LATEST ARTICLES

Uruguayan Independence Day Celebrated in The Hague

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Uruguayan Independence Day Celebrated in The Hague

The Embassy of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay marked his country’s Independence Day with a grand and festive reception. Held on August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague, the event drew over 200 distinguished guests from various sectors of Dutch society.

Ambassadors, chiefs of international missions, diplomats, academics, business leaders, and representatives from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with members of the Uruguayan community, all responded to H.E. Ambassador Dr. Álvaro González Otero’s invitation to celebrate ‘Día de la Independencia’—Uruguay’s National Day, commemorating its independence from Brazil in 1825.

H.E. Dr. Álvaro González Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay. National Day 2024 The Hague.

After nearly 200 years of conflict and civil unrest under Spanish and then Brazilian rule, Uruguay has emerged as a country renowned for its welcoming people, stunning landscapes, first-class meat production, and high-quality wine. In recent decades, Uruguayans have enjoyed a stable democracy, a steady improvement in living conditions, and overall well-being.

In a packed room with an animated audience, Ambassador González Otero took the microphone to thank all the attendees for their sincere affection for his people and country. He then proudly expressed:

“Two years have quickly passed since I arrived in this lovely kingdom. Since then, we have started to shift the focus of the Embassy, placing more emphasis on our bilateral relations. The Netherlands and Uruguay have more in common than people might imagine. We share international principles, landscapes, agricultural production, developed services, qualified exports, and a progressive lifestyle.

We also share strong commitments to the well-being of our citizens and visitors, the protection of human rights, environmental sustainability, progressive social policies, and significant efforts towards renewable energy and climate action. Both countries also emphasize education, democratic governance, and active participation in international organizations promoting peace and development. So, we will keep working to boost our bilateral relations.”

Uruguay National Day, August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague.
From the Embassy of Uruguay, Counsellor Pablo Bayarres, Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Hans Akerboom, Deputy Director Protocol and Host Country Affairs from the Netherlands.

Ambassador González Otero then listed some of the most relevant initiatives undertaken by the Embassy over the last few months:

– Uruguayan participation in the World Hydrogen Summit 2024: Led by the Minister of Industry, Energy, and Mining, Ms. Elisa Facio, with over 50 representatives from various sectors of the public and private sectors.

– Active participation in the “26th World Energy Congress.”

– Cooperation Project with Delft Institute for Water Education: Since 2011, Uruguayan professionals specializing in water resources have participated in the Delft Institute program for advanced training. Initially, the program began with 40 scholarships, resulting in 37 professionals successfully completing their studies. This early success led to the program’s relocation and implementation at the Technological University of Uruguay, now featuring regional participation. The program has since had two new editions in 2022 and 2024, expanding to include 17 professionals from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. This development has transformed Uruguay into a regional hub in the field of water resource education.

– Uruguay’s status as one of the 32 signing states of the Ljubljana – The Hague Convention in February 2024.

– Positioning Uruguay as a potential living and working destination for Dutch farmers.

– Interactions with RVO and Port of Rotterdam related to port cooperation.

– Exploring and initiating new cooperation projects with Westland Municipality and Wageningen University.

– Meetings with private sector actors related to agribusiness.

– Preparation for the Capitan Miranda’s visit to Amsterdam: Uruguay’s school tall ship has already confirmed its participation in Sail Amsterdam 2025.

– Multilateral achievements: The Embassy has made progress in multilateral areas, including ongoing contributions and work with international organizations based in The Hague: the ICJ, ICC, OPCW, HCCH, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Additionally, a closer relationship with The Hague Academy of International Law has been pursued. Significant advances have also been made through the coordinated work of the GRULAC Group in relation to various international organizations.

H.E. Mr. Fernando Arias, OPCW Director General , Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Mr Arias spouse, Patricia van Oordt.

Following his remarks, Ambassador González Otero invited the audience to watch a short video about Uruguay, which made a great impression on those present. He expressed, “Uruguay is an exceptional country that has developed a dynamic and robust culture, shaped by a fascinating blend of gaucho traditions, European influences, and the unique Rioplatense spirit. Tango, folklore, candombe, and milonga are examples of its rich artistic musical expression. Uruguayan gastronomy, featuring high-quality meat, wine, and dairy products, especially the beloved ‘dulce de leche,’ delights palates and consistently wins prestigious awards worldwide.”

“The work we have done does not mean we are satisfied; we want to continue advancing in a deeper process. The bilateral relationship is already strong, but the potential to strengthen bonds in several key areas is even greater.”

The Ambassador of Uruguay, H.E. Alvaro Gonzalez Otero and the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Graciela Gatti Santana with her husband Mr Gustavo Segovia.

The event was conceived to showcase the rich and diverse culture of Uruguay, a nation with a population of approximately 3,495,527 as of 2022.

The national anthems of Uruguay and the Netherlands were performed by the Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos. After the ambassador’s speech, the Embassy paid tribute to two influential musicians: José “El Sabalero” Carbajal and Jaime Roos, who both lived in the Netherlands. Jaime Roos settled in Amsterdam in 1978, where he played bass in several salsa, rock, and jazz groups. He had a son and remained in the Netherlands until 1984 when he returned to Uruguay.

Carbajal spent his days in the Netherlands with his wife, Anke van Haastrecht, and their two children. Anke was invited to share some special stories from their life together.

Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos.
Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez.

The enthusiastic audience enjoyed an authentic performance by talented Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and Nicolás Sánchez. The celebration continued with Uruguayan wine, classic savory empanadas, and dulce de leche, which delighted the crowded room and completed the great celebration.

Ambassador González Otero concluded the event by thanking his Embassy team: Counselor Pablo Bayarres, Chancellor Gustavo Morales, his assistant Juan Diego, and Martha Hernández and Sofía Anastasiou. He then led a warm toast for the people of the Netherlands, Uruguay, and the necessary and desired peace in the world.

China: A New Actor in the Contemporary Multipolar World

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
China: A New Actor in the Contemporary Multipolar World

By Mariarosaria Iorio, Political Analyst

I. The post-cold war world  

International relations are nowadays characterised by major changes that started at the end of the 80s with the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Indeed, the end of the cold war was marked by the dislocation of the two main political blocks, namely the Soviet Union and the Western World. Such a dislocation resulted in the marginalization of the post-war multilateral system embodied in the United Nations, and the standstill of the multilateral trade negotiations in the late 90s in the context of the World Trade Organisation.  New lines of political thought have been facing each other since then, while reshaping the post-cold war world in a number of fragmented and variable sub-blocks of countries. 

The United States decided to put itself first by concentrating on its internal affairs, while withdrawing from international affairs.  

Europe, the old continent, looks for an efficient strategy towards autonomy from the United States.  Europe also tries, not without difficulty, to create a more cohesive internal and external political approach.  The reality is however evolving rather more towards fragmentation of Europe in favour of European National fragmented interests. Such a fragmentation is the natural consequence of the decadence of the European Institutional and collective actions to the advantage of individual Sates actions and interests.   In sum, what seemed to be a structured and coherent European Union block fighting for the promotion of its economic and political values all over the world has somehow become an alliance at variable geometry both internally and externally.  The disorganisation of the leadership results in a chaotic and unpredictable European External and Internal action. 

Thereof, the empty influence spaces left on the international relations scene has given new international actors the opportunity to emerge.  

Meanwhile, the fragmentation of the European Institutions has also impacted the EU-USA relations within NATO, and affected the security and peace sphere.  Security issues have been on and off on the European agenda.    

In this context, Russia that has lost its empire in the 80s looks now for a new power game. In spite of the disruption of the Soviet Union, Russia attempts either by influence or by force to exercise power in its ancient affiliate countries.  Russia that was supposed to be defeated with the fall of the Berlin Wall takes back its role of opponent to the Western World on the international scene at least as it concerns the international affairs philosophy.  Thus, creating a tension aimed at restoring its power in the world.   

The group of emerging and developing economies that constitute a new variable block with a large portion of population employed in agriculture have emerged as new actors in the world’s geo-political discourses.  At the head of this block on the international scene, there is China.  The shaky international leadership context has indeed given China a new space. China’s   communist past combined with its market-based economic strategy gives it a particular position.  

China is The One that can communicate to Russia. China is also The One that can have an influence on the Western economic and political scene as China owns a big part of Western Foreign Debt  

China embeds a horizontal strategy in both its trade and development policies, while producing at low wages.  Its production system coupled with its pragmatic political approach has reshaped the international power structure.  The top-down approach of the Western World faces now the competition created by the horizontal win-win approach proposed by China in both developing and industrialized countries.

Indeed, as a result of the decline of the Western World global hegemony based on market access and economic and social liberalism as a means to ensure economic growth and promote economic development, the vision promoted by China’s discourse, centred on the protection of livelihoods and local sovereign choices finds new adepts.  Furthermore, China has successfully attempted to promote a trade-off approach to international cooperation during the last 20 years.  A cooperation that does not interfere in internal affairs of partner countries as it has often reproached to the Western countries involved in international cooperation.  

