Battle for the Gulf Tomorrow: Between a Hobbesian and a Kantian World

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Battle for the Gulf Tomorrow: Between a Hobbesian and a Kantian World

Strategic Assessment of the Emerging Gulf Security Architecture

By H.E. Mr. Vladimir Norov

The strategic landscape of the Gulf has fundamentally changed following the Iran-Israel confrontation and the direct attacks against Gulf states in 2026. For decades, Gulf security depended primarily on external powers—especially the United States. Recent conflict has demonstrated both the strengths and limitations of this model.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) successfully defended much of its critical infrastructure through integrated missile defence systems and close cooperation with the United States and other partners. Yet Gulf states were nevertheless drawn into a conflict they neither initiated nor controlled.

The central question is therefore no longer whether the Gulf can defend itself militarily, but whether it can develop a regional security order capable of sustaining peace while reducing its vulnerability to external great-power competition.

The answer emerging from recent developments is cautiously optimistic. The Gulf possesses unprecedented financial resources, political cohesion, military modernisation and diplomatic influence. Yet several structural obstacles remain, including unresolved regional rivalries, the Iranian challenge, the Palestinian issue, maritime insecurity and dependence on foreign military technology.

The most realistic path toward sustainable peace is not military dominance but a multilayered security architecture combining deterrence, diplomacy, economic integration and regional ownership.

Historical Evolution of Gulf Security

For nearly fifty years, Gulf security rested on three pillars:

  • American military protection;
  • oil-export stability; and
  • bilateral defence agreements.

Major turning points included:

  • the 1979 Iranian Revolution;
  • the Iran-Iraq War;
  • the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;
  • US intervention in Iraq;
  • the Arab Spring;
  • the Yemen conflict;
  • the Abraham Accords; and
  • the Iran-Israel confrontation.

Each crisis increased external military involvement while simultaneously exposing regional vulnerabilities.

The latest conflict differs because it directly targeted GCC infrastructure rather than proxy battlefields. The Gulf states have therefore entered a new strategic phase characterised by greater confidence, deeper regional coordination and a stronger emphasis on self-reliance.

Their investments in integrated air defence, critical infrastructure protection and diversified diplomatic relationships have enhanced resilience. At the same time, recent conflicts have demonstrated that military capability alone cannot guarantee peace if the surrounding political architecture remains fragile.

A durable regional order is therefore most likely to emerge from a layered approach: preserving strong partnerships with the United States, China and Europe while strengthening GCC institutions, expanding practical cooperation with regional partners, developing indigenous defence industries and maintaining channels for dialogue with adversaries. Progress on the Palestinian question, maritime security and confidence-building measures with Iran will remain central to any sustainable settlement.

Overall, the evidence from leading strategic institutions broadly supports the idea that the Gulf is moving from dependence towards greater strategic agency. However, this transition should be viewed as an evolution rather than a completed transformation. The region’s future stability will depend less on replacing external security guarantees than on complementing them with credible regional institutions, economic resilience and inclusive diplomacy.

The Gulf region stands at a strategic crossroads. Recent regional conflicts have exposed the limitations of a security system based predominantly on external guarantees while highlighting the growing need for a regionally owned framework capable of preventing crises, managing disputes and promoting long-term stability.

What the Gulf therefore requires is not another externally designed security arrangement, but a process through which regional states themselves can gradually develop the habits, mechanisms and institutions of cooperative security.

The proposed Muscat Process – in circulation as a proposal since June by the Group of Friends inspired by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), if facilitated by the Sultanate of Oman, offers an opportunity to establish an inclusive multilateral security dialogue for the Gulf and West Asia. Rather than replacing existing bilateral partnerships or military alliances, the initiative would complement them by creating permanent mechanisms for political consultation, confidence-building and practical cooperation among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Iraq and Iran, and even beyond.

The objective is not to resolve all regional disputes immediately, but to institutionalise dialogue, reduce strategic mistrust and gradually develop a cooperative regional security architecture.

The experience of the CSCE is instructive precisely because it did not begin with a peace treaty or a comprehensive settlement. It began with the recognition that sustained dialogue, agreed principles, confidence-building and practical cooperation could gradually transform relations among states whose political and security interests remained deeply divided.

The lesson of Helsinki was therefore not simply the text agreed in 1975, but the process that followed it. The CSCE demonstrated that states deeply divided by ideology, security interests and geopolitical rivalry could nevertheless begin with principles, regular dialogue and practical confidence-building, allowing a broader cooperative framework to develop gradually. The relevance of that experience for the Gulf lies precisely in this evolutionary character: the objective need not be a comprehensive settlement at the outset, but the creation of a process through which such a settlement may eventually become possible.

A further lesson is that such a process should not necessarily await the end of hostilities. On the contrary, dialogue is often most valuable when relations are at their most difficult. Establishing channels of communication, confidence-building measures and practical cooperation during a period of confrontation can help reduce miscalculation and create conditions for de-escalation. The Muscat Process should therefore be conceived not as a mechanism to be activated only after a political settlement, but as an instrument capable of contributing to the emergence of that settlement.

Why the Muscat Process Matters

For more than five decades, Gulf security has largely depended on external powers. While this model contributed to regional stability, recent developments have demonstrated that external security guarantees alone cannot prevent regional escalation or protect regional interests from broader geopolitical competition.

The Gulf now faces a historic opportunity to become an active producer rather than a passive consumer of regional security.

For smaller and middle-sized states in particular, participation in shaping the regional order is itself a matter of security. Those who are absent from the process through which the regional order is shaped risk becoming objects rather than authors of that order. A permanent regional process would therefore give smaller states not merely a voice in moments of crisis, but a continuing capacity to shape the rules, norms and arrangements by which their security is affected.

The major powers will continue to pursue their interests through strategic competition, deterrence and periods of selective détente. Smaller and middle-sized states, however, have a different instrument of statecraft – if timely, available to them: institution-building.

Their influence is well beyond the military weight alone. It can derive from convening, mediation, rule-making, connectivity and the creation of institutions in which larger powers also have an interest in maintaining stability. This is a form of statecraft particularly suited to a region in which no single power can impose a durable security order.

The Muscat Process would provide several strategic advantages:

  • establish a permanent regional platform for dialogue among the principal Gulf actors;
  • create structured mechanisms for crisis prevention and conflict de-escalation;
  • strengthen regional ownership of security while complementing existing international partnerships;
  • reduce the risks of military miscalculation through transparency and confidence-building measures; and
  • contribute to a stable environment for economic development, energy security and international trade.

By maintaining continuous dialogue during both periods of stability and crisis, the Process would help transform episodic diplomacy into a permanent mechanism for regional cooperation.

Why Oman?

Oman is uniquely positioned to facilitate such an initiative.

Its long-standing policy of neutrality, balanced regional relations and proven mediation record has earned the confidence of major regional actors. Muscat has consistently served as a trusted venue for discreet diplomacy and dialogue during periods of heightened tension.

The credibility of the Process therefore derives not only from its institutional design but also from the reputation of Oman as an impartial and respected facilitator.

Proposed Structure

The Muscat Process should evolve gradually through three successive phases.

Phase I – Confidence Building

The first phase would focus on establishing regular consultations among GCC member states, Iraq and Iran.

Meetings would be chaired by Oman and conducted on the basis of consensus, ensuring equal participation and political ownership by all members.

Initial discussions should concentrate on practical areas where cooperation is both feasible and mutually beneficial, including:

  • maritime security;
  • protection of critical infrastructure;
  • humanitarian cooperation;
  • disaster response;
  • cyber security;
  • environmental challenges; and
  • economic connectivity.

