TECH – MIND – HEALTH

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TECH – MIND – HEALTH

Beyond Technology: Preserving Humanity in the Age of AI

The unprecedented acceleration of artificial intelligence (AI) and digital technologies has fundamentally transformed the conditions under which humanity lives, governs, communicates, and understands itself – something I was writing about extensively for more than two decades . Yet the principal challenge of the digital age does not lie in the increasing sophistication of algorithms, computational power, or autonomous systems. Rather, it lies in humanity’s diminishing capacity to guide technological development through reflective awareness, ethical judgment, and responsibility.

Humans, technology, and nature exist within a relationship of profound interdependence in which every technological innovation reshapes the social, ecological, cognitive, and political conditions of human existence – thus confirming the central premise of the so-called anthropotechniques[1]. Consequently, the contemporary digital crisis is ultimately not a crisis of technology, but a crisis of consciousness – as this author noted long ago, describing the “cognitive deficit crisis”[2].

Human development can therefore no longer be measured solely through economic growth, productivity, or computational capability. It must equally be evaluated through the quality of human consciousness, mental well-being, ecological sustainability, social cohesion, cross-generational contents and solidarities, as well as other formats of equity and justice, to the very preservation of life in all its forms.

The chapters collected in this volume approach these questions from different disciplinary perspectives, yet they converge on one essential conclusion: technology must remain an instrument of human development rather than becoming the measure of humanity itself. The decisive question of our age is therefore not what technology can accomplish, but what humanity is capable of becoming through its responsible use.

More than seven centuries before the emergence of modern science, Jalal ad-Din Rumi reminded humanity that existence cannot be confined to the visible and the material, warning against the illusion that external forms alone constitute reality. Centuries later, Max Planck, whose discoveries inaugurated the quantum revolution, questioned the mechanistic worldview of classical science and argued that consciousness occupies a fundamental place in our understanding of reality. Although emerging from entirely different intellectual traditions and historical settings, Rumi, Planck and Buddhist philosophy converge in recognising that matter and consciousness cannot be understood as isolated or competing domains. To reduce one to the other—or to imagine that technology may ultimately substitute for human consciousness—is not merely philosophically inadequate but fundamentally contrary to the relational order of nature itself.

This understanding resonates equally with the humanistic philosophy of the post-Second World War European thought, most notably in the works of Erich Fromm, who argued that the highest achievement of civilization is not the accumulation of technical power or material possessions but the realization of the human person. The essential question is therefore not what technology can produce, but what human beings are capable of becoming. Technology derives its legitimacy not from novelty, speed or efficiency, but from its capacity to deepen freedom, cultivate reflective awareness, strengthen solidarity and enable the flourishing of individuals, communities and civilizations.

AI, as well as other forms of digital (over)exposure that is (over)stimulating us, should therefore be understood as nothing else but the latest form of anthropotechnique—one of the techniques through which humanity extends, cultivates and transforms its own capacities. I’ve written several books on this.

The history of civilization is, in essence, the history of anthropotechniques. Their original purpose was survival (through the mechanical solidarity of the group); their ultimate purpose is human (group and individual) self-realization. Such realization is therefore both the purpose and the criterion by which every anthropotechnique—from the first stone tool to AI—must ultimately be judged.

Throughout history, anthropotechniques have served humanity by strengthening its normative orders. Their legitimacy has never resided in technical sophistication itself, but in their contribution to the development of the human person and the advancement of civilization. Whenever technological development ceases to enhance human dignity, autonomy, wisdom, ecological responsibility and intergenerational well-being, and instead promotes dependence, alienation, domination, environmental degradation or the reduction of persons to objects of algorithmic optimisation, it fails its fundamental civilizational purpose. Technology was created to advance humanity; humanity was never created to advance technology.

At this critical civilizational juncture, humanity carries a responsibility extending far beyond the present generation. Our obligation is not merely to innovate, but to preserve the social and generational contract as well as the balance between analogue and digital, between efficient and human, between rational and empathic.

As this author have repeatedly argued in his writings, sustainable development is too often described as ‘any development that meets the entire needs of the present without compromising such needs of the future generations (deprived from hidden – societal, health or environmental costs)’, but maybe more accurate – while shorter, definition would be “any development aimed at the so-called 3Ms: the maximum good for maximum species, over maximum time-space span – comprehensive stewardship.” This principle applies with equal force to AI and to every past, current or emerging anthropotechnique. The 3Ms are therefore not merely a sustainability principle; they constitute the normative criterion by which every anthropotechnique should be evaluated. Technology fulfils its civilizational purpose only when it secures the greatest good for the greatest number of species over the longest possible time-space horizon, while preserving the social contract between contemporaries and the generational contract between present and future generations.

From this perspective, Quantum Buddhism (connecting Technology – Mind – Health; for more, see the author’s works on Geopolitics of Quantum Buddhism) may be understood as one possible ethical-philosophical orientation that restores the missing bridge between matter and spirit, capability and responsibility, science and wisdom – a merge between Newton and Rumi, between Weber and Sartre, between the vehicle and the journey, between colour and rhythm. It neither rejects science nor opposes technological innovation. Rather, it reminds us that technological progress acquires meaning only when directed toward the higher and longer-lasting common good. Science expands knowledge. Technology expands capability. Philosophy cultivates wisdom. A sustainable civilization requires the harmonious balance of all three. And these three require an unrestricted and fair, yet analogue, horizontal and vertical transmission.

If technology is the vehicle through which civilization advances, ethical reflection remains the compass that ensures the journey continues toward humanity rather than away from it. The journey begins with the human being, and its destination is human self-realization.

Ultimately, the future of technology will not be determined by machines but by humanity’s capacity to preserve wisdom alongside knowledge, responsibility alongside power and consciousness alongside innovation. The true measure of technological progress is therefore not whether machines become more intelligent, but whether humanity itself becomes wiser, freer, healthier, more compassionate and en route to its own self-realisation.

Technology is humanity’s greatest invention because of humanity’s unique ability to deploy the mind for abstract thinking. One exists only through the other. If we inherited this world from previous generations, then—even in the best of circumstances—we inherited only half of it; the other half is borrowed from future generations.

