today, most nation-states, regardless of their size, power, influence, or other attributes, have come to realize that isolationism, whether voluntary or imposed, is neither a virtue nor an advantage. Collective action and Cooperation have become the hallmarks of the era. Multilateralism, the collective search for common solutions to common problems, has proved its desirability and practical efficacy at both the regional and the global levels. Even major world powers have learned the hard way that they can no longer pursue their interests or achieve their particular goals unilaterally. The gradual yet growing trend of coalition-making, at the regional and global levels, both for short- term purposes and for more enduring enterprises, bears witness to the inescapability of collective action. Willful cooperation has gradually developed as a new working pattern of interaction among states; it has come to replace the once predominant and now discredited pattern of confrontation, unconditional subservience, and perpetual rivalry. As an inevitable consequence of globalization and the ensuing rise of collective action and cooperative approaches, the idea of seeking or imposing zero-sum games has lost its luster. Still, some actors cling to their old habits and habitually pursue their own interests at the expense of others. The insistence of some major powers on playing zero- sum games with win-lose outcomes has usually led to lose-lose outcomes for all the players involved. The much-challenged position of the United States in the world today, notwithstanding its preponderance of military power, is a glaring case in point. The actual situation in various parts of the world where the United States is directly involved, most notably in the greater Middle East and in Iranās immediate neighborhood, points to Washingtonās reluctant but unmistakable turn to the path of coalition building with other global powers and even regional actors. China, India, and Russia are engaged in intense competition, primarily with the Western bloc, in a concerted effort to secure more prominent global roles. However, major powers and emerging powers alike are now loath to use military means to resolve rivalries, differences, or even disputes. This has led to the gradual rise of a revisionist approach to foreign policy. Nation-states, regardless of their current position and power, now seek to enhance their stature and achieve their goals through a carefully balanced combination of cooperation and competition. The deadly rivalries of the past, a function of brute force and hard power, have gradually given way to cultural, normative, and ideational forms of competition. The uncertainty produced by the current transition in global norms and behavior also has a downside. If states miscalculate their own power or misperceive the capabilities and intentions of others, it could prove extremely costly to all involved. The intrinsic riskiness of this state of affairs calls for governments to rely on more objective analysis and to make careful assessments of their own positions and capabilities as well as of the intentions and possible conduct of others. All states can take advantage of this transitional stage to advance their positions and further their interests. Governments must make realistic calculations about their own relative advantages and vulnerabilities and, most important, articulate clear sets of objectives and plans. Over the past few decades, especially since the end of the Cold War, states that have pursued clearly articulated foreign policies have been the most successful in advancing their regional and global positions; those that have lacked an understanding of the global environment and pursued policies based on miscalculations and misjudgments have either lost their previous positions or become marginalized. FULFILLING IRANāS POTENTIAL As a solid regional power in this era of intense transition in global politics, Iran stands in a unique position. Given its large landmass and unique geographic position along the eastāwest transit route, Iran, since antiquity, has enjoyed a preeminent position in its region and beyond. Although Iranās civilization and cultural heritage have remained intact, its political and economic fortunes have fluctuated periodically, depending on, among other things, its governance at home and its relations with the outside world. The victory of the 1979 revolution, a popular, nationwide, antimonarchical uprising with a mixture of republican and Islamic traits, contributed to the establishment of a new revolutionary order in the country. The repercussions were drastic, and the revolution deeply affected the countryās foreign relations, not only in its immediate neighborhood but also throughout the greater Middle East and in the rest of the world. Any objective analysis of Iranās unique attributes within the larger context of its tumultuous region would reveal the countryās significant potential for a prominent regional and global role. The Islamic Re-public can actively contribute to the restoration