At this stage, the emphasis should remain on confidence-building rather than formal negotiations on politically sensitive disputes.

Phase II – Institutional Development

Once regular dialogue has become established, participants could agree to create a modest permanent secretariat in Muscat.

Working groups composed of governmental officials and technical experts would support cooperation in specific policy areas, while annual ministerial meetings would provide strategic guidance.

A small administrative structure would ensure continuity without creating excessive institutional costs.

Phase III – Comprehensive Regional Security Framework

Over the longer term, the Process could gradually evolve into an institutionalised regional organisation comparable in function—though not necessarily in structure—to the OSCE.

Possible future instruments may include:

  • confidence- and security-building measures;
  • crisis communication mechanisms;
  • military transparency arrangements;
  • maritime incident prevention procedures;
  • early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms;
  • regular political consultations; and
  • joint initiatives on economic and environmental security.

Such evolution would depend entirely on consensus among participating states.

IV. International Support while Preserving Regional Ownership

The Muscat Process should remain an indigenous regional initiative.

External actors would not participate in decision-making but could provide technical expertise and share institutional experience through a “Friends of the Process” mechanism (already diplomatically active).

An advisory panel composed of distinguished former senior officials from organisations such as the OSCE, the United Nations and other international institutions could support the initial establishment of the Process by providing expertise in mediation, institutional design and confidence-building.

This approach combines international experience with regional ownership, ensuring that solutions are developed by Gulf states while benefiting from lessons learned elsewhere.

Expected Strategic Benefits

If successfully implemented, the Muscat Process could generate substantial long-term benefits for regional stability. Politically, it would institutionalise dialogue among states with divergent strategic interests, reducing the likelihood of escalation through regular communication.

From a security perspective, it would promote transparency, confidence-building and practical cooperation on shared challenges, including maritime security, cyber threats and protection of critical infrastructure. Economically, greater regional stability would strengthen investor confidence, safeguard international energy markets and protect strategic trade routes such as the Strait of Hormuz. Institutionally, the Process would establish a comprehensive Gulf security framework owned and led by regional states themselves, complementing rather than replacing existing bilateral and international security arrangements.

Policy Recommendations

To maximise the prospects for success, participating states should:

  • endorse the establishment of the Muscat Process as a permanent consultative mechanism;
  • reaffirm consensus-based decision-making and equal participation of all members;
  • begin with practical, non-contentious areas of cooperation before addressing more sensitive political and security issues;
  • establish a small, cost-effective secretariat in Muscat to ensure continuity and institutional memory;
  • create technical working groups on maritime security, cyber resilience, critical infrastructure protection and humanitarian cooperation;
  • invite international experts to provide technical support while preserving full regional ownership; and
  • maintain flexibility, allowing the Process to evolve gradually according to the confidence and political will of participating states.

The Muscat Process represents a realistic and forward-looking response to the changing strategic environment in the Gulf. Drawing on the successful experience of the CSCE while adapting it to regional realities, it offers an inclusive framework capable of transforming dialogue into sustained cooperation.

Rather than seeking immediate solutions to deeply rooted geopolitical disputes, the initiative aims to establish the habits, institutions and confidence necessary for durable peace. In doing so, it could lay the foundations for a new Gulf security architecture—one that is regionally owned, internationally supported and designed to promote stability, prosperity and peaceful coexistence for decades to come.

Well aware that statecraft will ultimately be judged by history, and building on their personal experiences, the ‘Friends of the Process’ have a simple message: statecraft achieves better results the sooner it recognizes the challenge—especially for smaller states in geopolitically overcrowded neighborhoods. After all, the Bretton Woods institutions and the foundations of the United Nations architecture began to take shape well before the Second World War was over.

As President Roosevelt understood in the early 1940s, the Gulf does not need to wait for the perfect moment to begin. It needs a process capable of helping create one.

About the author:

H.E. Mr. Vladimir Norov is a Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan and a
Former Secretary-General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Eurojust Supports Arrest of Suspected Migrant Smuggler

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Eurojust Supports Arrest of Suspected Migrant Smuggler

The Hague, 6 August 2026

A high-value target suspected of smuggling more than 600 migrants along the Balkan route has been arrested following cooperation between German and Serbian authorities, coordinated by Eurojust and Europol.

The suspect was arrested in Belgrade on 5 August. He is suspected of working with other members of a smuggling network that transported people to Germany and other Western European countries along the Balkan route.

According to investigators, the network brought Syrian nationals into the European Union from Serbia via Hungary or from Bosnia and Herzegovina via Croatia. The migrants were subsequently transported by car, van or truck through Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland or Austria to Germany and other European countries.

The network reportedly charged between EUR 2,000 and EUR 10,000 per person. The suspect arrested on 5 August is believed to have played a central role in the network from his residence in Serbia. He allegedly transported migrants to Sombor, Serbia, where he handed them over to other members of the network, and is also suspected of facilitating their movement from Serbia into Hungary.

Between June 2023 and June 2024, he is suspected of having been involved in at least 37 smuggling operations.

The arrest forms part of a wider operation targeting other members of the network in Germany and Serbia. Five additional suspects were arrested during coordinated actions in Germany, the Netherlands and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2025.

Eurojust supported the German and Serbian authorities through a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) established at the Agency. The JIT facilitated the exchange of information on the smuggling network and supported preparations for the suspect’s arrest. The Western Balkans Criminal Justice Project also supported cooperation between the participating authorities.

Europol’s European Centre Against Migrant Smuggling coordinated an Operational Taskforce throughout the investigation, facilitating intelligence exchange between the participating countries and providing operational analysis to identify links between different investigations.

Europol also supported the identification of high-value targets, coordinated operational activities during the action day and deployed experts to provide real-time analytical and operational assistance to investigators.

The operation highlights the importance of coordinated international cooperation in disrupting organised migrant smuggling networks operating across multiple European countries.

Thailand’s Land Bridge Is Becoming a Long-Term Strategic Option

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Thailand’s Land Bridge Is Becoming a Long-Term Strategic Option

By Jianbo Wu

In April 2026, Thailand seemed to have found an answer to a longstanding geopolitical question: how to create an alternative to the Strait of Malacca for global shipping. The government announced it would accelerate the 1-trillion-baht (US$31 billion) Southern Land Bridge, citing the Hormuz crisis as a reminder of the strategic value of alternative routes. By July, however, the same project that had promised to rewrite regional trade was being rewritten itself. The Land Bridge was no longer an immediate national priority.

On July 24, a government committee concluded that the Land Bridge would no longer proceed as originally planned. A new feasibility review showed that the project’s net present value had turned from a projected surplus into a deficit of more than 10 billion baht (US$280 million). With no land acquired and construction yet to begin, Bangkok could still change course before locking itself into major sunk costs.

Three days later, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul made the government’s revised position clear. The Land Bridge, he announced, had not been cancelled. Immediate priority would now go to upgrading regional port berths and completing dual-track railway connections. “When the time is right,” Anutin clarified, “or when necessary and geopolitically appropriate, the project can be dusted off and resumed at any time.”

The debate over the project is closely tied to the spring crisis around the Strait of Hormuz. When tanker insurance premiums surged and ships faced rising detour costs, the vulnerability of concentrated maritime routes came back into focus. The Malacca Strait, the narrow corridor through which roughly one-quarter of global maritime trade passes, was once again viewed as a strategic risk. For Thailand, the crisis reinforced the case for turning the Kra Isthmus into an alternative gateway between the Indian and Pacific oceans. A 90-kilometre corridor promised to shorten voyages by 1,200 kilometres and two to three days. But strategic urgency and commercial viability are different calculations.