Geneva/Vienna, March 2026

Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic, GAFG’s co-founder and ABC

About the 4th GAFG eBook:

https://archive.org/details/technology-mind-health-gafg

https://pdfhost.io/v/rN4LPWa99g_Technology__Mind___Health

[1] As anthropotechniques, we should assume the (precognitive and) conscious clustering of different experiences, knowledges, discoveries, patents and the like; its practical application in any human activity (including all modes of horizontal and vertical transmission) aimed at acquiring resources for consumption in space and time by variety of tools and weaponry. As the only compensation for the biological and neurological limitations of humans (inferior to other forms of life on the planet), the anthropotechniques were answering the central pre-cognitive concern of humans: Survival! This is a self-coined definition based on works of prof. Kulic from late 1990 and early 2000, that ever since this author further developed and extensively used in his lectures on the ‘Institutions and Instruments of Sustainable Development’ (chapter: Environmental ethics). As such, the definition is extensive enough to describe the event of first usage of the sharp stone/broken bone by early homo faber all the evolutionary way to the development and deployment of the nuclear bomb.

[2] “…our crisis cannot be environmental, as it was never a financial or security (…) – our crisis must be a moral one”.

Sudan’s Future in the Grip of Competing External “Quartets”

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Sudan’s Future in the Grip of Competing External “Quartets”

By Willy Fautré, director of Human Rights Without Frontiers

Two different quartets now shape the battle for Sudan’s future. One is a hard‑edged regional bloc—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Iran—pursuing overlapping but by no means identical interests in the Red Sea corridor, political Islam, and regional security. The other is a more awkward concert of Western and multilateral actors—the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and the African Union—drifting towards a lowest‑common‑denominator outcome that restores a familiar interlocutor, even if that means reconciling themselves to the very forces Sudanese protesters tried to eject from power in 2019.

This is not simply diplomatic choreography. It is the frame within which outside powers are trying to close down Sudan’s war as a problem, rather than open up Sudan’s future as a political question. It is also the triumph of expediency and strategic self-interest over the interests and aspirations of a people battered by war and systematic repression. 

The Saudi–Egypt–Turkey–Iran quartet operates from a clear premise: Sudan is a strategic asset. Its ports, its airspace, its Islamist networks, its security services and its militias are all potential instruments in wider regional contests. Each member of this group reads the country through its own security lens. For Egypt, the priority is a strong, army‑dominated Sudan that keeps Islamist rivals in check, protects the Nile waters and ensures that no disorder spills catastrophically across its southern frontier. For Saudi Arabia, Sudan is part of a broader belt of vulnerabilities from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa—a theatre in which Riyadh wants to prevent chaotic state collapse but also to preserve leverage with whichever actors ultimately control territory and coastal infrastructure. Turkey and Iran, each in their own way, view Sudan as a field for projecting influence and countering their rivals’ alignments, whether through security cooperation, arms supplies, or ideological networks. Crucially, this engagement is not limited to mediation or diplomacy: all four states have materially and politically backed the SAF, treating it as the most reliable vehicle for securing their interests rather than as one party among many in a neutral peace process.

What binds this quartet together is not a shared vision of Sudan’s political future, but a shared insistence that Sudan’s future must be mediated through actors they understand and can deal with. In practice, that means a bias towards dealing with the Sudanese Armed Forces under General Burhan. A hierarchical army, operating through familiar security structures and embedded in long‑standing relationships, is far easier for them to read than a fragmented coalition of civilians and armed movements pushing for a radically different, secular and decentralized order. Burhan, with his Transitional Sovereign Council, offers an institutional form and a set of uniforms that look reassuringly like “the state.”

Set against this is the second quartet: the US, the EU, the UN and the AU. This group presents itself as the guardian of humanitarian norms and political transitions. It has backed negotiations, issued statements, applauded ceasefire initiatives, and repeatedly insisted on civilian protection and inclusive dialogue. Yet it is increasingly constrained by its own fatigue and caution. After a decade in which international crises—from Syria to Yemen, Afghanistan to Ukraine—have stretched diplomatic bandwidth and humanitarian budgets, Sudan registers as yet another calamity in a crowded field of emergencies. The appetite for a robust intervention—political or otherwise—that would fundamentally reconfigure the power balance on the ground is conspicuously absent.

Instead, this quartet tends to slip towards outcomes that stabilize the file rather than transform it. In practice, that means circling back to familiar interlocutors. The SAF under Burhan looks, from Western and multilateral vantage points, like the least disruptive option: an actor that can sign ceasefires, attend summits, promise transitions, and, crucially, anchor a narrative of “state continuity.” This attraction is reinforced by a pervasive fear of what a victory by the RSF—or a genuinely radical civilian coalition—might bring: legal instability over past atrocities, a redistribution of power away from the Nile corridor, and a reconfiguration of Sudan’s external alliances.

The result is convergence between these two quartets at precisely the point where Sudan’s internal rupture is most profound. Sudanese citizens have repeatedly signalled their rejection of the Islamist‑dominated National Congress Party (NCP) order, and of the security‑state structures that underpinned it. Yet the military‑centric solution now tacitly favoured by many external actors is rebuilding the political scaffolding of that order. NCP‑linked cadres, Islamist networks and elements of the old security apparatus have drifted back towards the SAF‑led regime as it struggles to hold power against the RSF and a fragmented civilian camp. The coalition around Burhan thus looks less like a neutral guardian of the transition, and more like a recycled version of the hegemonic, Nile‑centred elite which peripheral communities rose against in the first place.

At the same time, the RSF has seized on the vacuum created by this dissonance between external preferences and internal demands. It has begun to articulate an alternative political project—secular, democratic, regionally devolved—which presents itself as a break with the Islamist, centralized state. The credibility of that offer is limited by the RSF’s violence against civilians—a record more than matched by the SAF, whose atrocities extend to the use of chemical weapons—but the important point, in political terms, is that a contest of visions is underway. This is not simply a war about who controls the presidential palace; it is a war about whether Sudan continues under the familiar model of a Nile‑centric, Islamist‑inflected security state, or moves to a decentralised, more inclusive configuration in which historically marginalised regions gain genuine power.

The twin quartets, however, are signalling that this contest should be truncated in favour of a settlement that looks “legible” from the outside. For Riyadh, Cairo, Ankara and Tehran, this means a Sudan that does not suddenly turn into a laboratory for secular regionalism or a platform for rival Islamist movements out of their control. For Washington, Brussels, New York and Addis Ababa, it means a Sudan whose leadership can be invited to conferences, sign memoranda, and offer plausible assurances on humanitarian access, counter‑terrorism and migration. In both cases, Burhan’s Transitional Sovereign Council becomes the convenient pivot.

