COLOMBO SECURITY CONCLAVE — Three officers of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces are participating in a specialised Counter-Terrorism and Hostage Rescue Course in India, conducted under the framework of the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) from 21 September 2026.
The course forms part of the CSC’s efforts to strengthen regional cooperation, capacity building and operational interoperability among its Member States in addressing shared security challenges in the Indian Ocean region.
The training provides participating officers with exposure to established procedures, operational concepts and best practices in counter-terrorism and hostage rescue. It also offers an opportunity for officers from CSC Member States to exchange professional experiences and strengthen institutional and professional links.
Sri Lanka’s participation reflects its continued engagement with the objectives of the Colombo Security Conclave, including practical cooperation in maritime safety and security, countering terrorism and radicalisation, combating trafficking and transnational organised crime, cyber security, the protection of critical infrastructure and technology, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
The participation of Sri Lankan Armed Forces personnel contributes to greater mutual understanding and professional cooperation among the security forces of CSC Member States, supporting collective capacity to address emerging security challenges and promote a secure, stable and peaceful Indian Ocean region.
The Colombo Security Conclave comprises India, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Mauritius as Member States, with Bangladesh and Seychelles as Observers. It serves as a regional platform for practical cooperation and capacity building on shared security concerns in the Indian Ocean region.
THE HAGUE — On Saturday 5 September, the Lange Voorhout once again became one of the most international places in The Hague as the Embassy Festival 2026 brought together the cultures, traditions, music, food and stories of 47 countries.
From noon until 8 pm, thousands of visitors travelled around the world without leaving the city centre. The annual festival, now in its 14th edition, offered a free day of cultural discovery, with two stages, an extensive International Market and a renewed Activity Passport inviting visitors to explore the many participating countries.
Embassy Festival 2026
Music and dance from around the world
The festival programme reflected the extraordinary variety of cultures represented in The Hague. At the Harmony Hub, audiences encountered everything from Aruban bossa nova and Estonian jazz to Mexican troubadour music, Ukrainian a cappella singing, Romanian panflute and the powerful sound of Japanese taiko drums performed by Circle Percussion.
The Folk in Motion Stage continued the journey with Moroccan Gnawa, Georgian sword dance, Chilean cueca, Ukrainian folklore, West African djembé, Bolivian Tinku, Kosovo-Albanian dance and K-pop. Traditional music and dance from Oman and the Dominican Republic brought the programme towards its lively conclusion.
A special feature was The Embassy Sessions, in which The Hague-based band Yellofox opened its folk repertoire to musicians from different traditions, creating an informal musical exchange between cultures.
Dominican Republic coffee at the Embassy Festival 14th edition. The Hague.
A world of flavours and traditions
The International Market remained at the heart of the festival. Embassy pavilions, restaurants and cultural organisations welcomed visitors with food, crafts, demonstrations and stories.
Georgian wine and the tradition of the supra, Ghanaian Kente and Fugu, Qatar’s pearl-diving heritage, Slovenian honey and sparkling wine, Omani hospitality, Tunisian metalwork, Ukrainian vybiika printmaking, Yemeni silver, Ecuadorian toquilla hats, Filipino street food, Korean language and food culture and Mexican salsas were among the many experiences offered along the Lange Voorhout.
The diversity extended beyond the market stalls. Visitors could learn about traditions, try new foods, meet members of international communities and discover cultural practices presented directly by the countries themselves.
A passport to the world
The renewed Activity Passport added an interactive dimension to the festival. With 39 numbered stops, visitors could choose their own route and collect stamps while learning, tasting and taking part in activities.
Among the experiences were learning the Serbian Kolo, joining an Angolan Batuque workshop, trying Japanese kendama or origami, making a Ukrainian vybiika bookmark, tasting Mexican salsas, discovering the difference between jasmine and glutinous rice at the Embassy of Laos and writing one’s name in Korean Hangeul.
The passport turned the festival into more than a programme of performances: visitors became active participants in their own cultural journey.
The Hague celebrates its international character
The strong turnout and lively atmosphere once again demonstrated the appeal of an event that places international culture at the centre of public life in The Hague. Local reporting described the Lange Voorhout as busy throughout the day, with performances, international food stands and country pavilions creating a relaxed meeting place for cultures from around the world. (070online)
The Embassy Festival has become a distinctive feature of The Hague’s cultural calendar, reflecting the city’s international community while opening that world to residents and visitors alike.
For one September day, the Lange Voorhout offered a simple invitation: discover the world, meet its people and experience its cultures — all in the heart of The Hague.
Winter wonderland, exceptional objects at Hotel Des Indes
THE HAGUE — The Salon returns to Hotel Des Indes from 3 to 6 December 2026 for its third edition. Around 40 carefully selected exhibitors from the Netherlands and abroad will present jewellery, art, vintage pieces, decorative objects and fine furniture. A programme of talks, together with opportunities for emerging makers, will invite visitors to look beyond the objects themselves and discover the craftsmanship, histories and ideas behind them.
For The Salon’s founder, Nadia Simak, the fascination began early. An old piece of furniture could capture her attention as readily as an unusual book or a work of art. Who had made it? Where had it come from? What could it reveal about another time or its previous owner?
The Summer Salon, June 2026 at Hotel Des Indes. Photo Alina Krasieva.
A Personal Curiosity
She later recognised this same curiosity in the writings of philosopher Roger Scruton and art critic John Berger. Their work gave expression to something she had long felt: noticing and appreciating beauty requires attention.
The Salon grew from this belief. Inspired by the salons of the nineteenth century, Simak created a place where makers, collectors and specialists could meet, exchange knowledge and share stories that might otherwise remain untold.
“Some people have knowledge and true passion for their craft accumulated over many years that you simply cannot find in a book. I want The Salon to give them a place to share it and pass on their fascination to those eager to receive it. If we do not pass that knowledge on, we risk losing it. And that would be such a shame.”
