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Uruguayan Independence Day Celebrated in The Hague

Diplomat Magazine
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Uruguayan Independence Day Celebrated in The Hague

The Embassy of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay marked his country’s Independence Day with a grand and festive reception. Held on August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague, the event drew over 200 distinguished guests from various sectors of Dutch society.

Ambassadors, chiefs of international missions, diplomats, academics, business leaders, and representatives from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with members of the Uruguayan community, all responded to H.E. Ambassador Dr. Álvaro González Otero’s invitation to celebrate ‘Día de la Independencia’—Uruguay’s National Day, commemorating its independence from Brazil in 1825.

H.E. Dr. Álvaro González Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay. National Day 2024 The Hague.

After nearly 200 years of conflict and civil unrest under Spanish and then Brazilian rule, Uruguay has emerged as a country renowned for its welcoming people, stunning landscapes, first-class meat production, and high-quality wine. In recent decades, Uruguayans have enjoyed a stable democracy, a steady improvement in living conditions, and overall well-being.

In a packed room with an animated audience, Ambassador González Otero took the microphone to thank all the attendees for their sincere affection for his people and country. He then proudly expressed:

“Two years have quickly passed since I arrived in this lovely kingdom. Since then, we have started to shift the focus of the Embassy, placing more emphasis on our bilateral relations. The Netherlands and Uruguay have more in common than people might imagine. We share international principles, landscapes, agricultural production, developed services, qualified exports, and a progressive lifestyle.

We also share strong commitments to the well-being of our citizens and visitors, the protection of human rights, environmental sustainability, progressive social policies, and significant efforts towards renewable energy and climate action. Both countries also emphasize education, democratic governance, and active participation in international organizations promoting peace and development. So, we will keep working to boost our bilateral relations.”

Uruguay National Day, August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague.
From the Embassy of Uruguay, Counsellor Pablo Bayarres, Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Hans Akerboom, Deputy Director Protocol and Host Country Affairs from the Netherlands.

Ambassador González Otero then listed some of the most relevant initiatives undertaken by the Embassy over the last few months:

– Uruguayan participation in the World Hydrogen Summit 2024: Led by the Minister of Industry, Energy, and Mining, Ms. Elisa Facio, with over 50 representatives from various sectors of the public and private sectors.

– Active participation in the “26th World Energy Congress.”

– Cooperation Project with Delft Institute for Water Education: Since 2011, Uruguayan professionals specializing in water resources have participated in the Delft Institute program for advanced training. Initially, the program began with 40 scholarships, resulting in 37 professionals successfully completing their studies. This early success led to the program’s relocation and implementation at the Technological University of Uruguay, now featuring regional participation. The program has since had two new editions in 2022 and 2024, expanding to include 17 professionals from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. This development has transformed Uruguay into a regional hub in the field of water resource education.

– Uruguay’s status as one of the 32 signing states of the Ljubljana – The Hague Convention in February 2024.

– Positioning Uruguay as a potential living and working destination for Dutch farmers.

– Interactions with RVO and Port of Rotterdam related to port cooperation.

– Exploring and initiating new cooperation projects with Westland Municipality and Wageningen University.

– Meetings with private sector actors related to agribusiness.

– Preparation for the Capitan Miranda’s visit to Amsterdam: Uruguay’s school tall ship has already confirmed its participation in Sail Amsterdam 2025.

– Multilateral achievements: The Embassy has made progress in multilateral areas, including ongoing contributions and work with international organizations based in The Hague: the ICJ, ICC, OPCW, HCCH, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Additionally, a closer relationship with The Hague Academy of International Law has been pursued. Significant advances have also been made through the coordinated work of the GRULAC Group in relation to various international organizations.

H.E. Mr. Fernando Arias, OPCW Director General , Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Mr Arias spouse, Patricia van Oordt.

Following his remarks, Ambassador González Otero invited the audience to watch a short video about Uruguay, which made a great impression on those present. He expressed, “Uruguay is an exceptional country that has developed a dynamic and robust culture, shaped by a fascinating blend of gaucho traditions, European influences, and the unique Rioplatense spirit. Tango, folklore, candombe, and milonga are examples of its rich artistic musical expression. Uruguayan gastronomy, featuring high-quality meat, wine, and dairy products, especially the beloved ‘dulce de leche,’ delights palates and consistently wins prestigious awards worldwide.”

“The work we have done does not mean we are satisfied; we want to continue advancing in a deeper process. The bilateral relationship is already strong, but the potential to strengthen bonds in several key areas is even greater.”

The Ambassador of Uruguay, H.E. Alvaro Gonzalez Otero and the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Graciela Gatti Santana with her husband Mr Gustavo Segovia.

The event was conceived to showcase the rich and diverse culture of Uruguay, a nation with a population of approximately 3,495,527 as of 2022.

The national anthems of Uruguay and the Netherlands were performed by the Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos. After the ambassador’s speech, the Embassy paid tribute to two influential musicians: José “El Sabalero” Carbajal and Jaime Roos, who both lived in the Netherlands. Jaime Roos settled in Amsterdam in 1978, where he played bass in several salsa, rock, and jazz groups. He had a son and remained in the Netherlands until 1984 when he returned to Uruguay.

Carbajal spent his days in the Netherlands with his wife, Anke van Haastrecht, and their two children. Anke was invited to share some special stories from their life together.

Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos.
Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez.

The enthusiastic audience enjoyed an authentic performance by talented Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez. The celebration continued with Uruguayan wine, classic savory empanadas, and dulce de leche, which delighted the crowded room and completed the great celebration.

Ambassador González Otero concluded the event by thanking his Embassy team: Counselor Pablo Bayarres, Chancellor Gustavo Morales, his assistant Juan Diego, and Martha Hernández and Sofía Anastasiou. He then led a warm toast for the people of the Netherlands, Uruguay, and the necessary and desired peace in the world.

China: A New Actor in the Contemporary Multipolar World

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China: A New Actor in the Contemporary Multipolar World

By Mariarosaria Iorio, Political Analyst

I. The post-cold war world  

International relations are nowadays characterised by major changes that started at the end of the 80s with the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Indeed, the end of the cold war was marked by the dislocation of the two main political blocks, namely the Soviet Union and the Western World. Such a dislocation resulted in the marginalization of the post-war multilateral system embodied in the United Nations, and the standstill of the multilateral trade negotiations in the late 90s in the context of the World Trade Organisation.  New lines of political thought have been facing each other since then, while reshaping the post-cold war world in a number of fragmented and variable sub-blocks of countries. 

The United States decided to put itself first by concentrating on its internal affairs, while withdrawing from international affairs.  

Europe, the old continent, looks for an efficient strategy towards autonomy from the United States.  Europe also tries, not without difficulty, to create a more cohesive internal and external political approach.  The reality is however evolving rather more towards fragmentation of Europe in favour of European National fragmented interests. Such a fragmentation is the natural consequence of the decadence of the European Institutional and collective actions to the advantage of individual Sates actions and interests.   In sum, what seemed to be a structured and coherent European Union block fighting for the promotion of its economic and political values all over the world has somehow become an alliance at variable geometry both internally and externally.  The disorganisation of the leadership results in a chaotic and unpredictable European External and Internal action. 

