The Embassy of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay marked his country’s Independence Day with a grand and festive reception. Held on August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague, the event drew over 200 distinguished guests from various sectors of Dutch society.
Ambassadors, chiefs of international missions, diplomats, academics, business leaders, and representatives from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with members of the Uruguayan community, all responded to H.E. Ambassador Dr. Álvaro González Otero’s invitation to celebrate ‘Día de la Independencia’—Uruguay’s National Day, commemorating its independence from Brazil in 1825.
H.E. Dr. Álvaro González Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay. National Day 2024 The Hague.
After nearly 200 years of conflict and civil unrest under Spanish and then Brazilian rule, Uruguay has emerged as a country renowned for its welcoming people, stunning landscapes, first-class meat production, and high-quality wine. In recent decades, Uruguayans have enjoyed a stable democracy, a steady improvement in living conditions, and overall well-being.
In a packed room with an animated audience, Ambassador González Otero took the microphone to thank all the attendees for their sincere affection for his people and country. He then proudly expressed:
“Two years have quickly passed since I arrived in this lovely kingdom. Since then, we have started to shift the focus of the Embassy, placing more emphasis on our bilateral relations. The Netherlands and Uruguay have more in common than people might imagine. We share international principles, landscapes, agricultural production, developed services, qualified exports, and a progressive lifestyle.
We also share strong commitments to the well-being of our citizens and visitors, the protection of human rights, environmental sustainability, progressive social policies, and significant efforts towards renewable energy and climate action. Both countries also emphasize education, democratic governance, and active participation in international organizations promoting peace and development. So, we will keep working to boost our bilateral relations.”
Uruguay National Day, August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague.
Ambassador González Otero then listed some of the most relevant initiatives undertaken by the Embassy over the last few months:
– Uruguayan participation in the World Hydrogen Summit 2024: Led by the Minister of Industry, Energy, and Mining, Ms. Elisa Facio, with over 50 representatives from various sectors of the public and private sectors.
– Active participation in the “26th World Energy Congress.”
– Cooperation Project with Delft Institute for Water Education: Since 2011, Uruguayan professionals specializing in water resources have participated in the Delft Institute program for advanced training. Initially, the program began with 40 scholarships, resulting in 37 professionals successfully completing their studies. This early success led to the program’s relocation and implementation at the Technological University of Uruguay, now featuring regional participation. The program has since had two new editions in 2022 and 2024, expanding to include 17 professionals from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. This development has transformed Uruguay into a regional hub in the field of water resource education.
– Uruguay’s status as one of the 32 signing states of the Ljubljana – The Hague Convention in February 2024.
– Positioning Uruguay as a potential living and working destination for Dutch farmers.
– Interactions with RVO and Port of Rotterdam related to port cooperation.
– Exploring and initiating new cooperation projects with Westland Municipality and Wageningen University.
– Meetings with private sector actors related to agribusiness.
– Preparation for the Capitan Miranda’s visit to Amsterdam: Uruguay’s school tall ship has already confirmed its participation in Sail Amsterdam 2025.
– Multilateral achievements: The Embassy has made progress in multilateral areas, including ongoing contributions and work with international organizations based in The Hague: the ICJ, ICC, OPCW, HCCH, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Additionally, a closer relationship with The Hague Academy of International Law has been pursued. Significant advances have also been made through the coordinated work of the GRULAC Group in relation to various international organizations.
H.E. Mr. Fernando Arias, OPCW Director General , Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Mr Arias spouse, Patricia van Oordt.
Following his remarks, Ambassador González Otero invited the audience to watch a short video about Uruguay, which made a great impression on those present. He expressed, “Uruguay is an exceptional country that has developed a dynamic and robust culture, shaped by a fascinating blend of gaucho traditions, European influences, and the unique Rioplatense spirit. Tango, folklore, candombe, and milonga are examples of its rich artistic musical expression. Uruguayan gastronomy, featuring high-quality meat, wine, and dairy products, especially the beloved ‘dulce de leche,’ delights palates and consistently wins prestigious awards worldwide.”
“The work we have done does not mean we are satisfied; we want to continue advancing in a deeper process. The bilateral relationship is already strong, but the potential to strengthen bonds in several key areas is even greater.”
The Ambassador of Uruguay, H.E. Alvaro Gonzalez Otero and the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Graciela Gatti Santana with her husband Mr Gustavo Segovia.
The event was conceived to showcase the rich and diverse culture of Uruguay, a nation with a population of approximately 3,495,527 as of 2022.
The national anthems of Uruguay and the Netherlands were performed by the Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos. After the ambassador’s speech, the Embassy paid tribute to two influential musicians: José “El Sabalero” Carbajal and Jaime Roos, who both lived in the Netherlands. Jaime Roos settled in Amsterdam in 1978, where he played bass in several salsa, rock, and jazz groups. He had a son and remained in the Netherlands until 1984 when he returned to Uruguay.
Carbajal spent his days in the Netherlands with his wife, Anke van Haastrecht, and their two children. Anke was invited to share some special stories from their life together.
Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos.Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez.
The enthusiastic audience enjoyed an authentic performance by talented Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez. The celebration continued with Uruguayan wine, classic savory empanadas, and dulce de leche, which delighted the crowded room and completed the great celebration.
Ambassador González Otero concluded the event by thanking his Embassy team: Counselor Pablo Bayarres, Chancellor Gustavo Morales, his assistant Juan Diego, and Martha Hernández and Sofía Anastasiou. He then led a warm toast for the people of the Netherlands, Uruguay, and the necessary and desired peace in the world.
International relations are nowadays characterised by major changes that started at the end of the 80s with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Indeed, the end of the cold war was marked by the dislocation of the two main political blocks, namely the Soviet Union and the Western World. Such a dislocation resulted in the marginalization of the post-war multilateral system embodied in the United Nations, and the standstill of the multilateral trade negotiations in the late 90s in the context of the World Trade Organisation. New lines of political thought have been facing each other since then, while reshaping the post-cold war world in a number of fragmented and variable sub-blocks of countries.
The United States decided to put itself first by concentrating on its internal affairs, while withdrawing from international affairs.
Europe, the old continent, looks for an efficient strategy towards autonomy from the United States. Europe also tries, not without difficulty, to create a more cohesive internal and external political approach. The reality is however evolving rather more towards fragmentation of Europe in favour of European National fragmented interests. Such a fragmentation is the natural consequence of the decadence of the European Institutional and collective actions to the advantage of individual Sates actions and interests. In sum, what seemed to be a structured and coherent European Union block fighting for the promotion of its economic and political values all over the world has somehow become an alliance at variable geometry both internally and externally. The disorganisation of the leadership results in a chaotic and unpredictable European External and Internal action.
Thereof, the empty influence spaces left on the international relations scene has given new international actors the opportunity to emerge.
Meanwhile, the fragmentation of the European Institutions has also impacted the EU-USA relations within NATO, and affected the security and peace sphere. Security issues have been on and off on the European agenda.
In this context, Russia that has lost its empire in the 80s looks now for a new power game. In spite of the disruption of the Soviet Union, Russia attempts either by influence or by force to exercise power in its ancient affiliate countries. Russia that was supposed to be defeated with the fall of the Berlin Wall takes back its role of opponent to the Western World on the international scene at least as it concerns the international affairs philosophy. Thus, creating a tension aimed at restoring its power in the world.
The group of emerging and developing economies that constitute a new variable block with a large portion of population employed in agriculture have emerged as new actors in the world’s geo-political discourses. At the head of this block on the international scene, there is China. The shaky international leadership context has indeed given China a new space. China’s communist past combined with its market-based economic strategy gives it a particular position.
China is The One that can communicate to Russia. China is also The One that can have an influence on the Western economic and political scene as China owns a big part of Western Foreign Debt
China embeds a horizontal strategy in both its trade and development policies, while producing at low wages. Its production system coupled with its pragmatic political approach has reshaped the international power structure. The top-down approach of the Western World faces now the competition created by the horizontal win-win approach proposed by China in both developing and industrialized countries.
Indeed, as a result of the decline of the Western World global hegemony based on market access and economic and social liberalism as a means to ensure economic growth and promote economic development, the vision promoted by China’s discourse, centred on the protection of livelihoods and local sovereign choices finds new adepts. Furthermore, China has successfully attempted to promote a trade-off approach to international cooperation during the last 20 years. A cooperation that does not interfere in internal affairs of partner countries as it has often reproached to the Western countries involved in international cooperation.