of regional peace, security, and stability and play a catalytic role during this current transitional stage in international relations. In light of the increasing importance of normative and ideational factors in global politics, the Islamic Republic is well suited to draw on the rich millennial heritage of Iranian society and culture and the significant heritage of the Islamic Revolution, particularly its indigenously derived and sustained participatory model of governance. Iran can use such strengths to help realize the deeply cherished national aspirations of the Iranian people, including the achievement of long-term development and regional ascendance commensurate with the countryās inherent capacities and stature. Iran also benefits from a number of historical characteristics that could be considered unique sources of opportunity, many of which have not been properly or fully leveraged in the past. For example, Iran has remained independent from outside powers and practiced genuine nonalignment, lending it a particular freedom of action within the existing global order. Iran can also leverage its political traditions. It has successfully established an indigenous democratic model of governance, developing and maintaining a rare religious democracy in the modern world. It has an unmatched cultural identity emanating from its dynamic blend of Iranian and Islamic culture, which it can use to promote its mission and message throughout the entire Islamic world. As an ancient society with a plurality of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities, Iran also offers a model for political inclusion. And the country has achieved all of this at the center of a vital geostrategic region that has witnessed a long history of major- power rivalries, interventions of all sorts, and protracted military conflicts. Finally, Iran has also demonstrated its potent ideational capabilities and universal reach through such initiatives as President Muhammad Khatamiās āDialogue Among Civilizationsā and President Hassan Rouhaniās recent proposal for a āworld against violence and extremism,ā which was adopted as a resolution by the UN General Assembly last December. Governance in the modern world is challenging for every state, regardless of its size, demographics, form of government, geographic position, level of development, or relations with the world. Iran has been an organized state since antiquity, albeit with some periods of interruption. It has thus had extensive relations throughout history, in war and in peace, with its numerous neighbors and with other con- tending powers. It has accumulated a rich, layered collective memory and a deep reservoir of experiences. Iran borders seven countries and shares access to either the Caspian Sea or the Persian Gulf with 11 countries; both bodies of water are of interest to the littoral states as well as to a host of outside powers. Thus, Iran inevitably has a full plate to deal with when it comes to its national security and foreign relations. Iran also finds itself in a fundamentally crisis-ridden region. The decades- long occupation of Palestine and the ongoing conflict there has taken a destructive toll on the well-being and development of the entire Middle East. The chronic turmoil, instability, and violence in the region have grown worse in recent years due to a series of protracted external military interventions, most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since early 2011, political upheavals in the Arab world and their generally bloody aftermathsādubbed by some during their initial stages as āthe Arab Springā and by others as āthe Islamic Awakeningāāhave introduced another destabilizing factor to the region. The trend appears likely to continue for quite some time, even though the direction of the process remains extremely uncertain. Given this overall regional picture and the dynamics at work be- tween local and external playersāmost prominently the United StatesāIran today has to grapple with a number of major challenges in its external relations. Needless to say, the long shadow of the decades-old and still ongoing tussle between Iran and the United States, which has been much exacerbated as a result of the nuclear imbroglio, has further complicated the state of relations between Iran and a host of its neighbors. Meanwhile, there has been a recent surge in the activities of extremist and violent non-state actors in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, with a clear and unmistakable anti-Iran, anti-Shiite platform. A well-orchestrated campaign has promoted Islam phobia,Ā Iran phobia, and Shiite-phobia and depicted Iran as a threat to regional peace and security; extended support to anti-Iran claimants in the region; tarnished Iranās global image and undermined its stature; armed Iranās regional rivals; actively sup- ported anti-Iran forces, including the Taliban and other extremist groups; and fomented disagreements between Iran and its neighbors. MODERATION AND HOPE It was within this international context