The Land Bridge would require containers to be unloaded on one coast, moved across Thailand by rail, and loaded onto another ship before continuing their journey. That additional step could erase much of the advantage of avoiding the Malacca Strait. The July 24 feasibility review highlighted a broader challenge: nine of the world’s ten largest shipping lines had already committed capital to existing ports, routes and logistics networks, and there was little evidence they would divert meaningful volumes to the Land Bridge.

Domestic opposition added another layer of difficulty. Local fishing communities and environmental groups opposed the project over concerns about dredging, coastal reclamation and ecological impacts across roughly 13,000 rai. More than 100,000 signatures were submitted to the Prime Minister’s Office, heightening political pressure on Bangkok.

Furthermore, Thailand was not merely competing with a body of water. It was competing with one of the world’s most sophisticated maritime ecosystems, centred on Singapore. The city-state’s advantage comes not only from a transhipment hub connected to more than 600 ports worldwide, but also from the wider maritime services network built around it. Thailand was not simply building another port; it was trying to replicate an ecosystem that took decades to mature.

Yet Bangkok’s decision to pause the project did not end the competition. Instead, it changed the timeline. Singapore holds the advantage of the present: world-class efficiency, dense shipping alliances and high transshipment frequency. But the more global trade concentrates into a single highly optimised node, the more valuable credible alternatives become during moments of systemic disruption.

The Land Bridge does not need to match Singapore’s ecosystem today; it only needs to remain available when circumstances change. Alternatives rarely look cost-effective before they are needed. If insurance premiums surge, congestion worsens or geopolitical tensions further complicate passage through the straits, the question will no longer be whether Thailand can build a Land Bridge from scratch, but whether it has enough of one already in place.

This reality shaped Prime Minister Anutin’s political strategy. Facing the classic dilemma of how to retreat without surrendering, he unbundled the megaproject. Instead of pushing for twin mega-ports and a full industrial zone, state focus shifted to modest, high-utility works known as the “missing links”: modernising existing berths at Ranong Port and building a 110-kilometre rail link connecting Ranong to the national rail network at Chumphon.

Ranong is where the strategic option begins to take shape. The port already records rising cargo volumes, with container throughput climbing 55.56% in the first part of fiscal 2026, driven in part by trade diverted from Myanmar land borders. Completing the short rail gap that currently forces freight onto trucks would give Thailand’s entire national network, including future northbound links towards Laos and China, direct access to the Andaman Sea. Officials have also framed the port as a practical entry point for BIMSTEC markets, where shorter sailings to destinations such as Yangon, Chittagong and Chennai are already being tested.

Anutin’s mid-July official visit to Beijing illustrated a similar priority. The publicly available joint statement focused on accelerating the China-Thailand High-Speed Railway and integrating northbound rail corridors through Laos. The Land Bridge was conspicuously absent. The contrast was notable. At a time when Thailand was seeking to position itself as a maritime gateway, its most visible infrastructure cooperation with China remained centred on inland connectivity through rail links rather than a new cross-isthmus shipping corridor.

What emerged instead was an infrastructure ladder: one that delivers immediate economic value while preserving the option of a larger cross-isthmus corridor if conditions eventually justify it. In this sense, the pause did not abandon the Land Bridge’s strategic logic. It relocated that logic onto assets that already move cargo and can be expanded incrementally.

The debate is no longer whether Thailand will build the Land Bridge. It is whether the infrastructure now being built can create the commercial foundations for a project whose strategic value may ultimately depend on forces beyond Thailand’s control.

About the author:

Jianbo Wu is Secretary General of the Green and Smart Energy Organization (GSEO), an international non-profit focused on cooperation in green and smart energy systems. His work examines the intersection of energy, infrastructure, global supply chains, and economic connectivity. He has directed multiple United Nations-supported programmes and has contributed commentary to a range of international policy and business publications, including East Asia Forum, Singapore Business Review, and the LSE South Asia Centre.

The Makkah Agreement and the New Security Architecture of the Middle East

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The Makkah Agreement and the New Security Architecture of the Middle East

“In a multipolar world, security is no longer underwritten by a single guarantor; it is built through the prudent layering of alliances, interests and capabilities.”

By Major General (Two Stars) (retd) Corneliu Pivariu

Beyond the News of the Day

The signing of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on 7 August 2026 represents more than the formalisation of military cooperation that has developed gradually over recent years. By stipulating that an armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all, the document introduces an explicit principle of collective defence into a strategic space that has so far failed to build a coherent and durable regional security architecture.[1] The choice of Makkah as the venue for the signing amplifies the political and symbolic significance of the moment: three of the most influential states in the Muslim world are declaring their readiness to transform political solidarity and bilateral cooperation into a shared commitment to deterrence.

The agreement comes at a time when the region is being shaped by widening conflicts, attacks on the territory and energy infrastructure of the Gulf states, confrontation between the United States and Israel on the one hand and Iran and its allies on the other, and increasingly evident doubts about the sufficiency of external security guarantees. For Saudi Arabia, the vulnerability of its oil infrastructure and export routes threatens not only national security but also the economic transformation envisaged by Vision 2030. For Türkiye, regional instability, the rise of non-state actors and the deterioration of relations with Israel require an expansion of its strategic autonomy. For Pakistan, the agreement offers an opportunity to consolidate its influence beyond South Asia and to capitalise on a security relationship with Saudi Arabia built over decades.

The rapprochement among the three states was quickly presented as the emergence of an “Islamic NATO”. The phrase captures the political force of the collective-defence clause, but it risks distorting the agreement’s true nature. At least for the time being, there is no public information about the establishment of an integrated military command, the existence of joint forces, automatic intervention procedures, standing operational plans or predetermined military contributions. The summit’s joint statement is public, but the agreement’s full legal text and activation mechanisms have not been disclosed. Moreover, Saudi and Turkish officials have stated that the document is not intended to create a military axis or a religious bloc and does not replace existing bilateral and multilateral commitments.[2]

The deeper significance of the Makkah Agreement should therefore be sought not in the immediate emergence of an organisation comparable to NATO, but in the changing security logic of the region. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are neither abandoning their traditional partnerships nor detaching themselves from the major powers with which they cooperate. They are seeking to add a further regional guarantee to their external relationships, built on the complementarity of Saudi financial resources, Turkish military and technological capacity, and Pakistani strategic experience. The agreement thus marks a shift from dependence on a single guarantor to strategic redundancy: the layering of several partnerships and security mechanisms so that the vulnerability created by the weakening of one may be offset by the strengthening of the others.

From this perspective, the Makkah Agreement is not merely a response to the current regional crisis. It may become the nucleus of an alliance suited to a multipolar world: flexible, interregional, built among middle powers and compatible, at least for now, with the members’ different strategic affiliations and partnerships.

I. The Riyadh-Ankara-Islamabad Triangle: Strategic Complementarity

The Makkah Agreement does not create the relationship among the three states from scratch; rather, it brings together within a common framework three strands of cooperation that had already developed. The most firmly established is the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, built over several decades through military training, technical assistance and a Pakistani presence on Saudi territory. The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement signed by the two countries in September 2025 had already introduced the principle that aggression against either state would be considered aggression against both.[3] The Makkah document extends this logic by including Türkiye and transforms a bilateral guarantee into a trilateral mechanism of considerably greater regional weight.

