Alliances that survive are not the most comfortable ones, but those that adapt

By Corneliu Pivariu

I personally experienced, during my full professional activity, the post–Cold War period in which NATO adapted to new conditions and in which numerous theories circulated claiming that the North Atlantic Alliance had become obsolete and was on the path to disappearance. Then, as now—although today’s geopolitical conditions are far more complex—I expressed the view that the Organization possesses the capacity and resources to adapt to concrete realities and to maintain its relevance.

The advance signals of the Munich Security Conference (MSC) sent a clear strategic message from Washington: the NATO operating model of the past three decades is considered exhausted. What we are witnessing is not an American withdrawal from Europe, but a redefinition of roles within the Alliance, in a multipolar context marked by simultaneous strategic constraints.

The message was conveyed explicitly by Elbridge Colby[1], one of the principal architects of contemporary strategic thinking in Washington, who represented the United States at the NATO Defense Ministerial meeting held on 12 February 2026, in advance of the MSC.

His intervention can be read as a doctrinal proclamation rather than a situational or conjunctural statement.

1. From NATO 1.0 to NATO 3.0: an Explicit Strategic Periodization

Colby proposes—implicitly and explicitly—a three-phase periodization of the North Atlantic Alliance:

NATO 1.0 – the Cold War period

Characterized by hard strategic realism, credible deterrence, a clear distribution of responsibilities, and the explicit expectation that European allies contribute substantially to their own defense. This was the NATO of Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan.

NATO 2.0 – the unipolar American moment and the post–Cold War era

A phase defined by enlargement, “out-of-area” operations, relative European disarmament, and an increasingly structural dependence on American military capabilities. European territorial defense was largely externalized.

NATO 3.0 – a return to realism in a multipolar context

The proposed new architecture assumes a Europe that becomes the primary conventional defender of the continent, supported by the United States’ strategic, nuclear, and global power-projection capabilities. Conceptually, NATO 3.0 is closer to NATO 1.0 than to the model of the past three decades.

This distinction is essential: it is not a revolution, but a historical correction.

“Partnerships, Not Dependencies” – the Key Phrase of the New Doctrine

One of the core ideas of Colby’s discourse is the formulation: “We want partnerships, not dependencies.”
This marks a turning point in the transatlantic relationship:

• The United States no longer accepts the role of permanent substitute for European conventional capabilities;
• Europe is called upon to assume primary responsibility for its own security;
• The American guarantee remains, but it is redefined as strategic support, not as a structural crutch.

The message is not anti-European. On the contrary, it is a call for the maturation of the Alliance and for moving beyond the logic of comfortable dependency.

• The Implicit Response to the MSC Report: America Is Not Dismantling the Order, but Recalibrating It

Colby’s speech must also be read as an indirect response to the Munich Security Conference report, which portrays the United States as the “elephant in the room” of the international order, accused of destabilizing existing rules.

Washington, however, conveys a different message: the post–Cold War order is no longer sustainable, and artificially preserving it would generate even greater strategic risks. NATO’s recalibration is presented as an act of realism, not abandonment.

European Resonances at the MSC: von der Leyen, Macron, and Merz between Autonomy and Responsibility

The message transmitted from Washington at the Munich Security Conference did not go unanswered in European capitals. The interventions of French and German leaders confirmed that Europe is beginning to internalize—albeit with different nuances—the logic of NATO 3.0.

The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, articulated at Munich a strong appeal for Europe to turn its own defense mechanisms into operational realities. She explicitly called for “bringing to life” the EU’s mutual defense clause[2], emphasizing that the obligation of mutual assistance can no longer remain merely a theoretical principle of the Lisbon Treaty, but must become a functional instrument of collective security. In the same vein, von der Leyen supported European strategic independence, stating that Europe “has no other option” than to assume responsibility for its own security as a credible pillar within the Euro-Atlantic Alliance.

Emmanuel Macron: Strategic Autonomy as Responsibility, Not an Alternative to NATO

In his MSC address, the French President reiterated the theme of European strategic autonomy, but in a more pragmatic formulation than in previous years. Macron stressed that autonomy should not be understood as separation from the United States, but as the assumption of a genuine European capacity for action—including military action—when the continent’s security interests are directly threatened.

Within the NATO 3.0 framework, this position becomes complementary to the American vision: a more militarily capable Europe does not weaken the Alliance, but enhances its credibility. Macron emphasized the need for robust European conventional capabilities, a functional defense industry, and the overcoming of strategic fragmentation among member states.

Friedrich Merz: German Realism and the End of Strategic Ambiguity

Friedrich Merz’s intervention marked an important clarification of Germany’s position. Merz explicitly acknowledged that a European security model based on military underinvestment and the outsourcing of defense to the United States is no longer sustainable. Germany, he argued, must accept that economic leadership inevitably entails security leadership.

His message was one of realism: increasing military expenditures, rebuilding conventional capabilities, and assuming a more active role on the eastern flank are no longer political options, but conditions of European credibility within NATO. In this light, Germany is not rejecting NATO 3.0, but beginning to position itself as one of its continental pillars.

