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Uruguayan Independence Day Celebrated in The Hague

The Embassy of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay marked his country’s Independence Day with a grand and festive reception. Held on August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague, the event drew over 200 distinguished guests from various sectors of Dutch society.

Ambassadors, chiefs of international missions, diplomats, academics, business leaders, and representatives from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with members of the Uruguayan community, all responded to H.E. Ambassador Dr. Álvaro GonzĂĄlez Otero’s invitation to celebrate ‘DĂ­a de la Independencia’—Uruguay’s National Day, commemorating its independence from Brazil in 1825.

H.E. Dr. Álvaro Gonzålez Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay. National Day 2024 The Hague.

After nearly 200 years of conflict and civil unrest under Spanish and then Brazilian rule, Uruguay has emerged as a country renowned for its welcoming people, stunning landscapes, first-class meat production, and high-quality wine. In recent decades, Uruguayans have enjoyed a stable democracy, a steady improvement in living conditions, and overall well-being.

In a packed room with an animated audience, Ambassador GonzĂĄlez Otero took the microphone to thank all the attendees for their sincere affection for his people and country. He then proudly expressed:

“Two years have quickly passed since I arrived in this lovely kingdom. Since then, we have started to shift the focus of the Embassy, placing more emphasis on our bilateral relations. The Netherlands and Uruguay have more in common than people might imagine. We share international principles, landscapes, agricultural production, developed services, qualified exports, and a progressive lifestyle.

We also share strong commitments to the well-being of our citizens and visitors, the protection of human rights, environmental sustainability, progressive social policies, and significant efforts towards renewable energy and climate action. Both countries also emphasize education, democratic governance, and active participation in international organizations promoting peace and development. So, we will keep working to boost our bilateral relations.”

Uruguay National Day, August 27 at the Leonardo Royal Hotel in The Hague.
From the Embassy of Uruguay, Counsellor Pablo Bayarres, Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Hans Akerboom, Deputy Director Protocol and Host Country Affairs from the Netherlands.

Ambassador GonzĂĄlez Otero then listed some of the most relevant initiatives undertaken by the Embassy over the last few months:

Uruguayan participation in the World Hydrogen Summit 2024: Led by the Minister of Industry, Energy, and Mining, Ms. Elisa Facio, with over 50 representatives from various sectors of the public and private sectors.

Active participation in the “26th World Energy Congress.”

Cooperation Project with Delft Institute for Water Education: Since 2011, Uruguayan professionals specializing in water resources have participated in the Delft Institute program for advanced training. Initially, the program began with 40 scholarships, resulting in 37 professionals successfully completing their studies. This early success led to the program’s relocation and implementation at the Technological University of Uruguay, now featuring regional participation. The program has since had two new editions in 2022 and 2024, expanding to include 17 professionals from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. This development has transformed Uruguay into a regional hub in the field of water resource education.

Uruguay’s status as one of the 32 signing states of the Ljubljana – The Hague Convention in February 2024.

Positioning Uruguay as a potential living and working destination for Dutch farmers.

Interactions with RVO and Port of Rotterdam related to port cooperation.

Exploring and initiating new cooperation projects with Westland Municipality and Wageningen University.

Meetings with private sector actors related to agribusiness.

Preparation for the Capitan Miranda’s visit to Amsterdam: Uruguay’s school tall ship has already confirmed its participation in Sail Amsterdam 2025.

Multilateral achievements: The Embassy has made progress in multilateral areas, including ongoing contributions and work with international organizations based in The Hague: the ICJ, ICC, OPCW, HCCH, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Additionally, a closer relationship with The Hague Academy of International Law has been pursued. Significant advances have also been made through the coordinated work of the GRULAC Group in relation to various international organizations.

H.E. Mr. Fernando Arias, OPCW Director General , Ambassador Gonzalez Otero and Mr Arias spouse, Patricia van Oordt.

Following his remarks, Ambassador González Otero invited the audience to watch a short video about Uruguay, which made a great impression on those present. He expressed, “Uruguay is an exceptional country that has developed a dynamic and robust culture, shaped by a fascinating blend of gaucho traditions, European influences, and the unique Rioplatense spirit. Tango, folklore, candombe, and milonga are examples of its rich artistic musical expression. Uruguayan gastronomy, featuring high-quality meat, wine, and dairy products, especially the beloved ‘dulce de leche,’ delights palates and consistently wins prestigious awards worldwide.”

“The work we have done does not mean we are satisfied; we want to continue advancing in a deeper process. The bilateral relationship is already strong, but the potential to strengthen bonds in several key areas is even greater.”

The Ambassador of Uruguay, H.E. Alvaro Gonzalez Otero and the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Graciela Gatti Santana with her husband Mr Gustavo Segovia.

The event was conceived to showcase the rich and diverse culture of Uruguay, a nation with a population of approximately 3,495,527 as of 2022.

The national anthems of Uruguay and the Netherlands were performed by the Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos. After the ambassador’s speech, the Embassy paid tribute to two influential musicians: JosĂ© “El Sabalero” Carbajal and Jaime Roos, who both lived in the Netherlands. Jaime Roos settled in Amsterdam in 1978, where he played bass in several salsa, rock, and jazz groups. He had a son and remained in the Netherlands until 1984 when he returned to Uruguay.

Carbajal spent his days in the Netherlands with his wife, Anke van Haastrecht, and their two children. Anke was invited to share some special stories from their life together.

Uruguayan opera singer Sara de los Campos.
Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and NicolĂĄs SĂĄnchez.

The enthusiastic audience enjoyed an authentic performance by talented Uruguayan drummers Luis Gradin, Marcelo Terra, and NicolĂĄs SĂĄnchez. The celebration continued with Uruguayan wine, classic savory empanadas, and dulce de leche, which delighted the crowded room and completed the great celebration.

Ambassador GonzĂĄlez Otero concluded the event by thanking his Embassy team: Counselor Pablo Bayarres, Chancellor Gustavo Morales, his assistant Juan Diego, and Martha HernĂĄndez and SofĂ­a Anastasiou. He then led a warm toast for the people of the Netherlands, Uruguay, and the necessary and desired peace in the world.

China: A New Actor in the Contemporary Multipolar World

By Mariarosaria Iorio, Political Analyst

I. The post-cold war world  

International relations are nowadays characterised by major changes that started at the end of the 80s with the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Indeed, the end of the cold war was marked by the dislocation of the two main political blocks, namely the Soviet Union and the Western World. Such a dislocation resulted in the marginalization of the post-war multilateral system embodied in the United Nations, and the standstill of the multilateral trade negotiations in the late 90s in the context of the World Trade Organisation.  New lines of political thought have been facing each other since then, while reshaping the post-cold war world in a number of fragmented and variable sub-blocks of countries. 

The United States decided to put itself first by concentrating on its internal affairs, while withdrawing from international affairs.  

Europe, the old continent, looks for an efficient strategy towards autonomy from the United States.  Europe also tries, not without difficulty, to create a more cohesive internal and external political approach.  The reality is however evolving rather more towards fragmentation of Europe in favour of European National fragmented interests. Such a fragmentation is the natural consequence of the decadence of the European Institutional and collective actions to the advantage of individual Sates actions and interests.   In sum, what seemed to be a structured and coherent European Union block fighting for the promotion of its economic and political values all over the world has somehow become an alliance at variable geometry both internally and externally.  The disorganisation of the leadership results in a chaotic and unpredictable European External and Internal action. 

Thereof, the empty influence spaces left on the international relations scene has given new international actors the opportunity to emerge.  

Meanwhile, the fragmentation of the European Institutions has also impacted the EU-USA relations within NATO, and affected the security and peace sphere.  Security issues have been on and off on the European agenda.    

In this context, Russia that has lost its empire in the 80s looks now for a new power game. In spite of the disruption of the Soviet Union, Russia attempts either by influence or by force to exercise power in its ancient affiliate countries.  Russia that was supposed to be defeated with the fall of the Berlin Wall takes back its role of opponent to the Western World on the international scene at least as it concerns the international affairs philosophy.  Thus, creating a tension aimed at restoring its power in the world.   

The group of emerging and developing economies that constitute a new variable block with a large portion of population employed in agriculture have emerged as new actors in the world’s geo-political discourses.  At the head of this block on the international scene, there is China.  The shaky international leadership context has indeed given China a new space. China’s   communist past combined with its market-based economic strategy gives it a particular position.  

China is The One that can communicate to Russia. China is also The One that can have an influence on the Western economic and political scene as China owns a big part of Western Foreign Debt  

China embeds a horizontal strategy in both its trade and development policies, while producing at low wages.  Its production system coupled with its pragmatic political approach has reshaped the international power structure.  The top-down approach of the Western World faces now the competition created by the horizontal win-win approach proposed by China in both developing and industrialized countries.

Indeed, as a result of the decline of the Western World global hegemony based on market access and economic and social liberalism as a means to ensure economic growth and promote economic development, the vision promoted by China’s discourse, centred on the protection of livelihoods and local sovereign choices finds new adepts.  Furthermore, China has successfully attempted to promote a trade-off approach to international cooperation during the last 20 years.  A cooperation that does not interfere in internal affairs of partner countries as it has often reproached to the Western countries involved in international cooperation.  

As the developing countries leader, China positions itself as the spoke country for the poor.  As a new world powerful economic actor China plays as the guarantor of the Western Economic stability.  China positions itself as the bridge between the rich and the poor.  It is representing a different hegemonic game that only changes in its discourse, while still pursuing its own interests and influence zones.  Such a situation poses the question of the values that the international regime wants to embrace.  Indeed, this changing world results in an increased number of conflicts – be new or historical conflicts.  

The dislocation of the traditional leaders of the international relations has definitely created a chaotic and unpredictable scenario.  Chaos has in some cases been chosen as a political strategy to disrupt the post-1945 international regime. Such a disruption has benefitted new actors, and given space to new lines of thought.  These new lines of thought have attacked the existing international framework but has not yet succeeded in creating a new regime.  The increasing unbalance of power and the lack of leadership on the international political scene is risky. 