As the developing countries leader, China positions itself as the spoke country for the poor.  As a new world powerful economic actor China plays as the guarantor of the Western Economic stability.  China positions itself as the bridge between the rich and the poor.  It is representing a different hegemonic game that only changes in its discourse, while still pursuing its own interests and influence zones.  Such a situation poses the question of the values that the international regime wants to embrace.  Indeed, this changing world results in an increased number of conflicts – be new or historical conflicts.  

The dislocation of the traditional leaders of the international relations has definitely created a chaotic and unpredictable scenario.  Chaos has in some cases been chosen as a political strategy to disrupt the post-1945 international regime. Such a disruption has benefitted new actors, and given space to new lines of thought.  These new lines of thought have attacked the existing international framework but has not yet succeeded in creating a new regime.  The increasing unbalance of power and the lack of leadership on the international political scene is risky. 

The reduction by choice of leadership of the United States has indeed resulted in the weakening of the values emerged as a result of the dramatic experience of Second World War, namely freedom of thought and freedom of speech to mention only a few.   We are now facing a much more authoritarian world with force used as a means to manage the political arena.  Dialogue seems to be a rather consuming exercise that has left its place to the use of force.  Force is no longer seen as the last option but rather the opening act for political dialogue.  Nationalism and individual interests are now at the centre of the political game. This trend is taking the world to instability and conflict.  

The peoples of the world are more and more questioning the existing system. People’s needs and expectations are not met.  The new emerged actors, such as China have given the hope of a possible change in the present international system without fundamentally questioning its rationale but rather trying to rip a slate of the cake.  

The struggle for influence among countries has not succeeded in building a peaceful and stable world. Citizens will have to face the challenge of building a new era of peace and stability worldwide.

Derrière les murs du Palais de la Paix : permanence et changements de la Cour internationale de Justice

Editor
-
0
Derrière les murs du Palais de la Paix : permanence et changements de la Cour internationale de Justice

S.E. M. Philippe Couvreur est arrivé à La Haye en avril 1982, où il a d’abord occupé le poste d’assistant spécial aux bureaux du greffier et du greffier adjoint de la Cour internationale de Justice.

Il a ensuite exercé les fonctions de Secrétaire, Premier Secrétaire et Secrétaire juridique principal, avant d’être élu Greffier de la Cour en 2000, et réélu en 2007 et 2014. Pour marquer l’anniversaire de ses débuts à la Cour, il y a 35 ans, Diplomat Magazine l’a invité à témoigner de son expérience unique au service de cette institution, des évolutions qu’il a pu y observer, et à partager le regard qu’il porte sur les changements qui ont marqué la Cour et La Haye au cours des trois dernières décennies.
Philippe Couvreur avec le Pape Jean-Paul II prise le 13 mai 1985.
Je suis arrivé à La Haye en avril 1982 — de façon aussi inattendue que j’avais entamé des études de droit treize ans auparavant (mais c’est là une autre histoire…) — pour occuper un poste temporaire à la Cour internationale de Justice. La Cour était alors la seule institution judiciaire internationale existante au plan universel. Son activité, particulièrement faible à la fin des années 1970, ne pouvait en ce temps-là guère laisser présager du succès que rencontrerait la Cour dans les décennies à venir. Mon bienveillant maître de Louvain, le professeur Paul de Visscher, fils du célèbre internationaliste Charles de Visscher, unique juge belge à la Cour, m’avait prédit des jours aussi sereins qu’heureux, écoulés à lire et à écrire des ouvrages dans la solitude des imposants murs de la bibliothèque du Palais de la Paix…
Les mémoires ont été dûment déposés dans l’affaire El Salvador c. Honduras dans la salle Bol le 1 juin 1988, l’affaire du Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime.
En rejoignant la Cour, un frais matin d’avril, dont je garde un souvenir très précis, le jeune juriste que j’étais découvrit, non sans étonnement, une organisation de taille très modeste, le Greffe, qui en est l’organe administratif, alors composé de moins d’une quarantaine de fonctionnaires. Le fonctionnement de la Cour reposait entièrement sur cette équipe restreinte de personnel permanent, auquel s’ajoutait, selon que de besoin, un personnel temporaire pour faire face au surcroît de travaux linguistiques et de sténodactylographie lors des sessions (publiques et privées) de la Cour. Je me rappelle avoir été frappé par la personnalité haute en couleur de certains de ces traducteurs indépendants, dont la grande culture littéraire m’émerveillait. Cette structure très économique du Greffe impliquait une grande polyvalence de ses membres, et les Secrétaires de la Cour — ses fonctionnaires supérieurs — étaient appelés, en sus de leurs travaux de recherches juridiques, de préparation des documents de la Cour, et de rédaction de la correspondance diplomatique, à assumer eux-mêmes l’essentiel des tâches linguistiques (traduction et interprétation) et d’information, ainsi que la supervision de nombreuses activités administratives et logistiques.
La Grande salle de Justice, l’affaire Relative au Timor Oriental (Portugal c. Australie) Arrêt du 30 juin 1995.
Il n’était nullement rare qu’un nouveau venu comme moi ait à passer week-ends et nuits blanches au Palais de la Paix à effectuer les travaux les plus divers… allant jusqu’à imprimer et polycopier, sur de vieilles machines à stencils ronéotype, des décisions dont la Cour devait donner la lecture en séance publique le lendemain ! Dès mon arrivée au Greffe, j’ai eu le bonheur et le privilège d’être initié et associé à l’ensemble des fonctions de l’institution sous la patiente supervision de personnalités d’exception, tels que MM. Torres Bernárdez et Pillepich, alors respectivement Greffier et Greffier adjoint. J’en ai retiré le plus grand bénéfice, puisque cette immersion sans préparation dans toutes les facettes de l’activité du Greffe m’a permis d’acquérir de ce dernier une connaissance unique — de l’intérieur — et sous tous ses aspects —, un acquis particulièrement précieux au moment où j’ai été amené, bien des années plus tard, à assumer la délicate responsabilité d’en assurer la gestion au plus haut niveau. Devenir un fonctionnaire du Greffe au début des années 1980 signifiait accepter de se couler sans discussion dans un moule à tous égards exigeant, et se donner corps et âme, avec humilité et discrétion, à l’institution, sans penser à soi ni parler de soi. Depuis ces années d’initiation, j’ai été le témoin de profondes transformations de la Cour, rendues inévitables à la fois pour répondre à l’accroissement considérable de ses activités, avec la disparition du monde bipolaire qui avait relégué le règlement judiciaire à un rôle quelque peu marginal, et pour saisir les opportunités nouvelles offertes, notamment, par le progrès des technologies et de la communication. Entre 1982 et aujourd’hui, le nombre de fonctionnaires a ainsi presque triplé (il a quasiment doublé depuis l’an 2000, année de ma première élection en tant que Greffier). L’organisation du travail a été progressivement spécialisée entre les divers départements, juridique, linguistique et chargé de l’information, qui furent créés en 1997, et les services techniques. Par ailleurs, les Membres de la Cour ne disposèrent pas, pendant longtemps, de « référendaires » — ils s’y sont d’ailleurs longtemps refusés—, et l’assistance apportée aux juges en matière judiciaire était principalement répartie entre les fonctionnaires du Département des affaires juridiques.
H.E. Philippe Couvreur avec la Reine Beatrix photo prise pendant le 50 eme anniversaire de la Cour (18-04-1996).
Les cinq premiers postes de juristes référendaires ne furent obtenus de l’Assemblée générale et créés qu’en 2002, à l’issue de difficiles négociations que je me souviens avoir menées avec beaucoup de plaisir et d’intérêt ; le nombre de ces postes s’est progressivement accru, pour s’élever à quinze aujourd’hui. Les divers développements qui ont marqué le monde au cours des dernières décennies n’ont pas manqué de soulever pour la Cour de nouveaux défis. Comme c’est le cas pour toute institution, elle n’a pu les relever en faisant table rase des enseignements de son histoire ni, à l’inverse, en ne saisissant pas toutes les opportunités offertes par le temps présent. A ces différents égards, la Cour est certainement parvenue, au fil des ans, à assurer un équilibre, toujours délicat, entre changements et continuité. La continuité de la Cour est bien sûr inscrite dans son Statut, qui fait partie intégrante de la Charte des Nations Unies, et reflétée dans ses méthodes judiciaires, qui ont été très largement élaborées par sa devancière, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, et héritées d’elle. Cette continuité historique était particulièrement présente lorsque j’ai rejoint le Greffe. Ainsi, en manière d’anecdote, divers hauts fonctionnaires alors en poste avaient eux-mêmes côtoyé, au début de leur carrière, d’anciens fonctionnaires de la Cour permanente. Tous nourrissaient à l’égard de cette dernière le plus grand respect. Il régnait d’ailleurs dans les couloirs du Palais de la Paix une atmosphère feutrée et délicieusement surannée, évocatrice de la défunte Société des Nations. Je me souviens en avoir encore utilisé maintes fournitures de bureau ! La continuité jurisprudentielle et procédurale entre les deux Cours constitue pour les Etats une garantie importante de sécurité et de prévisibilité juridiques. Cette continuité, juridique et historique, de même que l’expérience accumulée en plus de quatre-vingt-dix ans d’exercice de la fonction judiciaire, sont pour la Cour un facteur crucial de légitimité.
H.E. Philippe Couvreur vec le Roi Willem-Alexander photo prise pendant le 70 eme anniversaire de la Cour (20-04-2016).
En même temps, la Cour a eu, à l’évidence, à s’adapter aux changements du monde réel dans lequel elle opère, comme aux nécessités et opportunités nouvelles de chaque époque traversée. L’une des transformations notoires auxquelles j’ai assisté fut l’ouverture croissante de la Cour sur l’extérieur : longtemps à l’écart, à dessein, des organes politiques des Nations Unies, la Cour a souhaité se faire plus et mieux entendre de ces organes et des Etats membres. Elle a ainsi rompu avec ce qui était parfois perçu comme un « splendide isolement » au sein des Nations Unies, même si elle défend toujours jalousement son autonomie. La Cour doit en outre désormais également tenir compte des nombreuses autres juridictions, internationales ou régionales, qui ont été créées ces dernières années, et veiller, autant que possible, à assurer l’harmonie du « concert judiciaire » que permet ce foisonnement de cours et tribunaux sur la scène internationale. Davantage ouverte sur la communauté internationale et ses réalités, la Cour s’est montrée de plus en plus attentive, non seulement à sa place dans l’Organisation des Nations Unies, mais aussi à la poursuite des objectifs de celle-ci et à sa mission propre au service du règlement pacifique des différends internationaux. Des différends de plus en plus complexes, tant juridiquement que factuellement, en même temps que politiquement plus denses, lui ont été soumis. En révisant constamment, selon que de besoin, ses méthodes de travail, elle a su les résoudre rapidement et efficacement, à un coût particulièrement modeste pour la communauté internationale, tout en assurant le développement du droit. Enfin, pour conclure sur une note plus prosaïque, mais qui est loin d’être négligeable, je ne peux taire la chance que j’ai eue de connaître l’extraordinaire développement de la ville de La Haye au cours des 35 dernières années. Celle-ci offre aujourd’hui à la Cour, comme aux nombreuses institutions internationales qui s’y sont installées à sa suite, une qualité de vie et un cadre de travail uniques, qui sont très loin de ressembler à ce que j’ai trouvé en y arrivant. A l’image de l’imposante stature du Palais de la Paix où elle siège, symbole mondialement connu de la justice internationale, la Cour est une institution solidement établie. En dépit des périodes de doute ou de désaffection qu’elle a traversées par le passé, son rôle est unanimement salué au sein de la communauté internationale et le recours à ses services par les Etats n’a jamais été aussi soutenu. 35 ans après, je continue de mesurer chaque jour le privilège qui est le mien de servir au mieux de mes capacités l’organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies. —– Les photos dans l’article sont une courtoisie de la Cour International de Justice.