that Rouhani won a decisive victory in the heavily contested Iranian presidential election in June 2013. He won 51 percent of all the votes cast in the first round against five conservative rivals. His political platform of prudent moderation and hope represented a significant turning point in Iranian politics. The fact that voter turnout reached 73 percent suggests that the public had moved past the lingering divisions of the June 2009 election. Rouhaniās pragmatic positions on foreign and domestic issues proved reassuring to the Iranian electorate. Rouhani distinguished his campaign from the murky platforms of his rivals in several key respects: his clear analysis of Iranās current situation, his lucid and un- ambiguous articulation of the major challenges facing society and the state, and his honest and straightforward approach to problems and possible solutions. In this way, Rouhani managed to mobilize the dis- enchanted segments of the population to take an active interest in the final days of the campaign and to participate in the national vote. Rouhaniās foreign policy platform was based on a principled, sober, and wise critique of the conduct of foreign relations during the pre- ceding eight years under the previous administration. RouhaniĀ promised to remedy the unacceptable state of affairs through a major overhaul of the countryās foreign policy. The changes he proposed demonstrated a realistic understanding of the contemporary international order, the current external challenges facing the Islamic Republic, and what it will take to restore Iranās relations with the world to a state of normalcy. Rouhani also called for a discourse of āprudent moderation.ā This vision aims to move Iran away from confrontation and toward dialogue, constructive interaction, and understanding, all with an eye to safeguarding national security, elevating the stature of Iran, and achieving long-term comprehensive development. Prudent moderation is an approach based on realism, self-confidence, realistic idealism, and constructive engagement. Realism re- quires an understanding of the nature, structure, mechanisms, and power dynamics of the international system and of the potential and limits of its institutions.Ā Rouhaniās moderation brings together a profound conviction in the cherished ideals of the Islamic Revolution with an objective evaluation of Iranās actual capacities, capabilities, and constraints. It demands a deliberate aversion to actions that are insulting, condescending, or self-aggrandizing. It promotes self-confidenceĀ Ā based on an understanding of Iranās material and moral re- sources, including the collective wisdom of its citizenry. It values accountability, transparency, and honesty in dealing with the populaceĀ Ā and implies a willingness to reform and improve existing policies. Rouhaniās approach entails a delicate balancing act: between national, regional, and global needs, on the one hand, and the available means, instruments, and policies, on the other; between persistence and flexibility in foreign policy; between goals and means; and among various instruments of power in a dynamically changing world. Finally, Rouhaniās commitment to constructive engagement requires dialogue and interaction with other nations on an equal footing, with mutual respect, and in the service of shared interests. It requires that all participants make serious efforts to reduce tensions, build confidence, and achieve dĆ©tente. A WAY FORWARD Guided by this conceptual framework, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic under the current administration will be based on achieving understanding and consensus at the national level and constructive engagement and effective cooperation with the outside world. Iranās policies will be guided by the principles of dignity, rationality, and prudence. This overall strategy aims to safeguard and strengthen Iranās national security, diffuse or eliminate external threats, combat Islam phobia and Iran phobia, elevate the countryās stature, and achieve comprehensive development. With the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving as the central organ for planning and executing Iranās foreign policy, in close coordination with other government bodies, the Islamic Republic will pursue several key goals moving forward. First, Iran will expand and deepen its bilateral and multilateral relations through meaningful engagement with a wide range of states and organizations, including international economic institutions. Multilateralism will play a central role in Iranās external relations. That will involve active contributions to global norm-setting and assertive participation in coalitions of like-minded states to promote peace and stability. A second priority will be to de- fend the individual and collective rights of Iranian nationals every- where and to promote Iranian-Islamic culture, the Persian language, Islamic valuesĀ Ā and Islamic democracy as a form of governance . Third, Iran will continue to support the cause of oppressed people across the