By Eljanos Kasaj
The leader of the Tisza-Respect and Freedom Party and member of the European Parliament, the centrist-conservative Magyar Péter, once a close ally and high-profile figure within the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance Party of the Bismarckian Prime Minister Orbán Viktor, has achieved a sensational and historic victory in the Hungarian parliamentary elections on 12 April, having secured around 55.25% of the vote and having won a supermajority of 141 seats in the National Assembly.
Through his political platform, which aims to restore the rule of law, strengthen democratic institutions, rebuild public services, reinstate media pluralism and reorient Hungary towards the European Union and NATO, Magyar succeeded in ending Fidesz’s 16-year rule in Hungary.
But if we were to try to look at it more carefully and with cooler emotions, we would notice that, despite the measured and balanced political rhetoric, Magayr and his Tisza Party’s program are very similar to those of outgoing Prime Minister Orbán and his Fidesz Party,
A careful observer would had maybe note that the political objectives of Fidesz and Tisza parties are curiously in many aspects the same (especially when it comes in protecting the Hungarian national sovereignty), differing only in what tools their leaders will use in order to achieve them.
To better understand what changes (if any) there may be in Hungary’s internal and external political course, let us endeavor to analyze the three most delicate and challenging issues that the new Hungarian prime minister is expected to face and what’s his approach on them:
Hungarian demographics and illegal migration
As Magyar Péter has pledged to his electorate a more pragmatic and less confrontational approach to the European Union on various issues, his positions on the key matters of Hungary’s national sovereignty – particularly border control and demographics – remain in line with the anti-immigration and ‘pro-family’ policy developed by the outgoing Prime Minister Orbán Viktor (some time even appearing more ‘radical’ than its predecessor), which we can observe in the following points:
Firstly, Magyar’s political program includes well-planned measures to incentivize Hungarians living abroad to return to Hungary, presenting this as an indicator of the restoration of citizens’ trust in the Hungarian state, and which will be achieved through restoring the rule of law, cutting corruption and improving the performance of public sectors (such as healthcare and education), consequently making Hungary a more attractive country in which to live and build the future.
At the same time, he has emphasized the continuation of support for Hungarians abroad (the autochthonous Hungarian minority and Hungarian diaspora) through the continuation of the policy of dual citizenship, the right to vote and preserving cultural heritage (language, traditions, costums, religion).
Secondly, in parallel with this ambitious program to repatriate Hungarian citizens to their country, Magyar has pledged to adopt a ‘very strict stance’ against illegal migration, including strengthening the southern border fence with Serbia built in 2015 and refusing the migrant relocation quotas mandated by the European Union.
Meanwhile, he also announced that, from June 1, 2026, all work permits for non-European migrants will be terminated, with the aim of reducing the number of new arrivals in the country to zero and stimulating the domestic labor market with new jobs for Hungarian citizens.
Thirdly, in a marked departure from Prime Minister Orbán, Magyar has stated that he intends to extradite high-profile political figures who have been granted political asylum by the previous government – such as former Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, former Polish Justice Minister and Prosecutor General Zbigniew Ziobro and former Polish Deputy Justice Minister Marcin Romanowski – to their countries of origin.
Thus, by putting an end to Hungary’s role as a ‘bastion of freedom’ and a ‘Christian stronghold’ that protected conservative European politicians from perceived ‘political persecution’ and ‘liberal repression’ of EU-aligned governments.
Lastly, while publicly criticizing Brussels’ past ‘mismanagement’ of migration, Magyar has signaled a willingness to find compromises to end the one-million-euro-a-day fine that Hungary has been paying for breaching the European Union’s asylum rules-a move which would liberate Hungary from financial burden and help stabilize its public finances, without forcing the country to make major concessions at the expense of national sovereignty.
Budapest relations with Moscow, Kiev and Beijing
Upon entering the Prime Minister’s office at the Carmelite Monastery, Magyar has pledged to rebuild and strengthen Hungary’s relations with the European Union, Visegrád Group and NATO, thus signaling a ‘de-Orbánization’ of Hungarian foreign policy.
Two of the most delicate and significant challenges of Magyar’s diplomatic approach would be the country’s complex relations with Russia, Ukraine and the People’s Republic of China, which present a curious mix of criticism (miscalculations or failures of the Prime Minister Orbán government) and a pragmatic stance (geographical realism and economic necessity):
While criticizing the previous government’s failure to diversify energy sources, a move that left Hungary after 2022 with no choice but Russian energy supplies, Magyar has preconize to construct a ‘pragmatic dialogue’ with Moscow and to continue importing ‘Russian cheap oil and gas’ until 2035 (a date considerably later than that announced by Brussels, which aims to break away from Russian energy sources by 2027).