— Nadia Simak, founder of The Salon
Martijn Akkerman – book signing. The Summer Salon, June 2026 at Hotel Des Indes. Photo Alina Krasieva
A Considered Selection
Exhibitors from the Netherlands, Italy, France, Spain and Belgium will be among those participating in The Winter Salon. Participation is by invitation, with selection based on authenticity, cultural significance, originality and craftsmanship.
Historical and contemporary pieces will be presented alongside one another, bringing different disciplines and generations into conversation. For Simak, these encounters are central to The Salon: they allow visitors to look beyond an object’s appearance and learn from those who have made, studied or collected it.
Artisan rings by Sluis Juwelen at The Summer Salon, June 2026. Hotel Des Indes. Photo Tom Brown
Knowledge Worth Sharing
The talks programme explores jewellery through its history, influences and human connections. Jewellery historian Kim van Zweeden will present Weird and Wonderful Jewellery, while Martijn Akkerman will speak on Juwelen & Mensen (Jewels & People). Belgian jewellery historian Céline Rose David will examine India’s influence on European jewellery in From Maharajas to Maisons, and Julia Bocanet will present Forgotten Jewels.
For each talk, The Salon will reserve a number of places for students in relevant fields, giving a new generation access to specialist knowledge.
Lecture by Alexandre Vassiliev Foundation at The Summer Salon, June 2026 at Hotel Des Indes. Photo Alina Krasieva
When Beauty Serves a Purpose
The Winter Salon opens on Thursday, 3 December, with the Opening Fellows’ Dinner and a charity auction. Each exhibitor will contribute two special pieces, some created especially for the occasion and others selected from their own collections.
A Winter Wonderland at Hotel Des Indes
For its December edition, the historic rooms of Hotel Des Indes will take on a festive character. An enchanted forest, complemented by touches of real gold and gemstones, will provide the setting for The Winter Salon, adding a touch of seasonal magic to the hotel’s grand interiors.
The Embassy of Indonesia in The Hague celebrated the 81st anniversary of the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence with a vibrant series of activities. These included hoisting the national flag, singing the national anthem, and an impressive reenactment of the independence proclamation, which is a must-see!
The festivities culminated in a Diplomatic Reception at the residence of the Ambassador, Wisma Duta, on 4 September 2026.
In his inaugural Independence Day observation, H.E. Ambassador Mr. L. Amrih Jinangkung addressed several hundred well-wishers who came to congratulate him, participate in the grand celebration, and enjoy Indonesian cuisine with all the traditional trimmings. Through the concept of Gastro-diplomacy, Indonesia seeks to share its cultural heritage, economic potential, and much more.
81st Anniversary of Indonesia Independence. Official Residence of the Ambassador of Indonesia. The Hague 2026.
In his speech, the Ambassador highlighted a promising example of the bilateral relationship: Project Beethoven, which aims to develop talent, research, and innovation in the semiconductor industry.
The Netherlands is an important partner for Indonesia in Europe, while Indonesia is an increasingly vital partner for the Netherlands in ASEAN.
“Indonesia Berdaulat, Adil, dan Makmur,” translates to “A Sovereign, Just, and Prosperous Indonesia”, is the theme for the 81st anniversary of the Independence of the Republic of Indonesia.
“Our journey as a nation has never been simple. It has required resilience, reform, and a constant effort to turn diversity into strength while preserving our national unity,” remarked Ambassador Jinangkung in his welcome address.
“As a diplomat, I am privileged to serve once again in the Netherlands with a mandate to nurture and strengthen our bilateral relationship in the interest of both nations’ aspirations.
This evening, I am particularly honored to cordially welcome our Guest of Honor, H.E. Ms. Dianne Letschert, Minister of Education, Culture, and Science. Minister, thank you for joining us. Your presence tonight reflects the diverse and multifaceted nature of the Indonesia-Netherlands relationship, particularly our longstanding cooperation in education, culture, and science. In her uplifting remarks, she expressed her excitement about the strong friendship between Indonesia and the Netherlands and her hope for deeper connections in politics, economics, and culture.
She highlighted our shared history and emphasized the importance of the 2013 Joint Declaration on a Comprehensive Partnership Agreement, signed by our former leaders, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Prime Minister Mark Rutte. This agreement has fostered increased collaboration among our governments, businesses, universities, and citizens, marking an inspiring moment for our partnership.
H.E. Ambassador Mr. L. Amrih Jinangkung, Ambassador of Indonesia.
The forthcoming Indonesia–European Union Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement will provide new momentum for our economic collaboration. The Embassy of Indonesia in The Hague is ready to facilitate and support initiatives from government, businesses, universities, and other stakeholders that can further strengthen the relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands.
I want to take a moment to thank each and every one of you for being here with us this evening! Your friendship, support, and collaboration mean so much as we work together to strengthen the bond between Indonesia and the Netherlands.
Tonight, we’re not just celebrating 81 amazing years of Indonesia’s independence; we’re also honoring the wonderful relationship we’ve built together.
Let’s continue to join forces and create an even brighter future for our partnership and the generations to come!
Rebuilding the migration relationship between Morocco and the European Union
By Dr Hakima Elhaite and Dr Anis H. Bajrektarevic
A policy paper inspired by the work of Dr Anis H. Bajrektarevic on the “Diaspora Hedge Fund”
Irregular migration between Morocco and the European Union is not a problem that can be solved through deterrence, nor through a single financial instrument. We propose here the creation of a Diaspora Fund for Moroccans Abroad (MDM), in an operational version adapted to the Moroccan context, inspired by the foundational work of Dr Anis H. Bajrektarevic on the “Diaspora Hedge Fund” concept, itself rooted in his work at the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in Vienna in the 1990s. This proposal starts from a shared observation: migration must be understood as a movement of capital, knowledge and opportunity, as much as of people. But it can only bear fruit if it addresses a deeper misalignment between three agendas that, today, largely ignore one another: the prospects of Morocco’s youth, the Kingdom’s strategic interests, and Europe’s economic and security needs. As long as these three agendas fail to converge in a shared framework, every migration agreement, including a diaspora fund, will remain fragile, reversible, and hostage to the next diplomatic dispute.