Eurojust Supports Arrest of Suspected Migrant Smuggler

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Eurojust Supports Arrest of Suspected Migrant Smuggler

The Hague, 6 August 2026

A high-value target suspected of smuggling more than 600 migrants along the Balkan route has been arrested following cooperation between German and Serbian authorities, coordinated by Eurojust and Europol.

The suspect was arrested in Belgrade on 5 August. He is suspected of working with other members of a smuggling network that transported people to Germany and other Western European countries along the Balkan route.

According to investigators, the network brought Syrian nationals into the European Union from Serbia via Hungary or from Bosnia and Herzegovina via Croatia. The migrants were subsequently transported by car, van or truck through Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland or Austria to Germany and other European countries.

The network reportedly charged between EUR 2,000 and EUR 10,000 per person. The suspect arrested on 5 August is believed to have played a central role in the network from his residence in Serbia. He allegedly transported migrants to Sombor, Serbia, where he handed them over to other members of the network, and is also suspected of facilitating their movement from Serbia into Hungary.

Between June 2023 and June 2024, he is suspected of having been involved in at least 37 smuggling operations.

The arrest forms part of a wider operation targeting other members of the network in Germany and Serbia. Five additional suspects were arrested during coordinated actions in Germany, the Netherlands and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2025.

Eurojust supported the German and Serbian authorities through a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) established at the Agency. The JIT facilitated the exchange of information on the smuggling network and supported preparations for the suspect’s arrest. The Western Balkans Criminal Justice Project also supported cooperation between the participating authorities.

Europol’s European Centre Against Migrant Smuggling coordinated an Operational Taskforce throughout the investigation, facilitating intelligence exchange between the participating countries and providing operational analysis to identify links between different investigations.

Europol also supported the identification of high-value targets, coordinated operational activities during the action day and deployed experts to provide real-time analytical and operational assistance to investigators.

The operation highlights the importance of coordinated international cooperation in disrupting organised migrant smuggling networks operating across multiple European countries.

Thailand’s Land Bridge Is Becoming a Long-Term Strategic Option

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Thailand’s Land Bridge Is Becoming a Long-Term Strategic Option

By Jianbo Wu

In April 2026, Thailand seemed to have found an answer to a longstanding geopolitical question: how to create an alternative to the Strait of Malacca for global shipping. The government announced it would accelerate the 1-trillion-baht (US$31 billion) Southern Land Bridge, citing the Hormuz crisis as a reminder of the strategic value of alternative routes. By July, however, the same project that had promised to rewrite regional trade was being rewritten itself. The Land Bridge was no longer an immediate national priority.

On July 24, a government committee concluded that the Land Bridge would no longer proceed as originally planned. A new feasibility review showed that the project’s net present value had turned from a projected surplus into a deficit of more than 10 billion baht (US$280 million). With no land acquired and construction yet to begin, Bangkok could still change course before locking itself into major sunk costs.

Three days later, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul made the government’s revised position clear. The Land Bridge, he announced, had not been cancelled. Immediate priority would now go to upgrading regional port berths and completing dual-track railway connections. “When the time is right,” Anutin clarified, “or when necessary and geopolitically appropriate, the project can be dusted off and resumed at any time.”

The debate over the project is closely tied to the spring crisis around the Strait of Hormuz. When tanker insurance premiums surged and ships faced rising detour costs, the vulnerability of concentrated maritime routes came back into focus. The Malacca Strait, the narrow corridor through which roughly one-quarter of global maritime trade passes, was once again viewed as a strategic risk. For Thailand, the crisis reinforced the case for turning the Kra Isthmus into an alternative gateway between the Indian and Pacific oceans. A 90-kilometre corridor promised to shorten voyages by 1,200 kilometres and two to three days. But strategic urgency and commercial viability are different calculations.

The Land Bridge would require containers to be unloaded on one coast, moved across Thailand by rail, and loaded onto another ship before continuing their journey. That additional step could erase much of the advantage of avoiding the Malacca Strait. The July 24 feasibility review highlighted a broader challenge: nine of the world’s ten largest shipping lines had already committed capital to existing ports, routes and logistics networks, and there was little evidence they would divert meaningful volumes to the Land Bridge.

Domestic opposition added another layer of difficulty. Local fishing communities and environmental groups opposed the project over concerns about dredging, coastal reclamation and ecological impacts across roughly 13,000 rai. More than 100,000 signatures were submitted to the Prime Minister’s Office, heightening political pressure on Bangkok.

Furthermore, Thailand was not merely competing with a body of water. It was competing with one of the world’s most sophisticated maritime ecosystems, centred on Singapore. The city-state’s advantage comes not only from a transhipment hub connected to more than 600 ports worldwide, but also from the wider maritime services network built around it. Thailand was not simply building another port; it was trying to replicate an ecosystem that took decades to mature.

Yet Bangkok’s decision to pause the project did not end the competition. Instead, it changed the timeline. Singapore holds the advantage of the present: world-class efficiency, dense shipping alliances and high transshipment frequency. But the more global trade concentrates into a single highly optimised node, the more valuable credible alternatives become during moments of systemic disruption.

The Land Bridge does not need to match Singapore’s ecosystem today; it only needs to remain available when circumstances change. Alternatives rarely look cost-effective before they are needed. If insurance premiums surge, congestion worsens or geopolitical tensions further complicate passage through the straits, the question will no longer be whether Thailand can build a Land Bridge from scratch, but whether it has enough of one already in place.

This reality shaped Prime Minister Anutin’s political strategy. Facing the classic dilemma of how to retreat without surrendering, he unbundled the megaproject. Instead of pushing for twin mega-ports and a full industrial zone, state focus shifted to modest, high-utility works known as the “missing links”: modernising existing berths at Ranong Port and building a 110-kilometre rail link connecting Ranong to the national rail network at Chumphon.

Ranong is where the strategic option begins to take shape. The port already records rising cargo volumes, with container throughput climbing 55.56% in the first part of fiscal 2026, driven in part by trade diverted from Myanmar land borders. Completing the short rail gap that currently forces freight onto trucks would give Thailand’s entire national network, including future northbound links towards Laos and China, direct access to the Andaman Sea. Officials have also framed the port as a practical entry point for BIMSTEC markets, where shorter sailings to destinations such as Yangon, Chittagong and Chennai are already being tested.