world, especially in Palestine, and will continue its principled rejection of Zionist encroachments in the Muslim world. Given the pressing challenges that it faces today,Ā Iran will also focus on a number of more urgent aims. The top priority is to diffuse and ultimately defeat the international anti-Iranian campaign, spearheaded by Israel and its American benefactors, who seek to āsecuritizeā Iranāthat is, to delegitimize the Islamic Republic by portraying it as a threat to the global order. The main vehicle for this campaign is the ācrisisā over Iranās peaceful nuclear programāa crisis that, in Iranās view, is wholly manufactured and therefore reversible. That is why Rouhani wasted no time in breaking the impasse and engaging in negotiations with the so-called P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany) to find common ground and reach an agreement that will ensure nonproliferation, preserve Iranās scientific ac- complishments , honor Iranās inalienable national rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and end the unjust sanctions that have been imposed by outside powers. Iran has no interest in nuclear weapons and is convinced that such weapons would not enhance its security. Iran does not have the means to engage in nuclear deterrenceādirectly or through proxiesāagainst its adversaries. Furthermore, the Iranian government believes that even a perception that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons is detrimental to the countryās security and to its regional role, since attempts by Iran to gain strategic superiority in the Persian Gulf would inevitably provoke responses that would diminish Iranās conventional military advantage. Therefore, the ongoing negotiations over the nuclear issue face no insurmountable barriers. The only requirements are political will and good faith for the negotiators to āget to yesā and achieve the objective established by the Joint Plan of Action adopted in Geneva last November, which states, āThe goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iranās nuclear programĀ will be exclusively peaceful.ā The unexpectedly fast pace of progress in the negotiations so far augurs well for a speedy resolution of this unnecessary crisis and for the opening up of new diplomatic horizons. Iran will also endeavor to diffuse external threats by resolving out- standing issues with the rest of the world, in particular with its immediate neighbors. Confidence building and cooperation will be the cornerstones of Iranās regional policy. That is why last year, Iran pro- posed the creation of a security and cooperation arrangement in the Persian Gulf area. As a responsible regional power, Iran will actively participate in combating and containing extremism and violence through bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation with countries in the region and beyond. Moreover, Iran will prudently manage its relations with the United States by containing existing disagreements and preventing further tensions from emerging unnecessarily, thereby gradually easing tensions. Iran will also engage with European countries and other Western states with the goal of reinvigorating and further expanding relations. This normalization process must be based on the principles of mutual respect and mutual interest, and it must address issues of legitimate concern to both sides. Iran will also expand and consolidate its amicable ties with other major powers, such as China, India, and Russia. As the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement until 2015, Iran will reach out to emerging powers of the āglobal Southā and will try to responsibly mobilize their enormous potential for contributing to global peace and prosperity. The Iranian people, with their massive turnout in last yearās presidential election and their decisive choice of assertive engagement, have provided a unique window of opportunity for the new Iranian government and for the world to chart a different and much more promising course in our bilateral and multilateral relations. The Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to vigorously honor its citizensā choice, which will undoubtedly have a tremendous impact on world affairs. For this endeavor to succeed, it is imperative for other states to accept the reality of Iranās prominent role in the Middle East and be- yond and to recognize and respect Iranās legitimate national rights, interests, and security concerns. It is equally important for other states to scrupulously observe the sensitivities of the Iranian nation, particularly regarding its national dignity, independence, and achievements. Westerners, especially Americans, need to modify their understandings of Iran and the Middle East and develop a better grasp of the regionās realities, avoiding the analytic and practical mis- takes of the past. Courage and leadership are required to seize this historic opportunity, which might not come again. The opportunity must not be lost.A prosperous Ukraine is in everybody Ā“s interest
Spring is in the air!