The reduction by choice of leadership of the United States has indeed resulted in the weakening of the values emerged as a result of the dramatic experience of Second World War, namely freedom of thought and freedom of speech to mention only a few.   We are now facing a much more authoritarian world with force used as a means to manage the political arena.  Dialogue seems to be a rather consuming exercise that has left its place to the use of force.  Force is no longer seen as the last option but rather the opening act for political dialogue.  Nationalism and individual interests are now at the centre of the political game. This trend is taking the world to instability and conflict.  

The peoples of the world are more and more questioning the existing system. People’s needs and expectations are not met.  The new emerged actors, such as China have given the hope of a possible change in the present international system without fundamentally questioning its rationale but rather trying to rip a slate of the cake.  

The struggle for influence among countries has not succeeded in building a peaceful and stable world. Citizens will have to face the challenge of building a new era of peace and stability worldwide.

DerriĂšre les murs du Palais de la Paix : permanence et changements de la Cour internationale de Justice

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S.E. M. Philippe Couvreur est arrivĂ© Ă  La Haye en avril 1982, oĂč il a d’abord occupĂ© le poste d’assistant spĂ©cial aux bureaux du greffier et du greffier adjoint de la Cour internationale de Justice.

Il a ensuite exercĂ© les fonctions de SecrĂ©taire, Premier SecrĂ©taire et SecrĂ©taire juridique principal, avant d’ĂȘtre Ă©lu Greffier de la Cour en 2000, et réélu en 2007 et 2014. Pour marquer l’anniversaire de ses dĂ©buts Ă  la Cour, il y a 35 ans, Diplomat Magazine l’a invitĂ© Ă  tĂ©moigner de son expĂ©rience unique au service de cette institution, des Ă©volutions qu’il a pu y observer, et Ă  partager le regard qu’il porte sur les changements qui ont marquĂ© la Cour et La Haye au cours des trois derniĂšres dĂ©cennies.
Philippe Couvreur avec le Pape Jean-Paul II prise le 13 mai 1985.
Je suis arrivĂ© Ă  La Haye en avril 1982 — de façon aussi inattendue que j’avais entamĂ© des Ă©tudes de droit treize ans auparavant (mais c’est lĂ  une autre histoire
) — pour occuper un poste temporaire Ă  la Cour internationale de Justice. La Cour Ă©tait alors la seule institution judiciaire internationale existante au plan universel. Son activitĂ©, particuliĂšrement faible Ă  la fin des annĂ©es 1970, ne pouvait en ce temps-lĂ  guĂšre laisser prĂ©sager du succĂšs que rencontrerait la Cour dans les dĂ©cennies Ă  venir. Mon bienveillant maĂźtre de Louvain, le professeur Paul de Visscher, fils du cĂ©lĂšbre internationaliste Charles de Visscher, unique juge belge Ă  la Cour, m’avait prĂ©dit des jours aussi sereins qu’heureux, Ă©coulĂ©s Ă  lire et Ă  Ă©crire des ouvrages dans la solitude des imposants murs de la bibliothĂšque du Palais de la Paix

Les mĂ©moires ont Ă©tĂ© dĂ»ment dĂ©posĂ©s dans l’affaire El Salvador c. Honduras dans la salle Bol le 1 juin 1988, l’affaire du DiffĂ©rend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime.
En rejoignant la Cour, un frais matin d’avril, dont je garde un souvenir trĂšs prĂ©cis, le jeune juriste que j’étais dĂ©couvrit, non sans Ă©tonnement, une organisation de taille trĂšs modeste, le Greffe, qui en est l’organe administratif, alors composĂ© de moins d’une quarantaine de fonctionnaires. Le fonctionnement de la Cour reposait entiĂšrement sur cette Ă©quipe restreinte de personnel permanent, auquel s’ajoutait, selon que de besoin, un personnel temporaire pour faire face au surcroĂźt de travaux linguistiques et de stĂ©nodactylographie lors des sessions (publiques et privĂ©es) de la Cour. Je me rappelle avoir Ă©tĂ© frappĂ© par la personnalitĂ© haute en couleur de certains de ces traducteurs indĂ©pendants, dont la grande culture littĂ©raire m’émerveillait. Cette structure trĂšs Ă©conomique du Greffe impliquait une grande polyvalence de ses membres, et les SecrĂ©taires de la Cour — ses fonctionnaires supĂ©rieurs — Ă©taient appelĂ©s, en sus de leurs travaux de recherches juridiques, de prĂ©paration des documents de la Cour, et de rĂ©daction de la correspondance diplomatique, Ă  assumer eux-mĂȘmes l’essentiel des tĂąches linguistiques (traduction et interprĂ©tation) et d’information, ainsi que la supervision de nombreuses activitĂ©s administratives et logistiques.
La Grande salle de Justice, l’affaire Relative au Timor Oriental (Portugal c. Australie) ArrĂȘt du 30 juin 1995.
Il n’était nullement rare qu’un nouveau venu comme moi ait Ă  passer week-ends et nuits blanches au Palais de la Paix Ă  effectuer les travaux les plus divers
 allant jusqu’à imprimer et polycopier, sur de vieilles machines Ă  stencils ronĂ©otype, des dĂ©cisions dont la Cour devait donner la lecture en sĂ©ance publique le lendemain ! DĂšs mon arrivĂ©e au Greffe, j’ai eu le bonheur et le privilĂšge d’ĂȘtre initiĂ© et associĂ© Ă  l’ensemble des fonctions de l’institution sous la patiente supervision de personnalitĂ©s d’exception, tels que MM. Torres BernĂĄrdez et Pillepich, alors respectivement Greffier et Greffier adjoint. J’en ai retirĂ© le plus grand bĂ©nĂ©fice, puisque cette immersion sans prĂ©paration dans toutes les facettes de l’activitĂ© du Greffe m’a permis d’acquĂ©rir de ce dernier une connaissance unique — de l’intĂ©rieur — et sous tous ses aspects —, un acquis particuliĂšrement prĂ©cieux au moment oĂč j’ai Ă©tĂ© amenĂ©, bien des annĂ©es plus tard, Ă  assumer la dĂ©licate responsabilitĂ© d’en assurer la gestion au plus haut niveau. Devenir un fonctionnaire du Greffe au dĂ©but des annĂ©es 1980 signifiait accepter de se couler sans discussion dans un moule Ă  tous Ă©gards exigeant, et se donner corps et Ăąme, avec humilitĂ© et discrĂ©tion, Ă  l’institution, sans penser Ă  soi ni parler de soi. Depuis ces annĂ©es d’initiation, j’ai Ă©tĂ© le tĂ©moin de profondes transformations de la Cour, rendues inĂ©vitables Ă  la fois pour rĂ©pondre Ă  l’accroissement considĂ©rable de ses activitĂ©s, avec la disparition du monde bipolaire qui avait relĂ©guĂ© le rĂšglement judiciaire Ă  un rĂŽle quelque peu marginal, et pour saisir les opportunitĂ©s nouvelles offertes, notamment, par le progrĂšs des technologies et de la communication. Entre 1982 et aujourd’hui, le nombre de fonctionnaires a ainsi presque triplĂ© (il a quasiment doublĂ© depuis l’an 2000, annĂ©e de ma premiĂšre Ă©lection en tant que Greffier). L’organisation du travail a Ă©tĂ© progressivement spĂ©cialisĂ©e entre les divers dĂ©partements, juridique, linguistique et chargĂ© de l’information, qui furent créés en 1997, et les services techniques. Par ailleurs, les Membres de la Cour ne disposĂšrent pas, pendant longtemps, de « rĂ©fĂ©rendaires » — ils s’y sont d’ailleurs longtemps refusĂ©s—, et l’assistance apportĂ©e aux juges en matiĂšre judiciaire Ă©tait principalement rĂ©partie entre les fonctionnaires du DĂ©partement des affaires juridiques.
H.E. Philippe Couvreur avec la Reine Beatrix photo prise pendant le 50 eme anniversaire de la Cour (18-04-1996).
Les cinq premiers postes de juristes rĂ©fĂ©rendaires ne furent obtenus de l’AssemblĂ©e gĂ©nĂ©rale et créés qu’en 2002, Ă  l’issue de difficiles nĂ©gociations que je me souviens avoir menĂ©es avec beaucoup de plaisir et d’intĂ©rĂȘt ; le nombre de ces postes s’est progressivement accru, pour s’élever Ă  quinze aujourd’hui. Les divers dĂ©veloppements qui ont marquĂ© le monde au cours des derniĂšres dĂ©cennies n’ont pas manquĂ© de soulever pour la Cour de nouveaux dĂ©fis. Comme c’est le cas pour toute institution, elle n’a pu les relever en faisant table rase des enseignements de son histoire ni, Ă  l’inverse, en ne saisissant pas toutes les opportunitĂ©s offertes par le temps prĂ©sent. A ces diffĂ©rents Ă©gards, la Cour est certainement parvenue, au fil des ans, Ă  assurer un Ă©quilibre, toujours dĂ©licat, entre changements et continuitĂ©. La continuitĂ© de la Cour est bien sĂ»r inscrite dans son Statut, qui fait partie intĂ©grante de la Charte des Nations Unies, et reflĂ©tĂ©e dans ses mĂ©thodes judiciaires, qui ont Ă©tĂ© trĂšs largement Ă©laborĂ©es par sa devanciĂšre, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, et hĂ©ritĂ©es d’elle. Cette continuitĂ© historique Ă©tait particuliĂšrement prĂ©sente lorsque j’ai rejoint le Greffe. Ainsi, en maniĂšre d’anecdote, divers hauts fonctionnaires alors en poste avaient eux-mĂȘmes cĂŽtoyĂ©, au dĂ©but de leur carriĂšre, d’anciens fonctionnaires de la Cour permanente. Tous nourrissaient Ă  l’égard de cette derniĂšre le plus grand respect. Il rĂ©gnait d’ailleurs dans les couloirs du Palais de la Paix une atmosphĂšre feutrĂ©e et dĂ©licieusement surannĂ©e, Ă©vocatrice de la dĂ©funte SociĂ©tĂ© des Nations. Je me souviens en avoir encore utilisĂ© maintes fournitures de bureau ! La continuitĂ© jurisprudentielle et procĂ©durale entre les deux Cours constitue pour les Etats une garantie importante de sĂ©curitĂ© et de prĂ©visibilitĂ© juridiques. Cette continuitĂ©, juridique et historique, de mĂȘme que l’expĂ©rience accumulĂ©e en plus de quatre-vingt-dix ans d’exercice de la fonction judiciaire, sont pour la Cour un facteur crucial de lĂ©gitimitĂ©.
H.E. Philippe Couvreur vec le Roi Willem-Alexander photo prise pendant le 70 eme anniversaire de la Cour (20-04-2016).
En mĂȘme temps, la Cour a eu, Ă  l’évidence, Ă  s’adapter aux changements du monde rĂ©el dans lequel elle opĂšre, comme aux nĂ©cessitĂ©s et opportunitĂ©s nouvelles de chaque Ă©poque traversĂ©e. L’une des transformations notoires auxquelles j’ai assistĂ© fut l’ouverture croissante de la Cour sur l’extĂ©rieur : longtemps Ă  l’écart, Ă  dessein, des organes politiques des Nations Unies, la Cour a souhaitĂ© se faire plus et mieux entendre de ces organes et des Etats membres. Elle a ainsi rompu avec ce qui Ă©tait parfois perçu comme un « splendide isolement » au sein des Nations Unies, mĂȘme si elle dĂ©fend toujours jalousement son autonomie. La Cour doit en outre dĂ©sormais Ă©galement tenir compte des nombreuses autres juridictions, internationales ou rĂ©gionales, qui ont Ă©tĂ© créées ces derniĂšres annĂ©es, et veiller, autant que possible, Ă  assurer l’harmonie du « concert judiciaire » que permet ce foisonnement de cours et tribunaux sur la scĂšne internationale. Davantage ouverte sur la communautĂ© internationale et ses rĂ©alitĂ©s, la Cour s’est montrĂ©e de plus en plus attentive, non seulement Ă  sa place dans l’Organisation des Nations Unies, mais aussi Ă  la poursuite des objectifs de celle-ci et Ă  sa mission propre au service du rĂšglement pacifique des diffĂ©rends internationaux. Des diffĂ©rends de plus en plus complexes, tant juridiquement que factuellement, en mĂȘme temps que politiquement plus denses, lui ont Ă©tĂ© soumis. En rĂ©visant constamment, selon que de besoin, ses mĂ©thodes de travail, elle a su les rĂ©soudre rapidement et efficacement, Ă  un coĂ»t particuliĂšrement modeste pour la communautĂ© internationale, tout en assurant le dĂ©veloppement du droit. Enfin, pour conclure sur une note plus prosaĂŻque, mais qui est loin d’ĂȘtre nĂ©gligeable, je ne peux taire la chance que j’ai eue de connaĂźtre l’extraordinaire dĂ©veloppement de la ville de La Haye au cours des 35 derniĂšres annĂ©es. Celle-ci offre aujourd’hui Ă  la Cour, comme aux nombreuses institutions internationales qui s’y sont installĂ©es Ă  sa suite, une qualitĂ© de vie et un cadre de travail uniques, qui sont trĂšs loin de ressembler Ă  ce que j’ai trouvĂ© en y arrivant. A l’image de l’imposante stature du Palais de la Paix oĂč elle siĂšge, symbole mondialement connu de la justice internationale, la Cour est une institution solidement Ă©tablie. En dĂ©pit des pĂ©riodes de doute ou de dĂ©saffection qu’elle a traversĂ©es par le passĂ©, son rĂŽle est unanimement saluĂ© au sein de la communautĂ© internationale et le recours Ă  ses services par les Etats n’a jamais Ă©tĂ© aussi soutenu. 35 ans aprĂšs, je continue de mesurer chaque jour le privilĂšge qui est le mien de servir au mieux de mes capacitĂ©s l’organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies. —– Les photos dans l’article sont une courtoisie de la Cour International de Justice.