I. Rethinking the diagnosis: why previous approaches have failed
Euro-Moroccan migration policy has long favoured a security-first approach. Between 2001 and 2019, the EU allocated at least €215 million to Morocco for border security projects¹. This spending has since accelerated: an additional €140 million in 2018 alone, including €55 million for the Border Management Programme for the Maghreb region, of which €30 million went to Morocco, with the Ministry of the Interior as the main beneficiary², followed by €222 million committed between 2021 and 2024, and a further €190 million planned by the end of 2027³. In total, Morocco is expected to have received more than one billion euros in European and Spanish funding for border control by 2027⁴. This approach treats the symptom rather than the cause, and feeds a tension that Rabat has voiced publicly: as early as 2018, Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita rejected the idea that Morocco should act as Europe’s outsourced border guard, a position he reaffirmed during the 2021 Ceuta crisis⁵.
Meanwhile, conventional development programmes have too often neglected geographic targeting and local governance. The clearest symptom of this underinvestment is that King Mohammed VI himself noted that diaspora investment accounts for only 10% of national private investment, a level he called unacceptable⁶, even as remittances exceeded $11.7 billion in 2024, or more than 8% of Morocco’s GDP⁷. The idea that these flows are captured by urban networks already close to the central government is plausible and well documented in the broader development literature, but at this stage it remains a qualitative hypothesis rather than a measured fact for the Moroccan case. It deserves to be verified region by region before being presented as an established finding.
Both approaches share the same flaw: they ignore the geopolitical dimension of the issue. Ceuta has seen two major crises in recent years. In May 2021, around 10,000 people crossed the border within 48 hours, amid diplomatic tension over Spain’s decision to admit Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali for medical treatment. More recently, on 30 and 31 July 2026, the day of Throne Day, a far larger wave occurred: between 60,000 and 80,000 people according to various sources, with a heavy and evolving human toll. Early counts from Reuters and the Associated Press put the death toll at 34 to 41, while later estimates put it at more than 111.
This second crisis illustrates why it would be a mistake to look for a single culprit: it unfolded against a backdrop of shared responsibility and tangled institutional, diplomatic and socio-economic factors on both sides of the border, discussed in detail in section I.1. This does not change the underlying conclusion: a migration agreement that fails to acknowledge the geopolitical and structural dimension of these episodes remains a house of cards, ready to collapse at the next crisis.
I.1, What the official responses reveal: shared responsibility
A review of government statements and international press coverage of the July 2026 crisis reveals a picture shaped by multiple factors, one that would be misleading to pin on a single actor. On the Spanish side, several institutional elements contributed to the vulnerability of the situation: a Supreme Court ruling of 8 July 2026, whose interpretation was distorted and spread through disinformation and human trafficking networks; an extraordinary regularisation drive, with more than one million applications filed by the end of June 2026, which heightened the perceived appeal of Spain; and, according to a Euronews investigation, intelligence warnings received before the crisis whose handling by the Spanish government remains disputed.
Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez himself chose to rule out any deliberate Moroccan involvement, stating that this crisis could only be resolved through cooperation, not through distrust of Morocco, and attributing the episode to disinformation and criminal networks rather than to a decision by Moroccan authorities.
Some media outlets and analysts noted that the episode followed, by ten days, Pedro Sánchez’s official visit to Algiers as part of the normalisation of Spanish, Algerian relations, a coincidence of timing that several commentators considered significant given the precedent of 2021, although no evidence has formally established a causal link. On the Moroccan side, officials and observers instead described authorities as overwhelmed by events, with the surge fuelled by viral social media rumours falsely claiming that Spain would not systematically return people who arrived by sea. A later report by the Spanish police unit CENIF did note a Moroccan deployment noticeably lighter than usual, which, in its own words, went beyond what the security mobilisation for Throne Day would explain. However, the Spanish Interior Ministry itself declined to draw a definitive conclusion, publicly stating that the mastermind behind the surge remained unknown at that stage.
Taken together, these elements point to a crisis of overlapping responsibilities rather than a single cause: a Spanish court ruling whose effects were poorly anticipated, a migratory pull effect reinforced by Spain’s own immigration policy, criminal networks that exploited the confusion, a possible and disputed lapse in Moroccan border security whose scale and intent remain unclear, and, underlying it all, the structural socio-economic causes detailed in section II. None of the parties involved, Spanish, Moroccan or European, can alone account for the scale of this episode, which is precisely the argument for the shared governance architecture proposed in this article rather than for assigning unilateral blame.
On the Moroccan side, the first official statement, issued in early August 2026, was described by the Moroccan press itself as a carefully calibrated communication exercise designed to protect the State’s image: it emphasised social media disinformation and the role of smuggling networks, and reaffirmed Morocco as a reliable and committed partner in the fight against irregular migration, without a single mention of unemployment, social hardship or the domestic economic climate. This silence is not incidental: it reflects a blind spot shared by official communications on both sides, Moroccan and Spanish alike, which both favoured institutional and security explanations over the deeper socio-economic causes that this article seeks to place at the centre of the analysis.
On the European side, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described the images as unacceptable, expressed her full support for Spain, and proposed strengthening financial and technical support to Morocco for border management, confirming the funding trajectory already described above. But the crisis also exposed a rift among member states: 22 countries, led by Italy and Denmark, called for an emergency meeting of interior ministers, while Sánchez accused some partners of an asymmetric response to the solidarity Spain expected. Ceuta thus became the first real test of the EU’s new Pact on Migration and Asylum, a test that exposed the limits of European coordination as much as those of bilateral border management.