Relations between Türkiye and Pakistan also have a consolidated military dimension, including training, naval and aeronautical cooperation, and industrial projects. The rapprochement between Ankara and Riyadh is more recent and follows a period of pronounced political rivalry. Their reconciliation has been accompanied by growing economic and military cooperation, including the acquisition and localisation in Saudi Arabia of Turkish unmanned systems, as well as agreements on munitions, sensors and technology transfer.[4] The Makkah Agreement thus anchors at the strategic level a rapprochement already visible in the economic and industrial spheres.

The potential strength of the new framework derives from the participants’ complementarity. Saudi Arabia brings financial resources, energy influence and centrality in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Türkiye possesses the most developed defence-industrial base of the three states, significant conventional capabilities and operational experience accumulated in several regional theatres. Pakistan contributes the size of its armed forces, experience in crisis management and strategic capabilities.

This complementarity should not, however, be turned into an idealised picture. The three states do not have identical interests. Türkiye seeks strategic autonomy and an expansion of its influence; Saudi Arabia wants to protect its territory, energy infrastructure and modernisation project; Pakistan must continue to prioritise its balance with India and the security of its western border. The agreement does not eliminate these differences. It seeks to create a space in which the three powers’ distinct resources can be brought to bear in concert when threats require it.

The importance of the Riyadh-Ankara-Islamabad triangle therefore lies not in the simple addition of military forces, but in the possibility of connecting Saudi capital, Turkish technology and Pakistani military capacity within a regional defence ecosystem. Whether this possibility becomes an actual capability will depend on the consultation, planning and decision-making mechanisms the states establish.

II. Deterrence: Iran and Pakistan’s “Nuclear Shadow”

The agreement’s immediate function is to strengthen deterrence. The formula whereby an armed attack against one signatory shall be regarded as an attack against them all increases uncertainty for a potential aggressor: the consequences of an action can no longer be calculated solely in relation to the targeted state, but must also take into account the possibility that the other two powers will become involved.

The context in which the agreement was signed inevitably points to Iran and Iran-associated armed actors as a central concern. Attacks on the Gulf states, threats to energy routes and the activity of armed groups in Yemen and Iraq have exposed the vulnerability of a regional architecture based primarily on external guarantees. Yet it would be excessive to reduce the agreement to the construction of an anti-Iranian front. Türkiye and Pakistan have their own relationships with Tehran and are more interested in limiting the spread of the conflict than in turning it into a generalised regional confrontation. At the same time, intensified Israeli military action and the deterioration of relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv introduce a second implicit area of concern. The agreement, however, does not officially identify either Iran or Israel as an adversary, and this ambiguity is deliberate.[5]

The most sensitive issue is Pakistan’s nuclear status. The participation of the Muslim world’s only nuclear power inevitably casts a “nuclear shadow” over the agreement. Even in the absence of an explicit guarantee, adversaries will have to include in their assessments the possibility of an escalation involving Pakistan. This uncertainty can reinforce political deterrence, but it should not be confused with the formal extension of Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Official statements have rejected any link between the agreement and nuclear ambitions or an arms race, while Islamabad has avoided claiming that its arsenal would automatically guarantee its partners’ security.

The pact’s credibility will therefore depend first and foremost on conventional capabilities and political will. Deterrence is produced not simply by stating a commitment, but by convincing an adversary that it will be honoured. Unless rapid consultation procedures, advance planning, interoperability and ready-to-use capabilities are established, the collective clause may remain a political signal rather than a military guarantee. The first major crisis in which one of the signatories requests support from the others will be the true test of the Makkah Agreement.

III. Beyond Iran: The United States, NATO, India and China

The consequences of the agreement extend beyond relations with Iran and must be considered in relation to the principal centres of power involved in the Middle East and South Asia. For the United States, the new arrangement reflects both the limits of the current security architecture and the regional allies’ desire to assume a greater share of responsibility for their own defence. Saudi Arabia is not abandoning its strategic partnership with Washington, Türkiye is not leaving NATO, and Pakistan is maintaining channels of cooperation with the United States. What is changing is the de facto exclusivity of the Western guarantee.

The comparison with NATO is inevitable, but it must be kept within rigorous limits. The formula of an attack against one being considered an attack against all reproduces the political principle of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Yet even Article 5 does not require an identical and automatic military response; each ally is to take such action as it deems necessary.[6] The essential difference is that NATO has a permanent political and military structure, an integrated command, joint planning, interoperability standards and procedures consolidated over more than seven decades. For now, the Makkah Agreement expresses a political commitment to collective defence, not the existence of a comparable military organisation.

For India, Türkiye’s accession to an agreement that includes Pakistan and Saudi Arabia raises more sensitive questions. New Delhi must assess whether the new clause might be invoked in an Indo-Pakistani crisis and to what extent its economic partnership with Riyadh might constrain Saudi solidarity with Islamabad. The undefined nature of the obligations allows each party some freedom of interpretation, but it does not eliminate the agreement’s political effects on the South Asian balance.

China occupies a different position. It is Pakistan’s principal strategic partner, has extensive economic relations with Saudi Arabia and cooperates with Türkiye despite existing disagreements. Beijing may view the emergence of a regional architecture that reduces exclusive dependence on the West favourably, provided that it does not affect Chinese economic projects or generate an escalation that threatens energy corridors. China is neither a member nor a guarantor of the new arrangement, but its relations with all three states give it indirect influence over the arrangement’s evolution.

The Makkah Agreement should therefore not be framed as a simple opposition between the West and the Muslim world, or between the United States and China. The three participating states simultaneously belong to different strategic networks. Türkiye is a NATO member, Pakistan is a strategic partner of China, and Saudi Arabia maintains strong security relationships with the United States and the Gulf monarchies. The novelty of the agreement lies precisely in its capacity to connect these different affiliations.

IV. From Dependence to Strategic Redundancy

Over recent decades, security in the Middle East has been organised predominantly around the United States military presence and Washington’s bilateral relationships with its principal partners. This system is not disappearing, but it is becoming insufficient for states that perceive threats as faster-moving, more diverse and less predictable. Missile and drone attacks, the actions of non-state groups, the vulnerability of energy infrastructure and the political hesitation of external guarantors have prompted regional powers to seek additional mechanisms.

The Makkah Agreement expresses a shift from dependence to strategic redundancy. Under this logic, a state does not replace one alliance with another; it layers several guarantees so that the weakening of one does not bring about the collapse of its entire security system. Saudi Arabia combines its American partnership, the Gulf Cooperation Council framework, the strategic relationship with Pakistan and the new trilateral association. Türkiye complements its NATO membership with its own network of regional and industrial relationships. Pakistan adds to its cooperation with China and its traditional relationship with Saudi Arabia an institutionalised platform that connects it directly to the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

The advantage of such an arrangement lies in flexibility. States can deepen cooperation without abandoning existing partnerships or subordinating themselves to a single centre of power. Its limitation derives from the same flexibility: the absence of detailed obligations can facilitate political adaptation but reduce the predictability of a military response. Redundancy enhances security only if the overlapping relationships reinforce one another; if they transmit contradictory signals, it can create uncertainty for partners and adversaries alike.

The industrial dimension could transform the agreement from a political commitment into an enduring association. Saudi capital, Türkiye’s research and production capabilities, and Pakistan’s military experience could support the joint development of drones, munitions, air-defence systems, and command-and-control technologies. Important precedents already exist for cooperation and the localisation of Turkish military production in Saudi Arabia.[7] Yet such projects should not be treated as automatic outcomes of the agreement: they will depend on financing, technology transfer, the protection of sensitive information and the harmonisation of operational requirements.