TĂŒrkiye Tulip Tribute and Children’s Day : the “Anadolu” Tulip

The Hague, 23 April 2025 – The Embassy of the Republic of TĂŒrkiye was a lively scene of celebration today, as H.E. Mr. Selçuk Ünal, Ambassador of TĂŒrkiye to the Netherlands, hosted a warm ceremony to unveil a special tulip variety named “Anadolu.” The event, rich with symbolism and national pride, also honored the 105th anniversary of the founding of the Grand National Assembly of TĂŒrkiye and National Sovereignty and Children’s Day, a very dear holiday in Turkish culture.

The tulip, aptly named “Anadolu” (Anatolia), blooms in the resplendent red and white colors of the Turkish flag. It is the final creation in a commemorative trilogy of tulips developed in cooperation with Royal Anthos and Smit Flowers to mark important moments in modern Turkish history.

In his remarks, Ambassador Ünal welcomed a diverse gathering of diplomats, Turkish families, business representatives from the floriculture sector, and special young guests. “Anadolu is more than just a geographical name,” he said. “It symbolizes resilience, wisdom, and rebirth.” The Ambassador’s speech underscored the close, nearly five-century-long ties between TĂŒrkiye and the Netherlands, highlighting mutual respect and continued collaboration, particularly in horticulture and diplomacy.

Today’s event took place in the Embassy’s historic premises, which themselves reflect the longstanding Turkish presence in The Hague. The festive atmosphere was enriched with children’s activities, and the shared joy of cultural celebration. Families involved in tulip growing, breeding, and exporting mingled with members of the diplomatic corps, enjoying the beauty of the new tulip and the warmth of the Turkish community.

Children held a place of honor, as 23 April is celebrated across TĂŒrkiye as National Sovereignty and Children’s Day. Originally dedicated by Mustafa Kemal AtatĂŒrk to the children of the world, the day promotes peace and a vision of the future built on youthful promise. In TĂŒrkiye, children from around the globe are invited to take part in official events, and this spirit of inclusion was mirrored today in The Hague.

Ambassador Ünal reminded guests that this tulip is a tribute to the past and a seed of hope: “By naming this tulip ‘Anadolu,’ we plant inspiration for generations to come.” He extended heartfelt thanks to Royal Anthos, Smit Flowers, Bostbloembollen, Max Com BV, and the Royal General Bulb Growers’ Association (KAVB) for making the project possible.

The “Anadolu” tulip now joins “Kızılırmak” and “Gelibolu” as emblematic blossoms of Turkish pride and Dutch-Turkish friendship.

Pope Francis: A Final Goodbye to the First American Pope

A chapter in the history of the Roman Catholic Church has drawn to a close. The world is mourning the passing of Pope Francis, the first American pontiff, who died on April 21, 2025.

Known for his humility, reformist spirit, and global influence, Pope Francis will be laid to rest on Saturday, April 26, at 10:00 a.m. in St. Peter’s Square, Vatican City. Thousands of faithful have already begun filing past his body, which lies in state at St. Peter’s Basilica. For three days, the Vatican is hosting a period of solemn prayer and recollection.

The funeral is expected to be attended by a significant contingent of world leaders, including U.S. President Donald Trump, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — underscoring Francis’s far-reaching diplomatic legacy. Following the funeral, Pope Francis will be buried at the Basilica of Santa Maria Maggiore, fulfilling his wish for a resting place outside the traditional Vatican tombs.

A Papacy of Firsts Pope Francis, born Jorge Mario Bergoglio in Argentina, made history as the first pope from the Americas, the first Jesuit pope, and a leader who shifted the Church’s tone toward one of inclusivity and social justice. His tenure was marked by bold stances on climate change, economic inequality, and migration.

Now, with the Holy See entering the period known as the Sede Vacante or “empty see,” the governance of the Vatican has passed to the Camerlengo, USA Cardinal Kevin Farrell. His responsibilities include certifying the pope’s death, sealing the papal apartments, managing the Vatican’s day-to-day operations, and preparing for the conclave that will elect the next Supreme Pontiff.

The Road to the Next Papacy The funeral will be presided over by Italian Cardinal Giovanni Battista Re, the dean of the College of Cardinals. Last February, Pope Francis had extended Cardinal Re’s term beyond the traditional five-year limit, alongside that of Argentine Vice-Dean Cardinal Leonardo Sandri. Cardinal Re will convene the daily general congregations of cardinals, during which the needs of the Church will be assessed and the desired qualities of a future pope deliberated. The conclave, held under strict secrecy in the Sistine Chapel, will follow.

Though the 1975 rules by Pope Paul VI capped the number of cardinal electors at 120, recent popes — including John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis — have exceeded that limit. This upcoming conclave may see between 130 and 145 electors, bolstered by Francis’s nomination of 21 new cardinals in December 2024, potentially tilting the balance toward a more global and progressive vision for the Church.

The Global Stage Awaits As the world bids farewell to Pope Francis, the Church finds itself at a crossroads. With war, forced migration, and new geopolitical forces reshaping the global landscape, the next pontiff will inherit a spiritual institution that must continue to evolve to maintain its relevance and moral authority.

For now, the bells of St. Peter’s Basilica toll in mourning. Pope Francis’s final journey may be drawing to a close, but the path he paved continues to guide millions around the globe.

A History of the Union of the United Kingdom

By Asad Yaseen

England, in the Early Middle Ages, was fragmented into a myriad of Anglo-Saxon Kingdoms known as the Heptarchy. The Seven independent Kingdoms included Wessex, Sussex, Essex, Mercia, Kent, East Anglia and Northumbria.

The Viking raids subdued all of these Kingdoms except Wessex and, partially, Mercia. Alfred the Great strongly resisted the raids and defeated the Vikings in the Battle of Edington (878). The intermarriages between Wessex and Mercia strengthened the position of the Anglo-Saxons.

Athelstan (924-939), however, was the first king to rule the complete land of what today we know as England.