Anutin’s mid-July official visit to Beijing illustrated a similar priority. The publicly available joint statement focused on accelerating the China-Thailand High-Speed Railway and integrating northbound rail corridors through Laos. The Land Bridge was conspicuously absent. The contrast was notable. At a time when Thailand was seeking to position itself as a maritime gateway, its most visible infrastructure cooperation with China remained centred on inland connectivity through rail links rather than a new cross-isthmus shipping corridor.

What emerged instead was an infrastructure ladder: one that delivers immediate economic value while preserving the option of a larger cross-isthmus corridor if conditions eventually justify it. In this sense, the pause did not abandon the Land Bridge’s strategic logic. It relocated that logic onto assets that already move cargo and can be expanded incrementally.

The debate is no longer whether Thailand will build the Land Bridge. It is whether the infrastructure now being built can create the commercial foundations for a project whose strategic value may ultimately depend on forces beyond Thailand’s control.

About the author:

Jianbo Wu is Secretary General of the Green and Smart Energy Organization (GSEO), an international non-profit focused on cooperation in green and smart energy systems. His work examines the intersection of energy, infrastructure, global supply chains, and economic connectivity. He has directed multiple United Nations-supported programmes and has contributed commentary to a range of international policy and business publications, including East Asia Forum, Singapore Business Review, and the LSE South Asia Centre.

The Makkah Agreement and the New Security Architecture of the Middle East

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
The Makkah Agreement and the New Security Architecture of the Middle East

“In a multipolar world, security is no longer underwritten by a single guarantor; it is built through the prudent layering of alliances, interests and capabilities.”

By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu

Beyond the News of the Day

The signing of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on 7 August 2026 represents more than the formalisation of military cooperation that has developed gradually over recent years. By stipulating that an armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all, the document introduces an explicit principle of collective defence into a strategic space that has so far failed to build a coherent and durable regional security architecture.[1] The choice of Makkah as the venue for the signing amplifies the political and symbolic significance of the moment: three of the most influential states in the Muslim world are declaring their readiness to transform political solidarity and bilateral cooperation into a shared commitment to deterrence.

The agreement comes at a time when the region is being shaped by widening conflicts, attacks on the territory and energy infrastructure of the Gulf states, confrontation between the United States and Israel on the one hand and Iran and its allies on the other, and increasingly evident doubts about the sufficiency of external security guarantees. For Saudi Arabia, the vulnerability of its oil infrastructure and export routes threatens not only national security but also the economic transformation envisaged by Vision 2030. For Türkiye, regional instability, the rise of non-state actors and the deterioration of relations with Israel require an expansion of its strategic autonomy. For Pakistan, the agreement offers an opportunity to consolidate its influence beyond South Asia and to capitalise on a security relationship with Saudi Arabia built over decades.

The rapprochement among the three states was quickly presented as the emergence of an “Islamic NATO”. The phrase captures the political force of the collective-defence clause, but it risks distorting the agreement’s true nature. At least for the time being, there is no public information about the establishment of an integrated military command, the existence of joint forces, automatic intervention procedures, standing operational plans or predetermined military contributions. The summit’s joint statement is public, but the agreement’s full legal text and activation mechanisms have not been disclosed. Moreover, Saudi and Turkish officials have stated that the document is not intended to create a military axis or a religious bloc and does not replace existing bilateral and multilateral commitments.[2]

The deeper significance of the Makkah Agreement should therefore be sought not in the immediate emergence of an organisation comparable to NATO, but in the changing security logic of the region. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are neither abandoning their traditional partnerships nor detaching themselves from the major powers with which they cooperate. They are seeking to add a further regional guarantee to their external relationships, built on the complementarity of Saudi financial resources, Turkish military and technological capacity, and Pakistani strategic experience. The agreement thus marks a shift from dependence on a single guarantor to strategic redundancy: the layering of several partnerships and security mechanisms so that the vulnerability created by the weakening of one may be offset by the strengthening of the others.

From this perspective, the Makkah Agreement is not merely a response to the current regional crisis. It may become the nucleus of an alliance suited to a multipolar world: flexible, interregional, built among middle powers and compatible, at least for now, with the members’ different strategic affiliations and partnerships.

I. The Riyadh-Ankara-Islamabad Triangle: Strategic Complementarity

The Makkah Agreement does not create the relationship among the three states from scratch; rather, it brings together within a common framework three strands of cooperation that had already developed. The most firmly established is the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, built over several decades through military training, technical assistance and a Pakistani presence on Saudi territory. The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement signed by the two countries in September 2025 had already introduced the principle that aggression against either state would be considered aggression against both.[3] The Makkah document extends this logic by including Türkiye and transforms a bilateral guarantee into a trilateral mechanism of considerably greater regional weight.

Relations between Türkiye and Pakistan also have a consolidated military dimension, including training, naval and aeronautical cooperation, and industrial projects. The rapprochement between Ankara and Riyadh is more recent and follows a period of pronounced political rivalry. Their reconciliation has been accompanied by growing economic and military cooperation, including the acquisition and localisation in Saudi Arabia of Turkish unmanned systems, as well as agreements on munitions, sensors and technology transfer.[4] The Makkah Agreement thus anchors at the strategic level a rapprochement already visible in the economic and industrial spheres.

The potential strength of the new framework derives from the participants’ complementarity. Saudi Arabia brings financial resources, energy influence and centrality in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Türkiye possesses the most developed defence-industrial base of the three states, significant conventional capabilities and operational experience accumulated in several regional theatres. Pakistan contributes the size of its armed forces, experience in crisis management and strategic capabilities.

This complementarity should not, however, be turned into an idealised picture. The three states do not have identical interests. Türkiye seeks strategic autonomy and an expansion of its influence; Saudi Arabia wants to protect its territory, energy infrastructure and modernisation project; Pakistan must continue to prioritise its balance with India and the security of its western border. The agreement does not eliminate these differences. It seeks to create a space in which the three powers’ distinct resources can be brought to bear in concert when threats require it.

The importance of the Riyadh-Ankara-Islamabad triangle therefore lies not in the simple addition of military forces, but in the possibility of connecting Saudi capital, Turkish technology and Pakistani military capacity within a regional defence ecosystem. Whether this possibility becomes an actual capability will depend on the consultation, planning and decision-making mechanisms the states establish.

II. Deterrence: Iran and Pakistan’s “Nuclear Shadow”

The agreement’s immediate function is to strengthen deterrence. The formula whereby an armed attack against one signatory shall be regarded as an attack against them all increases uncertainty for a potential aggressor: the consequences of an action can no longer be calculated solely in relation to the targeted state, but must also take into account the possibility that the other two powers will become involved.

The context in which the agreement was signed inevitably points to Iran and Iran-associated armed actors as a central concern. Attacks on the Gulf states, threats to energy routes and the activity of armed groups in Yemen and Iraq have exposed the vulnerability of a regional architecture based primarily on external guarantees. Yet it would be excessive to reduce the agreement to the construction of an anti-Iranian front. Türkiye and Pakistan have their own relationships with Tehran and are more interested in limiting the spread of the conflict than in turning it into a generalised regional confrontation. At the same time, intensified Israeli military action and the deterioration of relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv introduce a second implicit area of concern. The agreement, however, does not officially identify either Iran or Israel as an adversary, and this ambiguity is deliberate.[5]

The most sensitive issue is Pakistan’s nuclear status. The participation of the Muslim world’s only nuclear power inevitably casts a “nuclear shadow” over the agreement. Even in the absence of an explicit guarantee, adversaries will have to include in their assessments the possibility of an escalation involving Pakistan. This uncertainty can reinforce political deterrence, but it should not be confused with the formal extension of Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Official statements have rejected any link between the agreement and nuclear ambitions or an arms race, while Islamabad has avoided claiming that its arsenal would automatically guarantee its partners’ security.

The pact’s credibility will therefore depend first and foremost on conventional capabilities and political will. Deterrence is produced not simply by stating a commitment, but by convincing an adversary that it will be honoured. Unless rapid consultation procedures, advance planning, interoperability and ready-to-use capabilities are established, the collective clause may remain a political signal rather than a military guarantee. The first major crisis in which one of the signatories requests support from the others will be the true test of the Makkah Agreement.

III. Beyond Iran: The United States, NATO, India and China

The consequences of the agreement extend beyond relations with Iran and must be considered in relation to the principal centres of power involved in the Middle East and South Asia. For the United States, the new arrangement reflects both the limits of the current security architecture and the regional allies’ desire to assume a greater share of responsibility for their own defence. Saudi Arabia is not abandoning its strategic partnership with Washington, Türkiye is not leaving NATO, and Pakistan is maintaining channels of cooperation with the United States. What is changing is the de facto exclusivity of the Western guarantee.