As the developing countries leader, China positions itself as the spoke country for the poor. As a new world powerful economic actor China plays as the guarantor of the Western Economic stability. China positions itself as the bridge between the rich and the poor. It is representing a different hegemonic game that only changes in its discourse, while still pursuing its own interests and influence zones. Such a situation poses the question of the values that the international regime wants to embrace. Indeed, this changing world results in an increased number of conflicts – be new or historical conflicts.
The dislocation of the traditional leaders of the international relations has definitely created a chaotic and unpredictable scenario. Chaos has in some cases been chosen as a political strategy to disrupt the post-1945 international regime. Such a disruption has benefitted new actors, and given space to new lines of thought. These new lines of thought have attacked the existing international framework but has not yet succeeded in creating a new regime. The increasing unbalance of power and the lack of leadership on the international political scene is risky.
The reduction by choice of leadership of the United States has indeed resulted in the weakening of the values emerged as a result of the dramatic experience of Second World War, namely freedom of thought and freedom of speech to mention only a few. We are now facing a much more authoritarian world with force used as a means to manage the political arena. Dialogue seems to be a rather consuming exercise that has left its place to the use of force. Force is no longer seen as the last option but rather the opening act for political dialogue. Nationalism and individual interests are now at the centre of the political game. This trend is taking the world to instability and conflict.
The peoples of the world are more and more questioning the existing system. People’s needs and expectations are not met. The new emerged actors, such as China have given the hope of a possible change in the present international system without fundamentally questioning its rationale but rather trying to rip a slate of the cake.
The struggle for influence among countries has not succeeded in building a peaceful and stable world. Citizens will have to face the challenge of building a new era of peace and stability worldwide.
S.E. M. Philippe Couvreur est arrivé à La Haye en avril 1982, où il a d’abord occupé le poste d’assistant spécial aux bureaux du greffier et du greffier adjoint de la Cour internationale de Justice.
Il a ensuite exercé les fonctions de Secrétaire, Premier Secrétaire et Secrétaire juridique principal, avant d’être élu Greffier de la Cour en 2000, et réélu en 2007 et 2014.
Pour marquer l’anniversaire de ses débuts à la Cour, il y a 35 ans, Diplomat Magazine l’a invité à témoigner de son expérience unique au service de cette institution, des évolutions qu’il a pu y observer, et à partager le regard qu’il porte sur les changements qui ont marqué la Cour et La Haye au cours des trois dernières décennies.
Philippe Couvreur avec le Pape Jean-Paul II prise le 13 mai 1985.
Je suis arrivé à La Haye en avril 1982 — de façon aussi inattendue que j’avais entamé des études de droit treize ans auparavant (mais c’est là une autre histoire…) — pour occuper un poste temporaire à la Cour internationale de Justice. La Cour était alors la seule institution judiciaire internationale existante au plan universel.
Son activité, particulièrement faible à la fin des années 1970, ne pouvait en ce temps-là guère laisser présager du succès que rencontrerait la Cour dans les décennies à venir. Mon bienveillant maître de Louvain, le professeur Paul de Visscher, fils du célèbre internationaliste Charles de Visscher, unique juge belge à la Cour, m’avait prédit des jours aussi sereins qu’heureux, écoulés à lire et à écrire des ouvrages dans la solitude des imposants murs de la bibliothèque du Palais de la Paix…
Les mémoires ont été dûment déposés dans l’affaire El Salvador c. Honduras dans la salle Bol le 1 juin 1988, l’affaire du Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime.
En rejoignant la Cour, un frais matin d’avril, dont je garde un souvenir très précis, le jeune juriste que j’étais découvrit, non sans étonnement, une organisation de taille très modeste, le Greffe, qui en est l’organe administratif, alors composé de moins d’une quarantaine de fonctionnaires. Le fonctionnement de la Cour reposait entièrement sur cette équipe restreinte de personnel permanent, auquel s’ajoutait, selon que de besoin, un personnel temporaire pour faire face au surcroît de travaux linguistiques et de sténodactylographie lors des sessions (publiques et privées) de la Cour.
Je me rappelle avoir été frappé par la personnalité haute en couleur de certains de ces traducteurs indépendants, dont la grande culture littéraire m’émerveillait. Cette structure très économique du Greffe impliquait une grande polyvalence de ses membres, et les Secrétaires de la Cour — ses fonctionnaires supérieurs — étaient appelés, en sus de leurs travaux de recherches juridiques, de préparation des documents de la Cour, et de rédaction de la correspondance diplomatique, à assumer eux-mêmes l’essentiel des tâches linguistiques (traduction et interprétation) et d’information, ainsi que la supervision de nombreuses activités administratives et logistiques.
La Grande salle de Justice, l’affaire Relative au Timor Oriental (Portugal c. Australie) Arrêt du 30 juin 1995.
Il n’était nullement rare qu’un nouveau venu comme moi ait à passer week-ends et nuits blanches au Palais de la Paix à effectuer les travaux les plus divers… allant jusqu’à imprimer et polycopier, sur de vieilles machines à stencils ronéotype, des décisions dont la Cour devait donner la lecture en séance publique le lendemain !
Dès mon arrivée au Greffe, j’ai eu le bonheur et le privilège d’être initié et associé à l’ensemble des fonctions de l’institution sous la patiente supervision de personnalités d’exception, tels que MM. Torres Bernárdez et Pillepich, alors respectivement Greffier et Greffier adjoint. J’en ai retiré le plus grand bénéfice, puisque cette immersion sans préparation dans toutes les facettes de l’activité du Greffe m’a permis d’acquérir de ce dernier une connaissance unique — de l’intérieur — et sous tous ses aspects —, un acquis particulièrement précieux au moment où j’ai été amené, bien des années plus tard, à assumer la délicate responsabilité d’en assurer la gestion au plus haut niveau.
Devenir un fonctionnaire du Greffe au début des années 1980 signifiait accepter de se couler sans discussion dans un moule à tous égards exigeant, et se donner corps et âme, avec humilité et discrétion, à l’institution, sans penser à soi ni parler de soi.
Depuis ces années d’initiation, j’ai été le témoin de profondes transformations de la Cour, rendues inévitables à la fois pour répondre à l’accroissement considérable de ses activités, avec la disparition du monde bipolaire qui avait relégué le règlement judiciaire à un rôle quelque peu marginal, et pour saisir les opportunités nouvelles offertes, notamment, par le progrès des technologies et de la communication. Entre 1982 et aujourd’hui, le nombre de fonctionnaires a ainsi presque triplé (il a quasiment doublé depuis l’an 2000, année de ma première élection en tant que Greffier). L’organisation du travail a été progressivement spécialisée entre les divers départements, juridique, linguistique et chargé de l’information, qui furent créés en 1997, et les services techniques. Par ailleurs, les Membres de la Cour ne disposèrent pas, pendant longtemps, de « référendaires » — ils s’y sont d’ailleurs longtemps refusés—, et l’assistance apportée aux juges en matière judiciaire était principalement répartie entre les fonctionnaires du Département des affaires juridiques.
H.E. Philippe Couvreur avec la Reine Beatrix photo prise pendant le 50 eme anniversaire de la Cour (18-04-1996).
Les cinq premiers postes de juristes référendaires ne furent obtenus de l’Assemblée générale et créés qu’en 2002, à l’issue de difficiles négociations que je me souviens avoir menées avec beaucoup de plaisir et d’intérêt ; le nombre de ces postes s’est progressivement accru, pour s’élever à quinze aujourd’hui.
Les divers développements qui ont marqué le monde au cours des dernières décennies n’ont pas manqué de soulever pour la Cour de nouveaux défis. Comme c’est le cas pour toute institution, elle n’a pu les relever en faisant table rase des enseignements de son histoire ni, à l’inverse, en ne saisissant pas toutes les opportunités offertes par le temps présent. A ces différents égards, la Cour est certainement parvenue, au fil des ans, à assurer un équilibre, toujours délicat, entre changements et continuité.
La continuité de la Cour est bien sûr inscrite dans son Statut, qui fait partie intégrante de la Charte des Nations Unies, et reflétée dans ses méthodes judiciaires, qui ont été très largement élaborées par sa devancière, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, et héritées d’elle. Cette continuité historique était particulièrement présente lorsque j’ai rejoint le Greffe.
Ainsi, en manière d’anecdote, divers hauts fonctionnaires alors en poste avaient eux-mêmes côtoyé, au début de leur carrière, d’anciens fonctionnaires de la Cour permanente. Tous nourrissaient à l’égard de cette dernière le plus grand respect. Il régnait d’ailleurs dans les couloirs du Palais de la Paix une atmosphère feutrée et délicieusement surannée, évocatrice de la défunte Société des Nations. Je me souviens en avoir encore utilisé maintes fournitures de bureau !
