Celebrating Peru’s 205th Independence Day:

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Celebrating Peru’s 205th Independence Day:

A Strong Partnership Looking Toward the Future

The Embassy of Peru to the Kingdom of the Netherlands commemorated the 205th Anniversary of Peru’s Independence with a distinguished National Day reception in The Hague, bringing together a large gathering of ambassadors, heads of international organizations, judges from international courts, Dutch government representatives, business leaders, academics, members of civil society, and representatives of the Peruvian diaspora.

Guests were warmly welcomed by H.E. Franca Deza Ferreccio, Ambassador of Peru to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, together with the Peruvian Consul General, Mr. Sergio Manuel Avila Traverso. Upon arrival, attendees received the lyrics of the Peruvian National Anthem, allowing everyone to participate in the ceremonial opening of the evening.

H.E. Mr. Rokuichiro Michii, Ambassador of Japan, H.E. Ms Caroline Chipeta, Ambassador of Tanzania, the Ambassador of Peru, H.E. Franca Deza Ferreccio, H.E. Mrs. Clara Nunes dos Santos, Ambassador of Portugal and H.E. Madeleine Liguemoh Ondoua.

A traditional Pisco Sour, Peru’s emblematic cocktail, set the tone for the celebration, followed by an elegant selection of canapés inspired by Peru’s internationally acclaimed gastronomy. The reception offered a refined yet relaxed atmosphere where guests exchanged views on the growing bilateral relationship between Peru and the Netherlands, as well as on the country’s recent democratic transition following the election of President-elect Keiko Fujimori, who assumes office on 28 July 2026.

In her National Day address, Ambassador Deza Ferreccio reflected on the significance of Peru’s democratic process. “This year Peru has undergone a particularly important democratic process with the holding of the General Elections in April and June. The new constitutionally elected President of Peru, democratically elected by the Peruvian people, Mrs. Keiko Fujimori, will assume office on 28 July 2026.”

H.E. Mr. Mohamed Basri, Ambassador of Morocco, H.E. Ms. Ramatoulaye Ba Epse Faye, Ambassador of Senegal, H.E. Ms. Franca Deza Ferreccio, Ambassador of Peru, H.E. Mr. Lambert Dushimimana, Ambassador of Rwanda, H.E. Ambassador Lizeth N. Satumbo Pena, Ambassador of the Republic of Angola and H.E. Madeleine Liguemoh Ondoua.

The Ambassador emphasized the symbolic importance of celebrating Peru’s National Day in The Hague. “Celebrating our National Day in The Hague has a very special significance. This city, recognized as the Legal Capital of the World, symbolizes the principles of peace, justice, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, values that inspire Peruvian foreign policy. Our country maintains a firm commitment to international law, multilateralism, and the strengthening of international institutions as essential tools for addressing the global challenges of our time.”

“The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a strategic partner of Peru. Our diplomatic relations, founded on mutual respect, trust, and a long tradition of friendship, are currently experiencing a particularly dynamic period. We share common values and objectives, as well as the conviction that dialogue and cooperation constitute the best foundation for promoting the development and prosperity of our societies.”

H.E. Mr. Philippe Couvreur, Ambassador Deza Ferreccio and H.E. Ms. Sally Loo Hui, Ambassador of Panama.

Ambassador Deza Ferreccio pointed to several recent milestones that illustrate the growing depth of cooperation between both countries. Among them were the Sixth Political Consultations held in The Hague during the visit of Peru’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, which opened new avenues for political, economic, commercial, and technical cooperation.

Another landmark achievement was the signing of the Customs Cooperation Treaty between Peru and the Netherlands on 4 June 2026 in Lima. “This Treaty has undeniable strategic value because it will reinforce the trust that strengthens our economic and trade relationship, facilitating the safe and secure transit of goods, and consolidating the Netherlands as one of the main gateways for Peruvian products to the European market.”

H.E. Mr. Paul Teesalu, H.E. Ms. Sally Loo Hui, Ambassador of Panama, Ambassador Deza Ferreccio of Peru and H.E. Ms. Corinne Ciceron Buhler, Ambassador of Switzerland.

She also underscored the strategic role of the Port of Rotterdam as Peru’s principal logistics gateway into Europe.

Promoting Peru’s image abroad remains another important objective of the Embassy. The Ambassador highlighted the successful participation of Peru’s renowned training ship B.A.P. Unión during SAIL Amsterdam 2025 and Sails Curaçao 2026, describing the vessel as “an itinerant Ambassador of Peru.” “Our training ship carried not only the excellence of the Peruvian Navy, but also the richness of our history, culture, and maritime vocation, bringing our country closer to thousands of visitors and reaffirming Peru’s commitment to dialogue and international cooperation.”

Beyond maritime diplomacy, the Embassy has continued to organize lectures, art exhibitions, concerts, and cultural activities that showcase Peru’s rich heritage to Dutch audiences.

The Ambassador also highlighted the expanding cooperation between Peru and the Netherlands in integrated water management, agricultural innovation, and sustainable trade, while expressing appreciation for Dutch support throughout Peru’s accession process to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

A particularly heartfelt moment came when Ambassador Deza Ferreccio paid tribute to the Peruvian community living throughout the Kingdom of the Netherlands. “With their work, talent, and dedication, our compatriots enrich this society and project a positive image of Peru, becoming genuine ambassadors for our country and a human bridge that strengthens the ties between our two nations.”