Thereof, the empty influence spaces left on the international relations scene has given new international actors the opportunity to emerge.  

Meanwhile, the fragmentation of the European Institutions has also impacted the EU-USA relations within NATO, and affected the security and peace sphere.  Security issues have been on and off on the European agenda.    

In this context, Russia that has lost its empire in the 80s looks now for a new power game. In spite of the disruption of the Soviet Union, Russia attempts either by influence or by force to exercise power in its ancient affiliate countries.  Russia that was supposed to be defeated with the fall of the Berlin Wall takes back its role of opponent to the Western World on the international scene at least as it concerns the international affairs philosophy.  Thus, creating a tension aimed at restoring its power in the world.   

The group of emerging and developing economies that constitute a new variable block with a large portion of population employed in agriculture have emerged as new actors in the world’s geo-political discourses.  At the head of this block on the international scene, there is China.  The shaky international leadership context has indeed given China a new space. China’s   communist past combined with its market-based economic strategy gives it a particular position.  

China is The One that can communicate to Russia. China is also The One that can have an influence on the Western economic and political scene as China owns a big part of Western Foreign Debt  

China embeds a horizontal strategy in both its trade and development policies, while producing at low wages.  Its production system coupled with its pragmatic political approach has reshaped the international power structure.  The top-down approach of the Western World faces now the competition created by the horizontal win-win approach proposed by China in both developing and industrialized countries.

Indeed, as a result of the decline of the Western World global hegemony based on market access and economic and social liberalism as a means to ensure economic growth and promote economic development, the vision promoted by China’s discourse, centred on the protection of livelihoods and local sovereign choices finds new adepts.  Furthermore, China has successfully attempted to promote a trade-off approach to international cooperation during the last 20 years.  A cooperation that does not interfere in internal affairs of partner countries as it has often reproached to the Western countries involved in international cooperation.  

As the developing countries leader, China positions itself as the spoke country for the poor.  As a new world powerful economic actor China plays as the guarantor of the Western Economic stability.  China positions itself as the bridge between the rich and the poor.  It is representing a different hegemonic game that only changes in its discourse, while still pursuing its own interests and influence zones.  Such a situation poses the question of the values that the international regime wants to embrace.  Indeed, this changing world results in an increased number of conflicts – be new or historical conflicts.  

The dislocation of the traditional leaders of the international relations has definitely created a chaotic and unpredictable scenario.  Chaos has in some cases been chosen as a political strategy to disrupt the post-1945 international regime. Such a disruption has benefitted new actors, and given space to new lines of thought.  These new lines of thought have attacked the existing international framework but has not yet succeeded in creating a new regime.  The increasing unbalance of power and the lack of leadership on the international political scene is risky. 

The reduction by choice of leadership of the United States has indeed resulted in the weakening of the values emerged as a result of the dramatic experience of Second World War, namely freedom of thought and freedom of speech to mention only a few.   We are now facing a much more authoritarian world with force used as a means to manage the political arena.  Dialogue seems to be a rather consuming exercise that has left its place to the use of force.  Force is no longer seen as the last option but rather the opening act for political dialogue.  Nationalism and individual interests are now at the centre of the political game. This trend is taking the world to instability and conflict.  

The peoples of the world are more and more questioning the existing system. People’s needs and expectations are not met.  The new emerged actors, such as China have given the hope of a possible change in the present international system without fundamentally questioning its rationale but rather trying to rip a slate of the cake.  

The struggle for influence among countries has not succeeded in building a peaceful and stable world. Citizens will have to face the challenge of building a new era of peace and stability worldwide.

Derrière les murs du Palais de la Paix : permanence et changements de la Cour internationale de Justice

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Derrière les murs du Palais de la Paix : permanence et changements de la Cour internationale de Justice

S.E. M. Philippe Couvreur est arrivé à La Haye en avril 1982, où il a d’abord occupé le poste d’assistant spécial aux bureaux du greffier et du greffier adjoint de la Cour internationale de Justice.