The cost of this convenience is that the deeper political rupture created by the uprising and by the war is pushed out of view. Sudan’s peripheral communities—Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, eastern Sudan—have paid a disproportionate price in displacement, famine and violence. They have also been at the heart of demands for a different state: one in which power is not monopolised by Khartoum’s Islamist‑leaning cabals, but shared institutionally and economically with the regions that have long supplied cannon fodder and resources without representation. If external actors close ranks around a settlement that implicitly rebuilds the old centre, they risk entrenching the very inequalities that made Sudan so fragile in the first place.

If the US‑EU‑UN‑AU quartet continues down this path, it will claim that it is “ending the war” and “saving lives.” Some lives will indeed be saved by any reduction in open fighting. But the underlying political violence—the violence of exclusion, marginalisation and impunity—will remain untouched. The SAF will have little incentive to genuinely demilitarise politics or dismantle the Islamist networks that have reattached themselves to its command structure. The RSF, if forced into a subordinate or purely security role, will have still less incentive to accept accountability. Civilian actors will once again be invited to manage the public face of an order over which they hold little real control.

A different course is possible, but it requires both quartets to abandon the search for the “easy” interlocutor. For the regional quartet, it means recognising that a stable Sudan cannot be built on the back of a narrow Islamist‑military elite whose legitimacy is shot and whose appetite for compromise is thin. For the Western‑multilateral quartet, it means accepting that Sudan’s transition cannot be scripted as a technocratic exercise in constitution‑writing, while the armed centre is quietly restored. Pressure needs to be recalibrated: not towards legitimising one armed actor over another, but towards enforcing a genuinely inclusive process in which civilian movements, regional representatives and victims of violence are not simply decorative.

Sudan’s war is already the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, and the temptation to “make it go away” by recognising whoever controls the capital will only grow. But the country’s future will not be settled by convenience. It will be settled by whether its people, particularly those in the peripheries, are allowed to renegotiate the basic terms of power. The two quartets now hovering over Sudan can either facilitate that renegotiation, or smother it under the reassuring illusion of familiar uniforms and familiar faces.

A Decade After the Hague Ruling: The Lasting Impact of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration

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A Decade After the Hague Ruling: The Lasting Impact of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration

By Anton Lutter

On 12 July 2016, an arbitral tribunal constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague issued one of the most significant rulings in modern maritime law. The tribunal delivered its award in a case initiated by the Philippines concerning aspects of maritime entitlements and activities in the South China Sea. While the tribunal did not rule on questions of sovereignty over land features, it provided important interpretations of maritime rights and obligations under UNCLOS.

One of the central findings of the award concerned China’s claims to historic rights within the areas covered by the so-called “nine-dash line.” The tribunal concluded that such claims, insofar as they exceeded the maritime entitlements provided under UNCLOS, had no legal basis under the Convention. It also examined the maritime status of several features in the Spratly Islands and determined that none of the features assessed qualified as islands capable of generating a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

The tribunal further found that certain Chinese activities had affected the Philippines’ sovereign rights within areas that the tribunal considered to fall within the Philippines’ EEZ. These findings included interference with fishing and petroleum exploration activities, as well as environmental harm associated with large-scale land reclamation and construction activities on coral reefs.

China did not participate in the arbitration proceedings and rejected the tribunal’s jurisdiction and conclusions, stating that the award was “null and void.” Beijing has maintained that its maritime claims in the South China Sea are based on historical and legal grounds, while continuing to assert its position regarding disputed features and maritime areas. The arbitration award did not resolve competing sovereignty claims over islands, reefs, and other maritime features, which remain subject to ongoing diplomatic discussions.

Over the past decade, the 2016 award has remained an important reference point in international discussions on maritime law. Successive Philippine governments have used the ruling as a basis for advancing their maritime positions, while other claimant states, including Vietnam and Malaysia, have continued to refer to UNCLOS principles in support of their respective maritime claims. Several countries, including the United States, Japan, Australia, and members of the European Union, have expressed support for the importance of UNCLOS and the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes through international law.

During a visit to Manila in 2023, then Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Hanke Bruins Slot highlighted the importance of respecting international law in the South China Sea and expressed support for the implementation of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling.

The years following the award have witnessed continued maritime incidents involving Chinese and Philippine vessels in disputed areas, including confrontations involving water cannons, dangerous manoeuvres, and collisions. These developments have underlined the complexity of managing overlapping maritime claims in one of the world’s most strategically important regions. Diplomatic efforts, including negotiations between ASEAN and China on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, have continued, although a comprehensive agreement has yet to be reached.

As the world marks the tenth anniversary of the ruling in July 2026, governments and international organisations continue to refer to the arbitral award as an important development in the interpretation of maritime law. In a statement issued on 11 July 2026, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas reaffirmed the European Union’s support for efforts by ASEAN and China to conclude an effective, substantive, and legally binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea consistent with UNCLOS.

The statement also emphasised that tensions and disputes should be addressed through dialogue and peaceful means, in accordance with international law, the Charter of the United Nations, and UNCLOS. The European Union further expressed concern about rising tensions and dangerous incidents in the region, while reaffirming its commitment to safe, free, and open maritime routes in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Ten years after the Hague ruling, the 2016 South China Sea arbitration has not brought an end to the complex maritime issues facing the region. Its lasting contribution lies in clarifying aspects of maritime rights and obligations under UNCLOS and providing an important legal reference point for future diplomatic discussions. While implementation ultimately depends on political dialogue and cooperation, the award continues to influence legal interpretations, diplomatic engagement, and the broader conversation on the relationship between international law and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.

The Latin American Food Festival Comes to Hilton The Hague

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The Latin American Food Festival Comes to Hilton The Hague

The flavours, colours, and rhythms of Latin America will take centre stage on 28 August as Hilton The Hague hosts the Latin American Food Festival, an evening dedicated to celebrating the region’s rich culinary traditions and cultural diversity.