Looking ahead, the Ambassador expressed confidence in the future of bilateral relations. “The progress achieved demonstrates that the relationship between Peru and the Netherlands is currently experiencing a period of excellence and dynamism. The high-level political dialogue, the strengthening of our cooperation mechanisms, the expansion of trade, and the closer relations of our societies allow us to look to the future with optimism.”

She concluded by thanking the Embassy team, the Consulate General, Peru’s Commercial Office, and all those who have contributed to strengthening Peru-Netherlands relations before inviting guests to celebrate the country’s national day with the traditional toast:

“Happy Independence Day, Peru! Viva el Perú! Cheers!”

The Caspian Sea and the New Geography of Conflict: When Does Military Support Make a State a Party to War

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The Caspian Sea and the New Geography of Conflict: When Does Military Support Make a State a Party to War

By Ayesha Asim

The Caspian Sea was never supposed to be a battlefield in the war between Russia and Ukraine. Yet recent developments have brought the conflict into waters far removed from Ukraine’s front lines. Reports of Ukrainian operations targeting vessels and supply networks allegedly connected to Russia’s military logistics have raised questions about whether the geography of the war is expanding. For Iran, whose maritime space and interests in the Caspian are directly affected, the issue is even more sensitive.

The incident raises a question that international law has not yet answered with complete clarity: when does military assistance to another state make the assisting state a participant in an armed conflict, and when can the infrastructure supporting that assistance become a lawful military objective?

These questions are becoming increasingly important as modern warfare moves beyond traditional battlefields. A war may be fought in one country, supplied through another, supported by technology from a third, and sustained through maritime routes that cross several jurisdictions. The Caspian Sea illustrates this changing geography of conflict, particularly as military and strategic ties between Iran and Russia have deepened while Ukraine continues to seek ways to disrupt Russia’s ability to sustain its war effort.

The starting point must be the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) prohibits states from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, subject to recognised exceptions under international law. Article 51 preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack.

This framework creates an important legal limitation. Even if Iran provides military assistance to Russia, that fact alone does not automatically give Ukraine a general right to use force against Iranian territory. Military assistance and an armed attack are not legally synonymous. The threshold for invoking self-defence is considerably higher than simply demonstrating that another state has helped an adversary.

International law has long recognised that states may provide different forms of assistance to parties involved in armed conflicts without necessarily becoming direct participants themselves. Political support, diplomatic backing and even certain forms of arms transfers do not automatically transform a supporting state into a belligerent.

But not all forms of assistance are legally identical.

There is a difference between supplying weapons and providing operational intelligence. There is another difference between selling military equipment and directly assisting with the planning or execution of an attack. As the nature and degree of involvement increase, so too may the legal consequences.

This is where the law of state responsibility becomes relevant. Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts addresses the responsibility of a state that aids or assists another state in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. The provision requires knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongful act and that the conduct would also have been internationally wrongful if committed by the assisting state itself.

The significance of Article 16 is often misunderstood. It does not mean that every state supplying weapons automatically becomes responsible for every action carried out by the recipient state. The legal conditions must be satisfied. Questions of knowledge, the nature of the assistance and the relationship between that assistance and the wrongful conduct are central.

This creates a distinction between state responsibility and participation in an armed conflict. A state may potentially incur responsibility for assisting unlawful conduct without necessarily becoming a party to the conflict. Conversely, a state that becomes directly involved in military operations may acquire a different legal status.

The distinction is particularly important when considering the legality of attacks against military supply networks.

International humanitarian law applies once an armed conflict exists, but it does not make every object connected to the conflict a lawful target. The principle of distinction requires parties to distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Under the customary rules reflected in Additional Protocol I, an object may qualify as a military objective where it makes an effective contribution to military action and its destruction, capture or neutralisation offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time.

A vessel carrying military equipment may therefore raise a difficult legal question. Its legal status cannot be determined solely by its nationality or by the fact that it is travelling through the territory or waters of a state supporting another party to a conflict.

The crucial question is what the vessel is actually doing.

If a vessel is directly transporting military equipment that contributes to military operations, the legal analysis may differ from that applicable to an ordinary commercial ship carrying civilian cargo. Yet even then, the assessment must be made on the basis of the facts available at the time. The mere suspicion that a vessel is connected to a military supply network is not enough to remove the protection afforded to civilian objects.

The same principle applies to ports, warehouses and transport infrastructure. A facility that serves both civilian and military purposes does not automatically become a lawful military objective. The principles of proportionality and precautions in attack continue to apply. Even where an object is a legitimate military objective, an attack may remain unlawful if the expected incidental civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage, or if feasible precautions have not been taken.

This is where the geography of modern conflict becomes legally complicated.

A supply chain may begin in one country, pass through another and eventually support military operations thousands of kilometres away. But international law does not necessarily allow a state to follow that supply chain wherever it leads and treat every state, vessel or facility connected to it as part of the conflict.

The distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is therefore essential. The law governing whether a state may lawfully use force against another state is different from the law governing how force may be used once an armed conflict exists.