II. Solving the problem facing Morocco’s youth without relying solely on diaspora capital
It must be said plainly: Morocco is neither a country at war, nor in a state of internal political instability, nor struck by a major economic or humanitarian catastrophe. This distinction still holds even after the tragedy of Ceuta in July 2026: the severity of that episode’s human toll, at least several dozen deaths, possibly more than a hundred according to the most recent estimates, reflects a one off and dramatic migration event shaped by shared responsibility among several actors (see section I.1), not the collapse of the state or an armed conflict on Moroccan territory. Unlike the departure dynamics seen in Syria, Libya or the Sahel, Moroccan migration is not structurally a flight from violence or state collapse. It is a migration of aspiration, driven by a stable, educated and globally connected youth confronted with a labour market that cannot absorb them at the level they expect.
This distinction changes everything: it means the underlying problem is not securing a fragile country, but making better use of a stable one, even though isolated episodes such as July 2026 remind us that a lack of prospects can, under certain circumstances and combined with institutional factors on both sides of the border, produce mass movements with human consequences as severe as those seen in more classic crisis settings. Figures from Morocco’s High Commission for Planning (HCP) illustrate this clearly: while the national unemployment rate stood at 13% in 2025, it reached 38.4% among people aged 15 to 24 and 25.7% among university graduates⁸, a structural gap between education and opportunity within an otherwise stable context, not a matter of survival or security. A credible retention policy must therefore act on four levers at once:
Geographically targeting productive investment on the actual areas of emigration, the Rif, Al Hoceima, Nador, the South East, rather than concentrating it, as is too often the case, on the Casablanca, Tangier, Rabat corridor.
Building industrial and technology hubs that meet the real needs of the Moroccan economy, rather than showcase projects designed to satisfy the metrics of international donors.
Mobilising the diaspora as a channel for skills and mentorship, through temporary return programmes for professionals, as a complement, never a substitute, for financial investment.
Reforming the link between training and employment: Morocco’s problem is not only quantitative, the number of jobs, but qualitative, the mismatch between the qualifications produced and the needs of the market.
Only by demonstrating real, local change, a factory opening, a skilled job created, a young engineer choosing to stay, will the language of capitalising migration stop being a diplomatic formula and become a lived reality.
III. Safeguarding Morocco’s strategic interests: a condition for sustainability
No migration agreement will survive the next crisis unless it explicitly recognises that Moroccan cooperation on border management carries geopolitical, not merely operational, value. Three principles should structure this recognition:
A permanent strategic dialogue between Rabat, Madrid and Brussels, rather than a reactive dialogue convened only after each crisis, one that explicitly includes sensitive political issues, foremost among them Western Sahara.
Shared governance of the migration and development framework, in which Morocco has a genuine voice, rather than the role of a paid contractor providing a border control service.
European diplomatic coherence: positions taken by individual member states on sensitive issues should not, on their own, be able to derail the entire cooperation framework.
It is precisely this disconnect, treating migration as a full geopolitical issue rather than a mere technical matter of flow management, that has been most lacking so far, and that explains the recurring fragility of past agreements.
IV. What Europe must contribute: beyond financing
Europe’s contribution can no longer be limited to one off budget envelopes. Three structural commitments are needed:
Reciprocal legal mobility, with structured work quotas, both seasonal and skilled, offering a credible and predictable alternative to irregular migration, along the lines of programmes already tested by Spain in agriculture.
A genuinely strengthened advanced status between the EU and Morocco, covering market access, research and education, and above all decoupled from the diplomatic ups and downs linked to Western Sahara.
Direct European investment in Morocco’s emigration regions, in partnership with local businesses, rather than funding channelled exclusively through multilateral donors far removed from the ground.
The benefit for Europe is clear: a lasting reduction in irregular migration pressure, a stable partner on its southern border, and access to a skilled workforce and a growing market, within a predictable framework rather than a cycle of migration based pressure tactics.
V. The Diaspora Fund for Moroccans Abroad (MDM): an operational proposal
The four preceding sections converge on a single conclusion: prevention requires regionally targeted productive investment (Part II), which can only be sustainable if Morocco’s strategic interests are recognised within the partnership framework (Part III), and Europe can no longer simply fund border control, it must invest directly in emigration areas (Part IV). One question remains open: through what concrete instrument should this investment be channelled, without repeating the pattern of one off, untargeted funding that has so far characterised conventional development aid? The proposal that follows answers this question.
We propose the creation of a Diaspora Fund for Moroccans Abroad (MDM), a financial and institutional framework designed to convert part of Moroccan diaspora capital into productive investment serving the regions of origin identified in Part II. This proposal belongs to a broader intellectual tradition, that of diaspora bonds already tested by Israel, Ethiopia and Nigeria, and more directly to the “Diaspora Hedge Fund” concept developed by Dr Anis H. Bajrektarevic, building on his work at ICMPD in Vienna in the 1990s. Our contribution is to translate this into an operational version specifically adapted to the Moroccan context, drawing on the lessons from the weaknesses of conventional development instruments already discussed in Part I.
The choice to mobilise this particular lever is not arbitrary: it responds directly to the financial diagnosis set out in Part I. The Euro-Mediterranean migration debate has largely been shaped by an economics of containment, border controls, coercive measures and the rising cost of managing irregular migration, a cost already set to exceed one billion euros by 2027. The experience of Ceuta is a powerful reminder that this logic treats symptoms more readily than causes. A more strategic approach must start with an economics of prevention: if substantial resources are already being mobilised to manage migration pressures, it makes more sense to invest a share of them upstream, in local development, socio-economic inclusion, entrepreneurship and opportunity in the regions migration comes from.
This points to a largely untapped resource already identified in Part I: diaspora capital, whose transfers exceeded $11.7 billion in 2024 but remain mostly directed toward household consumption, with only 10% going into domestic private investment. The challenge is not to divert remittances from their social purpose, but to create additional channels through which part of this transnational financial capacity can become productive, bankable and lasting investment. The MDM Fund we propose rests on three institutional pillars: sovereign guarantees from the Moroccan state, the involvement of multilateral development banks, and dedicated financial vehicles.