The festival will feature an extensive buffet-style presentation showcasing a wide variety of authentic dishes from numerous Latin American countries. Guests will have the opportunity to sample traditional specialties prepared with regional ingredients and time-honoured recipes, offering a unique culinary journey across the continent. From savoury classics and grilled delicacies to fresh salads, tropical flavours, and traditional desserts, the generous buffet is designed to highlight the remarkable diversity of Latin American cuisine.

Chef Luis Rojas

“This is a valuable gastronomic initiative that promotes the social and cultural values of the region,” said Chef Rojas. According to the chef, the event will feature traditional dishes representing many Latin American countries, allowing guests to experience the richness and authenticity of the region’s gastronomy in one location.

Adding to the celebration, the evening will be accompanied by live Latin American music, creating a festive atmosphere where guests can enjoy the sounds and rhythms that have become synonymous with the region’s cultural identity.

The Latin American Food Festival is expected to welcome members of the diplomatic corps, representatives of international organisations, business leaders, and food enthusiasts from across the Netherlands. More than a culinary event, the festival serves as a platform for cultural exchange, demonstrating how gastronomy can bring people together, encourage dialogue, and strengthen mutual understanding among nations.

Hosted in the elegant surroundings of Hilton The Hague, the festival promises an evening of outstanding food, warm hospitality, colourful entertainment, and a genuine celebration of Latin America’s cultural heritage through its generous buffet, festive ambience, and lively music, in the heart of the international city of peace and justice.

Reservations Hilton The Hague

Italy’s Cultural Diplomacy Comes to Life in Athens

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Italy’s Cultural Diplomacy Comes to Life in Athens

By Eleni Vasiliki Bampaliouta

The Embassy of Italy in Athens presents three landmark exhibitions celebrating archaeology, art, fashion, and cinema across the Greek capital’s leading museums.

This summer, the Embassy of Italy in Athens places Italian culture at the heart of the Greek capital through an ambitious cultural programme featuring three major exhibitions hosted simultaneously at three of Athens’ leading museums. Spanning archaeology, fine arts, fashion, and cinema, the exhibitions offer a compelling journey through Italy’s rich cultural heritage while highlighting the longstanding dialogue between Italy and Greece.

Maria Callas Through the Art of Italian Costume Design

Until 13 September, the Benaki Museum hosts Maria La Callas: The Italian Art of Film Costumes, an exhibition organised by the Embassy of Italy in Athens in collaboration with Polimoda, the event’s educational partner, and its Director, Massimiliano Giornetti, under the patronage of the National Chamber for Italian Fashion.

The exhibition celebrates Italy’s internationally renowned tradition of costume design for cinema and theatre through eighteen remarkable creations, accompanied by jewellery and accessories. The costumes were designed by the acclaimed costume designer Massimo Cantini Parrini, who also curated the exhibition and has received numerous distinctions at major Italian and international film festivals.

Created for Angelina Jolie’s portrayal of Maria Callas in Pablo Larraín’s acclaimed film Maria, the costumes showcase the creative dialogue between fashion and cinema while tracing the evolution of Italian elegance from the 1950s to the 1970s. Beyond their cinematic significance, the creations pay tribute to one of opera’s greatest icons and underscore Italy’s lasting influence on international design and visual storytelling.

The Acropolis Museum

The Acropolis Museum Explores the Legacy of Ancient Greek Art in Italy

Until 30 August, the Acropolis Museum presents Inspiration: Ancient Greek Art in Italy, an exhibition organised by the Department for the Enhancement of Cultural Heritage of Italy’s Ministry of Culture in collaboration with the museum.

Featuring thirty-eight exceptional works from some of Italy’s most important museums, the exhibition explores the profound influence of ancient Greek art on the Italian peninsula, from the Late Iron Age to the twentieth century.

Among the highlights are the Cup of Nestor from Ischia, the Euphronios Krater from Cerveteri, the Ludovisi Throne, the Maiden of Anzio, and the celebrated bronze heads recovered from the Porticello shipwreck.

The exhibition concludes with masterpieces by Antonio Canova presented in dialogue with the Parthenon Sculptures, alongside works by Giorgio and Alberto de Chirico, illustrating how the artistic ideals of classical Greece continued to inspire Italian creativity across the centuries.

The Otranto Shipwreck: A Window into the Ancient Mediterranean

Until 15 September, the Museum of Byzantine Culture in Athens presents Greece and the Maritime Routes to the West: The Shipwreck in the Strait of Otranto. The exhibition was inaugurated in June by Italy’s Minister of Culture, Alessandro Giuli, and Greece’s Minister of Culture, Lina Mendoni. It is the result of a collaboration between the Department for the Protection of Cultural Heritage of Italy’s Ministry of Culture and the Italian Archaeological School at Athens.

At the heart of the exhibition is an extraordinary cargo of seventh-century BC Corinthian pottery and ceramic vessels destined for the markets of southern and Tyrrhenian Italy, discovered in a shipwreck lying 780 metres beneath the waters of the Strait of Otranto.

The archaeological finds were recovered during preliminary surveys carried out for the construction of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and are regarded as one of the most significant underwater archaeological discoveries of recent decades. The exhibition offers valuable new insights into ancient Mediterranean trade routes and the pivotal role of the Greek world in connecting cultures across the region.

Paolo Cuculi: “A Unique Opportunity to Showcase Italian Culture”

Commenting on the significance of the initiative, the Ambassador of Italy to Greece, Paolo Cuculi, described the simultaneous presentation of three major exhibitions at some of Athens’ most prestigious museums as a unique opportunity to showcase the breadth and diversity of Italian culture.

As Ambassador Cuculi noted, the exhibitions highlight not only Italy’s archaeological and historical heritage but also the internationally recognised creativity, craftsmanship, and aesthetic excellence that define Italian style. At the same time, they reaffirm the vitality of the cultural dialogue between Italy and Greece, demonstrating how cultural cooperation continues to strengthen the longstanding friendship between the two countries while promoting a shared appreciation of their common Mediterranean heritage.

Through this exceptional programme, the Embassy of Italy in Athens brings together institutions, scholars, artists, and the wider public in a celebration of Italy’s cultural legacy. More than a series of exhibitions, the initiative demonstrates the power of culture as a diplomatic instrument, reinforcing the close bonds between Italy and Greece and promoting international understanding through a shared appreciation of two civilisations whose histories have long been intertwined.