Prospects for expansion became more concrete on 8 August, when Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said he expected Egypt to join at a later stage once several technical issues had been resolved. He described Cairo as a “natural partner on all issues” and said that the four states already acted “as if [they] were alliance members”. This is politically significant, but it should not be treated as confirmation of Egyptian accession: Fidan expressed Ankara’s expectation, while no formal Egyptian commitment has yet been made public. Egypt’s eventual inclusion would substantially increase the pact’s Arab, African and maritime weight, bringing in the most populous Arab state, one of the region’s largest armed forces and the country controlling the Suez Canal. At the same time, enlargement would make threat definition, consultation and decision-making more complex. Expansion could therefore broaden the pact’s strategic reach while simultaneously testing its still-unproven institutional cohesion.[8]

Postscript, 9 August 2026. The First Operational Test Remains Inconclusive

The first developments after the signing do not justify a triumphalist interpretation. On 7 August, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella designation used by Iran-aligned factions, announced that it was postponing a planned response to recent US-Saudi strikes. The announcement followed an appeal by Hadi al-Amiri and other political interventions, while Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi assured the Saudi intelligence chief that Iraqi territory would not be used to launch attacks against another state.[9] The timing may suggest that the new agreement added weight to the militias’ risk calculations, but the available evidence does not establish a direct causal link. Iraqi political mediation and government pressure were already at work, and the armed factions did not identify either the intended target or the nature of their planned response.

Two days later, the limits of any claim to immediate deterrence became equally visible. Yemen’s Houthi movement claimed a drone attack on Saudi Aramco’s Jazan refinery. The resulting fire was extinguished and no injuries were reported, but neither Türkiye nor Pakistan had publicly indicated how it might participate in a Saudi response.[10] The episode demonstrates that the agreement did not immediately prevent low-cost proxy attacks and that its operational mechanisms, thresholds and division of responsibilities remain undefined.

Taken together, the Iraqi postponement and the Jazan attack support a cautious conclusion. The agreement may already influence perceptions and raise the potential cost of escalation at the margins, but its deterrent value remains unproven. Only the signatories’ conduct in a crisis that requires consultation, attribution, an explicit request for support and a concrete allocation of military or political contributions will show whether Makkah created a usable security mechanism or merely a significant diplomatic signal.

Not a New NATO, but a Form of Alliance for a Multipolar World

The Makkah Agreement does not yet establish an “Islamic NATO”. There is no public evidence of an integrated command, permanent joint forces, mandatory response procedures or collective planning comparable to that of the North Atlantic Alliance. The label may convey the symbolic impact of the collective-defence clause, but it does not describe the current level of institutionalisation.

The agreement’s importance lies elsewhere. For the first time, three Muslim powers with complementary strategic resources are establishing an explicit link among their national security interests. Saudi Arabia provides capital and regional centrality, Türkiye conventional and technological capacity, and Pakistan military experience and strategic weight. Together, they could form the nucleus of a deterrence system with Arab, Anatolian and South Asian dimensions.

The agreement does not mark the three states’ departure from their traditional partners, but their adaptation to an order in which no external guarantor is considered sufficient. The new architecture rests on overlapping alliances, selective partnerships and the freedom of regional powers to cooperate simultaneously with different centres of power. It is an arrangement characteristic of multipolarity: less rigid than the alliances of the previous century, but also more difficult to anticipate and control.

The document’s real value will be determined not by the solemnity of its signing but by what follows: consultation mechanisms, joint planning, intelligence exchange, interoperability, industrial projects and, above all, the conduct of the signatories in the first crisis. If the political commitment is transformed into a credible capacity for action, the Makkah Agreement could become one of the landmarks of the region’s new security order. If not, it will remain a powerful symbol, but one insufficient to alter the strategic balance.

In either case, its message is already clear: regional powers are no longer waiting for the security architecture to be built exclusively by the great powers. They are beginning to build it themselves.

Brașov, 8 August 2026
English-language version updated on 9 August 2026

ANNEX

Joint Statement of the Makkah Al-Mukarramah Summit for Joint Defence

At the gracious invitation of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, the President of the Republic of Türkiye, H.E. Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, H.E. Mr. Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif, paid a visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on 24 Safar 1448H, corresponding to August 7, 2026.

His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Crown Prince and Prime Minister received H.E. the President of Türkiye, and H.E. the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, at Al-Safa Palace in Makkah, where the Makkah Al-Mukarramah Summit for Joint Defence was held, during which the distinguished relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Türkiye and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan were reviewed, along with a number of issues of mutual interest.

Guided by the longstanding historical ties among the three States, based on the enduring bonds of brotherhood and Islamic solidarity that unite them, and building upon their shared strategic interests and longstanding defence cooperation, His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, H.E. Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of the Republic of Türkiye, and H.E. Mr. Muhammed Shehbaz Sharif, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, reflecting the three States’ shared commitment to further strengthening their collective security and to promoting peace, security, and stability in the region and beyond, in pursuit of a secure and prosperous future.

The Agreement is intended to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression, and stipulates that any armed attack against any one of the three States shall be regarded as an attack against them all. It further provides for the enhancement of all aspects of defence cooperation among the three States.

Note: As of the date this article was submitted for publication, the full text of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement had not been officially released. The text above reproduces the joint statement issued after the summit and should not be confused with the agreement’s legal text.

Makkah, 7 August 2026

Official source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, “Makkah Al-Mukarramah Summit for Joint Defence”, 7 August 2026. Official English text.

[1] “Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan Issue Joint Statement of the Makkah Al-Mukarramah Summit for Joint Defence”, Saudi Press Agency, 7 August 2026, official summit statement.

[2] Timour Azhari, Ariba Shahid and Tuvan Gumrukcu, “Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan pledge mutual defence as Middle East turmoil escalates”, Reuters, 7 August 2026; officials stated that the agreement was defensive, was not directed against any particular state and did not supersede existing commitments.

[3] “Joint Statement Issued Following Pakistan Prime Minister’s State Visit to the Kingdom”, Saudi Press Agency, 17 September 2025.

[4] “Saudi and Turkish Companies Ink Agreement and Two MoUs to Localize Drone Industry”, Saudi Press Agency, 7 August 2023.

[5] Timour Azhari, Ariba Shahid and Tuvan Gumrukcu, “Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan pledge mutual defence as Middle East turmoil escalates”, Reuters, 7 August 2026.

[6] “The North Atlantic Treaty”, Article 5, NATO, 4 April 1949.

[7] Suzan Fraser and Munir Ahmed, “Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan have signed a key defense agreement”, Associated Press, 7 August 2026; the cited analysis suggests that industrial coordination and technology transfer are more likely than large-scale military deployments.

[8] Hakan Fidan, interview with Anadolu Agency, 8 August 2026, reported in “Regional four-country platform including Egypt to remain ‘very important’: Turkish foreign minister”, Anadolu Agency, 9 August 2026; “Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia defence pact technically same as NATO’s Article 5, Turkish minister says”, Reuters, 8 August 2026.

[9] “Iraqi PM, Saudi intelligence chief discuss regional security as militias delay response”, Reuters, 7 August 2026; Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats Project, “Iran Update Evening Special Report: August 07, 2026”.

[10] “Yemen’s Houthis attack Saudi refinery after kingdom signs defence pact”, Reuters, 9 August 2026.