We situate this proposal within the broader ambition already set out in Parts III and IV: a renewed Euro-Mediterranean compact, in the spirit of the Marrakech Global Compact, shifting conventional border security subsidies toward high impact development partnerships, a process of capitalising migration that links diaspora, development and opportunity across the Mediterranean.
V.1, Operational version: four conditions for implementation in Morocco
For this framework to work without repeating the weaknesses of conventional development instruments, we propose building it, from the outset, on four operational principles:
Regionalisation: explicitly targeting the actual areas of departure, rather than the national territory as a whole, undifferentiated.
Local co-governance: involving credible actors on the ground, local authorities, cooperatives, regional business associations, rather than banks and central administration alone, to prevent the fund from being captured by already well connected elites.
Complementarity, not substitution: funding additional productive projects, without ever diverting existing remittances from their essential social role, education, health, family housing.
Diplomatic integration: making the fund one tool among others within the broader strategic partnership, rather than the sole showcase or political symbol of the migration file, which would otherwise place on it a burden no financial instrument alone can carry.
Designed this way, the MDM Fund stops being a simple transplant of a theoretical model and becomes a credible lever, tailored to the Moroccan context. Without these four conditions, it would remain an elegant financial tool disconnected from the real causes of departure and the real geopolitical balance of power.
VI. Conclusion: toward a partnership rather than a transaction
The measure of success for this approach is not the amount of capital mobilised, but the number of young Moroccans whose prospects have changed locally, without this requiring, at any point, a diplomatic concession wrung from Rabat under the pressure of a border crisis. Sustainability is measured by the structural alignment of interests, not by the repeated management of crises.
Morocco and Europe share, on this issue, more converging interests than their respective diplomatic postures admit. The question is not who needs the other more, but how to build a framework in which stability, regional development and strategic recognition stop being negotiated separately, and finally become the three pillars of a single structure.
Authors :
Hakima El Haite & Anis H. Bajrektarevic
Hakima El Haite is a Moroccan climate scientist, entrepreneur and politician. She is a former President of Liberal International and former Minister of Environment of Morocco.
Anis H. Bajrektarevic, professor of international law, author of 10 books. Co-founder of the Geneva-based Global Academy for Future Governance.
References
1. Statewatch, “Aid, border security and EU-Morocco cooperation on migration control,” 2019, €215 million between 2001 and 2019 for border security in Morocco.
2. Statewatch, ibid., €140 million committed in 2018, including €55 million for the Border Management Programme for the Maghreb (BMP-Maghreb), €30 million of which went to Morocco.
3. Euronews / European Commission, August 2026, €222 million committed between 2021 and 2024, with a further €190 million planned by the end of 2027.
4. Statewatch, October 2022, more than €1 billion in combined EU and Spanish funding for migration control in Morocco, projected through 2027.
5. Morocco World News, August 2026, statements by Nasser Bourita in 2018 and May 2021 rejecting the role of Europe’s “gendarme.”
6. Morocco World News, December 2024, statement by King Mohammed VI on the share of diaspora investment, 10% of national private investment.
7. Africanews / Morocco’s Foreign Exchange Office, 2026, Moroccan diaspora remittances of $11.7 billion in 2024, more than 8% of GDP.
8. Haut-Commissariat au Plan (HCP), “Activité, emploi et chômage,” 2024 to 2025 results, national unemployment 13%, unemployment among people aged 15 to 24 at 38.4%, unemployment among university graduates at 25.7%.
9. Bajrektarevic, Anis H., “Capitalising Migration: The Diaspora Hedge Fund as a New Governance Architecture for Cross-border Development and Migration Governance,” foundational work on the Diaspora Hedge Fund concept and the inspiration behind the MDM Fund proposal developed in this article.
10. Wikipedia (EN/FR), “2026 Ceuta migrant crisis”; Reuters, AP, El País, Euronews, France Info, The Conversation, July and August 2026, the Ceuta crisis of 30 and 31 July 2026: 60,000 to 80,000 entries, with a death toll of 34 to more than 111 depending on the source and the date of the count.
11. France 24, Le Temps, CNews, La Libre, 2 September 2026, report by Spain’s CENIF police unit describing a reduced Moroccan deployment and “permissiveness” during the crisis, and the public pushback against this reading from Spain’s Interior Ministry.
12. Maghreb Online / Maroc Mail, 3 and 4 August 2026, analysis of Morocco’s first official statement on the Ceuta crisis, noting the absence of any reference to unemployment or domestic socio-economic hardship.
13. CNBC Africa / Reuters, 3 August 2026, Ursula von der Leyen’s proposal to strengthen EU support for Morocco; Euronews, 1 August 2026, letter from 22 member states requesting an emergency meeting of EU interior ministers.
14. Le Devoir, Wikipedia (FR), Histoires Crépues, Zoom Algérie, Le JDD, July to September 2026, Pedro Sánchez’s visit to Algiers on 20 July 2026, his statements ruling out deliberate Moroccan involvement, Spain’s mass regularisation drive of more than 1 million applications, and intelligence warnings prior to the crisis according to Euronews.
In Russia, independent public life has either been crushed or brought under state control. In the current situation, the Russian diaspora is no longer merely a community of people living outside the country: it has become a space where free speech, independent institutions and discussion of Russia’s future are still possible. Andreas Umland – an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and an associate professor of political science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy – explains why a free Russia is linked, first and foremost, to the diaspora.
— You said that an independent Russia today exists primarily outside its borders. What has happened to the independent media, human rights organisations, the political opposition and culture within the country itself?
— In Russia, they have either been destroyed or reduced to mere window dressing. The authorities have systematically dismantled everything that might have existed autonomously: editorial offices, civil society organisations, independent platforms, political organisations and cultural institutions. Where some form of activity still formally persists, it exists under conditions of self-censorship and constant fear.
Russia’s true voice exists only abroad. It is only there that one can speak without state permission, publish what cannot be published within the country, and set up organisations without fearing that tomorrow one will be forced to fall silent.