La continuité jurisprudentielle et procédurale entre les deux Cours constitue pour les Etats une garantie importante de sécurité et de prévisibilité juridiques. Cette continuité, juridique et historique, de même que l’expérience accumulée en plus de quatre-vingt-dix ans d’exercice de la fonction judiciaire, sont pour la Cour un facteur crucial de légitimité.
H.E. Philippe Couvreur vec le Roi Willem-Alexander photo prise pendant le 70 eme anniversaire de la Cour (20-04-2016).
En même temps, la Cour a eu, à l’évidence, à s’adapter aux changements du monde réel dans lequel elle opère, comme aux nécessités et opportunités nouvelles de chaque époque traversée.
L’une des transformations notoires auxquelles j’ai assisté fut l’ouverture croissante de la Cour sur l’extérieur : longtemps à l’écart, à dessein, des organes politiques des Nations Unies, la Cour a souhaité se faire plus et mieux entendre de ces organes et des Etats membres. Elle a ainsi rompu avec ce qui était parfois perçu comme un « splendide isolement » au sein des Nations Unies, même si elle défend toujours jalousement son autonomie. La Cour doit en outre désormais également tenir compte des nombreuses autres juridictions, internationales ou régionales, qui ont été créées ces dernières années, et veiller, autant que possible, à assurer l’harmonie du « concert judiciaire » que permet ce foisonnement de cours et tribunaux sur la scène internationale.
Davantage ouverte sur la communauté internationale et ses réalités, la Cour s’est montrée de plus en plus attentive, non seulement à sa place dans l’Organisation des Nations Unies, mais aussi à la poursuite des objectifs de celle-ci et à sa mission propre au service du règlement pacifique des différends internationaux. Des différends de plus en plus complexes, tant juridiquement que factuellement, en même temps que politiquement plus denses, lui ont été soumis. En révisant constamment, selon que de besoin, ses méthodes de travail, elle a su les résoudre rapidement et efficacement, à un coût particulièrement modeste pour la communauté internationale, tout en assurant le développement du droit.
Enfin, pour conclure sur une note plus prosaïque, mais qui est loin d’être négligeable, je ne peux taire la chance que j’ai eue de connaître l’extraordinaire développement de la ville de La Haye au cours des 35 dernières années. Celle-ci offre aujourd’hui à la Cour, comme aux nombreuses institutions internationales qui s’y sont installées à sa suite, une qualité de vie et un cadre de travail uniques, qui sont très loin de ressembler à ce que j’ai trouvé en y arrivant.
A l’image de l’imposante stature du Palais de la Paix où elle siège, symbole mondialement connu de la justice internationale, la Cour est une institution solidement établie. En dépit des périodes de doute ou de désaffection qu’elle a traversées par le passé, son rôle est unanimement salué au sein de la communauté internationale et le recours à ses services par les Etats n’a jamais été aussi soutenu. 35 ans après, je continue de mesurer chaque jour le privilège qui est le mien de servir au mieux de mes capacités l’organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies.
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Les photos dans l’article sont une courtoisie de la Cour International de Justice.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) Office of the Prosecutor has concluded two preliminary examinations: the Situation in Venezuela II and the Situation in Lithuania/Belarus, both referred by States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
After assessing jurisdiction, admissibility and the interests of justice, the Office reached different conclusions in the two cases.
In Venezuela II, the Prosecutor found no reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction were committed as a result of sanctions imposed by the United States on Venezuela since 2014. The Office determined that available information did not establish the necessary causal link or criminal intent required under international criminal law. As a result, no investigation will be opened. Venezuela has 90 days to request a review of the decision.
The decision does not affect the separate and ongoing ICC investigation into alleged crimes against humanity in Venezuela related to detention practices since 2014.
In contrast, the Prosecutor has opened an investigation into the Lithuania/Belarus situation after concluding there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against humanity may have been committed, including deportation and persecution on political grounds. The case concerns alleged actions by authorities in Belarus that affected victims on the territory of Lithuania, an ICC member state.
The investigation will examine alleged transboundary crimes committed since May 2020, where at least one element occurred in Lithuania.
The Office has notified ICC States Parties and invited individuals or organizations with relevant information to submit it through its secure platform.
The Hague, 10 March 2026 — The Presidency of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has confirmed receipt of the conclusions of an external panel of judicial experts regarding alleged misconduct by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.
The panel, established by the ASP Bureau, was mandated to assess the matter under the legal framework of the Rome Statute and to provide a legal characterization of findings contained in a report by the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).
The Bureau is expected to meet within five working days to review both reports. The documents are confidential and will not be made public. The ASP Presidency also called for respect for the privacy and rights of all parties involved while the process continues.
The Hague, 12 March 2026 — Authorities from eight countries have dismantled a large-scale online service allegedly used by cybercriminals to conceal their identities and conduct illegal activities worldwide. The investigation, coordinated by Eurojust and supported by Europol, targeted a website offering IP proxy services that allowed users to mask their real locations by routing their internet traffic through compromised devices across the globe.
The proxy service allegedly enabled customers to hide their true IP addresses by providing access to IP connections belonging to unsuspecting individuals and organisations. These connections were obtained by infecting internet modems with malware, allowing cybercriminals to reroute their online activity through legitimate networks without the knowledge of the device owners.
Investigators estimate that approximately 369,000 routers and other devices in 163 countries were compromised through the malware. The service reportedly attracted a customer base of around 124,000 users, highlighting the scale and global reach of the operation.
Access to the proxy network required payment through a dedicated platform designed to facilitate anonymous transactions using cryptocurrency. Authorities estimate that the platform processed more than €5 million in payments from users purchasing access to the service.
The international investigation revealed that servers used to distribute the malware were located in France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania, and the United States. To dismantle the infrastructure, Eurojust coordinated judicial cooperation and ensured that European Investigation Orders were prepared in advance and executed simultaneously on the designated action day.
Judicial authorities from France, Austria, the Netherlands, and the United States held several coordination meetings in The Hague to exchange intelligence and develop a joint operational strategy. Additional judicial requests were transmitted through Eurojust to authorities in Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, and Romania in preparation for the coordinated enforcement action.
Operational support was provided by Europol, which assisted investigators with cryptocurrency tracing, malware and network analysis, and database cross-checks. On the day of the operation, Europol hosted a Virtual Command Post at its headquarters in The Hague to facilitate real-time coordination among participating authorities.
During the coordinated operation carried out on 11 March, law enforcement agencies successfully targeted the infrastructure running the proxy network. Authorities took down 24 servers across seven countries and seized 34 domains linked to the service. The infected modems used to facilitate the proxy network were also disconnected.
In addition, U.S. authorities froze approximately €3.5 million in cryptocurrency connected to the operation.
The enforcement actions involved a wide range of judicial and law enforcement agencies, including authorities from Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania, and the United States, demonstrating the growing importance of international cooperation in combating cybercrime.
The operation represents a significant step in disrupting criminal infrastructure that enables cybercriminal activities worldwide and highlights the critical role of coordinated global action against increasingly sophisticated digital threats.
The Hague, 10 March 2026 – Experts from the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), working in collaboration with the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology (VAST), have published new findings on advances in DNA-based human identification in the prestigious journal Forensic Science International: Genetics.
The April issue features an article examining DNA preservation in highly degraded skeletal remains dating from the Vietnam War. The study describes a technique developed at ICMP’s laboratories in The Hague, combined with formal training, implementation, and concordance testing conducted in Hanoi at the Center for DNA Identification (CDI) laboratory of Vietnam.
Using the innovative method, researchers successfully recovered human autosomal DNA from 70 percent of the bone samples tested. The breakthrough offers a promising new pathway for resolving decades-old cases involving unidentified human remains in Vietnam.
A second article, now available online and scheduled for publication in the June issue of Forensic Science International: Genetics, presents a comparative evaluation of SNP sequencing workflows. The research, conducted jointly by ICMP and Vietnamese scientists, demonstrates that targeted sequencing of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), combined with optimized and highly sensitive DNA library preparation techniques, provides a viable approach for large-scale human identification in Vietnam.
In December 2025, a ceremony was held in Hanoi to mark the first identification of missing Vietnamese soldiers made possible through the new DNA identification process. The technology, specifically tailored to conditions in Vietnam—where unidentified remains from the conflict have been buried for decades—allows kinship analysis up to the fourth or fifth degree, even in samples with poor-quality DNA.