Greece and Uzbekistan Deepen Cultural Diplomacy Through the Legacy of Alexander the Great

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Greece and Uzbekistan Deepen Cultural Diplomacy Through the Legacy of Alexander the Great

By Eleni Vasiliki Bampaliouta

A landmark exhibition, a joint feature film, and an ambitious programme of cultural cooperation signal a new chapter in relations between Athens and Tashkent. More than twenty-three centuries after Alexander the Great forged lasting ties between the Hellenic world and Central Asia, Greece and Uzbekistan are drawing upon their shared historical heritage to strengthen bilateral cultural relations.

During an official three-day visit to Greece, Uzbekistan’s Minister of Culture, Ozodbek Nazarbekov, met with Greece’s Minister of Culture, Lina Mendoni, to discuss an ambitious agenda for future cooperation. At the centre of the discussions were two flagship initiatives: the co-organisation of a major international exhibition dedicated to Alexander the Great and the joint production of a feature film exploring the story of the Macedonian king and Roxana.

Held in a particularly constructive atmosphere, the meeting underscored both governments’ commitment to expanding cooperation in culture, heritage, museums, audiovisual production, and international cultural diplomacy.

Alexander the Great: A Shared Historical Legacy

The discussions highlighted the unique historical links connecting Greece and present-day Uzbekistan through the legacy of Alexander the Great.

In 329 BC, Alexander captured Samarkand—known in antiquity as Maracanda—which had been founded around 700 BC and served as the capital of Sogdiana, a satrapy of the Achaemenid Persian Empire.

According to historical tradition, Alexander admired the city’s beauty upon entering it, declaring:

“Everything I have heard about Maracanda is true, except that it is even more beautiful than I imagined.”

Recognising the city’s strategic location, Alexander understood its potential to become a major commercial centre linking the Mediterranean with Asia. His vision of organised trade routes between East and West later contributed to the development of the Silk Roads, one of history’s most influential networks of commerce and cultural exchange.

Samarkand also occupies a special place in Alexander’s personal history. In 327 BC, he married Roxana, the Sogdian princess who became the mother of his only legitimate heir. Today, the Samarkand Museum preserves this shared historical memory through a dedicated exhibition tracing Alexander’s presence in the region.

It is this shared heritage that both countries now seek to transform into a platform for contemporary cultural cooperation.

From Shared Heritage to Institutional Cooperation

Building on their common historical legacy, the two ministers explored practical opportunities to expand bilateral cooperation across a broad range of cultural sectors. Minister Lina Mendoni highlighted the considerable potential for exchanging expertise in the protection and management of cultural heritage, archaeological documentation, monument conservation and restoration, and the management of cultural assets.

Museum cooperation emerged as another key priority. Both sides expressed their intention to promote exhibition exchanges and develop joint thematic projects highlighting the historical connections between Greece and Central Asia. Among the Greek institutions identified as potential partners were the National Archaeological Museum, the Museum of Islamic Art of the Benaki Museum, and the Museum of Asian Art of Corfu. Uzbekistan proposed cooperation with its Museum of Applied Arts and the State Museum of History.

The discussions also recognised the significance of Alexander the Great’s legacy in Central Asia and the spread of Greek artistic traditions beyond the Mediterranean as a shared field for future academic and museum collaboration.

Cinema, Digital Culture and Creative Industries

The meeting also explored new opportunities in the audiovisual and creative sectors, reflecting both countries’ intention to broaden cultural cooperation beyond traditional heritage projects. Among the proposals under consideration are virtual exhibitions, bilingual and multilingual digital archives, and collaboration on audiovisual productions.

The proposal to jointly produce a feature film on Alexander the Great and Roxana emerged as the flagship initiative, bringing together historical research, cultural storytelling, and contemporary filmmaking in a project designed to reach international audiences.

The ministers also discussed organising a Greek Cultural Week in Uzbekistan and an Uzbek Cultural Week in Greece, featuring programmes dedicated to traditional music, gastronomy, folk art, literature, and contemporary artistic expression, with the aim of strengthening people-to-people exchanges alongside institutional partnerships.

Strengthening Cooperation Through UNESCO

The meeting also reaffirmed the two countries’ commitment to closer cooperation within international organisations. The ministers welcomed the mutual support of Greece and Uzbekistan for their respective candidacies to UNESCO’s Executive Board for the 2027–2031 term, describing it as another indication of the growing partnership between the two countries in the multilateral arena.

Their discussions concluded with the signing of a Programme of Cooperation in Education, Science and Culture for the period 2026–2028, establishing a solid framework for future collaboration.

In the cultural field, the agreement provides for joint initiatives in heritage protection and management, exchanges of archaeologists, conservators, restoration specialists, and ethnographers, the organisation of archaeological, artistic, and ethnographic exhibitions, cooperation in cinema and audiovisual production, stronger links between literary and publishing institutions, and collaborative projects in music, dance, theatre, folklore, visual arts, and cultural routes.

A New Chapter in Cultural Diplomacy

The proposal to jointly organise a major exhibition and produce a feature film dedicated to Alexander the Great represents the most emblematic outcome of this new phase in Greek–Uzbek relations. Drawing on a shared historical legacy spanning more than two millennia, the initiative demonstrates how history can serve as a powerful instrument of contemporary cultural diplomacy.

More broadly, the agreements reached in Athens reflect a shared determination to transform common heritage into a dynamic framework for cooperation—one that extends beyond archaeology and museums to include education, the creative industries, digital innovation, and multilateral engagement. By placing Alexander the Great at the centre of this renewed partnership, Greece and Uzbekistan reaffirm the ability of culture to build bridges between nations, strengthen international dialogue, and promote mutual understanding among regions connected by a shared past.

Renewed UN Engagement Seeks to Reopen the Path Towards a Cyprus Settlement

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Renewed UN Engagement Seeks to Reopen the Path Towards a Cyprus Settlement

By Eleni Vasiliki Bampaliouta

A meeting between UN Secretary-General António Guterres, PresidentNikos Christodoulides, and Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman has signalled renewed diplomatic momentum while highlighting the continuing role of international engagement in the search for a comprehensive settlement.

A renewed diplomatic initiative under the auspices of the United Nations has generated cautious optimism regarding the future of the Cyprus settlement process, following a private dinner hosted by UN Secretary-General António Guterres with the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nikos Christodoulides, and Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman.