This means that even if a particular Iranian vessel were found to be contributing to Russia’s military operations, that would not automatically establish a general Ukrainian right to attack Iran as a state. The legality of an attack against a specific object under international humanitarian law must not be confused with the legality of using force against the territorial integrity of another state under the UN Charter.

The same legal standards should also apply consistently to all states. If Iranian military support for Russia is scrutinised under international law, then other forms of external military assistance must be assessed according to the same principles. The credibility of international law depends on its consistent application, regardless of political alliances.

The Caspian Sea therefore illustrates a broader transformation in modern warfare. Conflicts are increasingly sustained through international networks of weapons, technology, intelligence, logistics and maritime transport. The battlefield is no longer necessarily defined by the physical location of troops.

Yet the legal consequences of war do not automatically travel along every supply route.

The real challenge for international law is to determine where the boundaries lie. When does military assistance become participation? When does assistance create state responsibility? When does a supply vessel become a military objective? And when does an attack on a specific military object cross the separate legal threshold for the use of force against another state?

These questions will become increasingly important as conflicts become more interconnected. The Caspian Sea may be one of the places where these legal boundaries are tested, but the underlying problem is global.

The future of international humanitarian law will depend not only on how it regulates the battlefield, but also on how it responds to the complex networks that sustain modern warfare. The challenge is to ensure that the expansion of a conflict’s geography does not become an automatic expansion of the legal permission to use force.

  About the Author

Ayesha Asim is a legal academic, legal analyst, and PhD scholar in law. She holds an LLM in International Law (Gold Medal) and has experience in legal research, teaching, and advisory work. Her interests include international law, humanitarian issues, and other contemporary legal challenges. You can reach her at ayeshamalyc09@gmail.com

Freedom of Speech, Where the Border Starts and Where It Ends   

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Freedom of Speech, Where the Border Starts and Where It Ends   

Interview with Suleyman Aslami

By Aleksandra Osina, Charahja van Broekhoven, Taeyun Kim, Longrui Deng, Peace Ojoma Idoko, Ayat Alkhdour, Lauren van Laarhoven-Hargreaves.

Facts Over Fear: Suleyman Aslami on Free Speech in the Digital Age

Freedom of speech remains one of the cornerstones of democratic societies. Yet in an age of artificial intelligence, social media, and rapidly spreading misinformation, protecting this right has become increasingly complex. According to Dutch politician Suleyman Aslami (D66), safeguarding free speech today means not only defending the right to speak, but also ensuring that public debate is grounded in facts and political responsibility, not just defending the right to speak.

Having grown up alongside the rise of the internet, Aslami has watched digital platforms transform political communication. “The same systems that amplify participation also amplify outrage,” he says, “and those aren’t always the same thing as democratic debate.”

Asked about the greatest threats to free speech, Aslami points to two very different realities. The first is found in authoritarian states, where governments silence dissent and restrict basic freedoms. Drawing on his experience at the Dutch Embassy in Cuba, he recalls how citizens were prevented from expressing their opinions freely.

The second threat exists within democratic societies themselves. Rather than direct censorship, Aslami warns of misinformation amplified by social media platforms and the growing influence of algorithms on public opinion.

He cites the Dutch childcare benefits scandal, where an algorithm meant to detect welfare fraud disproportionately targeted families with migrant backgrounds, wrongly accusing thousands of innocent parents.

“You can compensate people financially,” he says, “but you cannot fully compensate for years of suspicion and broken trust in government. The real question is not how to fix the algorithm, but whether it should have been used at all.”

That question is one Aslami has worked on directly. As Chief of Staff to a D66 Member of the European Parliament, he was closely involved in working on the EU AI Act, working on transparency obligations for high-risk automated systems. He now brings that experience to Amsterdam’s city council.

For Aslami, responsible political communication begins with a simple principle: facts matter. He rejects the idea of “alternative facts” and insists that politicians must base public debate on evidence and science based facts. “Politicians have a louder microphone than most citizens,” he says. “With that comes a responsibility not to distort the facts just because it’s convenient.”

At the same time, Aslami stresses that responsibility should never become censorship. Democracies must remain open to difficult discussions on migration, inequality and social tensions. The line is crossed when speech promotes hatred, discrimination or violence.

Aslami welcomes European efforts, such as the EU AI Act to improve transparency and platform accountability while emphasising digital literacy. His message is clear: democracy depends not only on protecting free speech but on choosing facts over fear. In a political climate that often rewards outrage over substance, responsible speech remains essential to keeping democracy strong.

About the authors:

Aleksandra Osina, Charahja van Broekhoven, Taeyun Kim, Longrui Deng, Peace Ojoma Idoko, Ayat Alkhdour, Lauren van Laarhoven-Hargreaves are participants in the Bright Future Foundation, as part of the European Union’s “Participate & Promote Democracy” Youth Participation project, in cooperation with Diplomat Magazine, Embassy of the Netherlands in Armenia and young members of the Armenian partner organization Promising Youth.

ICC on ASP decision on disciplinary proceedings

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ICC on ASP decision on disciplinary proceedings

The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court takes note of the decision adopted by the Special Session of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) on 24 July to remove the Prosecutor from office, having found that he has committed serious misconduct and serious breach of duty.