Since 2020, ICMP has supported Vietnam in developing an effective, DNA-led missing persons identification system. Over the past two years, technical and software development, the provision of equipment, specialized training, and extensive testing have been carried out through a partnership between VAST and ICMP, with support from the United States Government.
The newly established system is expected to enable thousands of additional identifications in the coming years. Cooperation between ICMP scientists and their Vietnamese counterparts also contributes to the Vietnamese Government’s long-standing objective of identifying more than 300,000 sets of human remains from past conflicts.
On the evening of 3 March, the residence of the German Ambassador in The Hague became the setting for an elegant gathering where music and diplomacy met in harmony. The Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Netherlands, H.E. Mr. Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut, and Mrs. Brigitte Meyer-Landrut, together with ClubRO, hosted a memorable chamber concert featuring members of the renowned Residentie Orkest.
Guests began arriving at the prestigious German residence from 17:30, welcomed in a warm and refined atmosphere that reflected the elegance of the venue. The event brought together ambassadors, Dutch friends of Germany, and representatives from several academic organizations.
H.E. Ms Caterina Ghini, Ambassador of Greece, H.E. Mr. Juraj Podhorský, Ambassador of Slovakia, H.E. Mr. Dániel Horogszegi Szilágyi-Landeck, Ambassador of Hungary, H.E. Mr. Julius Liljeström, Ambassador of Sweden and spouse.Annelie Bulsing, Deputy Director of Audiences & Development at the Residentie Orkest.
Before the performance, Annelie Bulsing, Deputy Director of Audiences & Development at the Residentie Orkest and Amare, offered a brief introduction to the orchestra and the evening’s programme. Ambassador Meyer-Landrut personally welcomed the guests, highlighting the enduring ties between Germany and the Netherlands.
The musical highlight of the evening was Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart’s Clarinet Quintet in A major, KV 581 “Stadler” (1789), a masterpiece of chamber music celebrated for its lyrical beauty and delicate interplay between the clarinet and the string quartet. Performed by distinguished musicians from the Residentie Orkest, the work captivated the audience with its expressive depth.
Residentie Orkest Quintet playing Mozart at the German residency.
Following the concert, guests gathered for a reception, continuing conversations in an atmosphere of cordiality and appreciation for the arts. The evening demonstrated once again how cultural initiatives hosted by diplomatic missions enrich the international community in The Hague, the city known worldwide as a centre of diplomacy, peace, and international cooperation.
The Embassy of India in the Netherlands presented an evening of culture and artistic excellence with the “Indian Dance Extravaganza – Bhumi and Sufiana”, a contemporary dance production performed at Theatre Diligentia. The event gathered members of the diplomatic community, representatives of international organizations, cultural professionals, and admirers of Indian performing arts for a memorable exploration of India’s rich artistic traditions.
The performance, choreographed by acclaimed dancer and director Maitreyee Pahari, presented a dynamic fusion of two distinct Indian dance traditions: Kathak and Chhau. By blending the refined rhythmic storytelling of Kathak with the powerful and expressive movements of Chhau, the production offered a contemporary interpretation of classical forms while remaining deeply rooted in tradition.
Ms. Dewi van de Weerd, Ambassador for International Cultural Cooperation at Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Ambassador Tuhin.
The evening featured two main pieces—Bhumi and Sufiana—each exploring different dimensions of Indian cultural and spiritual expression. Bhumi, meaning “earth” or “motherland,” showed the diversity of India’s cultural heritage through carefully choreographed ensemble with exigent dance/gymnastic movements, and beautiful costumes.
Sufiana, inspired by the mystical traditions of Sufi philosophy, explored themes of devotion, transcendence, and spiritual love. The choreography reflected the contemplative and universal message of Sufism, inviting the audience into a poetic journey where movement, rhythm, and music intertwined.
The performance formed part of a European cultural tour by the Lok Chhanda Cultural Unit, supported by the Ministry of External Affairs of India as part of its broader cultural diplomacy initiatives. Through such artistic exchanges, India continues to promote dialogue, cultural appreciation, and people-to-people connections across continents.
H. E. Mr. Kumar Tuhin, Ambassador of India to the Netherlands.
In his opening remarks, H.E. Mr. Kumar Tuhin, Ambassador of India to the Netherlands, highlighted the significance of cultural diplomacy in strengthening international friendships. The Ambassador, who is himself a passionate musician in his private life, expressed particular enthusiasm in presenting the performance, noting that India’s classical dance traditions carry centuries of artistic evolution, storytelling, and philosophical depth.
The Ambassador warmly welcomed the artists and the audience, emphasizing that cultural performances such as Bhumi and Sufiana offer a unique opportunity to experience the diversity and spiritual richness of India’s heritage.
The evening drew an exceptional response from the public, with Theatre Diligentia filled to capacity. The audience responded with great enthusiasm to the dancers’ energy, precision, and expressive storytelling, rewarding the performers with sustained applause.
Mrs. Deepa Tuhin, spouse of the Ambassador of India to the Netherlands; Mrs. Beatriz Piza, spouse of the Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Netherlands; H. E. Mr. Arnoldo Brenes Castro, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Netherlands; H. E. Mr. Kum.ar Tuhin, Ambassador of India to the Netherlands.Interaction among participants who attended the Cultural event.
Following the performance, the Embassy of India hosted a reception where guests had the opportunity to meet the artists and exchange impressions of the evening. The gathering provided a relaxed setting for members of the diplomatic community and cultural guests to continue conversations inspired by the performance.
Events such as the Indian Dance Extravaganza reaffirm the role of the arts as a powerful bridge between cultures. By bringing the rhythms, stories, and spiritual traditions of India to audiences in the Netherlands, the Embassy of India once again demonstrated how cultural diplomacy enriches the international landscape of The Hague.
Cultural performance by Maitreyee Pahari and her team.Cultural performance by Maitreyee Pahari and her team.
The BRINK Quartet is a recent academic term used to denote a grouping of countries that represent a diverse geographic distribution, societal structures and political systems, yet strategically connected with each-other in a symbiotic relationship, which unlike classical politico-military alliances, represent a model of strategic coordination based on individual bilateral agreements or treaties (rather than multilateral ones) and the shared (geo) political views of their leaders, which are very similar to one another.
Comprising the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), the BRINK Quartet is today challenging the established international order since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the end of the Cold War, which they see it as unfair and exclusionary, characterizing it as a form of ” West neo-colonialism” that aggressively aims to maintain its hegemony through methods of indirect political intervention (West-founded NGO or Western-lobbing for political entities), economical pressure (through sanctions, tariffs, bans or embargo) and isolation from the international community (excluding from the international organizations bodies).
Based on these perceptions of geopolitical realities, the BRINK Quartet countries are presented as proponents of a classical worldview (regardless of the ideological differences among their political systems), based on the early XIX century post-Napoleonic conservative-reactionary ideas of the Concert of Nations and on the XX century post-Yalta Conference “division” (or “regionalization”) of spheres of influence, which they see it as the only way to ensure the political, economic and military stability of their countries, as well as to preserve the equilibrium between the Great Powers in the global political arena.
As of today, tensions between the Quartet and BRICS and the West (primarily the European Union and the United States) have escalated into dangerous direct and indirect armed conflicts, this global chaotic situation it seems to be benefiting another important international actor: the People’s Republic of China.
But before we examine how the “controlled conflict” between the countries of the BRINK Quartet and the West is today one of the most important tools in PRC quiet strategy to undermine the West’s political, economic and military monopoly, let us provide some specific details about the BRINK Quartet, which will later help us to subsequently analyze how Beijing has managed to turn them into a powerful (geo) political weapon, one that is achieving more satisfactory results than could ever have been achieved on the battlefield.
Five key commonalities that unite the BRINK Quartet countries
Regardless of their diverse geographic distribution, societal structures, political systems and state ideologies, the BRINK Quartet countries are united in a curious way by five key commonalities:
The first commonality uniting the countries of the BRINK Quartet is the respect for the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, while ideological uniformity is neither a prerequisite nor an obligation, which could possibly determine the relationships between them, thus framing cooperation are based on common practical interests;
A second common denominator, which we can categorize it as more technical then political, is that each of the political systems of the BRINK Quartet countries is centralized, statist and paternalist in typology- where every system aims to preserve the internal stability of its own country (especially in the case of fragile multinational states such as the Russian Federation or the Islamic Republic of Iran);
Meanwhile as we aforementioned at the beginning of our analyze, the BRINK Quartet countries share an official hostile stance towards Western global hegemony and Western-led values, which they regard as “foreign” and harmful to their countries and populations (based on the political, social and cultural chaos caused by their adoption – as in Russia’s case during the 1990s);
On the other hand, this hostile stance has also shaped the geo-political understanding of the BRINK Quartet countries, which consider themselves to be in ‘a permanent threat’ and in ‘a continuous war’ with the West-leaded alliances (as in the case of NATO/OTAN) and organizations (as in the case of European Union): Pyongyang has been the first who adopted this stance since the U.S.-led United Nations coalition intervention in the Korean War (1950–1953); Teheran since the triumph of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, followed by U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis (1979-1981) which led to first American sanctions against the new revolutionary government of Ruhollah Khomeini; Minsk since the imposition of the first Western sanctions (firstly mainly by EU) in 1996, following President Lukashenka amendments to the Constitution of Belarus; and Moscow since the diplomatic divergences that it had with the West on many security issues during the NATO expansion in the Central-East Europe in early 2000’ and especially after the Crimean crisis (2014) which saw the imposition of the first Western sanctions.