The comparison with NATO is inevitable, but it must be kept within rigorous limits. The formula of an attack against one being considered an attack against all reproduces the political principle of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Yet even Article 5 does not require an identical and automatic military response; each ally is to take such action as it deems necessary.[6] The essential difference is that NATO has a permanent political and military structure, an integrated command, joint planning, interoperability standards and procedures consolidated over more than seven decades. For now, the Makkah Agreement expresses a political commitment to collective defence, not the existence of a comparable military organisation.

For India, Türkiye’s accession to an agreement that includes Pakistan and Saudi Arabia raises more sensitive questions. New Delhi must assess whether the new clause might be invoked in an Indo-Pakistani crisis and to what extent its economic partnership with Riyadh might constrain Saudi solidarity with Islamabad. The undefined nature of the obligations allows each party some freedom of interpretation, but it does not eliminate the agreement’s political effects on the South Asian balance.

China occupies a different position. It is Pakistan’s principal strategic partner, has extensive economic relations with Saudi Arabia and cooperates with Türkiye despite existing disagreements. Beijing may view the emergence of a regional architecture that reduces exclusive dependence on the West favourably, provided that it does not affect Chinese economic projects or generate an escalation that threatens energy corridors. China is neither a member nor a guarantor of the new arrangement, but its relations with all three states give it indirect influence over the arrangement’s evolution.

The Makkah Agreement should therefore not be framed as a simple opposition between the West and the Muslim world, or between the United States and China. The three participating states simultaneously belong to different strategic networks. Türkiye is a NATO member, Pakistan is a strategic partner of China, and Saudi Arabia maintains strong security relationships with the United States and the Gulf monarchies. The novelty of the agreement lies precisely in its capacity to connect these different affiliations.

IV. From Dependence to Strategic Redundancy

Over recent decades, security in the Middle East has been organised predominantly around the United States military presence and Washington’s bilateral relationships with its principal partners. This system is not disappearing, but it is becoming insufficient for states that perceive threats as faster-moving, more diverse and less predictable. Missile and drone attacks, the actions of non-state groups, the vulnerability of energy infrastructure and the political hesitation of external guarantors have prompted regional powers to seek additional mechanisms.

The Makkah Agreement expresses a shift from dependence to strategic redundancy. Under this logic, a state does not replace one alliance with another; it layers several guarantees so that the weakening of one does not bring about the collapse of its entire security system. Saudi Arabia combines its American partnership, the Gulf Cooperation Council framework, the strategic relationship with Pakistan and the new trilateral association. Türkiye complements its NATO membership with its own network of regional and industrial relationships. Pakistan adds to its cooperation with China and its traditional relationship with Saudi Arabia an institutionalised platform that connects it directly to the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

The advantage of such an arrangement lies in flexibility. States can deepen cooperation without abandoning existing partnerships or subordinating themselves to a single centre of power. Its limitation derives from the same flexibility: the absence of detailed obligations can facilitate political adaptation but reduce the predictability of a military response. Redundancy enhances security only if the overlapping relationships reinforce one another; if they transmit contradictory signals, it can create uncertainty for partners and adversaries alike.

The industrial dimension could transform the agreement from a political commitment into an enduring association. Saudi capital, Türkiye’s research and production capabilities, and Pakistan’s military experience could support the joint development of drones, munitions, air-defence systems, and command-and-control technologies. Important precedents already exist for cooperation and the localisation of Turkish military production in Saudi Arabia.[7] Yet such projects should not be treated as automatic outcomes of the agreement: they will depend on financing, technology transfer, the protection of sensitive information and the harmonisation of operational requirements.

Prospects for expansion became more concrete on 8 August, when Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said he expected Egypt to join at a later stage once several technical issues had been resolved. He described Cairo as a “natural partner on all issues” and said that the four states already acted “as if [they] were alliance members”. This is politically significant, but it should not be treated as confirmation of Egyptian accession: Fidan expressed Ankara’s expectation, while no formal Egyptian commitment has yet been made public. Egypt’s eventual inclusion would substantially increase the pact’s Arab, African and maritime weight, bringing in the most populous Arab state, one of the region’s largest armed forces and the country controlling the Suez Canal. At the same time, enlargement would make threat definition, consultation and decision-making more complex. Expansion could therefore broaden the pact’s strategic reach while simultaneously testing its still-unproven institutional cohesion.[8]

Postscript, 9 August 2026. The First Operational Test Remains Inconclusive

The first developments after the signing do not justify a triumphalist interpretation. On 7 August, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella designation used by Iran-aligned factions, announced that it was postponing a planned response to recent US-Saudi strikes. The announcement followed an appeal by Hadi al-Amiri and other political interventions, while Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi assured the Saudi intelligence chief that Iraqi territory would not be used to launch attacks against another state.[9] The timing may suggest that the new agreement added weight to the militias’ risk calculations, but the available evidence does not establish a direct causal link. Iraqi political mediation and government pressure were already at work, and the armed factions did not identify either the intended target or the nature of their planned response.

Two days later, the limits of any claim to immediate deterrence became equally visible. Yemen’s Houthi movement claimed a drone attack on Saudi Aramco’s Jazan refinery. The resulting fire was extinguished and no injuries were reported, but neither Türkiye nor Pakistan had publicly indicated how it might participate in a Saudi response.[10] The episode demonstrates that the agreement did not immediately prevent low-cost proxy attacks and that its operational mechanisms, thresholds and division of responsibilities remain undefined.

Taken together, the Iraqi postponement and the Jazan attack support a cautious conclusion. The agreement may already influence perceptions and raise the potential cost of escalation at the margins, but its deterrent value remains unproven. Only the signatories’ conduct in a crisis that requires consultation, attribution, an explicit request for support and a concrete allocation of military or political contributions will show whether Makkah created a usable security mechanism or merely a significant diplomatic signal.

Not a New NATO, but a Form of Alliance for a Multipolar World

The Makkah Agreement does not yet establish an “Islamic NATO”. There is no public evidence of an integrated command, permanent joint forces, mandatory response procedures or collective planning comparable to that of the North Atlantic Alliance. The label may convey the symbolic impact of the collective-defence clause, but it does not describe the current level of institutionalisation.

The agreement’s importance lies elsewhere. For the first time, three Muslim powers with complementary strategic resources are establishing an explicit link among their national security interests. Saudi Arabia provides capital and regional centrality, Türkiye conventional and technological capacity, and Pakistan military experience and strategic weight. Together, they could form the nucleus of a deterrence system with Arab, Anatolian and South Asian dimensions.

The agreement does not mark the three states’ departure from their traditional partners, but their adaptation to an order in which no external guarantor is considered sufficient. The new architecture rests on overlapping alliances, selective partnerships and the freedom of regional powers to cooperate simultaneously with different centres of power. It is an arrangement characteristic of multipolarity: less rigid than the alliances of the previous century, but also more difficult to anticipate and control.

The document’s real value will be determined not by the solemnity of its signing but by what follows: consultation mechanisms, joint planning, intelligence exchange, interoperability, industrial projects and, above all, the conduct of the signatories in the first crisis. If the political commitment is transformed into a credible capacity for action, the Makkah Agreement could become one of the landmarks of the region’s new security order. If not, it will remain a powerful symbol, but one insufficient to alter the strategic balance.

In either case, its message is already clear: regional powers are no longer waiting for the security architecture to be built exclusively by the great powers. They are beginning to build it themselves.

Brașov, 8 August 2026
English-language version updated on 9 August 2026

ANNEX

Joint Statement of the Makkah Al-Mukarramah Summit for Joint Defence

At the gracious invitation of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, the President of the Republic of Türkiye, H.E. Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, H.E. Mr. Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif, paid a visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on 24 Safar 1448H, corresponding to August 7, 2026.

His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Crown Prince and Prime Minister received H.E. the President of Türkiye, and H.E. the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, at Al-Safa Palace in Makkah, where the Makkah Al-Mukarramah Summit for Joint Defence was held, during which the distinguished relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Türkiye and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan were reviewed, along with a number of issues of mutual interest.

Guided by the longstanding historical ties among the three States, based on the enduring bonds of brotherhood and Islamic solidarity that unite them, and building upon their shared strategic interests and longstanding defence cooperation, His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, H.E. Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of the Republic of Türkiye, and H.E. Mr. Muhammed Shehbaz Sharif, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, reflecting the three States’ shared commitment to further strengthening their collective security and to promoting peace, security, and stability in the region and beyond, in pursuit of a secure and prosperous future.

The Agreement is intended to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression, and stipulates that any armed attack against any one of the three States shall be regarded as an attack against them all. It further provides for the enhancement of all aspects of defence cooperation among the three States.

Note: As of the date this article was submitted for publication, the full text of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement had not been officially released. The text above reproduces the joint statement issued after the summit and should not be confused with the agreement’s legal text.

Makkah, 7 August 2026

Official source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, “Makkah Al-Mukarramah Summit for Joint Defence”, 7 August 2026. Official English text.

[1] “Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan Issue Joint Statement of the Makkah Al-Mukarramah Summit for Joint Defence”, Saudi Press Agency, 7 August 2026, official summit statement.