Il a ensuite exercé les fonctions de Secrétaire, Premier Secrétaire et Secrétaire juridique principal, avant d’être élu Greffier de la Cour en 2000, et réélu en 2007 et 2014. Pour marquer l’anniversaire de ses débuts à la Cour, il y a 35 ans, Diplomat Magazine l’a invité à témoigner de son expérience unique au service de cette institution, des évolutions qu’il a pu y observer, et à partager le regard qu’il porte sur les changements qui ont marqué la Cour et La Haye au cours des trois dernières décennies.
Philippe Couvreur avec le Pape Jean-Paul II prise le 13 mai 1985.
Je suis arrivé à La Haye en avril 1982 — de façon aussi inattendue que j’avais entamé des études de droit treize ans auparavant (mais c’est là une autre histoire…) — pour occuper un poste temporaire à la Cour internationale de Justice. La Cour était alors la seule institution judiciaire internationale existante au plan universel. Son activité, particulièrement faible à la fin des années 1970, ne pouvait en ce temps-là guère laisser présager du succès que rencontrerait la Cour dans les décennies à venir. Mon bienveillant maître de Louvain, le professeur Paul de Visscher, fils du célèbre internationaliste Charles de Visscher, unique juge belge à la Cour, m’avait prédit des jours aussi sereins qu’heureux, écoulés à lire et à écrire des ouvrages dans la solitude des imposants murs de la bibliothèque du Palais de la Paix…
Les mémoires ont été dûment déposés dans l’affaire El Salvador c. Honduras dans la salle Bol le 1 juin 1988, l’affaire du Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime.
En rejoignant la Cour, un frais matin d’avril, dont je garde un souvenir très précis, le jeune juriste que j’étais découvrit, non sans étonnement, une organisation de taille très modeste, le Greffe, qui en est l’organe administratif, alors composé de moins d’une quarantaine de fonctionnaires. Le fonctionnement de la Cour reposait entièrement sur cette équipe restreinte de personnel permanent, auquel s’ajoutait, selon que de besoin, un personnel temporaire pour faire face au surcroît de travaux linguistiques et de sténodactylographie lors des sessions (publiques et privées) de la Cour. Je me rappelle avoir été frappé par la personnalité haute en couleur de certains de ces traducteurs indépendants, dont la grande culture littéraire m’émerveillait. Cette structure très économique du Greffe impliquait une grande polyvalence de ses membres, et les Secrétaires de la Cour — ses fonctionnaires supérieurs — étaient appelés, en sus de leurs travaux de recherches juridiques, de préparation des documents de la Cour, et de rédaction de la correspondance diplomatique, à assumer eux-mêmes l’essentiel des tâches linguistiques (traduction et interprétation) et d’information, ainsi que la supervision de nombreuses activités administratives et logistiques.
La Grande salle de Justice, l’affaire Relative au Timor Oriental (Portugal c. Australie) Arrêt du 30 juin 1995.
Il n’était nullement rare qu’un nouveau venu comme moi ait à passer week-ends et nuits blanches au Palais de la Paix à effectuer les travaux les plus divers… allant jusqu’à imprimer et polycopier, sur de vieilles machines à stencils ronéotype, des décisions dont la Cour devait donner la lecture en séance publique le lendemain ! Dès mon arrivée au Greffe, j’ai eu le bonheur et le privilège d’être initié et associé à l’ensemble des fonctions de l’institution sous la patiente supervision de personnalités d’exception, tels que MM. Torres Bernárdez et Pillepich, alors respectivement Greffier et Greffier adjoint. J’en ai retiré le plus grand bénéfice, puisque cette immersion sans préparation dans toutes les facettes de l’activité du Greffe m’a permis d’acquérir de ce dernier une connaissance unique — de l’intérieur — et sous tous ses aspects —, un acquis particulièrement précieux au moment où j’ai été amené, bien des années plus tard, à assumer la délicate responsabilité d’en assurer la gestion au plus haut niveau. Devenir un fonctionnaire du Greffe au début des années 1980 signifiait accepter de se couler sans discussion dans un moule à tous égards exigeant, et se donner corps et âme, avec humilité et discrétion, à l’institution, sans penser à soi ni parler de soi. Depuis ces années d’initiation, j’ai été le témoin de profondes transformations de la Cour, rendues inévitables à la fois pour répondre à l’accroissement considérable de ses activités, avec la disparition du monde bipolaire qui avait relégué le règlement judiciaire à un rôle quelque peu marginal, et pour saisir les opportunités nouvelles offertes, notamment, par le progrès des technologies et de la communication. Entre 1982 et aujourd’hui, le nombre de fonctionnaires a ainsi presque triplé (il a quasiment doublé depuis l’an 2000, année de ma première élection en tant que Greffier). L’organisation du travail a été progressivement spécialisée entre les divers départements, juridique, linguistique et chargé de l’information, qui furent créés en 1997, et les services techniques. Par ailleurs, les Membres de la Cour ne disposèrent pas, pendant longtemps, de « référendaires » — ils s’y sont d’ailleurs longtemps refusés—, et l’assistance apportée aux juges en matière judiciaire était principalement répartie entre les fonctionnaires du Département des affaires juridiques.
H.E. Philippe Couvreur avec la Reine Beatrix photo prise pendant le 50 eme anniversaire de la Cour (18-04-1996).
Les cinq premiers postes de juristes référendaires ne furent obtenus de l’Assemblée générale et créés qu’en 2002, à l’issue de difficiles négociations que je me souviens avoir menées avec beaucoup de plaisir et d’intérêt ; le nombre de ces postes s’est progressivement accru, pour s’élever à quinze aujourd’hui. Les divers développements qui ont marqué le monde au cours des dernières décennies n’ont pas manqué de soulever pour la Cour de nouveaux défis. Comme c’est le cas pour toute institution, elle n’a pu les relever en faisant table rase des enseignements de son histoire ni, à l’inverse, en ne saisissant pas toutes les opportunités offertes par le temps présent. A ces différents égards, la Cour est certainement parvenue, au fil des ans, à assurer un équilibre, toujours délicat, entre changements et continuité. La continuité de la Cour est bien sûr inscrite dans son Statut, qui fait partie intégrante de la Charte des Nations Unies, et reflétée dans ses méthodes judiciaires, qui ont été très largement élaborées par sa devancière, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, et héritées d’elle. Cette continuité historique était particulièrement présente lorsque j’ai rejoint le Greffe. Ainsi, en manière d’anecdote, divers hauts fonctionnaires alors en poste avaient eux-mêmes côtoyé, au début de leur carrière, d’anciens fonctionnaires de la Cour permanente. Tous nourrissaient à l’égard de cette dernière le plus grand respect. Il régnait d’ailleurs dans les couloirs du Palais de la Paix une atmosphère feutrée et délicieusement surannée, évocatrice de la défunte Société des Nations. Je me souviens en avoir encore utilisé maintes fournitures de bureau ! La continuité jurisprudentielle et procédurale entre les deux Cours constitue pour les Etats une garantie importante de sécurité et de prévisibilité juridiques. Cette continuité, juridique et historique, de même que l’expérience accumulée en plus de quatre-vingt-dix ans d’exercice de la fonction judiciaire, sont pour la Cour un facteur crucial de légitimité.
H.E. Philippe Couvreur vec le Roi Willem-Alexander photo prise pendant le 70 eme anniversaire de la Cour (20-04-2016).
En même temps, la Cour a eu, à l’évidence, à s’adapter aux changements du monde réel dans lequel elle opère, comme aux nécessités et opportunités nouvelles de chaque époque traversée. L’une des transformations notoires auxquelles j’ai assisté fut l’ouverture croissante de la Cour sur l’extérieur : longtemps à l’écart, à dessein, des organes politiques des Nations Unies, la Cour a souhaité se faire plus et mieux entendre de ces organes et des Etats membres. Elle a ainsi rompu avec ce qui était parfois perçu comme un « splendide isolement » au sein des Nations Unies, même si elle défend toujours jalousement son autonomie. La Cour doit en outre désormais également tenir compte des nombreuses autres juridictions, internationales ou régionales, qui ont été créées ces dernières années, et veiller, autant que possible, à assurer l’harmonie du « concert judiciaire » que permet ce foisonnement de cours et tribunaux sur la scène internationale. Davantage ouverte sur la communauté internationale et ses réalités, la Cour s’est montrée de plus en plus attentive, non seulement à sa place dans l’Organisation des Nations Unies, mais aussi à la poursuite des objectifs de celle-ci et à sa mission propre au service du règlement pacifique des différends internationaux. Des différends de plus en plus complexes, tant juridiquement que factuellement, en même temps que politiquement plus denses, lui ont été soumis. En révisant constamment, selon que de besoin, ses méthodes de travail, elle a su les résoudre rapidement et efficacement, à un coût particulièrement modeste pour la communauté internationale, tout en assurant le développement du droit. Enfin, pour conclure sur une note plus prosaïque, mais qui est loin d’être négligeable, je ne peux taire la chance que j’ai eue de connaître l’extraordinaire développement de la ville de La Haye au cours des 35 dernières années. Celle-ci offre aujourd’hui à la Cour, comme aux nombreuses institutions internationales qui s’y sont installées à sa suite, une qualité de vie et un cadre de travail uniques, qui sont très loin de ressembler à ce que j’ai trouvé en y arrivant. A l’image de l’imposante stature du Palais de la Paix où elle siège, symbole mondialement connu de la justice internationale, la Cour est une institution solidement établie. En dépit des périodes de doute ou de désaffection qu’elle a traversées par le passé, son rôle est unanimement salué au sein de la communauté internationale et le recours à ses services par les Etats n’a jamais été aussi soutenu. 35 ans après, je continue de mesurer chaque jour le privilège qui est le mien de servir au mieux de mes capacités l’organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies. —– Les photos dans l’article sont une courtoisie de la Cour International de Justice.

Montenegro, the Netherlands, and the Next Chapter of European Integration

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Montenegro, the Netherlands, and the Next Chapter of European Integration

By H.E. Mr. Milisav Raspopovic, Ambassador of Montenegro

Upon my arrival in the Netherlands, I often heard an interesting observation when speaking with local residents. Whenever Montenegro was mentioned, someone would inevitably smile and remark that Montenegrins, together with the Dutch, are among the tallest people in the world.