Armenian Food Festival to Bring the Flavours of Armenia to The Hague

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Armenian Food Festival to Bring the Flavours of Armenia to The Hague

24–25 September 2026 | Leonardo Royal Hotel Den Haag Promenade

Armenia’s rich culinary traditions will take centre stage in The Hague on 24 and 25 September 2026, when the Embassy of the Republic of Armenia, in cooperation with Diplomat Magazine and the Leonardo Royal Hotel Den Haag Promenade presents the Armenian Food Festival.

The event forms part of the celebrations marking the 35th Anniversary of the Independence of the Republic of Armenia.

H.E. Viktor Biyagov, Ambassador of Armenia.

H.E. Mr. Viktor Biyagov, Ambassador of Armenia, has announced the dates of the festival, which will bring two Armenian chefs to The Hague especially for the occasion. Over two evenings, guests will have the opportunity to discover the flavours and culinary traditions of Armenia through a menu featuring modern fusion interpretations of traditional Armenian dishes.

Food will serve as a gateway to Armenia’s cultural heritage, creating an opportunity for guests from the diplomatic, business, cultural and international communities to experience the country through its cuisine and discover Armenia as a booming culinary tourism destination.

Two chefs, one culinary journey

Arayik Amzayan and Stepan Burmistrov are Yerevan-based chefs whose careers combine restaurant projects, culinary education, gastronomic events and international competitions.

Chef Arayik Amzayan

Chef Arayik Amzayan is the founder and chef of Central Kitchen Armenia, founder of Kuwa Izakaya, and co-organiser and brand chef of Yerevan Food Fest. He is also co-founder and brand chef of Gastro Camp Armenia and has worked as a project chef and manager for a range of restaurants and hospitality projects in Armenia.

His professional career began in Yerevan in 2012 and has included positions at Avenue Lorange, Diamond House Hotel, Moscafe and Bella Italia, among others. His international competition record includes winning the Silk Road Chef international competition in 2018 and taking first place at Cuisine Taste of Culture in Cairo. He was also a finalist at the WorldSkills International 2013 competition in Leipzig and placed fifth at the Young Chefs Olympiad in India in 2018.

Chef Stepan Burmistrov

Chef Stepan Burmistrov has spent years getting to know Armenia through its kitchens. Today, as Chef and Co-owner of Niko Kitchen & Bar in Yerevan, he belongs to a generation of chefs giving Armenian cuisine a distinctly contemporary voice.

His path to Armenia was shaped by more than a decade in professional kitchens and an unusually broad range of culinary influences. Working alongside guest chefs from Peru, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Argentina exposed him early on to very different ways of treating ingredients and tradition. In Yerevan, Stepan became Executive Chef of Gouroo Club & Garden, one of Armenia’s early healthy-dining concepts. At Niko Kitchen & Bar, that concept has found a more personal expression.

Together, the two chefs will contribute different experiences and perspectives to the festival while maintaining its central purpose: presenting the richness of Armenian cuisine.

A taste of Armenia in The Hague

The Food Festival will be hosted at the Leonardo Royal Hotel The Hague, where the visiting chefs will work closely with the hotel’s culinary team lead by Chef Sido de Brabander. Preparations will begin weeks before the two festival evenings, including coordination of the menu, ingredients and kitchen requirements.

The dinner concept is designed to allow guests to experience a broad selection of Armenian flavours. The menu will feature traditional dishes and will provide an introduction to the country’s culinary identity, from its longstanding traditions to the way Armenian cuisine is interpreted by today’s chefs.

For the Embassy of Armenia, the festival provides an opportunity to showcase the country through one of its most accessible and engaging forms of cultural diplomacy. Gastronomy can open conversations about Armenia’s history, traditions, tourism, culture and contemporary identity while bringing together people who might otherwise encounter the country through very different channels.

Armenian Food Festival.

For Diplomat Magazine, the Armenian Food Festival continues a series of national Food Festivals in The Hague that use gastronomy as a platform for cultural exchange and international engagement. The events bring diplomatic missions together with the hospitality sector and the wider public, creating an informal environment in which countries can present their heritage and contemporary identity.

On 24 and 25 September, the flavours of Armenia will therefore travel to The Hague, carried by two chefs with experience spanning Armenia and international culinary competitions.

The Armenian Food Festival promises to be an invitation to taste Armenian food; to discover a country through its traditions, creativity, wines and hospitality.

Armenian Food Festival
24–25 September 2026
Leonardo Royal Hotel The Hague

Egypt Celebrates National Day and 50 Years of Water Cooperation with the Netherlands

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Egypt Celebrates National Day and 50 Years of Water Cooperation with the Netherlands

On the occasion of Egypt’s National Day, marking the 74th anniversary of the 23 July Revolution, H.E. Mr. Emad Hanna, Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and Mrs. Hayam W. Mikhail hosted a diplomatic reception at the Egyptian Residence in The Hague.

The reception brought together a distinguished gathering of diplomats, heads of international organizations, Dutch officials, business leaders and members of the Egyptian community. In a warm and welcoming atmosphere, guests exchanged views on current international and regional affairs while enjoying Egyptian hospitality and cuisine.

Mrs. Hayam W. Mikhail, H.E. Mr. Emad Hanna, Ambassador of Egypt and Meike van Ginneken, Water Envoy of the Netherlands.

Following the national anthems, Ambassador Hanna reflected on the depth and breadth of Egyptian-Dutch relations, emphasizing the close political dialogue maintained between the two countries.

“Egypt and the Netherlands share a long-standing and dynamic relationship, built on mutual respect, shared values, and a growing portfolio of cooperation.”

He highlighted the continuous engagement between the political leaderships of both countries, particularly during the war in Gaza, and recalled the Dutch participation in the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit in October 2025.

“The high-level Dutch participation in the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit in October 2025 demonstrated the unwavering commitment to de-escalation, humanitarian action, and the pursuit of a just and lasting peace.”

Ambassadors attending the Egyptian National Day 2026 in The Hague.

The Ambassador also pointed to growing economic relations, notably the visit of the Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation to Egypt in May 2026, accompanied by a large business delegation. Cultural cooperation has likewise gained momentum, including the voluntary restitution by the Netherlands of an ancient Egyptian stone artefact dating from the reign of King Thutmoses III.

Another important area highlighted by Ambassador Hanna was Egypt’s role in humanitarian efforts for Gaza. He referred to the June 2026 visit of a Dutch parliamentary delegation to Egypt and the Rafah Crossing, where the delegation witnessed Egypt’s efforts to facilitate humanitarian assistance.

Looking ahead, Ambassador Hanna placed particular emphasis on the longstanding Egyptian-Dutch partnership in water management, which this year marks its 50th anniversary.

“This partnership has become a model of successful international cooperation built on innovation, knowledge exchange, and mutual trust.”

H.E. Ambassador Emad Hanna during his speech at the Egyptian Residence.

He also highlighted new cooperation with IHE Delft Institute for Water Education on water diplomacy and with Clingendael Academy on diplomatic training and the exchange of expertise. Egypt’s participation in the Dutch Shiraka programme, he noted, has further strengthened institutional cooperation and capacity building.

The Ambassador also invited Dutch companies to view Egypt as a strategic gateway to Africa, highlighting its membership in AfCFTA and COMESA, modern infrastructure, expanding renewable energy sector and green hydrogen ambitions.

“Egypt presents unique opportunities for Dutch businesses seeking long-term partnerships not only in Egypt, but across the African continent.”