[2] Timour Azhari, Ariba Shahid and Tuvan Gumrukcu, “Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan pledge mutual defence as Middle East turmoil escalates”, Reuters, 7 August 2026; officials stated that the agreement was defensive, was not directed against any particular state and did not supersede existing commitments.

[3] “Joint Statement Issued Following Pakistan Prime Minister’s State Visit to the Kingdom”, Saudi Press Agency, 17 September 2025.

[4] “Saudi and Turkish Companies Ink Agreement and Two MoUs to Localize Drone Industry”, Saudi Press Agency, 7 August 2023.

[5] Timour Azhari, Ariba Shahid and Tuvan Gumrukcu, “Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan pledge mutual defence as Middle East turmoil escalates”, Reuters, 7 August 2026.

[6] “The North Atlantic Treaty”, Article 5, NATO, 4 April 1949.

[7] Suzan Fraser and Munir Ahmed, “Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan have signed a key defense agreement”, Associated Press, 7 August 2026; the cited analysis suggests that industrial coordination and technology transfer are more likely than large-scale military deployments.

[8] Hakan Fidan, interview with Anadolu Agency, 8 August 2026, reported in “Regional four-country platform including Egypt to remain ‘very important’: Turkish foreign minister”, Anadolu Agency, 9 August 2026; “Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia defence pact technically same as NATO’s Article 5, Turkish minister says”, Reuters, 8 August 2026.

[9] “Iraqi PM, Saudi intelligence chief discuss regional security as militias delay response”, Reuters, 7 August 2026; Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats Project, “Iran Update Evening Special Report: August 07, 2026”.

[10] “Yemen’s Houthis attack Saudi refinery after kingdom signs defence pact”, Reuters, 9 August 2026.

Armenian Food Festival to Bring the Flavours of Armenia to The Hague

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Armenian Food Festival to Bring the Flavours of Armenia to The Hague

24–25 September 2026 | Leonardo Royal Hotel The Hague

Armenia’s rich culinary traditions will take centre stage in The Hague on 24 and 25 September 2026, when the Embassy of the Republic of Armenia, in cooperation with Diplomat Magazine and the Leonardo Royal Hotel The Hague, presents the Armenian Food Festival.

The event forms part of the celebrations marking the 35th Anniversary of the Independence of the Republic of Armenia.

H.E. Viktor Biyagov, Ambassador of Armenia.

H.E. Mr. Viktor Biyagov, Ambassador of Armenia, has announced the dates of the festival, which will bring two Armenian chefs to The Hague especially for the occasion. Over two evenings, guests will have the opportunity to discover the flavours and culinary traditions of Armenia through a menu featuring modern fusion interpretations of traditional Armenian dishes.

Food will serve as a gateway to Armenia’s cultural heritage, creating an opportunity for guests from the diplomatic, business, cultural and international communities to experience the country through its cuisine and discover Armenia as a booming culinary tourism destination.

Two chefs, one culinary journey

Arayik Amzayan and Stepan Burmistrov are Yerevan-based chefs whose careers combine restaurant projects, culinary education, gastronomic events and international competitions.

Chef Arayik Amzayan

Chef Arayik Amzayan is the founder and chef of Central Kitchen Armenia, founder of Kuwa Izakaya, and co-organiser and brand chef of Yerevan Food Fest. He is also co-founder and brand chef of Gastro Camp Armenia and has worked as a project chef and manager for a range of restaurants and hospitality projects in Armenia.

His professional career began in Yerevan in 2012 and has included positions at Avenue Lorange, Diamond House Hotel, Moscafe and Bella Italia, among others. His international competition record includes winning the Silk Road Chef international competition in 2018 and taking first place at Cuisine Taste of Culture in Cairo. He was also a finalist at the WorldSkills International 2013 competition in Leipzig and placed fifth at the Young Chefs Olympiad in India in 2018.

Chef Stepan Burmistrov

Chef Stepan Burmistrov has spent years getting to know Armenia through its kitchens. Today, as Chef and Co-owner of Niko Kitchen & Bar in Yerevan, he belongs to a generation of chefs giving Armenian cuisine a distinctly contemporary voice.

His path to Armenia was shaped by more than a decade in professional kitchens and an unusually broad range of culinary influences. Working alongside guest chefs from Peru, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Argentina exposed him early on to very different ways of treating ingredients and tradition. In Yerevan, Stepan became Executive Chef of Gouroo Club & Garden, one of Armenia’s early healthy-dining concepts. At Niko Kitchen & Bar, that concept has found a more personal expression.

Together, the two chefs will contribute different experiences and perspectives to the festival while maintaining its central purpose: presenting the richness of Armenian cuisine.

A taste of Armenia in The Hague

The Food Festival will be hosted at the Leonardo Royal Hotel The Hague, where the visiting chefs will work closely with the hotel’s culinary team lead by Chef Sido de Brabander. Preparations will begin weeks before the two festival evenings, including coordination of the menu, ingredients and kitchen requirements.

The dinner concept is designed to allow guests to experience a broad selection of Armenian flavours. The menu will feature traditional dishes and will provide an introduction to the country’s culinary identity, from its longstanding traditions to the way Armenian cuisine is interpreted by today’s chefs.

For the Embassy of Armenia, the festival provides an opportunity to showcase the country through one of its most accessible and engaging forms of cultural diplomacy. Gastronomy can open conversations about Armenia’s history, traditions, tourism, culture and contemporary identity while bringing together people who might otherwise encounter the country through very different channels.

Armenian Food Festival.

For Diplomat Magazine, the Armenian Food Festival continues a series of national Food Festivals in The Hague that use gastronomy as a platform for cultural exchange and international engagement. The events bring diplomatic missions together with the hospitality sector and the wider public, creating an informal environment in which countries can present their heritage and contemporary identity.

On 24 and 25 September, the flavours of Armenia will therefore travel to The Hague, carried by two chefs with experience spanning Armenia and international culinary competitions.

The Armenian Food Festival promises to be an invitation to taste Armenian food; to discover a country through its traditions, creativity, wines and hospitality.

Armenian Food Festival
24–25 September 2026
Leonardo Royal Hotel The Hague

  • +31 70 352 5161
  • Email: frontoffice.royaldenhaag@leonardo-hotels.nl

Egypt Celebrates National Day and 50 Years of Water Cooperation with the Netherlands

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Egypt Celebrates National Day and 50 Years of Water Cooperation with the Netherlands

On the occasion of Egypt’s National Day, marking the 74th anniversary of the 23 July Revolution, H.E. Mr. Emad Hanna, Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and Mrs. Hayam W. Mikhail hosted a diplomatic reception at the Egyptian Residence in The Hague.

The reception brought together a distinguished gathering of diplomats, heads of international organizations, Dutch officials, business leaders and members of the Egyptian community. In a warm and welcoming atmosphere, guests exchanged views on current international and regional affairs while enjoying Egyptian hospitality and cuisine.

Mrs. Hayam W. Mikhail, H.E. Mr. Emad Hanna, Ambassador of Egypt and Meike van Ginneken, Water Envoy of the Netherlands.

Following the national anthems, Ambassador Hanna reflected on the depth and breadth of Egyptian-Dutch relations, emphasizing the close political dialogue maintained between the two countries.

“Egypt and the Netherlands share a long-standing and dynamic relationship, built on mutual respect, shared values, and a growing portfolio of cooperation.”

He highlighted the continuous engagement between the political leaderships of both countries, particularly during the war in Gaza, and recalled the Dutch participation in the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit in October 2025.

“The high-level Dutch participation in the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit in October 2025 demonstrated the unwavering commitment to de-escalation, humanitarian action, and the pursuit of a just and lasting peace.”

Ambassadors attending the Egyptian National Day 2026 in The Hague.

The Ambassador also pointed to growing economic relations, notably the visit of the Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation to Egypt in May 2026, accompanied by a large business delegation. Cultural cooperation has likewise gained momentum, including the voluntary restitution by the Netherlands of an ancient Egyptian stone artefact dating from the reign of King Thutmoses III.

Another important area highlighted by Ambassador Hanna was Egypt’s role in humanitarian efforts for Gaza. He referred to the June 2026 visit of a Dutch parliamentary delegation to Egypt and the Rafah Crossing, where the delegation witnessed Egypt’s efforts to facilitate humanitarian assistance.

Looking ahead, Ambassador Hanna placed particular emphasis on the longstanding Egyptian-Dutch partnership in water management, which this year marks its 50th anniversary.

“This partnership has become a model of successful international cooperation built on innovation, knowledge exchange, and mutual trust.”

H.E. Ambassador Emad Hanna during his speech at the Egyptian Residence.

He also highlighted new cooperation with IHE Delft Institute for Water Education on water diplomacy and with Clingendael Academy on diplomatic training and the exchange of expertise. Egypt’s participation in the Dutch Shiraka programme, he noted, has further strengthened institutional cooperation and capacity building.