Following the decision, Deputy Prosecutors Nazhat Shameen Khan and Mame Mandiaye Niang, will continue to head the Office. Since Mr Karim A. A. Khan took a leave of absence in May 2025,  the Deputy Prosecutors have assumed responsibility for the leadership, management and administration of the Office. 

The Office wishes to reassure victims, affected communities, States Parties, civil society partners and all those who support its work that its activities in the fulfilment of its mandate continue without interruption. The Office remains committed to conducting independent and impartial investigations and prosecutions across all situations under the Court’s jurisdiction to deliver justice for victims of Rome Statute crimes.

The Office maintains a zero-tolerance policy against sexual harassment and other forms of misconduct, and is committed to upholding professionalism, integrity, and accountability in carrying out its work. It will continue to foster a respectful, safe and inclusive workplace environment by prioritising the duty of care it owes to its staff members.

The Francophonie at a Structural Crossroads: From a Community of Language to a Community of Shared Learning

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The Francophonie at a Structural Crossroads: From a Community of Language to a Community of Shared Learning

By Benoist Mallet Di Bento

As ministers gather to assess the candidates for the next Secretary-General of the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF), attention naturally focuses on personalities, diplomatic balances and electoral arithmetic. Yet this institutional sequence should not obscure the more fundamental question before the Francophone world.

The real issue is not simply who will lead the Organisation. It is what kind of Francophonie we wish to build over the next fifteen years.

The international environment has changed profoundly. Strategic competition has intensified, artificial intelligence is reshaping economies and societies, climate change is redefining development priorities, and civil societies are demanding a greater role in international governance. In such a context, the Francophonie cannot remain primarily an inherited institutional framework. It must become a platform capable of producing solutions, facilitating cooperation and generating shared innovation.

For decades, the Francophonie largely operated through a vertical dynamic in which expertise, financial resources and institutional models flowed from North to South. This approach produced significant achievements in education, cultural cooperation and institutional development. It deserves recognition.

However, the realities of the twenty-first century invite us to think differently.

The demographic centre of gravity of the French language now lies overwhelmingly in Africa. Innovation is emerging across the entire Francophone space. Québec has become a world-class centre for artificial intelligence. Morocco has developed major academic partnerships across Africa. Universities, entrepreneurs, researchers and local communities throughout Africa, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the Pacific are generating original responses to global challenges.

This evolution raises an essential question

What if some of tomorrow’s most significant educational, technological, agricultural and cultural innovations were to emerge first from the Global South?

If that happens, the Francophonie can no longer be understood simply as a space where knowledge is transmitted in one direction. It must become a community of reciprocal learning, where every society contributes its own experience and every member remains willing to learn from others.

Such a transformation also requires broadening our understanding of the Francophonie itself.

The OIF is an organisation of States and governments. Yet the Francophonie lives first through its peoples: teachers, researchers, entrepreneurs, artists, local authorities, universities, businesses, athletes, diasporas and, above all, younger generations.

Across the Francophone world, expectations are growing for an Organisation that is more visible, more accessible and more closely connected to realities on the ground. Establishing permanent dialogue with civil society, academic networks, territorial authorities and economic actors would considerably strengthen the Organisation’s legitimacy and effectiveness.

Ambition, however, requires resources

There is an increasingly visible gap between the missions assigned to the Francophonie and the financial means available to fulfil them. Education, mobility, research, cultural cooperation, digital transformation, agricultural development and youth programmes all require sustainable investment.

The next Secretary-General will therefore need to explore new instruments: public-private partnerships, Francophone investment funds, development finance institutions, philanthropic foundations, diaspora investment mechanisms and impact finance. In the longer term, the idea of a genuine Francophone financial architecture deserves serious consideration if the Organisation wishes to transform political aspirations into measurable achievements.

Technological sovereignty constitutes another major challeng

Artificial intelligence is no longer simply an innovation sector. It is becoming the infrastructure through which knowledge, information and economic activity circulate. The linguistic and cultural data that train these systems inevitably shape their outcomes.

The Francophone world possesses remarkable assets: research centres in Europe and North America, rapidly expanding innovation ecosystems across Africa and an exceptional linguistic diversity. Together, these strengths could support multilingual open models, digital preservation of languages, scientific cooperation and ethical governance of artificial intelligence. In this domain, the Francophonie could become not merely a participant, but a recognised international contributor.

Food security offers another strategic opportunity

Agriculture remains central to demographic growth, employment, territorial stability and climate resilience. Rather than viewing agriculture exclusively as a production sector, the Francophone world could promote integrated ecosystems connecting research, innovation, local transformation and entrepreneurship across continents. Such cooperation would strengthen both economic sovereignty and sustainable development.

Likewise, sport deserves greater recognition as an instrument of diplomacy. The Jeux de la Francophonie already demonstrate its potential. Expanded cooperation among universities, federations, local governments and youth organisations could transform sport into a powerful vector of inclusion, trust-building and peace.

Language itself also deserves renewed reflection

French constitutes our common linguistic space, yet it coexists with thousands of other languages. The Francophonie should therefore not pursue cultural uniformity, but rather become a laboratory of multilingualism.