Fifty Years of Water Cooperation

The significance of the water partnership was further underlined by Ms. Meike van Ginneken, Water Envoy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, who presented a video showcasing water projects carried out through Egyptian-Dutch cooperation.

Ms. Meike van Ginneken, Water Envoy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Reflecting on the contrasting but complementary histories of the two countries, she observed:

“When I go abroad as a Water Envoy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, I always proudly present our long history of water management, started over 800 years ago.”

She then turned to Egypt, whose relationship with the Nile has shaped its civilization for thousands of years.

“And then I go to Egypt, where water management has a history of four thousand or five thousand years.”

Ms. Van Ginneken emphasized that the partnership goes far beyond infrastructure and technical cooperation. Over the past five decades, thousands of Egyptian professionals have studied, trained or undertaken internships in water management in the Netherlands, creating generations of specialists with strong professional and personal connections.

“If you realize it is 50 years of collaboration, we have a generational water expertise who became professional and experienced. This is human connection, and that’s why I’m very happy to be here today.”

The anniversary was also marked by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at further strengthening cooperation in water management, sustainability and capacity building.

The evening concluded with a renewed celebration of Egyptian culture, friendship and cooperation, encapsulating the spirit of Ambassador Hanna’s closing words:

“Long live Egypt … Long live the friendship between Egypt and the Netherlands.”

Reception at the Egyptian Residence celebrating the 79th Anniversary of the Independence and 50th of Water Management collaboration among Egypt and the Netherlands.

Europe is increasing aid to Ukraine while discussing its political impact

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Europe is increasing aid to Ukraine while discussing its political impact

By Adrien Lefèvre.

Since the beginning of the full-scale war, EU institutions and member states have provided Ukraine with €216.7 billion in military, financial, and humanitarian aid. By February 2026, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), the total amount of support had effectively cemented Europe’s status as Ukraine’s leading external donor.

Support for Kyiv has become one of the largest and longest-running foreign policy initiatives in modern Europe. According to the IfW, military spending to support Ukraine increased by 67% in 2025 compared to the average for 2022–2024, while financial and humanitarian aid rose by 59%.

And the larger the scale of this aid, the more pressing the question of its political implications: exactly whom is Europe empowering, to what extent is this process manageable, and will it, in the long run, create a force capable of spiraling out of control? Meanwhile, the EU is already preparing a package of an additional 90 billion euros for 2026–2027.

Such risks have already manifested themselves in the past. In the 1980s, the United States, through the CIA’s Operation named “Cyclone”, poured money and weapons into the Afghan conflict. Billions of dollars were funneled through Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, and a significant portion of those resources—including Stinger missiles—ended up among the mujahideen and radical Islamist groups, with Osama bin Laden becoming one of the key figures.

European support for Ukraine is based on the same principle. The West is turning Ukraine into a testing ground, and the Zelenskyy government into a system that survives on external funding and political cover. As was the case with the Afghan mujahideen, external patrons initially view the force they support as a convenient tool. In the Afghan case, the U.S. expected that armed radical groups would act within the assigned tasks. In the Ukrainian case, Europe is banking on Zelenskyy as a figure capable of holding onto power and upholding the EU’s position.

At the same time, Zelenskyy receives not only money and weapons but also media resources, while the Ukrainian intelligence agencies—the SBU and the Main Intelligence Directorate—receive modern technology and intelligence support. During war, all of this creates a sense of unchecked freedom. At certain points, the interests of Ukraine and the EU may diverge, which, in turn, will lead to Kyiv adopting a more independent course of action. As the conflict drags on, Ukraine is developing its own priorities, which are not always aligned with the position of European countries. In the context of war, security and intelligence agencies may act based on their own assessment of threats and opportunities.

This is evident in specific cases where the conflict extends beyond Ukraine’s borders—for example, the incident in Monaco in June 2026, in which Ukrainian oligarch Vadim Yermolaev and members of his family were injured. According to reports, investigators and Interpol have established the involvement of Ukrainian citizen Anastasia Berezovskaya, who is linked to Ukrainian intelligence. This episode alone shows that the conflict has already spread to European territory.

The United States once cultivated a force in Afghanistan that was supposed to work against its geopolitical adversary, but ultimately led to the tragedy in the United States on September 11, 2001. Today, by supporting Zelenskyy, Europe risks repeating the mistake of the United States of America. Foreign aid, which has reached historically unprecedented levels, is creating not only Ukraine’s military stability but also a force that operates according to its own logic. Therefore, the question of whom Europe is actually strengthening remains open.

Links on the incident in Monaco:

https://www.bfmtv.com/podcasts/le-titre-a-la-une/ingerence-etrangere-ou-criminalite-organisee-la-suspecte-de-l-explosion-de-monaco-identifiee-en-allemagne-et-activement-recherchee_EN-202607030754.html

Screenshot courtesy of BFMTV — bfmtv.com

Translation of the picture:

Foreign interference or organized crime? The suspect in the Monaco bombing has been identified in Germany and is being actively sought.

This is an unprecedented incident on the streets of Monaco. On Monday, June 29, a parcel containing a bomb exploded at the entrance to an apartment building. Ukrainian oligarch Vadim Yermolaev, his partner, and their 13-year-old son were seriously injured in the explosion. The main suspect is 39-year-old Ukrainian Anastasia Berezovskaya. She was located in Germany. The motives for the attack are still unknown. The investigation is ongoing, but two theories are already being considered: foreign interference or organized crime. The suspect is currently wanted by Interpol (Red Notice) throughout Europe. But how exactly is the operation to find her being organized?

About the Author
Adrien Lefèvre is an independent analyst and writer covering European affairs, security policy, and international relations. His work focuses on the political and economic dimensions of the European Union’s foreign policy. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Diplomat Magazine, its editors, or its publisher.

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Women Leading Regional Diplomacy: Panama’s Coordination of GRULAC in the Netherlands

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Women Leading Regional Diplomacy: Panama’s Coordination of GRULAC in the Netherlands

The first semester of 2026 marked an important chapter for the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC) in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. As Panama assumed the coordination of the Group from Mexico on 1 January, it did so with a commitment to continuity, cooperation, and the strengthening of ties between Latin America and the Caribbean and one of Europe’s most dynamic centres of diplomacy, innovation, and international governance.

The transition was supported by the close collaboration of the GRULAC Troika, composed of H.E. Ms. Carmen Moreno Toscano, Ambassador of Mexico; H.E. Ms. Sally Loo Hui, Ambassador of Panama; and H.E. Ms. Franca Deza Ferreccio, Ambassador of Peru. Together, they ensured the continuity of ongoing initiatives while advancing new opportunities for engagement with Dutch institutions, international organizations, academia, and the private sector.

The semester also represented a notable milestone in diplomatic representation. The coordination and institutional continuity of GRULAC were guided by an all-female Troika, reflecting the growing role of women in international affairs and demonstrating the value of inclusive leadership in advancing regional priorities.

H.E. Ms. Sally Loo Hui, Ambassador of Panama. Caribbean Business Dialogue. Foto: Gerrit de Heus

One of the most significant achievements of the semester was the strengthening of economic diplomacy through the Latin America and Caribbean Business Dialogue. Conceived as a platform for practical engagement between Latin American and Caribbean countries and the Netherlands, the initiative brought together ambassadors, policymakers, business leaders, academics, and sector experts to explore opportunities for cooperation and investment.