The Ambassador also invited Dutch companies to view Egypt as a strategic gateway to Africa, highlighting its membership in AfCFTA and COMESA, modern infrastructure, expanding renewable energy sector and green hydrogen ambitions.

“Egypt presents unique opportunities for Dutch businesses seeking long-term partnerships not only in Egypt, but across the African continent.”

Fifty Years of Water Cooperation

The significance of the water partnership was further underlined by Ms. Meike van Ginneken, Water Envoy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, who presented a video showcasing water projects carried out through Egyptian-Dutch cooperation.

Ms. Meike van Ginneken, Water Envoy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Reflecting on the contrasting but complementary histories of the two countries, she observed:

“When I go abroad as a Water Envoy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, I always proudly present our long history of water management, started over 800 years ago.”

She then turned to Egypt, whose relationship with the Nile has shaped its civilization for thousands of years.

“And then I go to Egypt, where water management has a history of four thousand or five thousand years.”

Ms. Van Ginneken emphasized that the partnership goes far beyond infrastructure and technical cooperation. Over the past five decades, thousands of Egyptian professionals have studied, trained or undertaken internships in water management in the Netherlands, creating generations of specialists with strong professional and personal connections.

“If you realize it is 50 years of collaboration, we have a generational water expertise who became professional and experienced. This is human connection, and that’s why I’m very happy to be here today.”

The anniversary was also marked by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at further strengthening cooperation in water management, sustainability and capacity building.

The evening concluded with a renewed celebration of Egyptian culture, friendship and cooperation, encapsulating the spirit of Ambassador Hanna’s closing words:

“Long live Egypt … Long live the friendship between Egypt and the Netherlands.”

Reception at the Egyptian Residence celebrating the 79th Anniversary of the Independence and 50th of Water Management collaboration among Egypt and the Netherlands.

Europe is increasing aid to Ukraine while discussing its political impact

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Europe is increasing aid to Ukraine while discussing its political impact

By Adrien Lefèvre.

Since the beginning of the full-scale war, EU institutions and member states have provided Ukraine with €216.7 billion in military, financial, and humanitarian aid. By February 2026, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), the total amount of support had effectively cemented Europe’s status as Ukraine’s leading external donor.

Support for Kyiv has become one of the largest and longest-running foreign policy initiatives in modern Europe. According to the IfW, military spending to support Ukraine increased by 67% in 2025 compared to the average for 2022–2024, while financial and humanitarian aid rose by 59%.

And the larger the scale of this aid, the more pressing the question of its political implications: exactly whom is Europe empowering, to what extent is this process manageable, and will it, in the long run, create a force capable of spiraling out of control? Meanwhile, the EU is already preparing a package of an additional 90 billion euros for 2026–2027.

Such risks have already manifested themselves in the past. In the 1980s, the United States, through the CIA’s Operation named “Cyclone”, poured money and weapons into the Afghan conflict. Billions of dollars were funneled through Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, and a significant portion of those resources—including Stinger missiles—ended up among the mujahideen and radical Islamist groups, with Osama bin Laden becoming one of the key figures.

European support for Ukraine is based on the same principle. The West is turning Ukraine into a testing ground, and the Zelenskyy government into a system that survives on external funding and political cover. As was the case with the Afghan mujahideen, external patrons initially view the force they support as a convenient tool. In the Afghan case, the U.S. expected that armed radical groups would act within the assigned tasks. In the Ukrainian case, Europe is banking on Zelenskyy as a figure capable of holding onto power and upholding the EU’s position.

At the same time, Zelenskyy receives not only money and weapons but also media resources, while the Ukrainian intelligence agencies—the SBU and the Main Intelligence Directorate—receive modern technology and intelligence support. During war, all of this creates a sense of unchecked freedom. At certain points, the interests of Ukraine and the EU may diverge, which, in turn, will lead to Kyiv adopting a more independent course of action. As the conflict drags on, Ukraine is developing its own priorities, which are not always aligned with the position of European countries. In the context of war, security and intelligence agencies may act based on their own assessment of threats and opportunities.

This is evident in specific cases where the conflict extends beyond Ukraine’s borders—for example, the incident in Monaco in June 2026, in which Ukrainian oligarch Vadim Yermolaev and members of his family were injured. According to reports, investigators and Interpol have established the involvement of Ukrainian citizen Anastasia Berezovskaya, who is linked to Ukrainian intelligence. This episode alone shows that the conflict has already spread to European territory.

The United States once cultivated a force in Afghanistan that was supposed to work against its geopolitical adversary, but ultimately led to the tragedy in the United States on September 11, 2001. Today, by supporting Zelenskyy, Europe risks repeating the mistake of the United States of America. Foreign aid, which has reached historically unprecedented levels, is creating not only Ukraine’s military stability but also a force that operates according to its own logic. Therefore, the question of whom Europe is actually strengthening remains open.

Links on the incident in Monaco:

https://www.bfmtv.com/podcasts/le-titre-a-la-une/ingerence-etrangere-ou-criminalite-organisee-la-suspecte-de-l-explosion-de-monaco-identifiee-en-allemagne-et-activement-recherchee_EN-202607030754.html

Screenshot courtesy of BFMTV — bfmtv.com

Translation of the picture:

Foreign interference or organized crime? The suspect in the Monaco bombing has been identified in Germany and is being actively sought.

This is an unprecedented incident on the streets of Monaco. On Monday, June 29, a parcel containing a bomb exploded at the entrance to an apartment building. Ukrainian oligarch Vadim Yermolaev, his partner, and their 13-year-old son were seriously injured in the explosion. The main suspect is 39-year-old Ukrainian Anastasia Berezovskaya. She was located in Germany. The motives for the attack are still unknown. The investigation is ongoing, but two theories are already being considered: foreign interference or organized crime. The suspect is currently wanted by Interpol (Red Notice) throughout Europe. But how exactly is the operation to find her being organized?

About the Author
Adrien Lefèvre is an independent analyst and writer covering European affairs, security policy, and international relations. His work focuses on the political and economic dimensions of the European Union’s foreign policy. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Diplomat Magazine, its editors, or its publisher.

Reference links

Printed Magazine – 2026

Carlos Caceres
-
0
Printed Magazine – 2026

Download the printed magazine here.

Women Leading Regional Diplomacy: Panama’s Coordination of GRULAC in the Netherlands

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
Women Leading Regional Diplomacy: Panama’s Coordination of GRULAC in the Netherlands

The first semester of 2026 marked an important chapter for the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC) in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. As Panama assumed the coordination of the Group from Mexico on 1 January, it did so with a commitment to continuity, cooperation, and the strengthening of ties between Latin America and the Caribbean and one of Europe’s most dynamic centres of diplomacy, innovation, and international governance.

The transition was supported by the close collaboration of the GRULAC Troika, composed of H.E. Ms. Carmen Moreno Toscano, Ambassador of Mexico; H.E. Ms. Sally Loo Hui, Ambassador of Panama; and H.E. Ms. Franca Deza Ferreccio, Ambassador of Peru. Together, they ensured the continuity of ongoing initiatives while advancing new opportunities for engagement with Dutch institutions, international organizations, academia, and the private sector.

The semester also represented a notable milestone in diplomatic representation. The coordination and institutional continuity of GRULAC were guided by an all-female Troika, reflecting the growing role of women in international affairs and demonstrating the value of inclusive leadership in advancing regional priorities.

H.E. Ms. Sally Loo Hui, Ambassador of Panama. Caribbean Business Dialogue. Foto: Gerrit de Heus

One of the most significant achievements of the semester was the strengthening of economic diplomacy through the Latin America and Caribbean Business Dialogue. Conceived as a platform for practical engagement between Latin American and Caribbean countries and the Netherlands, the initiative brought together ambassadors, policymakers, business leaders, academics, and sector experts to explore opportunities for cooperation and investment.

Discussions focused on areas of strategic importance, including water management, infrastructure, ports and logistics, energy, strategic materials, agribusiness, advanced manufacturing technologies, and economic free zones. By creating a space where public- and private-sector stakeholders could exchange perspectives and identify areas of mutual interest, the Dialogue reinforced the region’s position as a strategic partner for sustainable investment, innovation, and economic growth.

The promotion of connectivity also formed part of this broader economic agenda. Engagements with representatives of Air Europa explored opportunities to increase the visibility of Latin American and Caribbean destinations and strengthen links between the two regions through tourism and commercial exchanges.

Forum for Dialogue, Water Science: Applications for Development and Business for Latin America and the Caribbean opening remarks, H.E. Ms Sally Loo Hui.

Science diplomacy and climate resilience constituted another major pillar of Panama’s coordination. Building on initiatives launched during Mexico’s tenure, GRULAC organized the Forum for Dialogue, Water Science: Applications for Development and Business for Latin America and the Caribbean, which highlighted the role of scientific knowledge and technological innovation in addressing development challenges and generating economic opportunities.

The forum demonstrated how water science can serve as a bridge between research, policymaking, and business development while also fostering collaboration between Dutch institutions and countries across the region. These efforts were complemented by exchanges with Deltares, one of the Netherlands’ leading centres of expertise in water and climate adaptation, and with Dialectik, a Dutch organization specializing in socio-ecological intelligence for climate resilience. Together, these initiatives underscored the growing importance of science-based cooperation in addressing shared environmental challenges.