“We are a modest nation,” I would usually reply. “We would gladly accept slightly lesser proportions if it meant standing alongside you as the tallest members of the European Union.”

Behind this friendly exchange lies a sincere national aspiration. Full membership in the European Union remains the cornerstone of Montenegro’s foreign policy. Guided by this strategic objective, Montenegro made the decision to establish, for the first time, a resident Embassy in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, thereby strengthening its presence in a country with which we share both friendly bilateral relations and allied ties within NATO.

The opening of the Embassy of Montenegro in The Hague therefore represents far more than a diplomatic formality. It is a clear signal of our determination to deepen cooperation with a country that strongly supported Montenegro’s accession to NATO and that continues to play an important role in maintaining political momentum for European integration.

The Dutch approach to EU enlargement is well known and widely respected. It rests on the principles of individual merit, measurable progress and full respect for the Copenhagen criteria, with particular emphasis on reforms in the rule of law. The message from The Hague has always been consistent: the process must remain strict but fair, guided by standards rather than shortcuts or exceptions.

For Montenegro, which today stands as the frontrunner among EU candidate countries, such an approach is not an obstacle but an additional motivation. The year 2026 carries particular symbolism for us. It is a year in which we continue to intensify our dialogue with Dutch institutions, members of parliament and the broader public, explaining why Montenegro is determined to conclude the technical phase of accession negotiations and move decisively toward our strategic objective: becoming, symbolically, the 28th member state of the European Union by 2028.

This year is also significant for another reason. Montenegro marks twenty years since the restoration of its independence and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It is an anniversary that invites reflection, but also confidence in the future. As a reliable NATO ally, fully aligned with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, Montenegro contributes to stability in a region that remains strategically important for Europe. At the same time, our size and population mean that our accession would represent not a burden but an added value for the Union.

Our commitment will also be reflected through an active international role in the coming period. Later this year Montenegro will host the EU–Western Balkans Summit and is currently chairing the Berlin Process, providing an opportunity to further promote regional cooperation, stability and development guided by European values. Toward the end of the year, Montenegro will also assume the Presidency of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, further demonstrating our readiness to contribute actively to strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law and human rights across the European continent.

Although Montenegro views its European path as a one-way road, we are fully aware that EU accession is not a unilateral journey. It is a partnership. As we approach what we hope will be the final phase of negotiations, the continued support and engagement of our friends in the Netherlands will be particularly valuable.

For that reason, we expect the coming period to be dynamic in bilateral terms as well. Beyond the anniversaries we celebrate this year, we hope to see intensified political dialogue, more frequent high-level visits and a stronger presence of Dutch experts and credible investors in Montenegro. Such engagement would send an important signal that Montenegro is approaching the final stretch of its European journey, while also reminding the wider region that progress toward the European Union remains both possible and achievable.

From time to time one hears that Montenegro is moving rapidly toward the European Union. I would suggest that our journey has been less about speed and more about direction. For over a decade we have patiently and consistently aligned our institutions and legislation with European standards. In our view, sustainable European integration is achieved not through shortcuts but through steady reforms, and this is the path Montenegro has chosen to follow.

Finally, it is impossible to speak about diplomacy in the Netherlands without acknowledging the unique role of The Hague, widely regarded as the legal capital of the world and a city with a remarkable multilateral dimension. At a time when the international order is facing increasing pressure and global tensions continue to rise, it is both a privilege and a responsibility to work in such an environment alongside colleagues from the diplomatic corps and representatives of numerous international organisations. Together, we share the responsibility of safeguarding a rules-based international order, effective multilateralism, and promoting a world founded on universal values, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as sovereignty and territorial integrity.

From the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea: The New Geopolitical Arc of the 21st Century

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From the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea: The New Geopolitical Arc of the 21st Century

Energy, geography and great-power competition in the formation of a new strategic axis between the Middle East and Eastern Europe

“Who controls the Rimland[1] dominates Eurasia;
who dominates Eurasia influences the destiny of the world.”
— Nicholas Spykman

By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu

Two seemingly separate strategic theatres

In contemporary geopolitics, the lines of separation between major strategic theatres are becoming increasingly blurred. Spaces once considered distinct are beginning to function as elements of the same system of geopolitical interdependencies, in which energy routes, trade corridors and maritime chokepoints connect distant regions into a single strategic arc.

In this context, the Black Sea and the Middle East can no longer be viewed as two separate geopolitical spaces. While in traditional analysis the Black Sea was considered a frontier zone between Europe and the Eurasian space, and the Middle East an epicentre of energy politics and regional conflicts, developments over the past decade show that this conceptual separation is becoming increasingly irrelevant.

The two regions now appear as segments of the same strategic space linking the Persian Gulf to Eastern Europe. This geopolitical interdependence between the Middle East and the Pontic region has also been emphasized by other analysts, who describe this space as a zone of compression between the major maritime and continental geopolitical systems.

Within this geopolitical arc intersect the interests of great powers, energy flows and trade routes between Asia and Europe. Understanding this interconnection becomes essential for analysing geopolitical transformations in Eurasia and for assessing the new balances of power that are emerging in the 21st century.

The geography of energy and trade routes

This interconnection begins, above all, with geography. The Black Sea represents the gateway between Europe and the energy space of the Middle East and the Caspian basin. At the centre of this connection lies the system of the Turkish Straits — the Bosporus and the Dardanelles — the only maritime link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, which makes control of this passage a geopolitical factor of global importance.

The legal regime of these straits is established by the Montreux Convention of 1936, which grants Turkey control over naval transit and provides Ankara with an essential strategic role in the military balance of the region.

The system of the Turkish Straits, the energy corridors crossing Anatolia and the Caucasus, as well as the transport infrastructure linking Asia to Europe create a strategic continuity between the two regions.

Within this system of interconnections, the Caucasus region plays the role of an intermediate strategic node through which the energy resources of the Caspian basin and the Middle East are connected to European transport infrastructures and markets.

The importance of this strategic arc has increased significantly in recent years, particularly in the context of European efforts to diversify energy and trade routes following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

The military interdependence of the two fronts

The military dimension reinforces this interdependence. The war in Ukraine has transformed the Black Sea into a major strategic theatre of confrontation between Russia and the West. At the same time, recurring tensions in the Middle East continue to influence global energy stability and the security of maritime routes.

The two fronts do not evolve in isolation. In practice, they simultaneously affect Europe’s security: the Black Sea directly influences the European security architecture, while the Middle East affects the continent’s energy flows and economic stability. From this perspective, Europe’s security increasingly depends on developments in both regions.

Pivot actors of the extended geopolitical space

Turkey plays a central role in this interconnection. Control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles gives Ankara a unique strategic position, as these maritime passages represent the only link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

At the same time, Turkey is involved militarily and politically both in the Pontic space and in the Middle East. Its presence in Syria and Iraq, its involvement in Libya, as well as its role in the strategic balance of the Black Sea transform Ankara into a geopolitical pivot between Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East. This position allows it to influence developments in both strategic theatres simultaneously.