Anglo-Scottish Wars to Great Britain

Anglo-Scottish relations date back to ancient times, however, Athelstan was the first King of England who tried to extend his influence in Scotland. In response, Scotland along with Strathclyde and the Irish invaded England.

Although Athelstan defeated the combined forces in the Battle of Brunanburh (937) and consolidated his rule over England, he could not subdue Scotland. William the Conqueror also invaded Scotland, but could only elicit political gains in the Treaty of Abernathy (1072) as both Kingdoms remained disparate.

During the times of Edward I, the Anglo-Scottish bonhomie started. He was called by the Scottish nobility to arbitrate a Succession dispute. The Scottish nobility paid homage to him and he ruled in favour of John Balliol.

Edward’s penchant for interfering in the internal affairs of Scotland brought him at loggerheads with John Balliol. As a result, John renounced his homage to Edward I and; therefore, Edward invaded Scotland which started the First Scottish War of  Independence (1296-1328).

The Scots defeated England in the Battle of Bannockburn (1314) and, later on, signed the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton (1328) to end the war. The Scots maintained their independence and England, again, failed to subdue the Scots by force.

Four years after the First Scottish War of Independence, England again invaded Scotland starting the Second Scottish War of Independence (1332-1357). The war became a theater of the Hundred Years’ War between France and England (1337-1453).

France and Scotland allied themselves against England an alliance known as the Auld Alliance. After the French defeat in the Battle of Crecy (1346), the Scots invaded England under the Auld Alliance.

Notwithstanding the capture of the Scottish King, David, by the English in the Battle of Neville’s Cross, the Scots refused to capitulate and fought till peace was made in the Treaty of Berwick (1357). England failed to appoint its candidate, Edward Balliol, to the Scottish throne and thus the Scots maintained their independence.

After centuries of fiascos, it became evident that it would be impossible to conquer or extend the English influence in the Scottish clod by force.

However, Henry VII (1485-1509) — the first Tudor King —, through his marriage diplomacy, sowed the seeds of the Anglo Scottish Union. He married his daughter, Margaret Tudor, to the King of Scotland — James IV. After two centuries, the marriage showed prolific results and played a significant role in the Anglo-Scottish Union.

In 1603, a hundred years after the marriage arrangement, England and Scotland had the same King — James I. Elizabeth I, the last Tudor Monarch, died without an heir. She nominated her relative from Scotland as the King of England. Although England and Scotland had the same King, the Parliaments and the legal systems remained disparate.

A hundred more years after the nuptial affair, England and Scotland united into Great Britain through the Act of Union, 1707. As a result, the Parliaments, too, were united.

England and Scotland enjoyed a smooth sailing for more than two centuries. In 1970s, however, the Scottish nationalism led to three intermittent referendums — two on devolution and one on the independence of Scotland.

In 1979, the First referendum was held during the Premiership of the Labour Prime Minister — James Callaghan — which ended in a fiasco. In 1997, Tony Blair — another Labour Prime Minister — held a second referendum on the Question of Scottish devolution which granted a separate Parliament to Scotland.

In 2014, the Scottish Independence Referendum was held by David Cameron — a Conservative Prime Minister — which the nationalists lost.

From Lordship of Ireland to the Good Friday Agreement

Ireland, in the early Middle Ages, comprised multiple power centers including the Norsemen — also known as the Vikings who ensconced themselves in Ireland. During the reign of Henry II — the Anglo-Norman King — England invaded Ireland and established its Lordship over it.

It was a watershed epoch in the history of Ireland as it started the long English domination over Ireland. Henry II established Lordship of Ireland (1177-1542) and made his son, John Lackland, the first Lord of Ireland.

The Pale, area under the English control, slowly started to diminish. As soon as Henry VIII (1509- 1547) helmed the stewardship, he started to consolidate his rule in Ireland by conquering the Gaelic lands. He styled himself as the King of Ireland which morphed the Lordship into the Kingdom of Ireland (1542-1800).

During Elizabeth I (1558-1603), Anglo-Spanish relations remained strained. England and Spain fought each other on the high sea engaging in naval battles and privateering. In addition to it, Spain supported the Irish against England in the Nine Years’ War (1593-1603) and England supported the Dutch in the Eighty Years’ War (1568-1648).

Elizabeth defeated the Gaels backed by Spain and cemented the English rule in Ireland. Her successor, James I, started the Plantation of Ulster — the settlement of English Protestants in the Northern Ireland. As a result of this policy, the crevice between the Catholic South and the Protestant North is still palpable on the Island.

In 1800, Pitt the Younger — one of the most influential Prime Ministers in the history of the United Kingdom — jockeyed for the Union of Ireland with Great Britan. The Napoleonic Wars and the Nationalist European milieu added impetus to the process.

The Act of Union 1800, coalesced the Parliament of Ireland with that of Great Britain and morphed the Great Britain into the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

Pitt the Younger fell out with King George III on the matter of Catholic Emancipation — the right of the Catholics to sit in the Parliament. Pitt wanted to extend the rights to the Catholics, however, the Crown was adamant in accepting the same.

The emancipation only betided after the election of Daniel O’Connell. Amidst the pressure, the King had to capitulate on the matter of emancipation. Therefore, in 1829, during the Premiership of Lord Wellington the Catholic Relief Act was passed.

In the latter half of the 19th Century, the demand for Home Rule started in Ireland. The Liberals were supportive of the cause. William Gladstone presented the Home Rule Bill twice. The First Bill (1886) was defeated in the Commons and the Second Bill (1893) was passed by the Commons, but defeated in the House of Lords.

The Third Home Rule Bill (1914) was presented and passed during the Premiership of H. H. Asquith. It became possible after the powers of the House of Lords were circumscribed under the Parliament Act, 1911. The Bill was suspended because of the start of the World War 1.

David Lloyd George, the last Prime Minister of the Liberal Party, tried to conscript the Irish hoi polloi in the World War 1 which backfired and had deleterious effects on the already precarious Anglo-Irish relations. Nationalist parties like Sinn Fein gained popularity in Ireland and Swept the subsequent elections of 1918.

Thereafter, the Irish War of Independence led to the Fourth Home Rule Bill (1920) and the subsequent Anglo-Irish treaty (1921) which clefted the Irish clod into Northern Ireland and the Free Irish State. This morphed the Kingdom into the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The Irish Referendum 1937 and the Republic of Ireland Act, 1948 morphed the status of Ireland from a dominion to a Republic.

The National-Union tensions started in Northern Ireland in the 1970s known as the Troubles, however, it ended with the Good Friday Agreement (1998) signed during the Premiership of Tony Blair.

According to the agreement, Northern Ireland got a separate assembly for itself and a framework was established for the North-South cooperation between the two Irelands and East-West cooperation between the Kingdom and the Republic.

Anglo-Welsh Union

Edward I conquered Wales and made it a Principality (1284-1536) through the Statue of Rhuddlan (1284). Thereafter, during the Tudor period, Henry VIII annexed Wales through the Laws in Wales Acts 1535 and 1542.

Two referendums for devolution in Wales were conducted — the First during the Premiership of James Callaghan and the Second during the Premiership of Tony Blair. The former was unsuccessful; however, the latter became successful which created the separate Welsh Assembly known as the Senedd Cymru.

80 Anniversary of the Great Patriotic War

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By H.E. Mr. Vladimir Tarabrin, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The 9th of May 2025 marks 80 years since the day of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War – a Victory that saved Europe from the darkness of fascism, oppression and extermination of millions of people.

For all countries of the former Soviet Union, May 9, 1945 is not just a historical date. Our compatriots who look today at the famous photograph by the Soviet war correspondent Evgeny Khaldei “The Victory Banner over the Reichstag” sees in it the history of their ancestors. Behind the Victory Banner there are more than 27 million human lives that our country lost, thousands of destroyed cities and ruined villages.

The Great Patriotic War has become for us a wound that can’t heal. In every Russian city and town you will find a monument to the fallen Soviet soldiers. Any person can tell you a story about his or her relatives’ life during the War – where they fought, how they suffered in Nazi captivity and concentration camps, helped the wounded or worked 12-hour shifts in the frozen workshops of the Urals and Siberian defense factories.

In Europe today, this is perceived quite differently – people are usually not very familiar with the events that took place on the Eastern Front during the World War II (as the Great Patriotic War is called here). Some have heard about the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, but the names of Rzhev or the Siege of Leningrad are much less common even in historical literature.

And almost certainly only few people here know the true price of European freedom – the Red Army paid for it with the lives of more than one million soldiers. During the liberation of Poland alone, 600 thousands of the Red Army soldiers died. 140 thousands died for Hungary, and another 140 thousands – for Czechoslovakia. These days these facts are often hushed up or, even worse, distorted – and liberation is being labeled “occupation”. That is why Russia’s primary task is to defend the historical truth and protect the memory of our ancestors.

I would also like to remind you that, having attacked the Soviet Union, the Nazi Germany began the deliberate expulsion and extermination of the local population – all of this was documented and established by the verdict of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. Russia calls on the international community to recognize this as a fact of genocide of the peoples of the Soviet Union. We will work tirelessly, including in the UN, to achieve justice for the memory of the millions of our dead.

This year, the Netherlands is also celebrating the 80th anniversary of the liberation from the Nazi invaders. And we remember what the Dutch people endured during the occupation – the brutality of the Gestapo, mass deportations of the Jewish population to concentration camps, the bombing of Rotterdam and Nijmegen. We also remember what the Nazis did to the Soviet prisoners of war in concentration camps. These atrocities are the subject of an exhibition at the newly opened museum at the “Soviet Field of Glory” Memorial Cemetery near Leusden.
I am glad that there are people in the Netherlands who do not forget the role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of Nazism.

Unfortunately, today we see that in many European countries that suffered greatly from the Nazi occupation, the lessons of that terrible war are being revised and forgotten. Russia cannot allow this to happen, and we will do everything to resist it. This is our duty, both to ourselves and to future generations.