Discussions focused on areas of strategic importance, including water management, infrastructure, ports and logistics, energy, strategic materials, agribusiness, advanced manufacturing technologies, and economic free zones. By creating a space where public- and private-sector stakeholders could exchange perspectives and identify areas of mutual interest, the Dialogue reinforced the region’s position as a strategic partner for sustainable investment, innovation, and economic growth.

The promotion of connectivity also formed part of this broader economic agenda. Engagements with representatives of Air Europa explored opportunities to increase the visibility of Latin American and Caribbean destinations and strengthen links between the two regions through tourism and commercial exchanges.

Forum for Dialogue, Water Science: Applications for Development and Business for Latin America and the Caribbean opening remarks, H.E. Ms Sally Loo Hui.

Science diplomacy and climate resilience constituted another major pillar of Panama’s coordination. Building on initiatives launched during Mexico’s tenure, GRULAC organized the Forum for Dialogue, Water Science: Applications for Development and Business for Latin America and the Caribbean, which highlighted the role of scientific knowledge and technological innovation in addressing development challenges and generating economic opportunities.

The forum demonstrated how water science can serve as a bridge between research, policymaking, and business development while also fostering collaboration between Dutch institutions and countries across the region. These efforts were complemented by exchanges with Deltares, one of the Netherlands’ leading centres of expertise in water and climate adaptation, and with Dialectik, a Dutch organization specializing in socio-ecological intelligence for climate resilience. Together, these initiatives underscored the growing importance of science-based cooperation in addressing shared environmental challenges.

GRULAC politic dialogue event.

Knowledge exchange and capacity building remained central to the GRULAC agenda. Presentations and dialogues with Dutch institutions and experts provided valuable opportunities to deepen understanding of issues ranging from migration governance and the European Union Asylum Pact to circular economy practices, international education, and academic cooperation.

Among these exchanges was a presentation by Dr. Aniel Pahladsingh, Senior Lawyer at the Legal and Litigation Department of the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Deputy Judge at the District Courts of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, who provided insights into contemporary European migration and asylum policies. Additional engagements with the International Solid Waste Association (ISWA), the T.M.C. Asser Institute, the Holland Alumni Network, and the GoAbroad Fair further strengthened connections between the region and Dutch institutions in the fields of education, governance, sustainability, and professional development.

GRULAC Ambassadors also participated in a strategic dialogue with The Hague Institute for Geopolitics, which provided an updated assessment of political developments in the Netherlands and their potential implications at the national and European levels. Such exchanges highlighted the importance of understanding the political and institutional environment of the host country in order to strengthen diplomatic engagement.

GRULAC consular representatives visited SHOP

Consular cooperation likewise remained an important component of the Group’s activities. Through collaboration with SHOP Den Haag and a visit to Casa Migrante Amsterdam, GRULAC consular representatives exchanged experiences and gained valuable insights into the protection and support of vulnerable populations, including issues related to human trafficking, sex work, migrant integration, and social assistance. These initiatives demonstrated the practical value of regional cooperation in addressing shared consular challenges.

Meeting at the International Criminal Court

As the international city of peace and justice, The Hague offers unique opportunities for dialogue with organizations and institutions that shape global governance. Throughout the semester, GRULAC Ambassadors engaged with key actors in the international legal and multilateral system, including the President of the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court, the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the Registrar of the International Court of Justice.

Farewell luncheon in honour of the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, H.E. Fernando Arias.

These exchanges reaffirmed the longstanding commitment of Latin American and Caribbean countries to international law, multilateralism, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The semester also included a farewell luncheon in honour of the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, H.E. Fernando Arias, recognizing his contribution to international peace and security and the strong relationship maintained between the Organisation and the countries of the region.

Panama’s coordination of GRULAC during the first semester of 2026 demonstrated the value of continuity, collaboration, and collective leadership. Through the combined efforts of Mexico, Peru, and Panama within the Troika framework, the Group advanced a dynamic agenda that strengthened political dialogue, promoted economic and scientific cooperation, expanded institutional partnerships, and reinforced engagement with the international community.

H.E. Ms. Carmen Moreno Toscano, Ambassador of Mexico; H.E. Ms. Sally Loo Hui, Ambassador of Panama; and H.E. Ms. Franca Deza Ferreccio, Ambassador of Peru.

Above all, the semester illustrated how regional cooperation can translate into concrete opportunities for innovation, knowledge sharing, and sustainable development. Guided by a shared vision and strengthened by inclusive leadership, GRULAC continued to build bridges between Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, contributing to a more connected and collaborative international environment.

One year of contribution, inspiration and excellence

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One year of contribution, inspiration and excellence

Celebrating one year of
Global Academy for Future Governance (GAFG)

Governance has acquired a curious habit; it talks incessantly about the future while preparing remarkably badly for it. Governments issue strategies, companies publish transformation plans, universities produce forecasts and consultants manufacture acronyms at an industrial scale. Yet the machinery for deciding what matters, what can wait and what may become disastrously expensive remains surprisingly weak.

That is where the Global Academy for Future Governance (GAFG) makes a persuasive proposition. Its central idea, that better governance depends on improving methods, means and mindsets (the ‘3Ms’), sounds almost disarmingly simple. Its importance lies precisely there. Modern problems are rarely caused by a shortage of information; they are caused by institutions that cannot connect information to judgement.

GAFG’s first virtue is its refusal to respect the fashionable boundaries between disciplines. Climate change is not merely an environmental question; artificial intelligence is not merely a technology question; migration is not merely a border question; and development is not merely an economic one. Each is an unruly mixture of economics, politics, science, ethics, security and human behaviour. Policymakers who insist on putting such problems into tidy boxes are not being rigorous, they are being convenient.

GAFG’s five-dimensional view – land, sea, airspace, near outer space and cyberspace – is similarly useful. The modern world does not operate in compartments. A satellite disruption can affect a port; a cyberattack can interrupt electricity; a drought can alter food prices, migration and political stability thousands of kilometres away. The serious task of governance is therefore less about predicting isolated events than understanding connections.

There is also something refreshing in GAFG’s scepticism about technological hype. The world does not need another institution shouting that every new algorithm will revolutionise everything. Markets are perfectly capable of doing that without assistance. What decision-makers need today is someone prepared to ask the unfashionable questions: Does this technology solve a real problem? Who pays for its unintended consequences? What happens to workers, institutions, ecosystems and public trust? And who benefits when the promised revolution turns out to be mostly a press release?

That emphasis matters especially in the Global South. Development cannot sensibly be measured by the number of digital platforms deployed, data centres constructed or glossy innovation districts opened. Economic progress that leaves societies more unequal, ecosystems more damaged or institutions less capable is not progress with a footnote, it is progress on credit.

GAFG’s claim that it is a partner rather than an expenditure is therefore more than positioning. Good foresight is cheap compared with bad decisions. A government that avoids one failed programme, a company that detects one strategic risk early, or an institution that prevents one costly ethical or environmental mistake – before the bill for unintended consequences eventually arrives – may recover its investment many times over.

The real test, however, will be whether GAFG can remain as independent in practice as it is ambitious in principle. Neutrality is valuable only when it survives pressure from clients, politics, fashionable technologies and commercial interests.

After one year, the strongest case for the Global Academy for Future Governance is not that it possesses a crystal ball, but that it recognises the future’s most dangerous feature: everything is connected. Better methods, adequate means and wiser mindsets may not guarantee excellent governance, but without them, excellence is mostly branding and the future is too expensive to leave to slogans.

Thanos Kalamidas, Editor-in-Chief OVI Magazine

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