In the context of a possible major destabilization of Iran, Turkey faces a complex strategic dilemma determined primarily by geographical proximity and by the experience accumulated over the past decade in managing regional crises. The lessons of the Syrian conflict have shown Ankara that the collapse of state order in a neighbouring country inevitably generates massive migration pressures, security risks and internal economic instability.

Consequently, Turkey’s security doctrine has increasingly shifted toward the concept of forward security, according to which threats must be managed as close as possible to their point of origin, even beyond national borders.

Within this doctrinal framework, the Turkish military has developed contingency plans in recent years for scenarios of regional destabilization, including the hypothesis of a partial collapse of the Iranian state. Such a situation could generate massive population movements toward the Turkish border and could create power vacuums in frontier regions.

From Ankara’s perspective, the main objective in such a scenario would not be the occupation of Iranian territory but the creation of limited buffer zones designed to manage refugee flows and prevent the spread of chaos toward Turkish territory.

Another sensitive element concerns the ethnic dimension of the region. In north-western Iran lives a large community of ethnic Azeris, estimated at approximately 15–20 million people, concentrated mainly in the province of Iranian Azerbaijan, with its centre in Tabriz.

The cultural and linguistic ties between these communities and Azerbaijan, as well as the increasingly close political relations between Ankara and Baku, give this region a particular geopolitical relevance. In the event of a major destabilization of Iran, the north-west of the country could become a space of strategic competition between several regional powers, and Turkey would inevitably be involved in the security dynamics of the area.

In recent years, Ankara has significantly strengthened the security infrastructure along its border with Iran, including through the construction of an extensive system of physical barriers, surveillance systems and aerial monitoring capabilities based on drones. These measures reflect Turkey’s constant concern regarding the risks generated by regional instability and demonstrate that the Turkish state is preparing flexible options for potential crisis situations.

Overall, the scenarios discussed in analytical circles regarding possible Turkish involvement in north-western Iran should be understood more in the logic of preventive planning than as indications of expansionist intentions. Ankara’s strategic priority remains maintaining stability at its own borders and preventing Turkey from becoming a space for absorbing crises generated by conflicts in its immediate neighbourhood.

However, the geopolitical implications of a possible destabilization of Iran go far beyond the strictly defensive dimension of this planning. From a broader perspective, the region of Iranian Azerbaijan, centered arround Tabriz, represents one of the sensitive links of the geopolitical space connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Middle East.

In the event of destabilization in Iran, this area could become a point of convergence for the interests of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Russia and other regional actors. For this reason, developments in north-western Iran should be monitored not only as a regional security issue but also as a possible indicator of a reconfiguration of the strategic balance in a key region of Eurasia.

From this perspective, developments in Iranian Azerbaijan should not be viewed merely as a local security issue but as part of a broader geopolitical dynamic involving relations between the Turkic world, the Caucasian space and the Middle East.

In recent years, the consolidation of the strategic relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as regional connectivity and energy projects, has amplified the importance of this region within the geopolitical architecture of the Eurasian space.

Global competition within the strategic arc

Beyond the regional dimension, there is also a global competition unfolding in this space. The United States, Russia and China are simultaneously present both in the Middle East and in the extended Black Sea region.

For Washington, the stability of the Middle East and the security of the Black Sea are part of the same strategic system influencing European security and the control of energy routes.

For Russia, control of the Black Sea provides access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, strengthening its power projection in the southern space of Eurasia.

For China, the stability of these routes is essential for energy security and for the functioning of Eurasian trade corridors.

An emerging strategic arc between the Persian Gulf and Eastern Europe

In this context, developments in one strategic theatre tend to produce direct effects in the other. A major escalation in the Middle East could affect European energy security and increase the importance of routes in the Black Sea region. Similarly, destabilization in the Pontic region would influence trade corridors between Europe and the Middle East and modify the regional geopolitical balance.

The two strategic spaces are therefore linked through a system of interdependencies that is becoming increasingly evident.

Thus, the Black Sea and the Middle East can no longer be analysed separately. They form a strategic arc stretching from the Persian Gulf to Eastern Europe and connecting energy resources, trade routes and maritime chokepoints between Asia and Europe.

Within this arc unfolds today one of the most important geopolitical competitions of the 21st century: the control of energy flows, trade corridors and strategic infrastructures connecting Eurasia to the global economy.

From this perspective, the Black Sea and the Middle East appear as two segments of the same geopolitical arc linking the Persian Gulf to Eastern Europe. Control of energy routes, trade corridors and maritime chokepoints in this space becomes one of the central stakes of competition between the great powers.

At the same time, this strategic axis gains additional relevance in the context of Western efforts to develop alternative energy and trade corridors to traditional routes controlled by Russia.

In a world undergoing an accelerated process of geopolitical rebalancing, this strategic axis will play an increasingly important role in defining energy security, regional stability and the balance of power between Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East.

In this sense, the geopolitical arc between the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea is not merely a zone where regional interests intersect. It is one of the spaces where a decisive part of the balance of power in 21st-century Eurasia will be shaped.

Iran’s Multiethnic Structure and Its Geopolitical Fault Lines

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Iran’s Multiethnic Structure and Its Geopolitical Fault Lines

The Kurdish Question and the Role of Ethnic Minorities in the Stability of the Iranian Regime

“State borders are drawn on maps, but the real fault lines run through societies.”

By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu

1. Iran – A Multiethnic State with Geopolitical Fracture Potential

Iran is often perceived as a relatively homogeneous state dominated by Persian identity. In reality, its ethnic composition is far more complex. Persians represent approximately 60–65% of the population, while the rest consists of numerous ethnic minorities: Azerbaijanis (≈16%), Kurds (≈10%), Lurs (≈6%), Arabs, Baluchis and Turkmen (≈2% each), along with smaller groups such as Talysh, Armenians or Assyrians.

An important strategic element is the geographical distribution: most of these minorities live in border regions, in direct contact with similar populations in neighboring states – Azerbaijan, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan or Turkmenistan.

This ethnic geography creates three strategic characteristics:

  • Transborder ethnic continuity
  • Potential external support
  • The possibility of territorial fragmentation in the event of a major political crisis.

For this reason, in many Western strategic analyses Iranian minorities are considered a potentially decisive factor in the event of destabilization of the regime in Tehran.

2. Minorities as a Strategic Factor in Regime-Change Scenarios

Ethnic minorities have consistently been more active in protests and anti-regime movements than the Persian majority population. Some studies estimate that approximately half of Iran’s population belongs to ethnic or linguistic minorities, and these communities have often been at the forefront of political opposition.

The Iranian regime perceives three regions as particularly sensitive areas of internal security:

  • Iranian Kurdistan (west)
  • Iranian Baluchistan (southeast)
  • Arab Khuzestan (southwest, an oil-producing region).

These territories combine three destabilizing elements: a distinct ethnic identity, a different religious component (many communities are Sunni), and an economic level below the national average.

Consequently, Tehran maintains a strong military and security presence in these areas, particularly through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iran

3. The Main Minorities and Their Geopolitical Potential

Azerbaijanis

  • approximately 16–20% of Iran’s population
  • concentrated in the northwest
  • predominantly Shiite (like the Persians)

Although there is a strong ethnic identity, Azerbaijanis are relatively integrated into the state structure and hold important positions within the elite. For this reason, their secessionist potential is limited, even though there are cultural ties with the Republic of Azerbaijan.