Close friends for 400 years
International Criminal Law and International Legal Approaches to Terrorism
Annual Summer Law Programme on International Criminal Law and International Legal Approaches to Terrorism
By Tanya Mehra LL.M., Education Development Manager, T.M.C. Asser Instituut From 2 ā 25 June 2014, the T.M.C. Asser Instituut will organise the Eighth Annual Summer Law Programme on International Criminal Law and International Legal Approaches to Terrorism. This Summer Law Program in The Hague is the product of a unique collaboration between the War Crimes Research Office of American Universityāsā Washington College of Law and the T.M.C. Asser Instituut. During this program, participants will have the opportunity to explore some of the most critical, legal issues today in The Hague, the legal capital of the world. The course on International Criminal Law will provide a thorough understanding of ICL, from substantive crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes) to the functionings of the international tribunals (ICTY, ICTR, ICC and hybrid tribunals) to the general role of the defence and victims. The course on International Legal Approaches to Terrorism in the 21st Century will cover the salient aspects in the fight against terrorism. From different forms of terrorism (terrorism in the air, terrorism on the sea and terrorism in cyberspace) to applicable law (international humanitarian law, international human rights law) to trying terrorists both domestically and internationally. This yearās speakers include, amongst others:Ā H.E. Judge Fausto Pocar, Judge, ICTY; Mr. Guido Acquaviva, Chef de Cabinet, Office of the President, STL; Ms. Helen Duffy, International Human Rights Lawyer; Ms. Alinda Verhaeg, Head of Case Analysis Unit at Eurojust; H. E. Judge Christine van den Wyngaert, ICC; Mr. Karim Khan, QC, Barrister, Temple Garden Chambers; Prof. dr. Larissa van den Herik, Professor of Public International Law, Leiden University.Ā Ā To complement the lectures, six afternoons will be devoted to study visits to various international courts and institutions in The Hague. Some of the confirmed study visits include: The ICC, the OPCW and the ICTY. These study visits will provide the participants with the chance to discover the structure and functioning of the various institutions and to ask their questions to working professionals on site. 40 students from US law schools will attend this summer law program. An additional 10 seats are available for interested students and young professionals from across the globe. āThis has been a great month [ā¦] I never would have had access to the sites and lectures that we have had hereā Participant in the 2013 Summer Programme on āInternational CriminalĀ Law and International Legal Approaches to Terrorismā For further information please contact: CharlotteĀ OāReilly, Project Manager Education & Events T.M.C. Asser Instituut educationtraining@asser.nlThe End of Aid
Slovakia ratifies amendments
Slovakia ratifies amendments to the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression and on article 8 related to war crimesĀ
The President of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, Ambassador Tiina Intelmann, observed and warmly welcomed the deposit at the United Nations on 28 April 2014 of the instruments of acceptance of the 2010 amendments to the Rome Statute, by H.E. Mr. Peter Burian, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic.
The 2010 Amendments to the Rome Statute are two sets of amendments that were adopted by consensus at the first Review Conference of the Rome Statute, held in Kampala, Uganda. The first of these amendments pertains to article 8 of the Rome Statute, which characterizes the use of certain weapons during non-international armed conflict as war crimes. The second concerns the provisions for the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of aggression. The crime of aggression was initially included in the Rome Statute in 1998 as one of the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, while the definition of the crime and the mechanism for the Courtās exercise of jurisdiction were deferred to a Review Conference. The amendments adopted in Kampala, Uganda in 2010 define the crime of aggression and provide for the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over this crime. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once thirty States Parties have ratified the amendments, and subject to a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017 by the States Parties. “The deposit of instruments of acceptance by Slovakia brings the number of States that have ratified both amendments to fourteen. The Kampala Amendments, especially on the crime of aggression, strengthen the international legal framework that prohibits the use of force and increases the guarantees of peace and of respect for the territorial integrity of the States Parties to the Rome Statute. I hope that other States Parties from all regions will follow suit,” stated President Intelmann. Slovakia ratified the Rome Statute on 11 April 2002, making it one of the first sixty States to contribute to the entry into force of the Statute, thereby establishing the ICC. Slovakia also ratified the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Court on 26 May 2004. Slovakia has also completed the process of domestic implementation of the Rome Statute through the incorporation of the crimes and general principles contained in the Rome Statute, and of the necessary provisions to ensure effective cooperation with the International Criminal Court.Reintegration of Returning Migrants
Women as agents of change in peacebuilding processes
Matthijs van der Beek, UPEACE Centre The Hague .
Summary of the lecture by Ms. Judy Cheng-Hopkins, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, on 7 March 2014.
The kick-off of the lecture series āPeace Building in Progressā by UPEACE Centre The Hague took place on Friday 7 March in the Academy Building of the Peace Palace. In these lectures various speakers will have the opportunity to share their views on peace and peacebuilding policies. We were honoured to welcome an important and passionate speaker, Ms. Judy Cheng-Hopkins, who works as the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support for the United Nations. Moreover, she is a Member of the Council for the University for Peace in Costa Rica, which indicates her interest in the relevance of peace education.