The meeting, held at the residence of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in the buffer zone in Nicosia, lasted approximately one and a half hours and served as preparation for the formal trilateral meeting between the three leaders that followed.

Although no immediate breakthrough was announced, the discussions were viewed as a constructive step towards identifying possible areas of progress and creating conditions conducive to the resumption of negotiations under the UN framework.

A Comprehensive Discussion on the Cyprus Issue

Following the dinner, President Christodoulides expressed cautious optimism while avoiding any premature assessment of the outcome. He noted that the discussions had established a constructive basis for possible progress.

Describing the exchange as “good, open and sincere,” the President stated that all major aspects of the Cyprus issue had been addressed. The discussions covered the substance of the dispute, areas of convergence achieved to date, the methodology for future negotiations, the possibility of an expanded conference, and confidence-building measures aimed at improving relations between the two communities.

“Everything was discussed: substance, methodology, convergences, an expanded format, confidence-building measures. The discussion will continue tomorrow morning, and we hope that specific announcements will be made. We are working in this direction.”

At the same time, he acknowledged that significant differences remain between the two sides. Certain issues, he noted, revealed divergent approaches, but the dialogue was conducted in a frank and constructive manner, with both arguments and counterarguments presented throughout the discussion.

The UN Secretary-General’s Continued Political Commitment

A central element of the meeting was the personal involvement of António Guterres and his continued political commitment to facilitating efforts aimed at reviving the negotiation process.

President Christodoulides highlighted the importance of the Secretary-General’s engagement, noting that Mr Guterres had once again reaffirmed his commitment during the dinner. “I would like once again to express my satisfaction because the Secretary-General reaffirmed tonight that he is politically committed to this effort.” The active involvement of the UN Secretary-General remains a significant factor in maintaining international attention and diplomatic momentum around one of Europe’s longest-running unresolved conflicts.

The Role of the European Union and the International Community

President Christodoulides also referred to the broader international engagement surrounding Cyprus, emphasising the complementary roles of the United Nations and the European Union in supporting efforts towards a negotiated settlement.

As a member state of the European Union, Cyprus remains closely connected to the wider European diplomatic agenda, with Brussels closely following developments and supporting initiatives aimed at creating favourable conditions for dialogue and stability.

“We are witnessing an international effort, both from the United Nations and the European Union, moving towards the major objective: the resumption of negotiations from where they were interrupted in 2017.”

Towards Concrete Steps and Confidence-Building Measures

President Christodoulides refrained from specifying which issues could lead to concrete announcements following the trilateral meeting but clarified that the discussions extended well beyond confidence-building measures.

The talks addressed the broader framework of the Cyprus issue, including its political substance, the methodology for negotiations, existing convergences, and possible future steps that could facilitate a return to formal negotiations. He also underlined that the international environment surrounding Cyprus has evolved significantly since March 2023, both within the United Nations and the European Union.

For the Republic of Cyprus, he stressed, achieving a comprehensive settlement remains the only viable path forward.

“We know what we want, we know where we want to reach, and I hope tomorrow to hear positive developments and positive results from the Secretary-General.”

A Continuing Diplomatic Effort for Stability

The latest UN-led initiative does not eliminate the substantial differences that continue to separate the two sides. However, it demonstrates that sustained international engagement remains essential to preserving the possibility of a negotiated settlement and maintaining stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The renewed diplomatic activity surrounding Cyprus reflects the continued importance of dialogue, confidence-building, and multilateral engagement in addressing one of Europe’s most enduring political challenges. Through the combined efforts of the United Nations, the European Union, and the parties involved, the current initiative seeks to create the conditions necessary for a meaningful return to the negotiating table.

Celebrating Peru’s 205th Independence Day:

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Celebrating Peru’s 205th Independence Day:

A Strong Partnership Looking Toward the Future

The Embassy of Peru to the Kingdom of the Netherlands commemorated the 205th Anniversary of Peru’s Independence with a distinguished National Day reception in The Hague, bringing together a large gathering of ambassadors, heads of international organizations, judges from international courts, Dutch government representatives, business leaders, academics, members of civil society, and representatives of the Peruvian diaspora.

Guests were warmly welcomed by H.E. Franca Deza Ferreccio, Ambassador of Peru to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, together with the Peruvian Consul General, Mr. Sergio Manuel Avila Traverso. Upon arrival, attendees received the lyrics of the Peruvian National Anthem, allowing everyone to participate in the ceremonial opening of the evening.

H.E. Mr. Rokuichiro Michii, Ambassador of Japan, H.E. Ms Caroline Chipeta, Ambassador of Tanzania, the Ambassador of Peru, H.E. Franca Deza Ferreccio, H.E. Mrs. Clara Nunes dos Santos, Ambassador of Portugal and H.E. Madeleine Liguemoh Ondoua.

A traditional Pisco Sour, Peru’s emblematic cocktail, set the tone for the celebration, followed by an elegant selection of canapés inspired by Peru’s internationally acclaimed gastronomy. The reception offered a refined yet relaxed atmosphere where guests exchanged views on the growing bilateral relationship between Peru and the Netherlands, as well as on the country’s recent democratic transition following the election of President-elect Keiko Fujimori, who assumes office on 28 July 2026.

In her National Day address, Ambassador Deza Ferreccio reflected on the significance of Peru’s democratic process. “This year Peru has undergone a particularly important democratic process with the holding of the General Elections in April and June. The new constitutionally elected President of Peru, democratically elected by the Peruvian people, Mrs. Keiko Fujimori, will assume office on 28 July 2026.”

H.E. Mr. Mohamed Basri, Ambassador of Morocco, H.E. Ms. Ramatoulaye Ba Epse Faye, Ambassador of Senegal, H.E. Ms. Franca Deza Ferreccio, Ambassador of Peru, H.E. Mr. Lambert Dushimimana, Ambassador of Rwanda, H.E. Ambassador Lizeth N. Satumbo Pena, Ambassador of the Republic of Angola and H.E. Madeleine Liguemoh Ondoua.

The Ambassador emphasized the symbolic importance of celebrating Peru’s National Day in The Hague. “Celebrating our National Day in The Hague has a very special significance. This city, recognized as the Legal Capital of the World, symbolizes the principles of peace, justice, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, values that inspire Peruvian foreign policy. Our country maintains a firm commitment to international law, multilateralism, and the strengthening of international institutions as essential tools for addressing the global challenges of our time.”