However, from a strategic perspective, the Azerbaijani minority could represent the most significant systemic risk to the stability of the Iranian regime. Azerbaijanis are almost twice as numerous as the Kurds, are concentrated in a compact region in the northwest of the country, and maintain direct ethnic and cultural links with the neighboring state of Azerbaijan. In addition, Azerbaijani regions include important urban and economic centers, and a possible political mobilization in these areas could have a far deeper impact on the internal balance of the Iranian state than a peripheral insurgency in the Kurdish mountainous regions.

This strategic dimension has become even more visible in the context of recent tensions between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan. On 5 March 2026, after drones originating from Iran struck targets in the Nakhchivan region, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev described the incident as an “act of terrorism”, convened the Security Council, and demanded official explanations from Tehran. Even though Iranian authorities denied direct responsibility, the episode illustrates how rapidly relations between Iran and the neighboring Azerbaijani state can become sensitive, particularly given the presence of a large Azerbaijani population on Iranian territory.

Arabs of Khuzestan

  • approximately 2–3% of the population
  • living in the oil-producing province of Khuzestan.

Their importance is strategic because the region produces a significant share of Iran’s oil. Separatist movements exist, but they have remained fragmented.

Baluchis

  • approximately 2% of the population
  • concentrated in the southeast, on the border with Pakistan.

They are predominantly Sunni and have a history of armed confrontations with the Iranian regime. However, the region is very poor and sparsely populated, which limits their strategic impact.

The Kurdish Question – Considered the Most Serious Internal Vulnerability

Over the past century, major powers have periodically supported various Kurdish movements, yet this support has almost always been limited by the logic of strategic interests. In the logic of realpolitik, foreign policy is not an act of solidarity but an instrument of power.

General data

  • approximately 8–10% of Iran’s population (3–5 million people)
  • concentrated in the provinces of Kurdistan, Kermanshah and West Azerbaijan
  • predominantly Sunni in a state dominated by Shiites.

Iranian Kurds are part of the transnational Kurdish space, which includes populations in: Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran.

In total, this community exceeds 30 million people, making the Kurdish issue one of the most complex geopolitical questions in the Middle East.

The modern history of the Kurds reflects one of the most persistent constants of regional geopolitics: the support of major powers is often circumstantial, and strategic interests prevail over political solidarity. This reality is reflected perfectly in the proverb: “The Kurds have no friends but the mountains.”

5. The Political Tradition of the Kurdish Movement in Iran

The Kurdish movement in Iran has a long political tradition:

  • 1946 – the Republic of Mahabad[1], the first modern Kurdish state, supported by the USSR
  • after 1979 – the Kurdish revolt against the Islamic regime
  • the emergence of political and paramilitary organizations.

The most important organizations are:

  • The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI)
  • PJAK (ideologically affiliated with the PKK)

These groups have bases in northern Iraq, from where they conduct political or military activities against Tehran.

6. Why the Kurds Are Considered the “Primary Vector” of Destabilization

The Kurdish issue is often considered Iran’s main internal vulnerability for several strategic reasons. First, the Kurds have a significant tradition of political and military organization, being one of the most politically active minorities in Iran. Second, the autonomous experience accumulated in the region plays an important role: the existence of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in Iraq and the consolidation of influential Kurdish entities in Syria have created a political and symbolic precedent that fuels Kurdish national aspirations.

At the same time, Kurdish-inhabited regions form a relatively continuous territorial arc from the Mediterranean Sea to western Iran, facilitating cross-border cooperation and maintaining political and military links among different Kurdish communities[2]. In addition, the Kurdish factor has repeatedly been used by different states as a geopolitical instrument in regional competitions, which has amplified its strategic relevance.

However, the Kurdish issue has not remained unresolved because it would be impossible to solve, but because no major actor is willing to bear the geopolitical cost of the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. From this perspective, the Kurdish file remains one of the most persistent and complex geopolitical issues in the Middle East.

In a potential scenario of destabilization of Iran, the Kurds could play a significant role. However, it is unlikely that they would become the decisive actor of regime change. The most realistic scenario would be one in which Kurdish movements are used rather as a peripheral pressure element, while the decisive evolution would depend on the dynamics of the political crisis within the ruling elite in Tehran.

7. The Limits of Using Minorities Against the Iranian Regime

Although ethnic minorities represent a potential vulnerability for the Iranian regime, using them as a destabilization instrument also faces important limitations. First, Iranian national identity still remains a significant factor of cohesion. Many members of minorities identify not only with their ethnic belonging but also with the Iranian state, which reduces the potential for separatist mobilization.

Second, the political and military organizations of these minorities are often fragmented and even rival among themselves, which makes it difficult to form a coherent and united opposition against the regime in Tehran.

At the same time, the Iranian state possesses effective instruments for managing such internal challenges. The security apparatus is strongly consolidated, particularly through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), supported by extensive internal security networks and strict border control.

Finally, another limiting factor is the widespread fear within Iranian society of the risk of ethnic fragmentation of the state. For a significant part of the population, the prospect of a “Yugoslav scenario”, characterized by state disintegration and internal conflicts, represents a powerful argument in favor of maintaining territorial integrity and the stability of the Iranian state.

8. Conclusions

Iran is a multiethnic state in which minorities represent approximately one third, and according to some estimates even almost half of the population. Most of these communities are concentrated in peripheral border areas, which gives them particular geopolitical relevance and creates potential pressure points on the central authorities.

Among them, the Kurds are often considered the minority with the greatest destabilizing potential, due to their relatively high level of political organization, the military experience accumulated over time, and their transborder connections with other Kurdish communities in the region.

However, from a broader strategic perspective, the Azerbaijani minority could represent an even more significant systemic risk for the stability of the Iranian state, due to its demographic size, compact territorial concentration, and ethnic links with the neighboring state of Azerbaijan.

In the event of a major crisis of the regime in Tehran, minorities could become a determining factor in the internal evolution of the Iranian state. Nevertheless, their external instrumentalization does not automatically guarantee regime change, since Iranian national identity and the sense of belonging to the state still remain important elements of internal cohesion.

Ultimately, Iran’s stability will depend less on the strength of its security apparatus than on the state’s capacity to manage the ethnic fault lines that run through its society.

Brașov, 4 March 2026

[1] The Republic of Mahabad was a short-lived Kurdish state proclaimed on 22 January 1946 in the city of Mahabad, in north-western Iran, in the context of the Soviet occupation of northern Iran following the Second World War. The state was led by the Kurdish leader Qazi Muhammad and benefited from indirect support from the Soviet Union. The republic existed only briefly and was dissolved in December 1946 after the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the restoration of control by the Iranian authorities. Its leaders were arrested, and Qazi Muhammad was executed in 1947. The Mahabad episode remains one of the main historical reference points of the Kurdish national movement and the first modern attempt to establish a Kurdish state.