Ā Her lecture dealt with the developments in peacebuilding and the many challenges that lie ahead for the United Nations (UN) and all parties involved. As stated in the short introduction by our Chairman Marius Enthoven, it is often uncertain what āpeacebuildingā is about. It was upon Judy Cheng-Hopkins to explain to a very mixed audience, made up of policymakers, representatives from NGOs, universities and students, what the UN are aiming at in their peacebuilding missions and what problems need to be tackled before conflicting parties can realize sustainable peace. Currently, the UN undertake fifteen peacekeeping operations worldwide and one special political mission in Afghanistan. Such operations on the ground do not complete what is considered to be āthe peacebuilding processā. According to Cheng-Hopkins, peacebuilding in a UN context can best be understood as a long and difficult process from war to sustainable peace, consisting of very different stages. During conflict and wars this process already starts early with humanitarian assistance and mediation between, preferably, the conflicting parties and UN representatives. Once a ceasefire has been achieved and the UN are mandated by the Security Council to launch a peacekeeping operation, blue helmets need to avoid relapses into violence and must provide protection to civilians. At the same time they assist, along with mediators and NGOs, in many forms of peacebuilding measures, such as the implementation of peace agreements, power-sharing arrangements, strengthening the rule of law and social and economic development. Thus peacekeeping operations encompass not only the observance of ex-combatants, but also the building of institutions that are ideally capable in providing justice and socio-economic recovery. In many cases, however, reality shows different outcomes compared to the high expectations among the UN and the international community. Over a period of more than sixty years of UN peacebuilding missions, Cheng-Hopkins argued, post-conflict societies faced many problems that prevent a future of peace and harmony. Among these general problems she distinguished relapses into violence, military domination by some groups (at the expense of civil society), high levels of corruption, and no access to education for youth. States often remain fragile in this manner, since violence disrupts any further development. Why then are the peacebuilding operations so important? According to Cheng-Hopkins, the involvement of a supra-national body as the UN can play a vital role in peacebuilding by helping the conflicting parties through the above mentioned stages. Knowledge about peacebuilding has grown over the last decades, thanks to a large amount of research, peace education and practical experience. Since the international community has the capacity to assist in (post-) conflict societies, there is no good reason to stay aside. Conflicts ask our attention because instability can have major consequences across the borders if one thinks for example about terrorism, drugs trafficking and refugee streams. Although the UN peacekeeping operations can assist in state-building processes in many ways, the current strategies are also lacking. Cheng-Hopkins identifies the exclusion of women from the peacebuilding process as the greatest gap in UNās policy. She argued that women are the ultimate victims of conflicts, suffering from miserable family circumstances and sexual violence by soldiers. But seeing them as victims only does neglect that women can also be āagents of changeā. In many (conflict) societies women are responsible for agriculture, raising their children and in providing most other family needs. From a grassroots level, she believes, women can fulfil all kinds of peacebuilding roles, but in order to achieve that, the peacebuilding paradigm must change. UN operations are mainly targeted on men when it comes to peacebuilding measures and are therefore inherently biased. Only over the past ten to fifteen years women issues received more and more attention among UN bodies. Promoting the role of women in peacebuilding is not easy, however, since there are several obstacles. Many societies ignore or downgrade the role of women in public life and should undergo a cultural change before these ambitious ideas by Cheng-Hopkins can be put in practice. The current peacebuilding mission in Liberia proved that such cultural change is difficult, when only safe projects are financed by the UN and the international community. Thus to educate men within conflict societies about the benefits of women participation in peace processes and to change traditional role patterns, requires a strong belief and cooperation among the UN, international organizations and business leaders who work together. Peace education that acknowledges the role of women as āeveryday peacebuildersā can be an important tool in changing the paradigm and in opening the way to perhaps a more effective strategy of peacebuilding. www.upeace.nl