“The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a strategic partner of Peru. Our diplomatic relations, founded on mutual respect, trust, and a long tradition of friendship, are currently experiencing a particularly dynamic period. We share common values and objectives, as well as the conviction that dialogue and cooperation constitute the best foundation for promoting the development and prosperity of our societies.”

H.E. Mr. Philippe Couvreur, Ambassador Deza Ferreccio and H.E. Ms. Sally Loo Hui, Ambassador of Panama.

Ambassador Deza Ferreccio pointed to several recent milestones that illustrate the growing depth of cooperation between both countries. Among them were the Sixth Political Consultations held in The Hague during the visit of Peru’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, which opened new avenues for political, economic, commercial, and technical cooperation.

Another landmark achievement was the signing of the Customs Cooperation Treaty between Peru and the Netherlands on 4 June 2026 in Lima. “This Treaty has undeniable strategic value because it will reinforce the trust that strengthens our economic and trade relationship, facilitating the safe and secure transit of goods, and consolidating the Netherlands as one of the main gateways for Peruvian products to the European market.”

H.E. Mr. Paul Teesalu, H.E. Ms. Sally Loo Hui, Ambassador of Panama, Ambassador Deza Ferreccio of Peru and H.E. Ms. Corinne Ciceron Buhler, Ambassador of Switzerland.

She also underscored the strategic role of the Port of Rotterdam as Peru’s principal logistics gateway into Europe.

Promoting Peru’s image abroad remains another important objective of the Embassy. The Ambassador highlighted the successful participation of Peru’s renowned training ship B.A.P. Unión during SAIL Amsterdam 2025 and Sails Curaçao 2026, describing the vessel as “an itinerant Ambassador of Peru.” “Our training ship carried not only the excellence of the Peruvian Navy, but also the richness of our history, culture, and maritime vocation, bringing our country closer to thousands of visitors and reaffirming Peru’s commitment to dialogue and international cooperation.”

Beyond maritime diplomacy, the Embassy has continued to organize lectures, art exhibitions, concerts, and cultural activities that showcase Peru’s rich heritage to Dutch audiences.

The Ambassador also highlighted the expanding cooperation between Peru and the Netherlands in integrated water management, agricultural innovation, and sustainable trade, while expressing appreciation for Dutch support throughout Peru’s accession process to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

A particularly heartfelt moment came when Ambassador Deza Ferreccio paid tribute to the Peruvian community living throughout the Kingdom of the Netherlands. “With their work, talent, and dedication, our compatriots enrich this society and project a positive image of Peru, becoming genuine ambassadors for our country and a human bridge that strengthens the ties between our two nations.”

Looking ahead, the Ambassador expressed confidence in the future of bilateral relations. “The progress achieved demonstrates that the relationship between Peru and the Netherlands is currently experiencing a period of excellence and dynamism. The high-level political dialogue, the strengthening of our cooperation mechanisms, the expansion of trade, and the closer relations of our societies allow us to look to the future with optimism.”

She concluded by thanking the Embassy team, the Consulate General, Peru’s Commercial Office, and all those who have contributed to strengthening Peru-Netherlands relations before inviting guests to celebrate the country’s national day with the traditional toast:

“Happy Independence Day, Peru! Viva el Perú! Cheers!”

The Caspian Sea and the New Geography of Conflict: When Does Military Support Make a State a Party to War

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The Caspian Sea and the New Geography of Conflict: When Does Military Support Make a State a Party to War

By Ayesha Asim

The Caspian Sea was never supposed to be a battlefield in the war between Russia and Ukraine. Yet recent developments have brought the conflict into waters far removed from Ukraine’s front lines. Reports of Ukrainian operations targeting vessels and supply networks allegedly connected to Russia’s military logistics have raised questions about whether the geography of the war is expanding. For Iran, whose maritime space and interests in the Caspian are directly affected, the issue is even more sensitive.

The incident raises a question that international law has not yet answered with complete clarity: when does military assistance to another state make the assisting state a participant in an armed conflict, and when can the infrastructure supporting that assistance become a lawful military objective?

These questions are becoming increasingly important as modern warfare moves beyond traditional battlefields. A war may be fought in one country, supplied through another, supported by technology from a third, and sustained through maritime routes that cross several jurisdictions. The Caspian Sea illustrates this changing geography of conflict, particularly as military and strategic ties between Iran and Russia have deepened while Ukraine continues to seek ways to disrupt Russia’s ability to sustain its war effort.

The starting point must be the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) prohibits states from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, subject to recognised exceptions under international law. Article 51 preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack.

This framework creates an important legal limitation. Even if Iran provides military assistance to Russia, that fact alone does not automatically give Ukraine a general right to use force against Iranian territory. Military assistance and an armed attack are not legally synonymous. The threshold for invoking self-defence is considerably higher than simply demonstrating that another state has helped an adversary.

International law has long recognised that states may provide different forms of assistance to parties involved in armed conflicts without necessarily becoming direct participants themselves. Political support, diplomatic backing and even certain forms of arms transfers do not automatically transform a supporting state into a belligerent.

But not all forms of assistance are legally identical.

There is a difference between supplying weapons and providing operational intelligence. There is another difference between selling military equipment and directly assisting with the planning or execution of an attack. As the nature and degree of involvement increase, so too may the legal consequences.

This is where the law of state responsibility becomes relevant. Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts addresses the responsibility of a state that aids or assists another state in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. The provision requires knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongful act and that the conduct would also have been internationally wrongful if committed by the assisting state itself.

The significance of Article 16 is often misunderstood. It does not mean that every state supplying weapons automatically becomes responsible for every action carried out by the recipient state. The legal conditions must be satisfied. Questions of knowledge, the nature of the assistance and the relationship between that assistance and the wrongful conduct are central.

This creates a distinction between state responsibility and participation in an armed conflict. A state may potentially incur responsibility for assisting unlawful conduct without necessarily becoming a party to the conflict. Conversely, a state that becomes directly involved in military operations may acquire a different legal status.

The distinction is particularly important when considering the legality of attacks against military supply networks.

International humanitarian law applies once an armed conflict exists, but it does not make every object connected to the conflict a lawful target. The principle of distinction requires parties to distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Under the customary rules reflected in Additional Protocol I, an object may qualify as a military objective where it makes an effective contribution to military action and its destruction, capture or neutralisation offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time.