[2] In the context of the escalation of the conflict in March 2026, Iran launched several missile and drone strikes against bases belonging to Iranian Kurdish organizations located in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which Tehran accused of preparing cross-border incursions. The operations targeted facilities associated in particular with groups such as the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) and Komala, including positions in the areas of Erbil, Koya and Sulaymaniyah. According to Iranian authorities, the strikes – carried out in cooperation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – were intended to destroy the bases and weapons depots of these groups.

German-Nordic Defence Industry Dialogue

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German-Nordic Defence Industry Dialogue

23 February-25 February 2026, Nürnberg, Free State of Bavaria, Germany: Enforce Tac, Europe’s leading trade fair for law enforcement, defence, tactical equipment and internal security technologies hosted a “German-Nordic Defense Industry Dialogue” featuring the participation from the ambassadors from the Nordic and Baltic regions accredited to Germany. ‘

During the panel the heads of mission of Sweden, Veronika Wand-Danielsson and Finland, Kai Jürgen Sauer, touched on current issues such as the development of an innovative defense tech ecosystem in Europe, that is, scaling up production and delivery capacities. Panelists agreed that the European defence industrial mindset needs to adapt to “wartime readiness”, further to high tech military capabilities. The societal resilience was highlighted as an equally important deterrence as well as a good and resilient understanding among neighbours and strategic allies.

Ambassador Wand-Danielsson and CIO of Diehl Defence, Helmut Rauch

Enforce Tac in Nuremberg is a highly specialized trade fair aimed at professionals from security agencies and the armed forces.

Since its inception in 2012, it has become an essential industry meeting place, renowned for its discreet atmosphere and the high quality of its exhibits and presentations.

The fair is organized by NürnbergMesse GmbH, one of Germany’s leading trade fair organizers, whose extensive expertise and professionalism provide the ideal framework for this event.

For further information

Enforce Tac: https://www.enforcetac.com/en/_site_enfor

Pictures courtesy of the Swedish Embassy in Germany 

9th EU–Turkmenistan Inter-Parliamentary meeting held in Brussels

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9th EU–Turkmenistan Inter-Parliamentary meeting held in Brussels

Thursday, 5 March 2026, European Parliament, Brussels: The European Parliament hosted the 9th Inter-Parliamentary Meeting between the European Union and Turkmenistan. During the meeting, the parties discussed current issues of political and economic cooperation, the regional agenda of Central Asia, the international situation, as well as matters related to the rule of law and social policy.

The Turkmen delegation consisted of members of the Mejlis of Turkmenistan and was headed by Mr. Maksat Kulyyev, Chairman of the Committee of the Mejlis of Turkmenistan on International and Inter-Parliamentary Relations. On the side of the European Parliament, the meeting was chaired by Member of the European Parliament Ms. Giuseppina Princi, Head of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with Central Asian countries (DCAS).

Images courtesy of the Embassy of Turkmenistan to the European Union 

Opening the meeting, participants emphasized the importance of regular inter-parliamentary contacts as an effective instrument for strengthening trust and mutual understanding.

During the exchange of views on the state of bilateral cooperation and the international agenda, Members of the European Parliament noted the growing importance of cooperation between the European Union and Central Asia amid ongoing international tensions. At the same time, interest was expressed in expanding the scope of partnership, including economic and energy cooperation, as well as in developing ties in education and scientific programmes.

The Turkmen side highlighted the initiatives and national priorities being implemented in the areas of sustainable development, energy, environmental protection, and the expansion of renewable energy sources. Particular attention was also given to the importance of transport connectivity and to Turkmenistan’s geostrategic role in the development of international transit and logistics routes, including the potential of the Turkmenbashi International Seaport as an important hub within regional transport corridors.

In the context of discussions on regional policy in Central Asia, attention was given to issues of stability and the development of regional connectivity. It was noted that the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan is regarded as an important contribution to strengthening peace and security and serves as a foundation for expanding the humanitarian dimension and cooperation on regional projects, including those related to Afghanistan.

9th EU-Turkmenistan Inter Parliamentary meeting

Within the agenda item devoted to the humanitarian dimension and social issues, the European side underlined the importance of continuing the relevant dialogue and exchanging best practices.

The participants positively assessed the substantive and constructive nature of the exchange of views and reaffirmed their intention to continue inter-parliamentary cooperation. In this regard, an agreement was reached to hold the next meeting at the beginning of next year in Ashgabat.

For further information 

Embassy of Turkmenistan to the European Union: https://belgium.tmembassy.gov.tm/en/news/158562 

Images courtesy of the Embassy of Turkmenistan to the European Union 

Team France in Germany coordinates work with French Ambassador Delattre

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Team France in Germany coordinates work with French Ambassador Delattre

An enriching exchange took place at the French Embassy in Germany, bringing together key stakeholders for a wide-ranging discussion with French Ambassador François Delattre on Franco-German relations in the current geopolitical context and the state of the German economy.

The meeting was held against a backdrop defined by pressing challenges such the ongoing war in Ukraine; the economic stakes facing Europe in its relations with China and the United States; as well as the growing frequency of attacks on the foundations of democratic systems.

Against this complex backdrop, participants converged on a clear conclusion, namely, that European, collective responses to these challenges are not only desirable, they are necessary. The Franco-German relationship remains a cornerstone of European cohesion, and strengthening this relationship at the level of citizens, businesses and states is a shared and deeply felt motivation among all actors of Team France in Germany.

Team France in Germany brings together the best public and private sector solutions to facilitate and accelerate international business development. Its network in Germany comprises:

·        State services: the Embassy, the Regional Economic Service in Berlin, and the Consulates

·        Business France (Business France Deutschland)

·        Foreign Trade Advisors (Conseillers du Commerce Extérieur)

·        French Tech communities: French Tech Berlin, French Tech Munich, French Tech Düsseldorf

·        Franco-German business clubs: Deutsch Französischer Wirtschaftskreis (DFWK); Deutsch-Französischer Wirtschaftsclub in Bayern; Club d’Affaires franco-allemand du Bade-Wurtemberg; Club des Affaires Saar-Lorraine; Club des Affaires NRW; Club des Affaires de la Hesse e.V.; Club des affaires Saxe/Saxe-Anhalt/Thuringe; Club d’affaires franco-allemand du Bade-Wurtemberg e.V.; CAFA Hamburg

·        Chamber of Commerce: The French Chamber of Commerce in Germany (CCI France Allemagne / CCFA e.V.)

·        Strategic partners in Germany: Qivive Avocats & Rechtsanwälte, Forvis Mazars in Germany, LPA Law, DWF, Pramex International, vif Management, ALTIOS International, Emploi Allemagne.

For further information

French Embassy in Germany: https://de.ambafrance.org                          

Rwanda: Where International Women’s Day Means More

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Rwanda: Where International Women’s Day Means More

International Women’s Day means more when it stays close to visible results. In Rwanda, women lead in sectors that move goods, attract visitors and help firms grow. Their work appears in exports, aviation, banking, tourism, technology, diplomacy and fashion. As a result, their leadership shapes daily economic life in practical ways. These are not symbolic roles. Instead, these women make decisions, run systems and open routes to market.