The ‘nuclear umbrella’ is another identifying aspect of the BRINK Quartet countries and an important part of their political rhetoric; the Russian Federation today possesses the largest arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the world, estimated between 5,450 to 5,580 nuclear warheads; the DPRK government continues aggressively to develop its nuclear capabilities (despite the international sanctions) and today possesses around 50 nuclear warheads; since June 2023 the Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka has agreed on deployment of ‘Oreshnik’ ballistic missiles and Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory; meanwhile Islamic Republic of Iran is pursuing an ambitious, albeit still embryonic, program for the potential development of a nuclear arsenal, which has had also the direct and indirect support from Moscow.
Satellite countries of the BRINK Quartet
The BRINK Quartet it structurally resembles a planetary system, where each of actors brings with it a group of satellite countries, which are also characterized by political systems similar to those of their political gravity centers and by diverse geographical distribution, and which serve not only as reliable allies, but also as a safety valve against the West’s diplomatic isolation efforts (as in the case of the punitive diplomatic isolation of Russia by the West following the outbreak of the armed conflict in Ukraine in February 2022), but also to maintain a politico-military presence in this key regions which have a special geostrategic and economic importance, especially on the trade routes and markets of goods.
The first cycle of these satellite countries include the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (or Burma), Central African Republic, the Alliance of African Sahel countries (composed of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso), the State of Eritrea, the ‘socialist’ Republics of Cuba and Nicaragua, and lately also the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
The second cycle include the ‘black holes’ of post-Soviet Union space: Caucasian Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (or Transnistria) in Moldova- all three of them share common stance on Russian financial assistance, the military presence of Russian troops in their territories (peacekeeper troops or military bases) and Moscow’s political support to preserve their de facto independence.
A third cycle composed of political-paramilitary organizations and Islamist groups located in Arab countries, indirectly or directly supported by Teheran government, include the Houthis (Ansar Allah Movement) which controls territories on Northwestern Highlands, Red Sea Coastline, Saada Province and the capital city of Sana’a in Yemen; Hezbollah (Allah Party) which controls territories on southern Lebanon, the eastern Bekaa Valley and partly in the capital city of Beirut; and Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) which has had the de facto control over the Gaza Strip since 2007.
These rings of satellite countries of the BRINK Quartet, besides their role as reliable allies, economic partners or a tool of military pressure, also serve as defensive rings intended to spread the conflict between the BRINK Quartet country and the West across multiple geographically dispersed fronts, which will force Western forces to spread themselves thin and prevent them from focusing on a war against just one BRINK-country, thereby protecting the core of this planetary system from direct confrontation.
The Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the XXI century
Although, as we mentioned at the beginning of our analysis, the BRINK Quartet countries are not linked to one another by any pact, alliance or union of any kind, but primarily through individual bilateral agreements among them, this has not prevented their governments from advancing efforts to establish a unique international platform, which will aim to change the political landscape of Eurasia forever.
On 3 February 2026, the Belarusian state news agency BelTA reported that at premises of the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Minsk) and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Moscow) simultaneously, the representatives of the Republic of Belarus, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Burma), and the Russian Federation, coauthored a statement titled “Towards a Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the XXI century”, pledging an “inclusive consultative process” to develop the “The Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the XXI century”.
The Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the XXI century is an international document, firstly articulated as an idea at the First International Conference on Eurasian Security, held in Minsk in October 2023, and was later followed by the panel discussion held in the framework of the Second and the Third International Conferences on Eurasian Security, also held in Minsk in 2024 and 2025, which saw the emerging of the various project-plans on how this plan could be materialized. During this time, the Belarusian and Russian diplomatic delegations have organized jointly information briefings on various venues, including the United Nations Office in Geneva, Switzerland (February 2025) and the headquarters of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Beijing, People’s Republic of China (February 2025).
Meanwhile, according to the analyze presented by BelTA, the aim of the Eurasian Charter would be to support the creation of a stable architecture of security and cooperation across the Eurasian space, based on the principles of equality, indivisible security, and the independent, solidarity-based resolution of regional issues by Eurasian states without destructive external interference. On the other hand work on the charter is open and inclusive to all Eurasian partners, and it’s focused on strengthening cooperation in four key areas: security, economy, humanitarian agenda, and civilizational exchange.
While the work to departmentalize the coordinated relations of the BRINK Quartet countries continues enthusiastically, it is expected to be finalized and signed at a high-level event, possibly at a future Eurasian Security Conference in Minsk this year, which would thus conclude as the materialization of one of the most important modern political structures across the territories of Eurasia since the formation of post-Soviet organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union.
BRINK Quartet as icebreaker of West-leaded global order
The beginning of the coordinated bombings by the American and Israeli armies against civilian, governmental, infrastructural, economic and military targets in the Islamic Republic of Iran since 28 February 2026 (although Washington was at the time still holding constructive talks with Teheran in Switzerland to resolve their divergences diplomatically), as well as the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, seems to have seriously undermined the confidence in the United States as a leading democracy and defender of international law, both domestically and internationally, as many citizens, world leaders and observer organizations have seen this as an unnecessary and illegitimate act of aggression against a sovereign state which has brought a new global energy crisis, further damaged the fragile regional stability, has led to thousands of humanitarian losses, and a revitalization of radical Islamist terrorist organizations or groups (such as Hezbollah in Lebanon or Houthis in Yemen), thus raising concerns about a possible escalation on a regional scale.
On the other hand, the Russo-Ukrainian armed conflict has also seen the largest political, military and economic mobilization of European Union countries (perhaps since the European Union Military Operation in Republic of Chad, in African continent, between 2008-2009), giving this conflict, seemingly isolated in the post-Soviet space, a universal (or continental) dimension, and shaping a protracted proxy war which today has officially been fought for more than four years-but, the failure to apply the same standard or unified harsh response to Israel, whose military actions in Gaza Strip against Palestinian civil population have been officially recognized by the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry as a “genocide”, has undermined the European Union credibility in the eyes of international community (especially in the Arabo-Persian and Muslim world), which has seen this “asymmetrical response” as a piece of evidence that demonstrates an old-colonial, unequal view on human rights and international law.
All these chaotic and volatile developments have also led to a polarization of European and American societies, thereby turning the current geopolitical crisis into an internal political crisis that has divided society and fuelled harsh political rhetoric on the governmental elites.
Meanwhile, as the ongoing conflicts between the West and the BRINK Quartet continue to dangerously escalate, this has significantly affected the West’s international preception, with the European Union and the United States facing today a growing criticism for promoting an international order based on unilateral rules, while from some they are seen as actors who prioritize military force over dialogue (as in the case of the current U.S.-Iran war or the proxy war between EU and Russia), which, according to critics, undermines public trust and weakens global diplomatic structures.
China as gateway to escape from old (geo) political realities and as a new alternative
The escalation of conflicts between the West and the BRINK Quartet, accompanied by the hardening of political rhetoric from governing elites, radical politicization of societies, as well as the crisis of moral and civic values, has also led that more and more people, especially young people (Generation Z), to seek ways to escape from the gloomy reality and to look for countries which political system that offer an alternative to their origin countries old systems, which they see it as dysfunctional, rotten, corrupted and inefficient.
People’s Republic of China (or PRC), with its semi-mythical history stretching back thousands of years, its highly colourful and vibrant culture, its gigantic modern economy and its lightning-fast technological innovation, seems to have become the utopian paradise of the young people, but of course the perception of PRC as such differs according to political environment, economic landscape and cultural background of the admirers:
Within the BRINK Quartet countries, harsh Western sanctions and international isolation have reoriented their governments towards Chinese markets and China-led organizations, turning their economic, political, cultural and technological dependence on Beijing from what firstly used to be an asymmetrical ‘strategic partnership’ into a vital factor for them, consequently influencing the opinions of the citizens of this countries, who today view the People’s Republic of China in a very positive light, not only as a reliable economic partner and a friendly country, but also as an example of success on the modernization processes without the need of adaption of the Western models, but by incorporating old traditions and cultural heritage of their countries with the technological achievements and scientific partnership with other friendly countries which share the same values and goals.