A vessel carrying military equipment may therefore raise a difficult legal question. Its legal status cannot be determined solely by its nationality or by the fact that it is travelling through the territory or waters of a state supporting another party to a conflict.

The crucial question is what the vessel is actually doing.

If a vessel is directly transporting military equipment that contributes to military operations, the legal analysis may differ from that applicable to an ordinary commercial ship carrying civilian cargo. Yet even then, the assessment must be made on the basis of the facts available at the time. The mere suspicion that a vessel is connected to a military supply network is not enough to remove the protection afforded to civilian objects.

The same principle applies to ports, warehouses and transport infrastructure. A facility that serves both civilian and military purposes does not automatically become a lawful military objective. The principles of proportionality and precautions in attack continue to apply. Even where an object is a legitimate military objective, an attack may remain unlawful if the expected incidental civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage, or if feasible precautions have not been taken.

This is where the geography of modern conflict becomes legally complicated.

A supply chain may begin in one country, pass through another and eventually support military operations thousands of kilometres away. But international law does not necessarily allow a state to follow that supply chain wherever it leads and treat every state, vessel or facility connected to it as part of the conflict.

The distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is therefore essential. The law governing whether a state may lawfully use force against another state is different from the law governing how force may be used once an armed conflict exists.

This means that even if a particular Iranian vessel were found to be contributing to Russia’s military operations, that would not automatically establish a general Ukrainian right to attack Iran as a state. The legality of an attack against a specific object under international humanitarian law must not be confused with the legality of using force against the territorial integrity of another state under the UN Charter.

The same legal standards should also apply consistently to all states. If Iranian military support for Russia is scrutinised under international law, then other forms of external military assistance must be assessed according to the same principles. The credibility of international law depends on its consistent application, regardless of political alliances.

The Caspian Sea therefore illustrates a broader transformation in modern warfare. Conflicts are increasingly sustained through international networks of weapons, technology, intelligence, logistics and maritime transport. The battlefield is no longer necessarily defined by the physical location of troops.

Yet the legal consequences of war do not automatically travel along every supply route.

The real challenge for international law is to determine where the boundaries lie. When does military assistance become participation? When does assistance create state responsibility? When does a supply vessel become a military objective? And when does an attack on a specific military object cross the separate legal threshold for the use of force against another state?

These questions will become increasingly important as conflicts become more interconnected. The Caspian Sea may be one of the places where these legal boundaries are tested, but the underlying problem is global.

The future of international humanitarian law will depend not only on how it regulates the battlefield, but also on how it responds to the complex networks that sustain modern warfare. The challenge is to ensure that the expansion of a conflict’s geography does not become an automatic expansion of the legal permission to use force.

  About the Author

Ayesha Asim is a legal academic, legal analyst, and PhD scholar in law. She holds an LLM in International Law (Gold Medal) and has experience in legal research, teaching, and advisory work. Her interests include international law, humanitarian issues, and other contemporary legal challenges. You can reach her at ayeshamalyc09@gmail.com

Freedom of Speech, Where the Border Starts and Where It Ends   

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Freedom of Speech, Where the Border Starts and Where It Ends   

Interview with Suleyman Aslami

By Aleksandra Osina, Charahja van Broekhoven, Taeyun Kim, Longrui Deng, Peace Ojoma Idoko, Ayat Alkhdour, Lauren van Laarhoven-Hargreaves.

Facts Over Fear: Suleyman Aslami on Free Speech in the Digital Age

Freedom of speech remains one of the cornerstones of democratic societies. Yet in an age of artificial intelligence, social media, and rapidly spreading misinformation, protecting this right has become increasingly complex. According to Dutch politician Suleyman Aslami (D66), safeguarding free speech today means not only defending the right to speak, but also ensuring that public debate is grounded in facts and political responsibility, not just defending the right to speak.

Having grown up alongside the rise of the internet, Aslami has watched digital platforms transform political communication. “The same systems that amplify participation also amplify outrage,” he says, “and those aren’t always the same thing as democratic debate.”

Asked about the greatest threats to free speech, Aslami points to two very different realities. The first is found in authoritarian states, where governments silence dissent and restrict basic freedoms. Drawing on his experience at the Dutch Embassy in Cuba, he recalls how citizens were prevented from expressing their opinions freely.

The second threat exists within democratic societies themselves. Rather than direct censorship, Aslami warns of misinformation amplified by social media platforms and the growing influence of algorithms on public opinion.

He cites the Dutch childcare benefits scandal, where an algorithm meant to detect welfare fraud disproportionately targeted families with migrant backgrounds, wrongly accusing thousands of innocent parents.

“You can compensate people financially,” he says, “but you cannot fully compensate for years of suspicion and broken trust in government. The real question is not how to fix the algorithm, but whether it should have been used at all.”

That question is one Aslami has worked on directly. As Chief of Staff to a D66 Member of the European Parliament, he was closely involved in working on the EU AI Act, working on transparency obligations for high-risk automated systems. He now brings that experience to Amsterdam’s city council.

For Aslami, responsible political communication begins with a simple principle: facts matter. He rejects the idea of “alternative facts” and insists that politicians must base public debate on evidence and science based facts. “Politicians have a louder microphone than most citizens,” he says. “With that comes a responsibility not to distort the facts just because it’s convenient.”

At the same time, Aslami stresses that responsibility should never become censorship. Democracies must remain open to difficult discussions on migration, inequality and social tensions. The line is crossed when speech promotes hatred, discrimination or violence.

Aslami welcomes European efforts, such as the EU AI Act to improve transparency and platform accountability while emphasising digital literacy. His message is clear: democracy depends not only on protecting free speech but on choosing facts over fear. In a political climate that often rewards outrage over substance, responsible speech remains essential to keeping democracy strong.

About the authors:

Aleksandra Osina, Charahja van Broekhoven, Taeyun Kim, Longrui Deng, Peace Ojoma Idoko, Ayat Alkhdour, Lauren van Laarhoven-Hargreaves are participants in the Bright Future Foundation, as part of the European Union’s “Participate & Promote Democracy” Youth Participation project, in cooperation with Diplomat Magazine, Embassy of the Netherlands in Armenia and young members of the Armenian partner organization Promising Youth.

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