Antonina Konopelska’s “Truth of Seeing” Debuts at Pulchri Studio Under Polish EU Presidency

In a striking intersection of digital art and diplomacy, the Embassy of Poland in The Hague, under the leadership of H.E. Ambassador Margareta Kassangana, hosted the solo exhibition Truth of Seeing by acclaimed Polish artist and photographer Antonina Konopelska at Pulchri Studio.

The event formed part of the official cultural programme of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, and was held under the honorary patronage of Ambassador Kassangana, who was deeply moved by Konopelska’s work during a recent visit to Warsaw.

Mr. Josué Roberto Liévano Paz, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of El Salvador, H.E. Mr. Fernando Simas Magalhães, Ambassador of Brazil, H.E. Mr. Alvaro Gonzalez Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay and Francisco Javier Llorca Vega, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of Ecuador.

Antonina Konopelska is a prominent figure in contemporary Polish photography. Her work explores the boundaries of identity, presence, and perception in the digital age.

With a background in both fine arts and Iberian studies, and a Ph.D. from the Academy of Fine Arts in Katowice, Konopelska has developed a unique visual language that blends traditional photography with cutting-edge digital manipulation.

H.E. Mr. Dren Doli, Ambassador of Kosovo.

Her latest exhibition, Truth of Seeing, showcases a large-format post-photographic collection of portraits that question the line between reality and simulation. Through a process she terms “graphical personification,” Konopelska transforms her subjects into performative simulacra, merging organic form with technological artifice.

The resulting images exist in a liminal space between human presence and artificial curation, challenging the viewer’s notions of authenticity, identity, and representation.

Renowned curator Barbara London, a pioneer in video and media art, has positioned Konopelska’s work within broader philosophical and technological discourses. Truth of Seeing engages deeply with theories of post-photography, identity performance, and simulation, drawing inspiration from thinkers such as Jean Baudrillard, Susan Sontag, David Levi Strauss, VilĂ©m Flusser, and Joan Fontcuberta.

The vernissage, held on Wednesday, April 16, drew a distinguished crowd including ambassadors, diplomats, Dutch and international artists, members of Pulchri Studio, and business professionals. In her opening remarks, Ambassador Kassangana warmly welcomed the guests, sharing how personally captivated she had been when encountering the exhibition in Warsaw. She then invited Antonina Konopelska to address the audience. The artist spoke passionately about her creative process and encouraged guests to reflect on the deeper questions raised by her work.

Mr. Mohamed Zerktouni, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Morocco, Mr. Stany Muhizi, First Counsellor, Embassy of Burundi, H.E. Mr. Mifougo Youssouf Diarrassouba, Ambassador of Ivory Coast and Mr. Azat Smaiyl, First Secretary, Embassy of Kazakhstan.

Among the attendees were the ambassadors of Cîte d’Ivoire, Kosovo, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, and New Zealand, underscoring the strong diplomatic interest in the cultural dialogue fostered by the exhibition.

With Truth of Seeing, Antonina Konopelska presents a provocative body of work, also offering a timely reflection on the essence of human identity in an increasingly digitized world.

Pictures by Roy Strik for Diplomat Magazine.

About Antonina Konopelska

Konopelska is a Polish interdisciplinary artist, photographer, and educator born in 1990. Her work primarily involves staged or provoked photographic scenarios rooted in personal experiences and documentary research, exploring themes such as identity, interpersonal relationships, and proxemics within social contexts.

She earned her MA and BA from the Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw, studying under Professor Grzegorz Kowalski at the Audiovisual Space Studio “Kowalnia.” Additionally, she holds a BA in Iberian and Ibero-American Studies from the University of Warsaw. In 2022, she completed her Ph.D. at the Academy of Fine Arts in Katowice under the supervision of Professors Ewa Zawadzka and Judyta Bernaƛ.

By Antonina Konopelska.

Konopelska’s notable project, “The Wax of Poland,” is an ongoing series of digitally manipulated portraits that transform subjects into transhuman figures. This work delves into the intersection of photography and digital technology, reflecting on the nature of photographic representation in the post-photographic era.

Her exhibitions include solo shows like “ChĂłr / The Choir” at Vienna Woods Gallery in Los Angeles (2020), “Libertango” at TRAFO in Szczecin (2018), and “The Wax of Poland 3.1” at Promocyjna Gallery in Warsaw (2018). She has also participated in group exhibitions such as “Out of Poland” at Arena 1 Gallery in Santa Monica (2019) and “Masquerade” at the Centre for Photography in Stockholm (2012).

Konopelska has received several accolades, including scholarships from the Adam Mickiewicz Institute for Polish Culture Abroad (2018, 2020, 2021), the ZAIKS Polish Society of Authors and Composers (2013–2021), and awards from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education.

In addition to her artistic practice, she serves as an Assistant Professor at the Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw and lectures at the Polish-Japanese Academy of Information Technology.

Antonina Konopelska and Ambassador Kassangana during “Truth of Seeing” vernissage at Pulcri Studio.

For more information, you can visit her official website: antoninakonopelska.com

On Political Ideology: From Transition to Travesty

By Cătălin Balog – PhD, Retired Colonel

This article offers a political analysis of the Romanian electoral landscape on the eve of the 2025 elections, with a focus on the ideological transformations of the main parties and the mechanisms that sustain a democratic system that is functional only in appearance. From the PSD’s drift toward a mimetic, Trump-inspired populism, to the doctrinal vacuum of the PNL, and the instrumentalization of radical opposition as a symbolic safety valve, the text presents a radiography of a system that mimics pluralism while preserving stagnation.

Under the title “On Political Ideology: From Transition to Travesty”, the author investigates the mechanisms of democratic simulation, the effects of manipulation through polls and institutional silence, as well as the increasingly limited options of a lucid voter caught between resignation and civic engagement. Ultimately, it is a critical reflection on the ideological void that threatens to render formal democracy irrelevant to its own citizens.

I. Introduction

For more than three decades, Romanian politics has oscillated between reformist promises and conservative reflexes, between democratic rhetoric and authoritarian practices, between the simulation of pluralism and the consolidation of a monopoly of institutionalized survival. In this prolonged context of transition, ideologies have often served more as decorative backdrops than as genuine foundations of political action.

Yet what we are currently experiencing is no longer just doctrinal ambiguity or strategic eclecticism. It is a profound metamorphosis in which the boundaries between left and right, between pro-Europeanism and sovereignty-focused nationalism, between moderation and radicalism have become so fluid that any coherent reference point risks being dissolved in the background noise of political marketing.

The 2024–2025 elections – local, parliamentary, and presidential – are taking place in a climate of apparent institutional stability, yet deep ideological confusion and latent polarization. The governing alliance of PSD-PNL-UDMR, supported by the minority group, presents itself as a bastion of balance and European continuity. In reality, however, this construct is more a non-aggression pact among certain power structures than a coalition built around shared values and goals. Meanwhile, the parliamentary opposition is fragmented, and anti-system parties – especially AUR and SOS – are gaining ground electorally, fuelled by frustration and a lack of genuine representation.

Against this backdrop, a clear-eyed radiography of the current political scene becomes necessary – one that goes beyond electoral appearances and examines the mechanisms by which populism, ideological mimicry, and strategies of democratic simulation have become the norm. The PSD’s recent drift toward a Trump-inspired discourse – analysed in the article “Trumpism, the Last Refuge of the PSD Loyalist”[1] – is symptomatic of a broader trend: the transformation of mainstream parties into vehicles for the preservation of power through the recycling of illiberal rhetoric. Likewise, the possible rebranding of a figure like Crin Antonescu as a “consensus candidate” of the governing alliance confirms the system’s preference for predictable, ideologically inoffensive figures who remain compatible with the requirements of a cosmeticized democracy.

This article proposes a structured and argument-driven analysis of these dynamics, seeking not only to offer a political diagnosis, but also to identify the signs by which Romanian democracy risks being replaced by a simulated form of governance – one in which pluralism is mimed, elections are pre-scripted in sociological laboratories, and the voter is reduced to a silent piece in a game with a predetermined stake.

II. PSD and Trumpism, Romanian-Style: From Social Left to Mimetic Populism

The Social Democratic Party (PSD), heir to a moderate left-wing ideological current originally built around social protection and the representation of the “working class,” has in recent years undergone an ideological reconversion that is neither coherent nor openly assumed, yet profoundly significant. In the absence of genuine doctrinal reflection and under pressure from an increasingly heterogeneous electorate, the PSD has begun to borrow themes, rhetorical reflexes, and mobilization strategies specific to Trump-style populism – without articulating a truly new political platform.

This ideological drift is visible not only in rhetoric, but also in the official positioning of party leaders, in their relationship to state institutions, the media, and especially the notion of the “elite” as a symbolic enemy. The classic discourse of social democracy – focused on social equity, redistribution, and cohesion – is gradually being replaced by a vulgarized anti-elitist rhetoric in which intellectuals, NGOs, the independent press, and European institutions are recurrent targets, accused of contempt toward the “real people.”

This strategy is not unique to the Romanian PSD. It is a regional adaptation of a model already tested in other Central European states – particularly Hungary and Poland – where “conservative” or “social” parties have infused their rhetoric with emotionally charged nationalism, deep scepticism toward the West, rejection of multiculturalism, and nostalgic appeals to traditional values. In Romania, this model has been imported without doctrinal depth but with electoral efficiency – especially among rural and post-industrial voters who feel left behind by rapid modernization and globalist narratives.

Paradoxically, this adoption of elements drawn from Trump-style rhetoric does not reflect a clear ideological commitment, but rather an improvised tactic – a tool for emotional mobilization in the absence of coherent public policy or a genuine economic vision. It is a “contentless copy,” where populism serves not to reform institutions in the name of the people, but to preserve existing power structures under the guise of a vaguely defined national identity. In other words, it is Trumpism deployed as political technique, not as political vision.