This diversity extends beyond languages to modes of knowledge transmission. Across many Francophone societies, oral traditions continue to preserve memory, education and collective experience alongside written culture. At a time when artificial intelligence is reshaping learning itself, these traditions should no longer be regarded simply as heritage. They represent living intellectual resources capable of enriching future educational models.

Climate change reinforces this need for intellectual openness

Throughout the Francophone world, diverse legal traditions, scientific approaches and local knowledge systems coexist. Indigenous knowledge, customary practices and contemporary science should not be viewed as competing systems but as complementary contributions to environmental stewardship. The Francophonie is uniquely positioned to facilitate this dialogue.

Natural resources should also become instruments of cooperation rather than sources of conflict. Critical minerals, energy resources and biodiversity can generate shared prosperity only if accompanied by local value creation, education, institutional capacity and long-term peace.

More than twenty years ago, former United Nations and Francophonie Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali warned against cultural uniformity and argued that cultural diversity should be shared rather than merely protected. For him, dialogue among cultures was not an abstract ideal but a necessary condition for lasting peace. That insight remains remarkably relevant today.

In an increasingly fragmented international order, the Francophonie has an opportunity to renew that vision. Diversity should not simply be preserved as a historical inheritance; it should be mobilised as a strategic resource for innovation, cooperation and peace.

Ultimately, the election of a Secretary-General is important. But it is not the final objective. The deeper challenge is to enable the Francophonie to evolve from a community bound primarily by a shared language into a community united by shared learning.

Such a transformation would not diminish the Organisation’s original vocation. On the contrary, it would fulfil it. In a multipolar world where no civilisation possesses all the answers, every society has something to teach, and every society has something to learn. Perhaps this is the Francophonie’s greatest strategic opportunity—and its greatest responsibility.

About the author:

Benoist Mallet Di Bento is a Consultant en stratégie internationale, essayiste et observateur des enjeux de la Francophonie

From Gibraltar to the Arctic

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From Gibraltar to the Arctic

Why the Arctic Cannot Wait for the Governance of Tomorrow

By Maria Elena Ahner

For much of the past three years, Europe’s strategic attention has been fixed further south. The Red Sea crisis, instability around the Strait of Hormuz, recurring disruptions at the Suez Canal and Eastern European calamities Ukraine have understandably dominated maritime policy. In the process, the Arctic has quietly slipped down the political agenda. That is a strategic mistake.

The Arctic is often portrayed as a region whose significance belongs to some distant future, to be addressed once geopolitical or climate tensions subside. Yet history suggests precisely the opposite. The most consequential governance decisions are rarely made when new realities fully emerge; they are made years beforehand. By the time commercial opportunities become obvious, institutional choices have already been taken—or neglected.

Nearly two decades ago, Professor Anis H. Bajrektarević argued that the melting Arctic should not be understood merely as an environmental phenomenon. Rather, it represented the emergence of a new geopolitical and geo-economic space in which climate, commerce, sovereignty and security would increasingly converge. At the time, this appeared a forward-looking proposition. Today it reads less as a prediction than as a description of reality.

The question confronting the EU and the rest of Europe is therefore no longer whether the Arctic will matter. It already does. The real question is whether Europe is preparing the governance architecture required to manage its long-term implications.

Until recently, the Northern Sea Route—often referred to as the North Passage—was increasingly discussed as a viable complement to the traditional maritime routes linking Europe and Asia. Retreating sea ice, advances in navigation technology and the prospect of significantly shorter transit times encouraged governments and shipping companies alike to explore its commercial potential. While few believed Arctic shipping would replace the Suez Canal, many recognised that it could eventually become an important element in a more diversified and resilient global trading system.

Then geopolitics intervened: The war in Ukraine fundamentally transformed Europe’s relationship with the Arctic. Trade wars, military tensions and the collapse of political trust have severely constrained practical cooperation across the High North (Arctic/Litoral 5). Since much of the Northern Sea Route to Asia remains under Russian jurisdiction, European commercial engagement (even with the Canada’s Hudson Bay) has become increasingly uncertain. As a consequence, strategic debate has largely shifted elsewhere.

This change in political circumstances, however, should not be mistaken for a reduction in the Arctic’s strategic importance.

Climate change has not paused because diplomacy has stalled. Arctic ice continues to retreat. Technological innovation continues to reshape maritime navigation. The global race for critical minerals continues to intensify – so does the calamity all over West Asia. Scientific research continues to reveal the region’s growing environmental and economic importance. Whether relations between Europe and Russia improve next year or in the next decade, these structural transformations will continue.

The Arctic therefore represents one of the rare geopolitical theatres where long-term trends are advancing independently of short-term politics. Canadians and Americans are understanding it well. That distinction matters because infrastructure can be built relatively quickly; institutions cannot.

Europe has devoted considerable attention to strengthening supply chains, modernising ports, improving digital logistics and enhancing maritime resilience. These are essential investments. Yet physical infrastructure alone cannot govern an increasingly complex maritime domain.

The Arctic presents questions that extend well beyond navigation. They concern environmental protection, search and rescue capabilities, digital maritime services, subsea infrastructure, energy security, scientific cooperation, resource management, indigenous communities and the legal frameworks governing international waters. Above all, they concern the ability of states to cooperate under conditions of growing strategic competition.