GRULAC politic dialogue event.

Knowledge exchange and capacity building remained central to the GRULAC agenda. Presentations and dialogues with Dutch institutions and experts provided valuable opportunities to deepen understanding of issues ranging from migration governance and the European Union Asylum Pact to circular economy practices, international education, and academic cooperation.

Among these exchanges was a presentation by Dr. Aniel Pahladsingh, Senior Lawyer at the Legal and Litigation Department of the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Deputy Judge at the District Courts of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, who provided insights into contemporary European migration and asylum policies. Additional engagements with the International Solid Waste Association (ISWA), the T.M.C. Asser Institute, the Holland Alumni Network, and the GoAbroad Fair further strengthened connections between the region and Dutch institutions in the fields of education, governance, sustainability, and professional development.

GRULAC Ambassadors also participated in a strategic dialogue with The Hague Institute for Geopolitics, which provided an updated assessment of political developments in the Netherlands and their potential implications at the national and European levels. Such exchanges highlighted the importance of understanding the political and institutional environment of the host country in order to strengthen diplomatic engagement.

GRULAC consular representatives visited SHOP

Consular cooperation likewise remained an important component of the Group’s activities. Through collaboration with SHOP Den Haag and a visit to Casa Migrante Amsterdam, GRULAC consular representatives exchanged experiences and gained valuable insights into the protection and support of vulnerable populations, including issues related to human trafficking, sex work, migrant integration, and social assistance. These initiatives demonstrated the practical value of regional cooperation in addressing shared consular challenges.

Meeting at the International Criminal Court

As the international city of peace and justice, The Hague offers unique opportunities for dialogue with organizations and institutions that shape global governance. Throughout the semester, GRULAC Ambassadors engaged with key actors in the international legal and multilateral system, including the President of the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court, the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the Registrar of the International Court of Justice.

Farewell luncheon in honour of the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, H.E. Fernando Arias.

These exchanges reaffirmed the longstanding commitment of Latin American and Caribbean countries to international law, multilateralism, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The semester also included a farewell luncheon in honour of the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, H.E. Fernando Arias, recognizing his contribution to international peace and security and the strong relationship maintained between the Organisation and the countries of the region.

Panama’s coordination of GRULAC during the first semester of 2026 demonstrated the value of continuity, collaboration, and collective leadership. Through the combined efforts of Mexico, Peru, and Panama within the Troika framework, the Group advanced a dynamic agenda that strengthened political dialogue, promoted economic and scientific cooperation, expanded institutional partnerships, and reinforced engagement with the international community.

H.E. Ms. Carmen Moreno Toscano, Ambassador of Mexico; H.E. Ms. Sally Loo Hui, Ambassador of Panama; and H.E. Ms. Franca Deza Ferreccio, Ambassador of Peru.

Above all, the semester illustrated how regional cooperation can translate into concrete opportunities for innovation, knowledge sharing, and sustainable development. Guided by a shared vision and strengthened by inclusive leadership, GRULAC continued to build bridges between Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, contributing to a more connected and collaborative international environment.

One year of contribution, inspiration and excellence

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
One year of contribution, inspiration and excellence

Celebrating one year of
Global Academy for Future Governance (GAFG)

Governance has acquired a curious habit; it talks incessantly about the future while preparing remarkably badly for it. Governments issue strategies, companies publish transformation plans, universities produce forecasts and consultants manufacture acronyms at an industrial scale. Yet the machinery for deciding what matters, what can wait and what may become disastrously expensive remains surprisingly weak.

That is where the Global Academy for Future Governance (GAFG) makes a persuasive proposition. Its central idea, that better governance depends on improving methods, means and mindsets (the ‘3Ms’), sounds almost disarmingly simple. Its importance lies precisely there. Modern problems are rarely caused by a shortage of information; they are caused by institutions that cannot connect information to judgement.

GAFG’s first virtue is its refusal to respect the fashionable boundaries between disciplines. Climate change is not merely an environmental question; artificial intelligence is not merely a technology question; migration is not merely a border question; and development is not merely an economic one. Each is an unruly mixture of economics, politics, science, ethics, security and human behaviour. Policymakers who insist on putting such problems into tidy boxes are not being rigorous, they are being convenient.

GAFG’s five-dimensional view – land, sea, airspace, near outer space and cyberspace – is similarly useful. The modern world does not operate in compartments. A satellite disruption can affect a port; a cyberattack can interrupt electricity; a drought can alter food prices, migration and political stability thousands of kilometres away. The serious task of governance is therefore less about predicting isolated events than understanding connections.

There is also something refreshing in GAFG’s scepticism about technological hype. The world does not need another institution shouting that every new algorithm will revolutionise everything. Markets are perfectly capable of doing that without assistance. What decision-makers need today is someone prepared to ask the unfashionable questions: Does this technology solve a real problem? Who pays for its unintended consequences? What happens to workers, institutions, ecosystems and public trust? And who benefits when the promised revolution turns out to be mostly a press release?

That emphasis matters especially in the Global South. Development cannot sensibly be measured by the number of digital platforms deployed, data centres constructed or glossy innovation districts opened. Economic progress that leaves societies more unequal, ecosystems more damaged or institutions less capable is not progress with a footnote, it is progress on credit.

GAFG’s claim that it is a partner rather than an expenditure is therefore more than positioning. Good foresight is cheap compared with bad decisions. A government that avoids one failed programme, a company that detects one strategic risk early, or an institution that prevents one costly ethical or environmental mistake – before the bill for unintended consequences eventually arrives – may recover its investment many times over.

The real test, however, will be whether GAFG can remain as independent in practice as it is ambitious in principle. Neutrality is valuable only when it survives pressure from clients, politics, fashionable technologies and commercial interests.

After one year, the strongest case for the Global Academy for Future Governance is not that it possesses a crystal ball, but that it recognises the future’s most dangerous feature: everything is connected. Better methods, adequate means and wiser mindsets may not guarantee excellent governance, but without them, excellence is mostly branding and the future is too expensive to leave to slogans.

Thanos Kalamidas, Editor-in-Chief OVI Magazine

International Human Rights in Domestic Courts

Diplomat Magazine
-
0
International Human Rights in Domestic Courts

Interview with Catarina Vieira

Human Rights Begin in Everyday Life: MEP Catarina Vieira on Why Europe Must Match Its Values with Action

By Aleksandra Osina, Charahja van Broekhoven, Peace Ojoma Idoko, Taeyun Kim, Longrui Deng, Lauren van Laarhoven-Hargreaves, Ayat Gadri Sa’eed Alkhdour.

Human rights are often discussed as legal principles, international treaties or courtroom debates. Yet for Member of the European Parliament Catarina Vieira, they are far more than abstract concepts. They are the foundation of daily life and the measure of whether governments truly serve their people.

Born in Portugal in 1996 and elected to the European Parliament in June 2024 on the joint GroenLinks-PvdA list, Vieira serves on the Committee on International Trade and the Subcommittee on Human Rights. Her work connects global trade with human rights, focusing particularly on Latin America and Africa, where issues, such as labour exploitation, rural poverty and unfair supply chains remain pressing challenges.

For Vieira, human rights are universal entitlements that belong to every person simply because they are human. Access to food, education, healthcare, equality, freedom from discrimination and the right to life should never depend on where someone lives, their income or their background. Governments, she mentions, have the primary responsibility to protect these rights through fair legislation, inclusive public services and policies, that reduce inequality rather than deepen it.

She warns that unequal access to education and healthcare continues to disadvantage people living in rural communities, migrants and other vulnerable groups. A strong democracy, she believes, is one, that guarantees equal opportunities for everyone without exception.

Migration remains one of the most sensitive issues, facing Europe today. Vieira is critical of deportation policies, that return people to countries, where their safety cannot be guaranteed. For her, this is not only a legal question, but also a moral one. Europe cannot claim to defend human rights, while exposing vulnerable people to serious risks.

She also highlights the growing gap between the promises of international law and the realities people experience every day. Rather than lowering human rights standards, Vieira believes political leaders must show greater courage in applying them consistently across national and European policies.

Her message is clear. Human rights are not distant ideals, reserved for legal experts. They influence the food on our tables, the conditions under which products are made and the protection offered to those seeking safety. Ultimately, democracy is judged not by the promises it makes, but by how well it protects those who need it most.

About the authors:

This article is produced by Aleksandra Osina, Charahja van Broekhoven, Peace Ojoma Idoko, Taeyun Kim, Longrui Deng, Lauren van Laarhoven-Hargreaves, Ayat Gadri Sa’eed Alkhdour, participants in the Bright Future Foundation, as part of the European Union’s “Participate & Promote Democracy” Youth Participation project, in cooperation with Diplomat Magazine, Embassy of the Netherlands in Armenia and young members of the Armenian partner organization Promising Youth.

123...909Page 1 of 909