On the other hand, in the West, the People’s Republic of China is no longer seen as a big, bad wolf in the eyes of young people, who are today rediscovering the country through touchpoints of Chinese commercial culture, such as futuristic cities like Shanghai and Chongqing, the ugly-but-cute Labubu dolls, innovations on social media platforms like Tik Tok or Rednote, and most recently by Unitree G1 humanoid robots. This has also led to the emergence of a new viral popular phenomenon on social media, mainly Tik Tok, called “Chinamaxxing” or “becoming Chinese”, in which non-Chinese users, predominately young people, appropriate traditional Chinese wellness habits, aesthetics, fashion and daily lifestyle practices.
As a February 2026 survey conducted by French polling firm CSA Research, of 19,025 Europeans aged 18 to 35 revealed, around 82% of respondents held a positive view of China, while in United States over 40% of Americans aged 18-29 had a favorable opinion of China, according to a poll posted in Facebook by Global Times Post on December 2025.
Meanwhile globally, according to a study conducted by The University of Cambridge’s Center for the Future of Democracy, today around 6.3 miliard people living in 136 countries worldwide-mainly in Non-Aligned emerging economies and Global South-feel generally positive towards the People’s Republic of China, which is viewed as an alternative global power that respects the sovereignty of other countries and does not demand concessions in the core of their traditional political systems, or of their national traditions and customs.
Thanks to this generally positive public image internationally, Beijing is more confident as it leads efforts to create a multipolar world, but unlike the militarist strategy of BRINK Quartet countries, the Chinese strategy is based on deepening economic integration through regional trade alliances (such as the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), regional cooperation organizations (such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and key global infrastructure development strategy (through the Belt and Road Initiative).
This economic, cultural and political expansion of Beijing, which is filling the vacuum left in the international arena by key historical factors – such as the European Union, the United States or the Russian Federation – is turning the PRC into a political, economic, cultural and technological centre, thus paving the way for its proclamation as the new global superpower, thereby consequently leading to the establishment of a new global order.
Conclusions
The recent dynamic and dramatic geopolitical developments seem to represent the culmination of the processes establishing political, economic and military multipolarism, which also mark the end of the old unipolar world order, established chaotically after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union.
These transformative processes are currently unfolding on two fronts:
The first front is represented by the countries of the BRINK Quartet and their satellites, which see the use of force as the only efficient way to protect their geostrategic and national interests, as well as to achieve the formation of a new global order, the guarantee of which will be the military strength that these countries possess.
But, as the recent diplomatic initiative of the Eurasian Charter has shown, the prospect of institutionalizing BRINK, aim of which would be to lead to the creation of a stable architecture of security and cooperation across the vast Eurasian space, also appears to be viable.
The second front is represented by the People’s Republic of China, which is using trade framed within strategic initiatives (such as the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative or the Global Civilization Initiative) and regional organizations (such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), in order to dismantle the old order and create a new one based on an integrated global trade network with PRC at its centre.
This front seems to be gaining ground more and more each day, and at the same time it appears to represent the most practical and diplomatically flexible strategy, which is based on the simple fact that, thanks to Beijing’s Titoist policy, PRC today, just like SFR Yugoslavia during the Cold War, is the only global actor that has managed to benefit from the deepening crisis caused by the direct and indirect confrontation between the BRINK Quartet and the West.
Thus, as PRC is rapidly emerging as a global superpower, challenging Western dominance (especially American), it has managed to do so quietly and without sparking any direct conflict with the West, but by waging a proxy war through states with which Beijing today maintains a ‘controlled dependency’ relationship, which allows it to challenge Western hegemony, while keeping them under control. And which, ultimately, makes Beijing the sole victor, regardless of how the geopolitical situation on the battlefield ground or on the negotiating table will unfold.
About the author:
Eljanos Kasaj is a Albanian academic, currently studying at the Institute of Political Science and World Politics, specialising in Global Security, at the University of Wroclaw (Poland).
By H.E. Mr. Milisav Raspopovic, Ambassador of Montenegro
Upon my arrival in the Netherlands, I often heard an interesting observation when speaking with local residents. Whenever Montenegro was mentioned, someone would inevitably smile and remark that Montenegrins, together with the Dutch, are among the tallest people in the world.
“We are a modest nation,” I would usually reply. “We would gladly accept slightly lesser proportions if it meant standing alongside you as the tallest members of the European Union.”
Behind this friendly exchange lies a sincere national aspiration. Full membership in the European Union remains the cornerstone of Montenegro’s foreign policy. Guided by this strategic objective, Montenegro made the decision to establish, for the first time, a resident Embassy in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, thereby strengthening its presence in a country with which we share both friendly bilateral relations and allied ties within NATO.
The opening of the Embassy of Montenegro in The Hague therefore represents far more than a diplomatic formality. It is a clear signal of our determination to deepen cooperation with a country that strongly supported Montenegro’s accession to NATO and that continues to play an important role in maintaining political momentum for European integration.
The Dutch approach to EU enlargement is well known and widely respected. It rests on the principles of individual merit, measurable progress and full respect for the Copenhagen criteria, with particular emphasis on reforms in the rule of law. The message from The Hague has always been consistent: the process must remain strict but fair, guided by standards rather than shortcuts or exceptions.
For Montenegro, which today stands as the frontrunner among EU candidate countries, such an approach is not an obstacle but an additional motivation. The year 2026 carries particular symbolism for us. It is a year in which we continue to intensify our dialogue with Dutch institutions, members of parliament and the broader public, explaining why Montenegro is determined to conclude the technical phase of accession negotiations and move decisively toward our strategic objective: becoming, symbolically, the 28th member state of the European Union by 2028.
This year is also significant for another reason. Montenegro marks twenty years since the restoration of its independence and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It is an anniversary that invites reflection, but also confidence in the future. As a reliable NATO ally, fully aligned with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, Montenegro contributes to stability in a region that remains strategically important for Europe. At the same time, our size and population mean that our accession would represent not a burden but an added value for the Union.
Our commitment will also be reflected through an active international role in the coming period. Later this year Montenegro will host the EU–Western Balkans Summit and is currently chairing the Berlin Process, providing an opportunity to further promote regional cooperation, stability and development guided by European values. Toward the end of the year, Montenegro will also assume the Presidency of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, further demonstrating our readiness to contribute actively to strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law and human rights across the European continent.
Although Montenegro views its European path as a one-way road, we are fully aware that EU accession is not a unilateral journey. It is a partnership. As we approach what we hope will be the final phase of negotiations, the continued support and engagement of our friends in the Netherlands will be particularly valuable.
For that reason, we expect the coming period to be dynamic in bilateral terms as well. Beyond the anniversaries we celebrate this year, we hope to see intensified political dialogue, more frequent high-level visits and a stronger presence of Dutch experts and credible investors in Montenegro. Such engagement would send an important signal that Montenegro is approaching the final stretch of its European journey, while also reminding the wider region that progress toward the European Union remains both possible and achievable.
From time to time one hears that Montenegro is moving rapidly toward the European Union. I would suggest that our journey has been less about speed and more about direction. For over a decade we have patiently and consistently aligned our institutions and legislation with European standards. In our view, sustainable European integration is achieved not through shortcuts but through steady reforms, and this is the path Montenegro has chosen to follow.
Finally, it is impossible to speak about diplomacy in the Netherlands without acknowledging the unique role of The Hague, widely regarded as the legal capital of the world and a city with a remarkable multilateral dimension. At a time when the international order is facing increasing pressure and global tensions continue to rise, it is both a privilege and a responsibility to work in such an environment alongside colleagues from the diplomatic corps and representatives of numerous international organisations. Together, we share the responsibility of safeguarding a rules-based international order, effective multilateralism, and promoting a world founded on universal values, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Energy, geography and great-power competition in the formation of a new strategic axis between the Middle East and Eastern Europe
“Who controls the Rimland[1] dominates Eurasia; who dominates Eurasia influences the destiny of the world.” — Nicholas Spykman
By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu
Two seemingly separate strategic theatres
In contemporary geopolitics, the lines of separation between major strategic theatres are becoming increasingly blurred. Spaces once considered distinct are beginning to function as elements of the same system of geopolitical interdependencies, in which energy routes, trade corridors and maritime chokepoints connect distant regions into a single strategic arc.