More troubling is that this discursive mutation unfolds within a governing alliance that claims to be pro-European and moderate, producing a cognitive dissonance that is hard to ignore: how can nationalist, anti-Western rhetoric coexists with a formal commitment to European values, the rule of law, and political pluralism? The answer is simple: it cannot. The two cancel each other out in a game of appearances meant to simultaneously appease Brussels and local electorates – a cynical balancing act between image and reality.

In this logic, the PSD is not reinventing itself, but camouflaging. It becomes, by turns, social-democratic in its European discourse, conservative on the ground, populist during campaigns, and technocratic in governance. Increasingly, it reveals itself as a party of adaptation, not conviction; of strategy, not ideology. And this discursive plasticity, far from being a sign of pragmatism, becomes a symptom of an identity void with long-term destabilizing potential.

III. The PNL and the Death of Liberalism: Governance Without Vocation, Survival Without Vision

If the transformation of the PSD into a mimetic populist formation is a symptom of strategic adaptation, in the case of the PNL, the ideological regression is deeper – and more concerning. The PNL has not only systematically abandoned the values of classical liberalism, but has also become, in recent years, a party of administration without conviction, without an ideological compass, and without authentic leadership. This metamorphosis did not occur abruptly, but as the result of a series of compromises, accepted with disarming ease in the name of “governing stability.”

Originally a moderate right-wing party, part of the European liberal family, the PNL has gradually distanced itself from the principles that were supposed to shape its vision: economic freedom, rule of law, support for private initiative, pluralism of opinion, and institutional balance. Instead, the party has embraced a purely administrative logic of governance, in which decisions are no longer guided by values, but by the need to maintain equilibrium within the power coalition.

The clearest symptom of this drift was the acceptance of a governing alliance with the PSD – a party traditionally located at the opposite end of the ideological spectrum. Initially, this coalition was presented as a “necessary compromise” in response to successive crises (health, economic, energy). But in the absence of a reformist horizon, the collaboration degenerated into a form of political symbiosis in which the differences between the two parties have become increasingly indistinguishable. Today, the PNL functions more as an extension of the administrative apparatus than as an autonomous political entity with a distinctive vision for society.

More troubling still, the PNL’s withdrawal from ideological debate has left a dangerous void in the representation of the democratic right. The party has become a platform for bureaucrats rather than reformers – a structure for distributing offices, not advancing ideas. Lacking leaders with moral or intellectual authority, the PNL’s public discourse is often technical, defensive, and devoid of vision. Worse yet, the party has failed to respond to the major challenges of contemporary society – education reform, administrative digitalization, energy transition, fiscal policy, or judicial reform – preferring instead a bureaucratic conservatism that is harmless, yet sterile.

This ideological regression is further exacerbated by a communication strategy increasingly focused on personalizing power and delegitimizing dissent. Internal criticism is viewed as betrayal, appeals for doctrinal coherence are met with suspicion, and any attempt at reform is postponed in the name of “governing responsibility.” Instead of serving as an institutional counterweight in the alliance with the PSD, the PNL has chosen the comfort of silence and docility, consolidating its image as a party of obedience – spineless, and reduced to acting as a buffer between the administrative elite and the electorate.

In this sense, the death of liberalism within the PNL is not just a rhetorical diagnosis but a political reality with serious implications: without an active democratic right, political pluralism is compromised, and centre-right voters are left to choose between abstention, fragmentation, or radicalization. In the absence of a coherent political offering, the public sphere becomes fertile ground for demagoguery, extremism, and counterfeit alternatives.

As it stands today, the PNL is not a liberal party, but an electoral vehicle running on inertia, caught between two thresholds: that of power, and that of irrelevance. Within this increasingly narrow space, any return to a meaningful ideological identity seems improbable – if not altogether impossible.

IV. Crin Antonescu – The Ghost Candidate: A Symbol of Strategic Resignation

In a political landscape dominated by stagnation and confusion, the idea of relaunching Crin Antonescu as a potential presidential candidate for the governing alliance is not merely a journalistic speculation but a symptomatic hypothesis reflecting the current establishment’s strategic fatigue and ideological vacuum. At a time when Romania urgently needs a clarified political direction and a genuinely competitive electoral offering, the reappearance of a withdrawn, politically inactive figure – detached from the major developments of the past decade – reveals more about the system’s inability to generate relevant leadership than about any calculated, value-based decision.

Crin Antonescu, a former liberal leader and prominent figure during the USL (Social Liberal Union) era, now appears as a symbol of an ambiguous past: a politician who fluctuated between strong opposition to the Băsescu regime and an alliance with the PSD, between reformist rhetoric and soft nationalism, between unfulfilled institutional promises and a sudden political retreat. His reemergence in public discourse – even as a polling subject – is not a reconnection with the electorate, but a symbolic resuscitation, meant to fill a representational void with a familiar (and already exhausted) figure from the collective imagination.

What makes this hypothesis even more telling is the context in which it arises: in the absence of a natural candidate with a convincing profile, internal legitimacy, and public resonance, the political system resorts to a neutral, predictable name – one unlikely to disrupt existing balances. This is not a choice born of vision, but of damage control: Crin Antonescu is not the most capable candidate to mobilize the public, but the least likely to disturb it. He carries no major conflicts with either the PSD or the PNL, poses no threat to coalition stability, and provokes no significant concern from international actors. In every respect, he is the ideal candidate for a system seeking to remain identical to itself.

Yet this choice comes at a cost. Selecting a “ghost candidate” – lacking contemporary public stature, a coherent political project, or connection to the key issues of today’s society – signals the complete retreat of politics from the field of real debate. In an electoral climate already tainted by apathy and distrust, such a profile cannot generate civic enthusiasm – only functional resignation. The voter is not called to choose a societal vision, but to endorse a preservation solution.

Moreover, reactivating a political figure from the recent past of PSD-PNL cohabitation sends a clear message: Romania does not aim for real power alternation, but for a change of scenery. A new president, but from the same meld; a familiar face, but unaccountable for the present; a formal balance, but lacking any authentic democratic substance.

In this sense, the candidacy of Crin Antonescu would not constitute a genuine political option, but a mechanism for maintaining the illusion of normality – a ghostly return to an increasingly hollow electoral game, carefully calibrated for a system that prefers stagnation over risk, and inert consensus over ideological competition.

V. Polls, Silence, and the Management of Perception: Between Stagnation and Electoral Staging

In any mature democracy, opinion polls are a useful tool for understanding electoral trends, calibrating campaigns, and enhancing transparency in the democratic process. In Romania, however, polls have increasingly become strategic instruments for managing collective perception – a mechanism designed to artificially stabilize a political hierarchy that is silently, yet increasingly, contested.

According to recent data published by HotNews[2], at least five separate polls converge on the same electoral ranking: PSD and PNL dominated by the usual figures, followed by AUR and a fragmented opposition. This convergence raises legitimate concerns about the authenticity of the political dynamics these polls claim to reflect. Granted, these parties benefit from institutional infrastructure, access to resources, media exposure, and entrenched networks of influence. But to accept uncritically that Romanian society has suddenly become immobile, immune to systemic crises, and devoid of reformist energy or political alternatives is an act of intellectual resignation.

The overall impression of stagnation induced by these polls creates a self-fulfilling electoral effect: if nothing changes in the polls, then nothing can be changed in reality. This mechanism has a demobilizing effect on active segments of the electorate – especially among the educated, urban, and younger demographics – who end up feeling excluded from the logic of representation. Consequently, absenteeism becomes a silent form of protest, yet one that functions systemically to maintain the status quo.

Equally concerning is the lack of transparency regarding who funds these polls, how they are conducted, and for what purpose. In the absence of genuine public debate about pluralism in measuring public opinion, or rigorous regulation, polls can be politically instrumentalized – used to float “tested” candidacies or to prematurely shut down conversations about real alternatives.

More subtly – but no less significantly – silence plays a crucial role in this equation. Mainstream media, largely aligned both economically and ideologically with the dominant parties, avoids questioning the stagnant nature of the electoral landscape, rarely interrogates the manipulation of public perception, and seldom gives voice to emerging political actors. In doing so, the public is held in a state of diffuse expectation, trapped in a continuous present where the future appears choreographed and the past strategically recycled.

This management of stagnation through polling is not accidental; it is part of a deliberate architecture meant to preserve the current political equilibrium by inducing a form of democratic fatalism. The result is a widespread sense that all options have been exhausted, that every viable candidate has already been tried, and that no new leadership can emerge. Within such a setup, elections cease to be real competitions of ideas, projects, or visions – they become exercises in affirming a pre-established hierarchy.

In conclusion, today’s polls no longer merely reflect voter intention; they have become political actors in their own right, endowed with performative power over the electoral landscape. Rather than showing how citizens think, they increasingly dictate how voters “should” think about the candidates. And when perception becomes more important than actual choice, democracy itself enters a regime of controlled simulation.

VI. Băsescu and the Specter of Instability: The “American Problem” and the Insinuation of Chaos

In a political climate already strained by institutional stagnation, ideological confusion, and eroding public trust, the recent emergence of alarming statements from a former Romanian president should have triggered a process of clarification and reflection among political elites and society at large. Traian Băsescu’s claim that “the United States has only one problem in its relationship with Romania” – a statement suggesting the possible cancellation of the upcoming November elections – is exceptionally serious. Its gravity lies not in its explicit content, but in the insidious mechanism of insinuation it sets in motion[3].

The remark occupies an ambiguous space – somewhere between geopolitical observation and prophetic warning. It stops short of making a formal accusation, yet it cannot be dismissed as mere speculation. At its core, the message operates on two fronts: on one hand, it subtly suggests a major rupture or tension between Romania and its strategic partner; on the other, it opens a speculative space regarding the legitimacy of democratic elections in an EU and NATO member state.

This dual insinuation has destabilizing effects, casting doubt on the electoral process before the campaign has even begun, and questioning not only the administrative integrity of the elections but also the decision-making sovereignty of the state itself. In a context where public trust in institutions is already fragile, such messaging risks fuelling suspicion, conspiracy theories, and even doubts about Romania’s Euro-Atlantic alignment – consequences that are difficult to quantify in the long term.