These are governance challenges long before they become commercial ones. History repeatedly demonstrates that institutional responses tend to lag behind technological and geopolitical transformation. New shipping routes emerge faster than regulatory systems. Commercial interests expand more rapidly than mechanisms for international cooperation. Competition develops long before governance adapts. The Arctic is unlikely to prove an exception.

Waiting for political conditions to improve before preparing governance frameworks would therefore reverse the proper sequence of strategic planning. Institutions should not be improvised once new patterns of trade emerge. They should be designed while options remain open. For Europe, this requires abandoning an increasingly outdated habit of treating the Arctic as an isolated frontier rather than as an integral component of its wider maritime strategy.

Developments in the High North are no longer detached from the EU/Europe’s broader strategic environment. Disruptions affecting southern maritime corridors inevitably reinforce interest in northern alternatives (especially under the current situation when the fast and cheap blue and green lanes – such as the trans-Siberian, Hormuz-Red Sea-Suez, or Africa corridor are under question). Likewise, future changes in Arctic navigation will influence Europe’s long-term connectivity, supply-chain resilience and economic security. The Arctic should therefore be viewed not as a distant (mental, geographic or political) periphery but as part of a wider maritime system whose resilience depends less on any single route than on the quality of governance that connects them (see GAFG Connectivity Doctrine).

This carries particular significance for the Nordic countries (not only the Arctic 5). Their geographic proximity gives them an immediate stake in the Arctic’s future, but the implications extend well beyond Northern Europe. The EU (led by Denmark for that matter), Britain and other Atlantic partners all share an interest in ensuring that future Arctic governance is based on cooperation, predictability and internationally accepted (UNCLOS-based) rules rather than strategic improvisation.

Preparing for that future does not require predicting when the Northern Sea Route will once again become commercially attractive. Such forecasts remain hostage to political developments beyond anyone’s control. It requires something more fundamental: recognising that governance must precede opportunity.

This is precisely the rationale behind the Global Maritime Governance Forum of the Global Academy for Future Governance (GAFG), whose inaugural meeting is planned for Gibraltar this September. Rather than becoming another conference on shipping, ports or maritime security, the GAFG Forum seeks to establish a permanent international platform where policymakers, port authorities, industry leaders, insurers, academics and international organisations can jointly examine the governance of an increasingly interconnected maritime system. At a time when the Arctic is becoming strategically more significant even as political cooperation grows more difficult, such dialogue is not a luxury—it is an investment in institutional preparedness. Its ambition is simple but timely: to begin shaping the governance architecture before changing geopolitical realities make it indispensable.

Europe should therefore resist the temptation to postpone its Arctic thinking until relations with Russia eventually stabilise. Strategic foresight cannot depend upon diplomatic timing. The Arctic will continue to evolve regardless of political cycles, because the forces transforming it—climate change, technological innovation, resource competition and shifting patterns of global trade—operate on a different timeline.

The greatest strategic mistake would not be failing to predict precisely when the Arctic will become Europe’s next great maritime frontier. It would be waiting until that moment arrives before preparing the institutions capable of governing it. The Arctic is not waiting for Europe to prepare. Neither should Europe wait to govern the Arctic.

Author:

Maria Elena Ahner, the Copenhagen-based GAFG Head of Coherence & Control

Selected References

  • Bajrektarević, A. H. (2011). The Melting Poles: Between Challenges and Opportunities. Central European Journal of International and Security Studies (CEJISS), 5(3), 22–43.
  • Arctic Council. Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA). 2009. https://pame.is/projects/arctic-marine-shipping/amsa
  • European Commission & European External Action Service. (2021). JOIN(2021) 27 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=JOIN:2021:27:FIN
  • International Maritime Organization (IMO). https://www.imo.org
  • United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). https://www.un.org/depts/los/
  • OECD. (2023) The Ocean Economy to 2050 https://www.oecd.org/ocean/
  • World Bank. The Container Port Performance Index (CPPI). www.worldbank.org/ext/
  • UNCTAD. Review of Maritime Transport 2024 https://unctad.org
  • Global Academy for Future Governance (GAFG). Connectivity Doctrine. (Internal policy document.)

President Ilham Aliyev in official visit to Germany

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President Ilham Aliyev in official visit to Germany

20-21 July 2026, Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany: Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev paid an official visit to Germany. In the framework of the visit, he was welcomed by his counterpart, Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier at Villa Borsig and subsequently by the Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Friedrich Merz.
Background to the exchanges with the German counterparts of President Aliyev was focused on bilateral relations, the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and current regional and international issues. For instance, Federal President Steinmeier acknowledged the progress made in the peace and normalisation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan and encouraged further steps towards a peace agreement.

Bilateral cooperation between Germany and Azerbaijan was also a topic of the conversation. Overall, the German dignitaries highlighted Azerbaijan’s importance as a key partner in the South Caucasus and in matters of energy and the economy.

Following a lengthy preparatory period, the establishment of the German-Azerbaijani Business Council (GABC) was formally sealed at the Federal Chancellery in Berlin in the presence of Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz and the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev. Both leaders view the new body as a key driver for German-Azerbaijani economic cooperation and the strategic partnership between the two nations.