In this context, the Black Sea and the Middle East can no longer be viewed as two separate geopolitical spaces. While in traditional analysis the Black Sea was considered a frontier zone between Europe and the Eurasian space, and the Middle East an epicentre of energy politics and regional conflicts, developments over the past decade show that this conceptual separation is becoming increasingly irrelevant.
The two regions now appear as segments of the same strategic space linking the Persian Gulf to Eastern Europe. This geopolitical interdependence between the Middle East and the Pontic region has also been emphasized by other analysts, who describe this space as a zone of compression between the major maritime and continental geopolitical systems.
Within this geopolitical arc intersect the interests of great powers, energy flows and trade routes between Asia and Europe. Understanding this interconnection becomes essential for analysing geopolitical transformations in Eurasia and for assessing the new balances of power that are emerging in the 21st century.
The geography of energy and trade routes
This interconnection begins, above all, with geography. The Black Sea represents the gateway between Europe and the energy space of the Middle East and the Caspian basin. At the centre of this connection lies the system of the Turkish Straits — the Bosporus and the Dardanelles — the only maritime link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, which makes control of this passage a geopolitical factor of global importance.
The legal regime of these straits is established by the Montreux Convention of 1936, which grants Turkey control over naval transit and provides Ankara with an essential strategic role in the military balance of the region.
The system of the Turkish Straits, the energy corridors crossing Anatolia and the Caucasus, as well as the transport infrastructure linking Asia to Europe create a strategic continuity between the two regions.
Within this system of interconnections, the Caucasus region plays the role of an intermediate strategic node through which the energy resources of the Caspian basin and the Middle East are connected to European transport infrastructures and markets.
The importance of this strategic arc has increased significantly in recent years, particularly in the context of European efforts to diversify energy and trade routes following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.
The military interdependence of the two fronts
The military dimension reinforces this interdependence. The war in Ukraine has transformed the Black Sea into a major strategic theatre of confrontation between Russia and the West. At the same time, recurring tensions in the Middle East continue to influence global energy stability and the security of maritime routes.
The two fronts do not evolve in isolation. In practice, they simultaneously affect Europe’s security: the Black Sea directly influences the European security architecture, while the Middle East affects the continent’s energy flows and economic stability. From this perspective, Europe’s security increasingly depends on developments in both regions.
Pivot actors of the extended geopolitical space
Turkey plays a central role in this interconnection. Control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles gives Ankara a unique strategic position, as these maritime passages represent the only link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.
At the same time, Turkey is involved militarily and politically both in the Pontic space and in the Middle East. Its presence in Syria and Iraq, its involvement in Libya, as well as its role in the strategic balance of the Black Sea transform Ankara into a geopolitical pivot between Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East. This position allows it to influence developments in both strategic theatres simultaneously.
In the context of a possible major destabilization of Iran, Turkey faces a complex strategic dilemma determined primarily by geographical proximity and by the experience accumulated over the past decade in managing regional crises. The lessons of the Syrian conflict have shown Ankara that the collapse of state order in a neighbouring country inevitably generates massive migration pressures, security risks and internal economic instability.
Consequently, Turkey’s security doctrine has increasingly shifted toward the concept of forward security, according to which threats must be managed as close as possible to their point of origin, even beyond national borders.
Within this doctrinal framework, the Turkish military has developed contingency plans in recent years for scenarios of regional destabilization, including the hypothesis of a partial collapse of the Iranian state. Such a situation could generate massive population movements toward the Turkish border and could create power vacuums in frontier regions.
From Ankara’s perspective, the main objective in such a scenario would not be the occupation of Iranian territory but the creation of limited buffer zones designed to manage refugee flows and prevent the spread of chaos toward Turkish territory.
Another sensitive element concerns the ethnic dimension of the region. In north-western Iran lives a large community of ethnic Azeris, estimated at approximately 15–20 million people, concentrated mainly in the province of Iranian Azerbaijan, with its centre in Tabriz.
The cultural and linguistic ties between these communities and Azerbaijan, as well as the increasingly close political relations between Ankara and Baku, give this region a particular geopolitical relevance. In the event of a major destabilization of Iran, the north-west of the country could become a space of strategic competition between several regional powers, and Turkey would inevitably be involved in the security dynamics of the area.
In recent years, Ankara has significantly strengthened the security infrastructure along its border with Iran, including through the construction of an extensive system of physical barriers, surveillance systems and aerial monitoring capabilities based on drones. These measures reflect Turkey’s constant concern regarding the risks generated by regional instability and demonstrate that the Turkish state is preparing flexible options for potential crisis situations.
Overall, the scenarios discussed in analytical circles regarding possible Turkish involvement in north-western Iran should be understood more in the logic of preventive planning than as indications of expansionist intentions. Ankara’s strategic priority remains maintaining stability at its own borders and preventing Turkey from becoming a space for absorbing crises generated by conflicts in its immediate neighbourhood.
However, the geopolitical implications of a possible destabilization of Iran go far beyond the strictly defensive dimension of this planning. From a broader perspective, the region of Iranian Azerbaijan, centered arround Tabriz, represents one of the sensitive links of the geopolitical space connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Middle East.
In the event of destabilization in Iran, this area could become a point of convergence for the interests of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Russia and other regional actors. For this reason, developments in north-western Iran should be monitored not only as a regional security issue but also as a possible indicator of a reconfiguration of the strategic balance in a key region of Eurasia.
From this perspective, developments in Iranian Azerbaijan should not be viewed merely as a local security issue but as part of a broader geopolitical dynamic involving relations between the Turkic world, the Caucasian space and the Middle East.
In recent years, the consolidation of the strategic relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as regional connectivity and energy projects, has amplified the importance of this region within the geopolitical architecture of the Eurasian space.
Global competition within the strategic arc
Beyond the regional dimension, there is also a global competition unfolding in this space. The United States, Russia and China are simultaneously present both in the Middle East and in the extended Black Sea region.
For Washington, the stability of the Middle East and the security of the Black Sea are part of the same strategic system influencing European security and the control of energy routes.
For Russia, control of the Black Sea provides access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, strengthening its power projection in the southern space of Eurasia.
For China, the stability of these routes is essential for energy security and for the functioning of Eurasian trade corridors.
An emerging strategic arc between the Persian Gulf and Eastern Europe
In this context, developments in one strategic theatre tend to produce direct effects in the other. A major escalation in the Middle East could affect European energy security and increase the importance of routes in the Black Sea region. Similarly, destabilization in the Pontic region would influence trade corridors between Europe and the Middle East and modify the regional geopolitical balance.
The two strategic spaces are therefore linked through a system of interdependencies that is becoming increasingly evident.
Thus, the Black Sea and the Middle East can no longer be analysed separately. They form a strategic arc stretching from the Persian Gulf to Eastern Europe and connecting energy resources, trade routes and maritime chokepoints between Asia and Europe.
Within this arc unfolds today one of the most important geopolitical competitions of the 21st century: the control of energy flows, trade corridors and strategic infrastructures connecting Eurasia to the global economy.
From this perspective, the Black Sea and the Middle East appear as two segments of the same geopolitical arc linking the Persian Gulf to Eastern Europe. Control of energy routes, trade corridors and maritime chokepoints in this space becomes one of the central stakes of competition between the great powers.
At the same time, this strategic axis gains additional relevance in the context of Western efforts to develop alternative energy and trade corridors to traditional routes controlled by Russia.
In a world undergoing an accelerated process of geopolitical rebalancing, this strategic axis will play an increasingly important role in defining energy security, regional stability and the balance of power between Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East.
In this sense, the geopolitical arc between the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea is not merely a zone where regional interests intersect. It is one of the spaces where a decisive part of the balance of power in 21st-century Eurasia will be shaped.
The Kurdish Question and the Role of Ethnic Minorities in the Stability of the Iranian Regime
“State borders are drawn on maps, but the real fault lines run through societies.”
By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu
1. Iran – A Multiethnic State with Geopolitical Fracture Potential
Iran is often perceived as a relatively homogeneous state dominated by Persian identity. In reality, its ethnic composition is far more complex. Persians represent approximately 60–65% of the population, while the rest consists of numerous ethnic minorities: Azerbaijanis (≈16%), Kurds (≈10%), Lurs (≈6%), Arabs, Baluchis and Turkmen (≈2% each), along with smaller groups such as Talysh, Armenians or Assyrians.
An important strategic element is the geographical distribution: most of these minorities live in border regions, in direct contact with similar populations in neighboring states – Azerbaijan, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan or Turkmenistan.