More troubling still is the absence of any public demand for clarification from major political figures, nor has there been any firm institutional or diplomatic response. In this case, silence is not merely suspect – it is complicit. It tacitly legitimizes, through passivity, a normalization of destabilizing discourse in which former leaders cast shadows on the present without being held accountable for their words.

Beyond the substance of the statement itself, the rhetorical mechanism employed is characteristic of modern forms of political disinformation: an undefined “problem” is announced, the existence of a geopolitical crisis is insinuated, and responsibility is displaced outside the democratic framework. Interpreted through this lens, Băsescu’s message reads as a sophisticated form of discursive intoxication, designed to undermine public confidence in the constitutional order without offering any alternatives or solutions.

At a deeper level, such interventions point to an increasingly visible trend among former political elites: the discrediting of representative democracy in the name of supposedly “backstage realities” – realities inaccessible to the public but allegedly decisive. This amounts to a reactivation of the “deep state” mythology, now reframed in geopolitical terms, functioning as a tool of symbolic control over the public sphere. But in a functioning democracy – where the rules of the political game are clear and respected – such messages are not only unacceptable but require strong institutional mechanisms of response and disavowal.

In the absence of such mechanisms, Romania risks sliding – not formally, but gradually – into a grey zone of democratic discourse, where the boundary between opinion and manipulation, between warning and diversion, becomes impossible to draw. And when the very notion of free and fair elections is questioned by those who were once entrusted to defend it, the danger no longer comes from outside democracy, but from within it.

VII. AUR, SOS, and the Usefulness of Populism: Opposition as Décor, Extremism as a Safety Valve

In a political system where, governing parties operate more as administrators of a self-referential balance than as drivers of a coherent societal vision, the role of the opposition becomes paradoxical – not as a genuine alternative, but as a choreographed component of the broader equilibrium. Within this architecture, parties like AUR and SOS Romania play a crucial role: that of symbolic outlets for diffuse discontent, yet lacking any real capacity to assume power or articulate a coherent governing project.

AUR’s rise in recent years has rightly been interpreted as symptomatic of a deep rift between society and the traditional political class. In a public space marked by cynicism, stagnation, and a crisis of representation, an anti-system party with nationalist, conservative, and often conspiratorial rhetoric manages to mobilize overlooked or alienated segments of the electorate: disillusioned youth, marginalized rural populations, frustrated diaspora, and the anti-vaccine and anti-globalization demographic.

However, once it entered Parliament and gained media attention, AUR did not evolve toward political professionalization or doctrinal consolidation. On the contrary, it radicalized its discourse, embraced theatrical forms of opposition – symbolic protests, direct attacks on the press, the promotion of conspiracy theories – yet consistently failed to present any sustainable governmental alternative. In this sense, AUR has become a decorative form of opposition, feeding the fears of moderate voters and thereby justifying, by contrast, the “rationality” of the PSD-PNL governing coalition.

Parties like SOS Romania – splintered off directly from this same radical and opportunistic vein – amplify the logic of fragmentation and spectacle. Lacking solid infrastructure, coherent ideological foundations, or strategies for civic engagement, these formations function as loudspeakers of raw discontent without bearing any real political responsibility. They express, but do not propose; they scandalize, but do not construct.

From a cynical yet realistic perspective, AUR and its satellites perform an indirect systemic function: they polarize public discourse, channel frustrations in predictable directions, artificially dramatize the electoral climate, and generate the illusion of pluralism. In reality, it is precisely this polarization that enables the governing alliance to present itself as the “balanced solution” – positioned between anti-system extremism and the chaos of instability.

This dynamic is sustained, in part, by segments of the media which – whether due to ideological affinities or audience-driven logic – offer disproportionate exposure to radical parties, thus contributing to the normalization of an illiberal, resentful, and often anti-democratic discourse. In the absence of ethical filters and responsible political journalism, the spectacle of populism becomes the main electoral content offered to the public.

It is essential to understand that radical populism, as practiced by AUR and its counterparts, does not constitute a genuine anti-system solution, but rather a diversion of rebellious energy into a controllable and sterile zone, where political conflict is reduced to posturing and ideology is replaced by primitive impulses.

In this landscape, genuine opposition – the kind that should offer alternative projects, challenge institutional capture, and propose new social contracts – is virtually non-existent or marginalized. In its absence, populism remains useful not as a solution, but as a tool for preserving order through fear and the caricaturing of change.

VIII. The Lucid Voter: Between Resignation, Protest, and Reconstruction

Faced with a political landscape defined by ideological mimicry, institutional stagnation, and stage-managed populism, a fundamental question arises: what options remain for a lucid, informed voter committed to democratic values? What real choices exist for a citizen unwilling to be trapped in the false dilemma between inert power management and theatrical anti-system posturing? The answer, far from comforting, demands political maturity, critical discernment, and, above all, a civic effort toward reconstruction.

First, the lucid voter confronts a structural dilemma: either cast a rational vote for the “lesser evil,” thereby perpetuating a drifting political order, or adopt a position of refusal – boycotting elections, submitting null votes, or retreating into civic passivity – with the risk of leaving the public space to be aggressively and unscrupulously occupied by others. Both options, though seemingly rational, entail their own traps. Voting for the “lesser evil” may, over time, become a form of resigned complicity, where pragmatic calculation overshadows any moral or doctrinal exigency. At the same time, withdrawal from participation weakens the very critical segment of society, paving the way for vocal radicalism and political control structures.

A third option – the most difficult, yet perhaps the only viable one in the long run – is active engagement in rebuilding a pluralistic, coherent, and responsible civic space, one capable of generating real alternatives. This does not necessarily mean entering party politics, but it does require a conscious commitment to the idea of citizenship as responsibility: supporting civic initiatives, monitoring those in power, fostering critical thinking, and strengthening independent networks of information and democratic education.

This path also entails a fundamental rethinking of how political representation is understood. The lucid voter must go beyond the binary logic of choosing between “government” and “opposition” and begin evaluating parties, candidates, and platforms through the lens of value coherence, intellectual honesty, institutional competence, and openness to critical dialogue. Without such criteria, democracy risks remaining trapped in cycles of simulation and substitution, with no meaningful progress.

There is also an urgent need to rearticulate the democratic discourse in a language that is once again intelligible and credible to the average citizen. Too often, the rational voices of civil society or fragmented opposition remain locked in technocratic, self-referential language – detached from social realities and the legitimate struggles of large segments of the population. The true challenge of democratic reconstruction is not only political, but cultural: to rebuild a shared vocabulary that can simultaneously express social justice, individual freedom, and institutional accountability.

Finally, the lucid voter must accept that democracy does not offer immediate certainties, but opportunities for long-term construction. There are no guarantees of success – but there is the near certainty of failure if choice is replaced by apathy and critique by paralyzing sarcasm. In an age of ideological masquerades and cynical populism, lucidity is a form of resistance. But more than that, it is the beginning of a much-needed reconstruction.

IX. Conclusions

The show goes on, but time has run out. Romania in 2025 finds itself at a critical moment – though not one of visible trauma. The crisis is no longer one of form, but of substance; not a procedural crisis of legitimacy, but one of meaning. Elections are being organized, parties are campaigning, polls are circulating, and the media is broadcasting. Yet all these mechanisms operate within a framework increasingly devoid of real democratic substance, where ideological differences have faded, and alternatives have dissolved into a competition of symbolic gestures and the rotation of worn-out political figures.

In this setting, PSD’s adoption of Trump-style populism, PNL’s disconnection from its own liberal foundations, the emergence of phantom candidates, and the instrumentalization of anti-system populism are not mere accidents – they are symptoms of a broader strategy aimed at managing change through simulation. Opposition is mimicked, diversity is choreographed, and stagnation is carefully maintained. Within this framework, the voter is no longer choosing between distinct paths of progress, but merely between different levels of acceptability within an already fixed status quo.

Yet democracy cannot indefinitely function as a surface-level spectacle. In the absence of an articulated political project and a real debate on the major issues of society – education, healthcare, justice, security, social equity, digitalization, institutional reform – elections risk becoming mere exercises in reconfirming a system that preserves only its appearances.

Time no longer works in favour of the system. Apathy, civic disengagement, and disillusionment will inevitably feed waves of mistrust and radicalization. And in an increasingly volatile international context – with rising geopolitical pressures and a tense internal climate – the absence of a genuine democratic contract between those who govern and the governed becomes a strategic vulnerability.

What is at stake is not merely the next government or presidency, but the very capacity of Romanian society to reconstruct the meaning of democracy beyond its formal shell. This will require lucidity, civic commitment, a refusal of resignation, and, above all, the courage to say the emperor has no clothes – even when the stage is lavish and the applause appears unanimous.

The political performance will undoubtedly continue. But if we do not break free from the logic of the set and regain the courage to think and build alternative paths, we may soon realize that the real time of democracy has already passed – and what we are living is no longer transition, but post-democracy in an advanced state of preservation.

About author:

Cătălin Balog is an analyst and trainer with extensive experience in intelligence, information security, and strategic communication. He holds a PhD in Military Sciences, with a dissertation focused on security risk management in cyberspace, and has served for over two decades in structures of the Romanian Ministry of National Defence.

Currently, he is an associate professor at the University of Bucharest, where he teaches courses in information management. His research interests include the analysis of contemporary social and political mechanisms, with particular attention to the relationship between ideology, technology, and the simulation of democracy.

Photograph from the author’s personal archive


[1] https://comunitatealiberala.ro/trumpismul-ultimul-refugiu-al-psd-istului-anatomia-unei-tradari/

[2] https://hotnews.ro/cel-putin-cinci-sondaje-pentru-prezidentiale-arata-acelasi-clasament-spune-seful-unei-case-de-sondare-ce-va-fi-foarte-important-mai-mult-ca-oricand-1937311

[3] https://hotnews.ro/traian-basescu-afirma-ca-sua-au-o-singura-problema-in-relatia-cu-romania-se-pune-astfel-sub-semnul-intrebarii-anularea-alegerilor-din-noiembrie-1937325

The Best of Bangladesh Returns to Europe for its Second Edition

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17–18 April 2025 | Beurs van Berlage, Amsterdam

The much-anticipated second edition of the “Best of Bangladesh in Europe” is set to return to the iconic Beurs van Berlage in Amsterdam on April 17th and 18th, 2025. This prestigious event brings together the dynamic spirit, innovation, and entrepreneurial excellence of Bangladesh to the heart of Europe, offering a unique opportunity for international stakeholders to engage with the country’s thriving industries.