At the same time, he has also expressed support to continue the Paks II nuclear power plant project, but has pledged to review and potentially renegotiate the financial and contractual details of the agreement signed with Russia’s State Atomiс Energy Corporation ‘ROSATOM’, over concerns about the financial sustainability of the €12.5 milliard project and the massive Russian loan financing the project, which is considered a potential trap for the Hungarian national finances.
On the other hand he has made it clear that Budapest will neither send its own troops, weapons nor taxpayers’ money to Ukraine, nor will it allow Hungarian territory to be used as a transit country for arms shipments – thus emphasizing the desire to keep Hungary out of the direct or indirect conflict with Moscow that could possibly damage its energy supplies from Russia.
But he appears more open to reaching a compromise with Brussels’ over the European funds for Kiev, which would lead to the resumption of Russian oil and gas supplies via the ‘Druzhba’ oil pipeline, even though it’s not clear how Kremlin will interpret this move.
Meanwhile, unlike his distant stance towards Moscow, Magyar, like many European leaders lately, appears more open to maintaining economic relations with Beijing, albeit with more careful scrutiny and based on ‘pragmatic cooperation’.
Although he has publicly criticized the impact that Chinese factories and plants (as well as those from South Korea) have had on Hungary’s ecological systems, he does not appear to intend to ‘dismantle’ the existing Chinese industrial projects (such as CATL in Debrecen and BYD in Szeged), but has promised to review the contracts with them and to ensure they bring as many benefits as possible to the Hungarian people and to the Hungarian economy.
Magyar has also announced his plans to support European Union initiatives (such as the “Made in Europe” draft law), which could require Chinese and all other foreign investors in Hungary to employ at least 50% of their projects’ workforce from the domestic Hungarian labor market.
Thus, based on this complex stance, we can assume that, rather than a complete reversal of Prime Minister Orbán’s ‘Eastern Opening’ policy, Magyar’s foreign policy towards is based on the ‘Hungary First’ principle, which aims to maximize the benefits for Hungary from its pragmatic relations with Moscow and Beijing.
Approach to Israel
Despite the rise of anti-Israeli sentiment among the European public and the growing criticism and condemnation from European leaders regarding Israel’s genocidal war in Palestine, Magyar has promised that he will continue the policy of ‘zero tolerance’ towards anti-Semitism and ensure the safety of one of Europe’s largest Jewish communities, living in Hungary.
He has also emphasized that Israel is and would remain a key economic partner of Hungary, and that the relationship between the two countries would be ‘pragmatic’ and based on Hungary’s national interest.
Meanwhile, despite an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court (ICC), during a telephone conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who congratulated him on his victory in the parliamentary elections, Magyar invited him to Budapest for the 70th anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising in October 2026, while Netanyahu invited him in Jerusalem.
At the same time, Magyar has publicly confirmed that he would continue to block the EU’s proposals to impose sanctions on Israel, even though his government will consider each EU decisions “on a case-by-case basis”, but without giving sufficient explanation as to how this evaluation process will be carried out.
Even though it’s still early to draw conclusions, it’s becoming obvious that although Budapest’s rhetoric towards Tel Aviv may or will become more restrained, Hungary will continue to remain one of the most Israel-friendly states in Europe, together with Germany, Italy and the Czech Republic.
Conclusions
As we are now less than 20 days away from 9 May 2026, when Magyar Péter will be officially sworn in as the new Prime Minister of Hungary, many analysts, experts, opinionists, political scientists, academics and journalists are analyzing what the Hungarian people and the European political community will expect from the former Fidesz politician.
It is certain that a reform process (so urgently needed in the country at this moment) will take place in Hungary and with it a new era will begin on the Hungarian political scene and an old one will close.
But, although the ‘revolutionary euphoria’ there are still many questions and uncertainties on how closely this process will align with the expectations of the electorate and Brussels’ political elites.
As tone in Budapest seems set to change, but as the German idiom goes, ‘Der Ton macht die Musik’ – so it remains to be seen how the Magyar’s political rhetoric will impact the Hungarian politics and more broadly the political landscape of Central and Eastern Europe, and if he will be a liberator of Hungary from the Fidesz or a continuator of Prime Minister Orbán’s political legacy.
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