— From you point of view, for a Russian why is freedom precisely related to leaving the country?
— All those who remain in Russia have been intimidated by the propaganda machine. They do not merely live under an authoritarian system, but within a state that claims control over their speech, their work, their family, their children’s education and even their perception of reality. Only by leaving do they become free. Outside Russia, they gain the opportunity to speak frankly, without weighing up every sentence against the threat of criminal prosecution. It is precisely these people who will build a new, free Russia. This is not a question of geography as such, but a question of liberation from Russian state coercion.
— The Russian authorities continue to hold elections and present them as an expression of the will of the people. But under these circumstances, can we really say that the elections genuinely ensure political representation for citizens?
—No. We do not believe in fair elections in Russia. The system has long since mapped out the outcome. It determines who has the right to participate, who shall be excluded, who is to be imprisoned, who shall be forced to leave, who shall have access to the media, and who is to be erased from the public sphere. Under such conditions, the ballot paper is not a tool for free choice — it becomes part of the scenery. And the people who live in Russia do not count: not because they do not exist, but because the regime has deprived them of the opportunity to be heard and to influence the outcome.
— You refer to Russians who have left the country as the ‘ambassadors of European Russia’. What do you mean by that?
—Those who have left are the bearers of a European-oriented Russia, and they are those whom will be in demand after a change of power. For the most part, they are educated people who had the possibility to leave: journalists, researchers, academics, lawyers, entrepreneurs, creative professionals and activists. These are people for whom freedom of speech, dignity, the rule of law, openness to the world, respect for facts and an aversion to war are second nature.
Their departure is their act of responsibility. They do not want to raise their children in a culture of war and lies. They do not want to perpetuate a society in which aggression is called patriotism and censorship is called the defence of the state. And the more people leave, the weaker the Kremlin becomes. The regime is losing its expertise, its independent voices and its future. Mass emigration is the only referendum they are capable of brining to life.
—Why do you believe emigration represents a political alternative to today’s Russia, rather than simply a community of people who have fled repression?
— Emigration is important not because people who found themselves abroad – for example, in Berlin, Vilnius or London – automatically understand Russia better, but because there they have something that merely exists within the country: the opportunity to act openly and to come together. Russian politicians, journalists, human rights defenders, experts and activists can set up media outlets and organisations, debate, seek allies, work with European institutions and develop alternative programmes — having no threat of criminal prosecution. Any independent organisation within Russia is vulnerable: it can be shut down, declared extremist or ‘undesirable’, thus deprived of funding, and its staff – and even its audience – intimidated.
That is why emigration is the only source of an alternative for Russia. And those are precisely the people that Europe must be ready to support — not out of charity, but because without them, a free Russia would simply lack both the human capital and the institutional foundations necessary for its revival.
The Hague, 16 September 2026 — The Trial Panel of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) today pronounced its judgment in the case of Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi, finding all four criminally responsible for war crimes committed during the Kosovo conflict.
The Panel found the four accused criminally responsible for arbitrary detention of 385 individuals, cruel treatment of 49 individuals, torture of 303 individuals and murder of 96 individuals.
The accused were found not guilty of crimes against humanity, as the Specialist Prosecutor failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. They were also acquitted in relation to a number of specific incidents of war crimes.
The Panel sentenced Hashim Thaçi to 25 years, Kadri Veseli to 18 years, Rexhep Selimi to 13 years and Jakup Krasniqi to 25 years of imprisonment, with credit for time already served.
The judges found that, during the conflict, the four men contributed to a common criminal purpose targeting perceived opponents of the Kosovo Liberation Army’s (KLA) political and military objectives. Those targeted included Kosovo Albanians associated with other political or military organisations, individuals alleged to have links to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or Serbian authorities, and members of ethnic minorities, including Roma and Serbs.
The Panel found that the targeting involved killings, arrests and detention without due process, physical and psychological mistreatment, intimidation and other forms of abuse. With limited exceptions, it found no evidence that the victims had engaged in criminal activity, actively participated in hostilities or posed another legitimate security concern to the KLA. Many were described, often without basis, as collaborators or spies.
The Panel also considered the lasting physical and psychological consequences suffered by victims and noted that some were particularly vulnerable because of their age or because they witnessed the mistreatment or killing of family members.
Individual Roles
Regarding Hashim Thaçi, the Panel found that as a member of the KLA General Staff and head of its Political Directorate, he was a key figure in formulating and implementing the common purpose, including establishing detention facilities, identifying perceived opponents and arranging their arrest and detention and, where necessary, their killing. The Panel also found that Thaçi personally participated in crimes, including the arrest, arbitrary detention and interrogation of 13 parliamentarians, as well as the arrest, detention, transfer and murder of Behajdin Allaqi.
For Kadri Veseli, head of the KLA Intelligence Directorate, the Panel found that his responsibilities included identifying, obtaining information about, monitoring and neutralising persons suspected of being collaborators. It also found that he was personally involved in identifying and targeting opponents, many of whom were subsequently murdered, and noted that intelligence used against many victims consisted largely of unverified rumours.
The Panel determined that Rexhep Selimi, although holding less authority over other KLA members than the other accused, failed to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law in his roles as a member of the General Staff, head of the Operational Directorate and inspector general. The Panel found that he tolerated serious violations and participated in the arrest and detention of 13 parliamentarians, among other contributions to the common criminal purpose.
Regarding Jakup Krasniqi, the Panel found that, as a member of the General Staff and Political Directorate, KLA spokesperson and deputy commander, he played a key role in formulating and implementing the policy of targeting opponents. The Panel concluded that his communiqués, political statements, speeches and orders encouraged or expressed tolerance for crimes against perceived opponents.
Witness Intimidation
The Trial Panel also highlighted the persistent climate of witness intimidation surrounding the proceedings. Several prosecution witnesses recanted earlier statements, changed their accounts or otherwise failed to provide consistent testimony. At the same time, the Panel recognised that most witnesses appeared before it with courage and determination, including several who testified despite intimidation and attempts to discourage them from doing so.