Organized by the Bangladesh Apparel Exchange, the two-day event will feature over 40 Bangladeshi exhibitors representing eight diverse industries—from textiles and technology to leather goods, ceramics, jute, and more. This carefully curated showcase is designed to reflect the evolving identity of Bangladesh as a hub of sustainability, creativity, and economic growth.

A Platform for Discovery, and Innovation

The 2025 edition of Best of Bangladesh promises to be even more dynamic and engaging than its inaugural launch. The event will include:

  • A grand opening ceremony, setting the tone for a celebration of partnerships
  • Insightful panel discussions with thought leaders, policymakers, and industry pioneers
  • Interactive breakout sessions focused on key sectors and opportunities
  • In-depth presentations highlighting Bangladesh’s achievements and roadmaps
  • A fireside chat offering personal insights from influential changemakers
  • The launch of two major projects that represent the country’s forward-looking vision
  • An innovation runway show, where cutting-edge ideas and sustainable designs will take center stage

Join Us in Shaping the Future

This gathering is more than an exhibition—it’s an invitation to explore meaningful collaborations and fresh opportunities. Whether you are a buyer, investor, policymaker, journalist, or simply curious about the rising potential of Bangladesh, Best of Bangladesh in Europe is a must-attend event.

To ensure your participation, we invite you to register here. You may also view the full event schedule for a detailed overview of the program.

We warmly encourage you to be part of this exciting journey—come see, connect, and collaborate with the best of Bangladesh on April 17th and 18th, 2025, in Amsterdam.


For more information, please visit http://bangladeshapparelexchange.com

A Powerful Musical Statement Against War on Remembrance Day in The Hague

On Sunday, 4 May, three hundred singers and musicians will come together at Amare concert hall in The Hague to deliver a poignant musical tribute to peace and reconciliation. In commemoration of Remembrance Day, the Residentie Bachkoor, in collaboration with Toonkunstkoor Utrecht, will perform Benjamin Britten’s War Requiem, an iconic and deeply moving choral masterpiece that underscores the senselessness of war.

This large-scale performance coincides with the lead-up to the 80th anniversary of the liberation of the Netherlands, making the message more relevant than ever.

A Special Collaboration

The performance marks a unique collaboration between the Residentie Bachkoor, Toonkunstkoor Utrecht, the youth choir of Zangschool Utrecht, and the Promenade Orchestra, including both symphonic and chamber ensembles. Under the direction of conductor Jos Vermunt, these 300 performers will offer a powerful musical reflection on the tragedies of war.

Prior to the concert, Retired Lieutenant General Ben Droste, former Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air Force, will deliver a brief address. This will be followed by the traditional two minutes of silence to honour those who have fallen.

The War Requiem – A Universal Call for Peace

Composed in 1962 for the consecration of the new Coventry Cathedral, which was destroyed during the Second World War, Britten’s War Requiem remains one of the most emotionally compelling works of the 20th century. A committed pacifist, Britten wove together the solemn Latin Mass for the Dead with the harrowing war poetry of Wilfred Owen, a British soldier and poet killed in the First World War. The result is a work that denounces the glorification of conflict and elevates a plea for peace and reconciliation.

Unlike traditional requiems, War Requiem offers no triumph or glorification. Instead, it mourns the fallen and reminds us that, in war, every soldier is a victim. Britten dedicated the work to four friends who perished in the war, making it both deeply personal and universally resonant.


Concert Details:

  • May 4, 2025
    7:45 PM
  • Amare, Spuiplein 150, The Hague

Performers:

  • Residentie Bachkoor
  • Toonkunstkoor Utrecht
  • Youth Choir of Zangschool Utrecht
  • Symphonic and Chamber Orchestra of the Promenade Orkest

Soloists:

  • Jeannette van Schaik – soprano
  • Bernard Loonen – tenor
  • Frans Fiselier – bass

Conductor: Jos Vermunt

đŸŽŸïž Tickets:
€45 (Rank 1) / €38 (Rank 2) / €34 (Rank 3) / €29 (Rank 4)
Youth up to 29 years: €11
Ooievaarspas holders: 50% discount

đŸŽ« Order online:
www.amare.nl/nl/agenda/3203/herdenking-80-jaar-bevrijding-residentie-bachkoor/war-requiem

This concert is part of the Hague Freedom Weeks 2025 and will also be performed on 3 May at TivoliVredenburg in Utrecht.

From DeepSeek to DEEP Robotics

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How China’s Zhejiang University Cultivates the Tech Leaders of Tomorrow

Zhejiang University and China’s Tech Renaissance

The recent release of Hangzhou Code: How the “Six Little Dragons” Took Flight has renewed attention on Hangzhou’s ascent as a global innovation hub. Central to this transformation is Zhejiang University (ZJU), one of China’s leading academic institutions, which has played a defining role in educating many of the city’s top tech entrepreneurs.

Founded 128 years ago, ZJU counts among its alumni Liang Wenfeng, founder of the AI firm DeepSeek, and Zhu Qiuguo, founder of DEEP Robotics—both part of the so-called “Six Little Dragons” of Hangzhou. The university’s College of Information Science and Electronic Engineering (ISEE) has emerged as a key contributor to China’s AI and robotics talent pipeline.

A Forward-Looking Curriculum

ZJU introduced China’s first university-wide innovation and entrepreneurship program in 1999. It now offers over 100 courses aligned with industry demands and emerging technologies. Notably, the university established its computer science department in 1978 with an early emphasis on AI. In 2019, it became one of the first institutions in China to offer an undergraduate degree in artificial intelligence.

The AI+X initiative, launched nationally in 2021 and upgraded under ZJU’s leadership in 2025, reflects the university’s push for interdisciplinary training. Liang, for example, was already studying advanced AI electives more than two decades ago.

“Our aim is to balance specialization with cross-disciplinary fluency,” said Professor Chen Hongsheng, Dean of ISEE.

Bridging Theory and Practice

More than 80% of ZJU undergraduates participate in applied research or industry-linked projects. Students also gain experience through internships, international exchanges, and global competitions. Zhu Qiuguo’s journey began with ZJUDancer, a student robotics team focused on humanoid soccer robots. Competing in international contests like RoboCup, he honed his skills in both hardware and software design.

“Competitions force you to connect theory with real-world problem-solving,” said Zhu, now an associate professor at ZJU.

Innovation Grounded in Responsibility

ZJU’s emphasis on societal impact is embedded in its educational philosophy. Wang Wei, deputy dean of ISEE, noted that the university aims to cultivate not just technical expertise but also civic responsibility.

This ethos is evident in projects like undergraduate Ye Bowen’s award-winning AR safety tool for delivery riders, developed under the mentorship of Professor Yang Zongyin. A ZJU graduate and Cambridge PhD, Yang returned to teach and develop practical technologies—among them, a miniature spectrometer with potential applications in non-invasive diabetes care.

“I encourage students to focus on technologies that improve lives,” Yang said.

Through a combination of rigorous academics, hands-on experience, and a focus on public value, Zhejiang University continues to shape a generation of engineers and entrepreneurs steering China’s technological future.

25 Years of Panamanian Administration of the Panama Canal

Embassy of Panama in The Hague Organizes Conference

The Hague, Netherlands, March 14, 2025 – The Embassy of Panama in The Hague successfully held the conference titled “Panama Canal: 25 Years of Panamanian Administration”, an event featuring distinguished panelists and representatives from various sectors. 

Engineer Ilya Espino de Marotta, Deputy Administrator and Chief of the Sustainability Office of the Panama Canal Authority (ACP), H.E. Mr. Carlos Guevara Mann, Vice Minister for Multilateral Affairs and Cooperation of Panama’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and H.E. Ms. Sally Loo Hui, Ambassador of Panama to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The Ambassador of Panama to the Netherlands, H.E. Ms. Sally Loo Hui, officially opened the event, highlighting the historical, economic, and strategic significance of the Canal for both Panama and the world. In her remarks, she emphasized the success of the Panamanian management model over the past 25 years and its prospects for the future. 

The panel featured the distinguished participation of H.E. Mr. Carlos Guevara Mann, Vice Minister for Multilateral Affairs and Cooperation of Panama’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He discussed the historical background of the Canal and the significance of the Neutrality Treaty and the Panama Canal Treaty in securing Panamanian sovereignty over this vital interoceanic route. 

Engineer Ilya Espino de Marottam Panama Canal Authority.

Additionally, Engineer Ilya Espino de Marotta, Deputy Administrator and Chief of the Sustainability Office of the Panama Canal Authority (ACP), provided a detailed overview of the Canal’s current situation. She emphasized ongoing projects focused on environmental sustainability and technological expansion to ensure the future competitiveness of the maritime route. 

The event gathered members of the diplomatic corps accredited in the Netherlands, representatives of the Dutch government, international organizations, maritime and logistics industry entrepreneurs, academics, and members of the Panamanian community residing in the Netherlands. 

Later in the afternoon, the conference was held again at Leiden University, specifically aimed at students, academics, and the general public. This session sought to raise awareness and foster a broader dialogue on the importance of the Panama Canal and its future perspectives. During this session, H.E. Sally Loo Hui donated the book “The Expansion of the Panama Canal, Portraits of a Historic Work / Volume IV” to the Latin American Studies program of the Faculty of Humanities. 

Both sessions concluded with a valuable exchange between attendees and panelists, who agreed on the importance of continuing to strengthen the Panamanian administration model of the Canal, ensuring its global competitiveness and long-term sustainability.