President Aliyev and President Steinmeier – Picture by Presidency of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Through this new body, the German Eastern Business Association, the German-Azerbaijani Chamber of Commerce (AHK Azerbaijan), and the Export and Investment Promotion Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (AZPROMO) are creating the two countries’ most important bilateral business platform for dialogue with policymakers. The aim is to further deepen bilateral economic relations, foster investment and joint projects, and expand dialogue on future-oriented topics and sustainable economic development.

In the first five months of 2026, German trade with Azerbaijan rose by 30% year-on-year to €835 million, with German exports increasing by 18% and imports by 38%. Germany sources crude oil—and, since January 2026, natural gas—from the South Caucasus nation.

For further information 

Presidency of the Federal Republic of Germany: https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Berichte/DE/Frank-Walter-Steinmeier/2026/07/260721-StP-AZE-Alijew.html

Presidency of the Republic of Azerbaijan: https://president.az/en/articles/view/73031

The Strait of Hormuz and International Law: Can Iran Restrict or Charge for Passage?

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The Strait of Hormuz and International Law: Can Iran Restrict or Charge for Passage?

By Ayesha Asim

The Strait of Hormuz has once again become the subject of international attention. As tensions in the Middle East continue to rise, concerns over the security and accessibility of this narrow waterway have also increased. The Strait is not simply a geographical feature. It is one of the world’s most important maritime routes, connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the wider Indian Ocean. Any serious disruption to navigation through it can have consequences far beyond the region. This raises an important legal question. Can Iran, as one of the states bordering the Strait, restrict passage or require vessels to pay a charge for using it?

The answer under international law is not entirely straightforward. It requires a careful balance between two competing principles. On one side is the sovereignty and security of a coastal state. On the other is the international community’s interest in freedom of navigation.

The legal starting point is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, commonly known as UNCLOS. The Convention establishes a special regime for straits used for international navigation. Under Articles 37 and 38, ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage through such straits. This right is particularly important because it allows international navigation to continue between one part of the high seas or exclusive economic zone and another. Transit passage is not supposed to be suspended or unnecessarily impeded by the states bordering the strait.

The Strait of Hormuz is widely regarded as falling within this category. Its international importance and the volume of shipping that passes through it make it difficult to view it simply as ordinary territorial waters subject to unrestricted coastal control. However, one important legal complication must be acknowledged. Iran signed UNCLOS in 1982 but has not ratified it. Therefore, Iran is not bound by the Convention as a state party in the same manner as states that have ratified it. This does not, however, mean that UNCLOS is irrelevant to the legal debate. Some of its provisions reflect customary international law, while others remain matters of treaty obligation between states parties. The precise customary status of individual provisions therefore matters.

Iran has also historically expressed reservations about aspects of the Convention’s regime concerning international straits. Its position reflects a broader concern that the rights of coastal states should not be overlooked in favour of the interests of powerful maritime states.

This is an important perspective to consider. The Strait of Hormuz lies immediately adjacent to Iranian territory. Iran has legitimate security concerns in a region where foreign military forces have maintained a significant presence for decades. From Iran’s perspective, the Strait is not merely a commercial route. It is also part of a sensitive security environment. International law cannot simply disregard these realities. At the same time, sovereignty over territorial waters does not give a coastal state unlimited authority to control international navigation. The law of the sea has always attempted to strike a balance between coastal sovereignty and the wider interests of the international community.

The question of charging vessels illustrates this balance particularly well. There is a significant legal difference between imposing a mandatory toll simply for the right to pass through a maritime strait and charging for a specific service provided to a vessel. The latter may be legally defensible in certain circumstances. The former is much more difficult to justify.

Article 26 of UNCLOS, although formally part of the regime governing innocent passage, reflects an important principle: a coastal state should not impose a charge on a foreign ship merely because it passes through its territorial sea. Charges may instead be connected to specific services provided to the ship. While the direct application of this provision to the transit passage regime and to Iran’s legal position requires careful consideration, the underlying distinction remains relevant.

In practical terms, there is a difference between saying, “You must pay because you are passing through these waters,” and saying, “You must pay for a specific maritime service that we provide.” International law is much more comfortable with the second situation than the first. Therefore, if Iran were to impose a general compulsory toll on every vessel simply for using the Strait of Hormuz, it would face serious legal difficulties. Such a measure could be seen as interfering with the broader principle of international navigation. If, however, a charge was genuinely connected to a specific service, such as navigational assistance or another identifiable maritime facility, the legal analysis would be different.

The purpose and practical effect of the charge would therefore be critical. The same distinction applies to restrictions on passage. Iran may have legitimate authority to regulate navigation for reasons such as maritime safety, environmental protection or the prevention of unlawful activities. International law does not require coastal states to abandon all regulatory powers simply because a waterway is internationally important.

The difficulty arises when regulation becomes an effective restriction on navigation. A measure that genuinely improves maritime safety is legally different from one designed to prevent particular states or categories of vessels from exercising their navigation rights. International law therefore requires a close examination of the actual purpose and effect of any restriction.