Presiding Judge Charles L. Smith III emphasised that the trial was not about the legitimacy of the KLA or its objective of an independent Kosovo, but about whether certain criminal means were used by members of the KLA in pursuit of those objectives. He also stressed that the proceedings did not concern crimes committed by Serbian forces and paramilitaries against Kosovo Albanians, but were limited to determining whether the crimes charged in the indictment had been committed and whether the accused bore criminal responsibility for them.
Kadri Veseli, in The Hague. 2018.
The Case
The indictment against the four accused was confirmed on 26 October 2020 and subsequently amended. Following their arrests, Thaçi, Veseli, Selimi and Krasniqi were transferred to the KSC detention facilities in The Hague on 4 and 5 November 2020.
The trial began on 3 April 2023. The Prosecution concluded its case in April 2025, followed by the presentation of the participating victims’ case and the Defence cases. Evidentiary proceedings closed on 19 December 2025, with closing statements held from 9 to 18 February 2026.
During the proceedings, the Trial Panel heard evidence from 273 witnesses and admitted 5,467 exhibits. It also took judicial notice of 1,017 adjudicated facts and 29 agreed facts, while the trial transcript reached more than 29,000 pages.
The judgment marks a major judicial development in the proceedings before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, established in The Hague to adjudicate alleged crimes arising from the Kosovo conflict.
Europe’s Security Imperative: Protecting Critical Infrastructure Without Undermining Regulatory Certainty
By M. De Lara
Cybersecurity and geopolitical security measures must not undermine regulatory certainty, technical standards, and investment confidence. When Geopolitics Enters Technical Rules: Europe Needs Security—and Must Preserve Certainty and Its Standards Advantage
Geopolitical tensions are increasingly reshaping global trade, technology and industrial cooperation. For the European Union, growing supply-chain dependencies, foreign interference and cyber threats have made the security of critical infrastructure a strategic priority. Europe therefore has legitimate reasons to strengthen its ability to identify and address risks that extend beyond the technical security of individual products and systems.
The challenge, however, is to ensure that stronger security measures do not come at the expense of the regulatory certainty that underpins the Single Market. In recent years, Member States have adopted different approaches to non-technical supply-chain risks and high-risk suppliers, creating the risk of fragmentation. The European Commission’s proposed revision of the Cybersecurity Act—CSA 2.0—in January 2026—seeks to address this through a common EU framework for trusted ICT supply chains.
Alongside strengthening ENISA and reforming the European Cybersecurity Certification Framework, the proposal adds a binding “trusted ICT supply chain framework”. This would bring factors such as third-country legislation, foreign influence, ownership and control structures into EU cybersecurity governance.
The regulatory question would therefore no longer be limited to whether a product is technically secure. It would also encompass whether a supplier is considered trustworthy from a geopolitical and institutional perspective.
That shift responds to genuine concerns. Critical infrastructure cannot be protected solely by addressing software vulnerabilities and product performance. Europe must also consider the risks of foreign interference, malicious control and systemic supply-chain dependency.
Yet security policy must answer more than one question. It must define the risks Europe seeks to prevent—but it must also allow European businesses to know whether the technologies they select, the equipment they purchase and the investments they make today will remain lawful, usable and valuable ten years from now.
The key question is therefore not whether Europe should strengthen security, but how it can do so while preserving the clarity, predictability and standards-based system on which long-term investment and the competitiveness of the Single Market depend
How would CSA 2.0 work?
CSA 2.0 would establish a common EU mechanism for assessing and mitigating ICT supply-chain risks.
The Commission, or a group of at least three Member States, could trigger a coordinated EU-level supply-chain security assessment. The Commission could subsequently designate “third countries posing cybersecurity concerns”, identify “key ICT assets” used across the 18 sectors covered by NIS2, and determine high-risk suppliers on the basis of factors including establishment, ownership and control.
The Commission could then require relevant entities to implement measures such as audits, restrictions on data transfers and contractual relationships, and supplier diversification. It could also prohibit the use of components from specified suppliers in key ICT assets and, in certain circumstances, require the phase-out of components already deployed. European Commission proposal for CSA 2.0
The objective is legitimate: to prevent fragmented national responses and build a more resilient Single Market. But the current design raises a fundamental concern:
The proposal creates a potentially powerful decision-making mechanism without providing businesses with equally clear decision-making standards
The greatest industrial risk is an inability to price the future
The proposal contains criteria for concepts such as “key ICT assets”, “significant cybersecurity risks” and “serious and structural non-technical risks”. Yet these criteria do not currently provide sufficiently granular or measurable thresholds for businesses operating across very different sectors.
Which components will ultimately be considered key? Which suppliers may face restrictions? What level of risk will trigger an audit, diversification requirement, procurement restriction or outright prohibition? Much of this would be determined later through risk assessments and implementing acts.
Consequently, even a product that complies with European technical standards and has obtained cybersecurity certification may not remain eligible for use in critical infrastructure. Market access could depend not only on the product’s technical characteristics, but also on its supplier’s ownership, the legal environment of its home country and an evolving geopolitical assessment.
The costliest regulatory burden is not the price of compliance. It is the inability to know whether compliance will still secure access to the market
Critical infrastructure is normally planned over ten- or twenty-year investment cycles. If companies cannot assess the long-term eligibility of suppliers, installed equipment or entire technology pathways, they will respond before any formal restriction is imposed. They may freeze procurement, shorten contracts, reduce research spending, redesign systems or relocate factories, data centres and R&D programmes to jurisdictions offering greater regulatory predictability.
Uncertainty itself creates a regulatory overhang. Corporate boards will avoid technologies that might be restricted in the future. Banks will price additional risk into financing. Insurers will reassess exposure, while smaller suppliers will follow the location decisions of major investors.