Europe between Lost Comfort and Strategic Maturation

Taken together, the positions of Macron and Merz indicate a slow but significant convergence: Europe understands that the era of unconditional strategic protection has ended. Differences in discourse persist, but the direction is common—strengthening internal capabilities as a prerequisite for relevance within the Alliance.

In this sense, NATO 3.0 is not merely an American construct, but the framework within which Europe is compelled to resolve its own strategic ambiguities. MSC 2026 thus marks not only a doctrinal shift, but the beginning of a European re-assumption of continental security. One can only hope that the distance from declarations to concrete action by European leaders will not be as long as it has too often been in recent years.

Implications for Europe and the Eastern Flank

For European states, the message is direct and quantifiable:

• growth in real conventional capabilities, not merely declarative budgets;
• emphasis on ground forces, ammunition stocks, logistics, and integrated command structures;
• the relaunch of the European defense industry as a security asset, not merely an economic one.

For the eastern flank—including Romania—the transition to NATO 3.0 entails:

• greater operational responsibility;
• deeper integration of territorial defense into Alliance planning;
• the reduction of the illusion that security is exclusively an “imported” product.
• What NATO 3.0 Means for Romania

Within the NATO 3.0 architecture, Romania’s relevance is not determined by political declarations, but by the measurable capacity to contribute to the defense of the eastern flank.

• Defense budget: Romania allocates approximately 2.5% of GDP to defense (above the NATO 2% benchmark), but the major challenge remains transforming expenditure into operational capabilities—forces, ammunition, maintenance—rather than merely acquisition programs.
• Active forces: approximately 65,000–70,000 active personnel, a significant portion of whom are engaged in guard, support, or administrative missions. NATO 3.0 emphasizes high-intensity combat-ready ground forces, not merely symbolic presence.
• Reserves: fewer than 50,000 trained reservists, with a still limited mobilization and training system. Under NATO 3.0 logic, the reserve becomes a critical element of deterrence, not a bureaucratic annex.
• The Black Sea: Romania has approximately 245 km of coastline, hosts critical NATO infrastructure, and serves as a gateway for regional energy and commercial security. Control and protection of this space become primary missions, not secondary ones.
• Defense industry: a limited contribution to GDP (under 0.5%), with restricted ammunition production and maintenance capacities. NATO 3.0 requires industrial resilience, not mere imports.

In NATO 3.0, Romania matters to the extent that it can resist, deter, and sustain allied efforts in the short and medium term. The difference is not made by the percentage of GDP, but by real combat capability, mobilization, and continuity.

NATO 3.0 does not penalize small states, but it tests—without leniency—their real capacity to contribute to their own defense.

Elbridge Colby’s discourse and the European echoes at the Munich Security Conference mark the closure of a historical stage in NATO’s functioning. The post–Cold War model—based on asymmetrical responsibility and European strategic comfort—is no longer considered sustainable in a multipolar environment characterized by strategic competition and simultaneous pressures across multiple theaters.

NATO 3.0 does not announce an American withdrawal, but a realistic redefinition of the transatlantic relationship. Washington maintains its role as the strategic pillar of the Alliance, but conditions this position on Europe’s assumption of primary responsibility for the continent’s conventional defense. The focus thus shifts from status to capability, and from declarations to performance.

The positions expressed in Munich by European leaders indicate a gradual acceptance of the loss of strategic comfort. Differences in discourse persist, but the direction is clear: without real military capabilities, a functional defense industry, and political will, European influence within the Alliance will inevitably be limited.

For Romania and the eastern flank, this transformation has immediate relevance. NATO 3.0 does not penalize small states, but it exposes—without leniency—their real limits. Strategic relevance no longer derives exclusively from positioning or loyalty, but from the ability to resist, deter, and sustain allied efforts in the initial phases of a crisis.

In this sense, NATO 3.0 is less a promise and more a test. For those who adapt, it can become an opportunity for consolidation. For others, the risk is not exit from the Alliance, but marginalization within it.

Brașov, 16 February 2026

[1] Elbridge Colby (b. 1979) graduated from Harvard College, where he studied history, and subsequently attended Yale Law School, earning a Juris Doctor degree. His academic background combines a classical humanistic education in strategic history with elite legal training, characteristic of the American strategic establishment. He is one of the leading contemporary theorists of American strategic realism.

Colby served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development at the U.S. Department of Defense (2017–2018), where he was among the principal architects of the National Defense Strategy that established the return of great-power competition as the central axis of U.S. security policy.

He is the author of The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (Yale University Press, 2021), a seminal work for the doctrine of deterrence by denial and for the rebalancing of security responsibilities between the United States and its allies. Colby is associated with the realist school of American foreign policy and explicitly advocates a more balanced distribution of security burdens within alliances, emphasizing Europe’s assumption of primary responsibility for the conventional defense of its own continent in a multipolar geopolitical context.

[2] Ursula von der Leyen stated that Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union, which provides for the obligation of mutual defense in the event of aggression, must be implemented in practice, not remain merely a legal formula. She emphasized that this clause is not optional, but constitutes a real obligation of the Member States, and that Europe must acquire the capability and credibility necessary to activate it effectively in practice.