The present circumstances make the issue even more complicated because the region is experiencing heightened military tensions. If an international armed conflict exists, the legal analysis may extend beyond the ordinary law of the sea to the law of naval warfare and international humanitarian law.

In an armed conflict, states may have greater legal authority to take measures against enemy vessels in certain circumstances. But this does not mean that every commercial vessel becomes a legitimate target or that a state can simply close an international strait without regard to international law.

The status of the vessel becomes important. A military vessel belonging to a party to an armed conflict is legally different from a neutral commercial tanker carrying civilian cargo. Any military action against shipping must be assessed under the applicable rules governing armed conflict, including the principles of distinction and proportionality. This is why the present debate should not be reduced to a simple question of whether Iran can “close Hormuz”. The legal position depends on the circumstances, the nature of the measure, the status of the vessel and the existence of an armed conflict. There is also a broader point that deserves attention. Freedom of navigation should not be used selectively.

If Iran’s actions are assessed under international law, the actions of other states operating in or around the Strait should also be assessed by the same legal standards. The principle of freedom of navigation does not give any state an automatic licence to use military force. Any military operation must comply with the United Nations Charter and other applicable rules of international law.

This is where a balanced approach becomes essential. Iran cannot simply rely on its geographical position to claim an unlimited right to control international navigation. At the same time, other states cannot ignore Iran’s legitimate security concerns or assume that every disagreement over maritime access can be resolved through military pressure. The law seeks a middle ground.

In my assessment, Iran may face significant legal difficulties in claiming a general right to impose a mandatory toll simply for passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The stronger interpretation of international maritime law is that international navigation through a strait used for international navigation should not be made conditional upon such a payment. However, this does not necessarily rule out every form of maritime charge or regulation. Genuine service fees and reasonable safety-related measures raise different legal questions.

The issue of restrictions is similarly context-dependent. In peacetime, broad restrictions that effectively prevent international navigation would be difficult to reconcile with the principles governing international straits. During armed conflict, however, the law of naval warfare may permit certain measures in relation to enemy shipping, subject to strict legal limitations. The Strait of Hormuz therefore represents a delicate balance between national sovereignty and international interests. Iran has legitimate interests in protecting its security and regulating activities near its territory. Other states have legitimate interests in ensuring that international maritime routes remain open and secure.

International law recognises both interests.

The real challenge is ensuring that neither principle is treated as absolute. Iran’s sovereignty does not automatically give it an unrestricted right to turn an international maritime chokepoint into a pay-for-passage route. Equally, the importance of freedom of navigation does not erase the rights and security concerns of the coastal state. The legal question surrounding Hormuz is therefore not simply whether Iran can control the Strait. It is about the limits of that control under international law. For now, the strongest legal position appears to be that Iran cannot lawfully impose a general mandatory toll merely as the price of international passage. But any specific measure must be examined on its own terms. Its purpose, legal basis and practical effect all matter.

The Strait of Hormuz remains a powerful reminder that international law often operates in the space between competing interests. Its purpose is not to give one side everything it wants. It is to establish rules that allow sovereignty, security and international navigation to coexist. That balance will be tested again as tensions in the region develop. How the international community responds will have implications not only for Iran and its neighbours, but also for the future interpretation of freedom of navigation in strategically important maritime straits around the world.

About the Author:

Ayesha Asim is a legal academic, legal analyst, and PhD scholar in law. She holds an LLM in International Law (Gold Medal) and has experience in legal research, teaching, and advisory work. Her interests include international law, humanitarian issues, and other contemporary legal challenges. You can reach her at ayeshamalyc09@gmail.com   

Liaoning University Wins 2026 Chinese Edition of the ICC Moot Court Competition

Diplomat Magazine
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Liaoning University Wins 2026 Chinese Edition of the ICC Moot Court Competition

On 10 July 2026, Liaoning University was crowned the winner of the Chinese edition of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Moot Court Competition, following the final round held in Courtroom I of the ICC in The Hague, the Netherlands.

The Peking University School of Transnational Law secured second place, while the China University of Political Science and Law finished third. The Best Speaker Award was presented to Xinrui Fang of the Peking University School of Transnational Law in recognition of outstanding oral advocacy.

The final round was presided over by ICC Judge Keebong Paek, who chaired the panel of judges. The members of the winning Liaoning University team were Su Bojia, Ma Haitian, Fan Bingqian, Liu Meirui, Wang Qiran, Wen Jiale, and Zhao Meitong.

During the competition, participating teams argued a fictitious case before the Court, assuming the roles of the Office of the Prosecutor, the Defence, and State Counsel. The proceedings were livestreamed on the ICC’s official website and Facebook platform, allowing audiences around the world to follow the final.

The 2026 edition of the Chinese ICC Moot Court Competition was organised by Leiden University in partnership with the Chinese Initiative on International Law. A total of 130 universities took part in the preliminary rounds, reflecting the growing interest in international criminal law among Chinese law students.

The ICC Moot Court Competitions form part of the Court’s Academic Programme and are currently organised in English, Spanish, French, and Chinese, with plans to support an Arabic-language edition in the future. Through these competitions, the ICC promotes a deeper understanding of international criminal law, encourages academic engagement with the Court’s work, and contributes to strengthening respect for international justice worldwide.

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