This ethnic geography creates three strategic characteristics:
Transborder ethnic continuity
Potential external support
The possibility of territorial fragmentation in the event of a major political crisis.
For this reason, in many Western strategic analyses Iranian minorities are considered a potentially decisive factor in the event of destabilization of the regime in Tehran.
2. Minorities as a Strategic Factor in Regime-Change Scenarios
Ethnic minorities have consistently been more active in protests and anti-regime movements than the Persian majority population. Some studies estimate that approximately half of Iran’s population belongs to ethnic or linguistic minorities, and these communities have often been at the forefront of political opposition.
The Iranian regime perceives three regions as particularly sensitive areas of internal security:
Iranian Kurdistan (west)
Iranian Baluchistan (southeast)
Arab Khuzestan (southwest, an oil-producing region).
These territories combine three destabilizing elements: a distinct ethnic identity, a different religious component (many communities are Sunni), and an economic level below the national average.
Consequently, Tehran maintains a strong military and security presence in these areas, particularly through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Iran
3. The Main Minorities and Their Geopolitical Potential
Azerbaijanis
approximately 16–20% of Iran’s population
concentrated in the northwest
predominantly Shiite (like the Persians)
Although there is a strong ethnic identity, Azerbaijanis are relatively integrated into the state structure and hold important positions within the elite. For this reason, their secessionist potential is limited, even though there are cultural ties with the Republic of Azerbaijan.
However, from a strategic perspective, the Azerbaijani minority could represent the most significant systemic risk to the stability of the Iranian regime. Azerbaijanis are almost twice as numerous as the Kurds, are concentrated in a compact region in the northwest of the country, and maintain direct ethnic and cultural links with the neighboring state of Azerbaijan. In addition, Azerbaijani regions include important urban and economic centers, and a possible political mobilization in these areas could have a far deeper impact on the internal balance of the Iranian state than a peripheral insurgency in the Kurdish mountainous regions.
This strategic dimension has become even more visible in the context of recent tensions between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan. On 5 March 2026, after drones originating from Iran struck targets in the Nakhchivan region, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev described the incident as an “act of terrorism”, convened the Security Council, and demanded official explanations from Tehran. Even though Iranian authorities denied direct responsibility, the episode illustrates how rapidly relations between Iran and the neighboring Azerbaijani state can become sensitive, particularly given the presence of a large Azerbaijani population on Iranian territory.
Arabs of Khuzestan
approximately 2–3% of the population
living in the oil-producing province of Khuzestan.
Their importance is strategic because the region produces a significant share of Iran’s oil. Separatist movements exist, but they have remained fragmented.
Baluchis
approximately 2% of the population
concentrated in the southeast, on the border with Pakistan.
They are predominantly Sunni and have a history of armed confrontations with the Iranian regime. However, the region is very poor and sparsely populated, which limits their strategic impact.
The Kurdish Question – Considered the Most Serious Internal Vulnerability
Over the past century, major powers have periodically supported various Kurdish movements, yet this support has almost always been limited by the logic of strategic interests. In the logic of realpolitik, foreign policy is not an act of solidarity but an instrument of power.
General data
approximately 8–10% of Iran’s population (3–5 million people)
concentrated in the provinces of Kurdistan, Kermanshah and West Azerbaijan
predominantly Sunni in a state dominated by Shiites.
Iranian Kurds are part of the transnational Kurdish space, which includes populations in: Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran.
In total, this community exceeds 30 million people, making the Kurdish issue one of the most complex geopolitical questions in the Middle East.
The modern history of the Kurds reflects one of the most persistent constants of regional geopolitics: the support of major powers is often circumstantial, and strategic interests prevail over political solidarity. This reality is reflected perfectly in the proverb: “The Kurds have no friends but the mountains.”
5. The Political Tradition of the Kurdish Movement in Iran
The Kurdish movement in Iran has a long political tradition:
1946 – the Republic of Mahabad[1], the first modern Kurdish state, supported by the USSR
after 1979 – the Kurdish revolt against the Islamic regime
the emergence of political and paramilitary organizations.
The most important organizations are:
The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI)
PJAK (ideologically affiliated with the PKK)
These groups have bases in northern Iraq, from where they conduct political or military activities against Tehran.
6. Why the Kurds Are Considered the “Primary Vector” of Destabilization
The Kurdish issue is often considered Iran’s main internal vulnerability for several strategic reasons. First, the Kurds have a significant tradition of political and military organization, being one of the most politically active minorities in Iran. Second, the autonomous experience accumulated in the region plays an important role: the existence of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in Iraq and the consolidation of influential Kurdish entities in Syria have created a political and symbolic precedent that fuels Kurdish national aspirations.
At the same time, Kurdish-inhabited regions form a relatively continuous territorial arc from the Mediterranean Sea to western Iran, facilitating cross-border cooperation and maintaining political and military links among different Kurdish communities[2]. In addition, the Kurdish factor has repeatedly been used by different states as a geopolitical instrument in regional competitions, which has amplified its strategic relevance.
However, the Kurdish issue has not remained unresolved because it would be impossible to solve, but because no major actor is willing to bear the geopolitical cost of the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. From this perspective, the Kurdish file remains one of the most persistent and complex geopolitical issues in the Middle East.
In a potential scenario of destabilization of Iran, the Kurds could play a significant role. However, it is unlikely that they would become the decisive actor of regime change. The most realistic scenario would be one in which Kurdish movements are used rather as a peripheral pressure element, while the decisive evolution would depend on the dynamics of the political crisis within the ruling elite in Tehran.
7. The Limits of Using Minorities Against the Iranian Regime
Although ethnic minorities represent a potential vulnerability for the Iranian regime, using them as a destabilization instrument also faces important limitations. First, Iranian national identity still remains a significant factor of cohesion. Many members of minorities identify not only with their ethnic belonging but also with the Iranian state, which reduces the potential for separatist mobilization.
Second, the political and military organizations of these minorities are often fragmented and even rival among themselves, which makes it difficult to form a coherent and united opposition against the regime in Tehran.
At the same time, the Iranian state possesses effective instruments for managing such internal challenges. The security apparatus is strongly consolidated, particularly through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), supported by extensive internal security networks and strict border control.
Finally, another limiting factor is the widespread fear within Iranian society of the risk of ethnic fragmentation of the state. For a significant part of the population, the prospect of a “Yugoslav scenario”, characterized by state disintegration and internal conflicts, represents a powerful argument in favor of maintaining territorial integrity and the stability of the Iranian state.
8. Conclusions
Iran is a multiethnic state in which minorities represent approximately one third, and according to some estimates even almost half of the population. Most of these communities are concentrated in peripheral border areas, which gives them particular geopolitical relevance and creates potential pressure points on the central authorities.
Among them, the Kurds are often considered the minority with the greatest destabilizing potential, due to their relatively high level of political organization, the military experience accumulated over time, and their transborder connections with other Kurdish communities in the region.
However, from a broader strategic perspective, the Azerbaijani minority could represent an even more significant systemic risk for the stability of the Iranian state, due to its demographic size, compact territorial concentration, and ethnic links with the neighboring state of Azerbaijan.
In the event of a major crisis of the regime in Tehran, minorities could become a determining factor in the internal evolution of the Iranian state. Nevertheless, their external instrumentalization does not automatically guarantee regime change, since Iranian national identity and the sense of belonging to the state still remain important elements of internal cohesion.
Ultimately, Iran’s stability will depend less on the strength of its security apparatus than on the state’s capacity to manage the ethnic fault lines that run through its society.
Brașov, 4 March 2026
[1] The Republic of Mahabad was a short-lived Kurdish state proclaimed on 22 January 1946 in the city of Mahabad, in north-western Iran, in the context of the Soviet occupation of northern Iran following the Second World War. The state was led by the Kurdish leader Qazi Muhammad and benefited from indirect support from the Soviet Union. The republic existed only briefly and was dissolved in December 1946 after the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the restoration of control by the Iranian authorities. Its leaders were arrested, and Qazi Muhammad was executed in 1947. The Mahabad episode remains one of the main historical reference points of the Kurdish national movement and the first modern attempt to establish a Kurdish state.
[2] In the context of the escalation of the conflict in March 2026, Iran launched several missile and drone strikes against bases belonging to Iranian Kurdish organizations located in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which Tehran accused of preparing cross-border incursions. The operations targeted facilities associated in particular with groups such as the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) and Komala, including positions in the areas of Erbil, Koya and Sulaymaniyah. According to Iranian authorities, the strikes – carried out in cooperation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – were intended to destroy the bases and weapons depots of these groups.