Export leadership in motion

Angel Uwantege of Bahage Foods offers a clear example. In October 2024, Bahage Foods reportedly shipped a full container of Hass avocados weighing 22 tonnes. According to the source, it was the first Rwandan woman-led business to export a full container of avocados. That result points to careful planning, quality control, buyer trust and strong execution. In other words, export growth rarely arrives with noise. More often, it moves through deadlines, standards and logistics that hold together under pressure.

Tourism, routes and access

Meanwhile, other women shape Rwanda’s growth story in equally practical ways. Bonita Mutoni (Uber Luxe Safaris) reflects a tourism model built on experience design, premium travel and strong storytelling. As such, her work points to a tourism offer that goes beyond sightseeing alone. At the same time, Yvonne Manzi Makolo, as CEO of RwandAir, helps shape how visitors and business travellers enter and leave Rwanda. Routes, partnerships and passenger experience all affect tourism flows and trade ties. Therefore, connectivity does not simply support growth. It actively helps create it.

Finance and export credibility

Likewise, Dr. Diane Karusisi leads Bank of Kigali from a position that can influence business growth in direct ways. Her role connects to lending priorities, product design and the ability of entrepreneurs to formalize and scale. In coffee, Epiphanie Mukashyaka of Bufcoffee shows what export credibility requires over time. She represents consistency, traceability and long-term relationships with producers and buyers. Together, these elements help products travel well and compete in demanding markets.

Brand, policy and digital reach

Beyond those sectors, Sonia Mugabo adds another dimension through fashion and brand-building. As founder and CEO of her label, she connects contemporary Rwandan identity with local craftsmanship. Similarly, Irene Murerwa, appointed Chief Tourism Officer at RDB in late September 2024, brings cross-sector leadership to tourism management. Clare Akamanzi also links public leadership with private-sector reach through her move from RDB to NBA Africa. In addition, Louise Mushikiwabo brings diplomatic influence through international leadership. Finally, Clarisse Iribagiza adds a digital enterprise lens through HeHe Limited and recognition in UNCTAD’s eTrade for Women network.

A wider growth story

Taken together, these women show how Rwanda’s economic story takes shape in real work. They finance, connect, design, negotiate and build. Consequently, their leadership gives that story both structure and momentum.

Cyprus contribution to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims

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Cyprus contribution to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims

The Republic of Cyprus, a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) since 2002, has made a voluntary contribution of EUR 25,000 to the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV), reaffirming its commitment to international justice and the rights of victims of crimes under the Rome Statute.  This amount has been marked by the Republic of Cyprus as an unrestricted contribution and will be used to redress the harm suffered by victims. 

H.E. Kevin Kelly, Member of the Board of Directors of the TFV stated, “On behalf of the Board of Directors, I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to the Republic of Cyprus for its voluntary contribution to the Trust Fund for Victims. Cyprus has displayed remarkable commitment to the TFV’s cause, consistently donating to the Fund annually since 2017. This new donation sends an important signal of support in these challenging times and will be instrumental in ensuring that victims of heinous crimes are afforded redress and have a chance at healing and rebuilding their lives.” 

H.E. Spyros Attas, Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus to the Kingdom of The Netherlands stated, “The Republic of Cyprus reaffirms its steadfast support for the ICC Trust Fund for Victims through a continued voluntary contribution, acknowledging the Fund’s very important and impactful work.” 

Cyprus has been providing regular support to the TFV through voluntary contributions each year since 2017, with its total voluntary contributions amounting to over EUR 150,000. 

Israeli Candidate Elected President of Key Body of the Hague Conference on Private International Law

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Israeli Candidate Elected President of Key Body of the Hague Conference on Private International Law

Israeli candidate Yael Weiner has been elected Chair of the Council on General Affairs and Policy (CGAP) of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) on Thursday, March 5. This marks the first time that an Israeli representative will lead this important governing body of the organization.

Weiner was elected by a large majority of the HCCH’s Member States, following a multi-month diplomatic process led by the Israeli Embassy in The Hague in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Justice.

During the meeting, a small group of countries—including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Malaysia, and Spain—proposed postponing the vote. A large majority of Member States rejected this proposal, after which the election proceeded by secret ballot, resulting in clear support for Weiner.

Weiner currently serves as Vice-Chair of the CGAP and has been closely involved in the organization’s work for many years. She was the sole candidate for the position and is widely regarded within the organization as a highly experienced expert in international legal cooperation.

Founded in 1893, the Hague Conference on Private International Law today counts around 90 Member States. The organization develops international legal frameworks that facilitate cooperation between countries on cross-border legal matters, including international family law cases and other forms of judicial and administrative assistance.

The Council on General Affairs and Policy serves as the principal governing body of the HCCH, overseeing the organization’s activities and determining its strategic direction and work programme.

Weiner’s election reflects the confidence of Member States in her leadership, solid knowledge, and extensive experience, as well as her long-standing commitment to the work of the HCCH.

Seized Phones in Swedish Town Uncover Global Drug Trafficking Network

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Seized Phones in Swedish Town Uncover Global Drug Trafficking Network

The Hague, 6 March 2026

A global drug trafficking network has been dismantled following coordinated actions by authorities worldwide, supported by Eurojust and Europol. The operation resulted in the arrest of 15 suspects and began after Swedish investigators seized two mobile phones in a small town.

Forensic analysis of the devices revealed international contacts and communications used to coordinate criminal activities far beyond Sweden. The data exposed a sophisticated network involved in large-scale drug trafficking and money laundering, linking several criminal groups operating through a web of companies across multiple countries.

Investigators determined that members of the network in Thailand ran an online drug distribution operation targeting customers in the Nordic region. In Sweden, associates managed domestic distribution and laundered criminal profits, while in Spain a high-value target facilitated large-scale drug trafficking.

Following the discovery, Eurojust brought together judicial authorities from several countries to exchange information and coordinate strategic action. Early results included the seizure by German authorities of 1.2 tonnes of synthetic drugs destined for the Australian market. Two distributors waiting for the shipment were subsequently identified and arrested in Australia.

Once the key actors within the network were identified, authorities prepared a coordinated international operation. On 4 March, approximately 20 searches were carried out in Spain, Sweden and Thailand, leading to the arrest of 13 suspects. Investigators seized phones, documents and other evidence, which are now being further analysed.

Judicial cooperation through Eurojust began in early 2025 after the Swedish Prosecution Authority identified the need for international coordination. Meetings held at Eurojust in The Hague brought together authorities from Sweden, Germany, Spain and Australia to exchange intelligence and plan strategic actions. Eurojust also facilitated the preparation and execution of European Investigation Orders, European Arrest Warrants and freezing orders across multiple jurisdictions.

Europol provided extensive operational support throughout the investigation, including advanced analytical assistance, cryptocurrency analysis, intelligence reporting and funding for cross-border investigative activities.

Commenting on the operation, Senior Public Prosecutor Tove Kullberg of Sweden stated: “The support from Eurojust during the action day made things run smoothly. I found the support from Eurojust invaluable.”

Authorities involved:

Sweden: Swedish Prosecution Authority – National Unit Against Organised Crime; Swedish Economic Crime Authority; Swedish Police.

Spain: Central Investigative Court No. 4; Anti-Drug Prosecutor’s Office; Guardia Civil – UCO Málaga and Balearic Islands; Judicial Police Unit of Catalonia.

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