The eventual cost is not limited to replacing equipment. It includes stranded assets, factories that are never built, research centres that are located elsewhere, and the talent and supply-chain ecosystems that move with them.
Capital can absorb risk. It cannot price discretion whose boundaries continue to move
Annual business investment in the EU is roughly €2.4 trillion. An ECB study estimates that a typical economic policy uncertainty shock reduces euro-area business investment by around 1.2% at its trough, with the impact persisting for some time. This is not an estimate of the cost of CSA 2.0. It does, however, demonstrate that even a small uncertainty effect across 18 critical sectors could place tens of billions of euros of investment at risk. European Central Bank
Global evidence also shows how quickly investment reacts to geopolitical signals. IMF research finds that, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the number of announced FDI projects between geopolitically distant blocs has declined by roughly 20% relative to investment within the same bloc. Investment losses often occur before formal restrictions are adopted—and once an industrial ecosystem has been established elsewhere, attracting it back is difficult. International Monetary Fund
Nor does excluding suppliers automatically create new European capacity. In markets already characterised by a limited number of specialised vendors, exclusion may further concentrate supply, raise prices, reduce innovation and increase dependence on the remaining suppliers.
A policy designed to strengthen resilience may, if it reduces choice, competition and investment, remove one risk only to create a larger one
Standards are a foundation of Europe’s global competitiveness
Europe competes globally not only through the size of its Single Market, but through its ability to turn technical excellence into common rules.
Over several decades, common technical standards, certification and mutual recognition have helped build the Single Market. Through organisations such as ISO, IEC, ITU and ETSI, Europe has also shaped global industrial development. For European companies, early participation in standard-setting can create technological leadership, facilitate market access and support entire industrial ecosystems.
Standards may be Europe’s most successful invisible export
Studies cited by the European Commission have estimated the macroeconomic contribution of standardisation at around 0.8% in France and 1% in Germany. In Germany alone, standardisation has been estimated to generate annual economic benefits of up to €17 billion. European Commission material on the economic role of standards
The value of standards, however, cannot be measured only in direct economic gains. Their deeper value lies in the expectation they create: comparable risks should be subject to comparable requirements, and products meeting those requirements should receive broadly consistent treatment in the market.
The authority of a standard does not rest simply on the rule-maker’s power to demand compliance. It rests on the rule-maker’s willingness to be bound by the same rule
If products that comply with European standards and pass European certification can nevertheless be excluded through non-technical assessments whose boundaries are not clearly defined, technical compliance will no longer provide a predictable route to market.
Once compliance and market access become disconnected, standards cease to function as a common market passport. They risk becoming technical reference documents that can be overridden by political decisions at any time.
The consequences would extend well beyond individual suppliers. Companies would have less incentive to invest in shared standards and certification. Other regions would accelerate the development of their own standards, assurance regimes and supply-chain ecosystems. The global market could fragment into parallel technical systems that duplicate research, testing and certification while trusting one another less.
European exporters would face the same duplication abroad—and potentially reciprocal restrictions justified by other governments on geopolitical and national-security grounds.
A standard can be overridden by a single political decision. Rebuilding trust in the standards system may take a generation
When rule-makers begin to bypass the rules they have built, the first casualty is not a particular product or supplier. It is the credibility of the rules themselves. If Europe weakens technical standards to gain short-term political discretion, it risks consuming one of its most valuable—and least easily replicated—sources of global competitiveness.
Making security and certainty mutually reinforcing
CSA 2.0 does not need to disregard non-technical risk. It does, however, need clearer limits.
Technical assessment should come first, with non-technical factors serving as a complementary layer. Intervention should focus on the highest-risk scenarios capable of producing systemic consequences. A transparent risk-to-measure framework should distinguish between risks that justify monitoring, auditing or diversification and those exceptional cases that warrant prohibition or phase-out. Clear thresholds, proportionality requirements and realistic transition periods should provide businesses with the greatest possible degree of certainty.
Europe does not need unlimited security discretion. It needs a bounded security capacity capable of addressing the most serious risks with precision.
Geopolitical judgement may be necessary to manage exceptional cases. It should not replace technical rules as the normal basis of market governance. Europe must de-risk—but it must not de-rule.
If regulatory certainty and technical standards lose credibility, Europe will lose far more than individual investments or suppliers. It will weaken one of the deepest foundations of the Single Market—and one of the Union’s most valuable sources of influence and competitiveness in the global economy.
By adressing non-technical criteria in the CSA2 the cybersecurity act that originally was based on technical security standards, by design, can become a trade instrument. Whether this was intently or not is not relevant. It deviates significantly from its main objective, reinforcing Europe’s cybersecurity.
Mexico’s national celebrations also reached The Hague, where the Embassy of Mexico hosted a diplomatic reception marking the 216th Anniversary of the Independence of Mexico and El Grito de Dolores. The occasion also provided an opportunity to welcome Mexico’s newly arrived Ambassador to the Netherlands, H.E. Alicia Buenrostro Massieu, who presented her Letters of Credence to H.M. King Willem-Alexander on 2 September.
Held at the official residence of Mexico in Wassenaar, the reception brought together a large gathering of ambassadors and heads of mission, senior representatives of international organisations and institutions, judges of international courts, renowned academics, members of the diplomatic community and many Mexicans living in the Netherlands.
For Ambassador Buenrostro Massieu, the celebration had a particular significance as one of her first opportunities to welcome the Netherlands-based diplomatic and international community since taking up her post.
“This occasion is particularly special for me. I have only recently arrived in the Netherlands, and this is one of my first opportunities to welcome so many friends and partners of Mexico under one roof,” she said.
She spoke of her enthusiasm for beginning her assignment and of the responsibility that comes with representing Mexico in the Netherlands.
“I come with great enthusiasm and a clear sense of purpose. Every ambassador has the privilege and the responsibility of building on the work of those who came before us, strengthening existing ties, identifying new opportunities and creating new bridges between our societies. And that is precisely what I intend to do: to listen, to engage and, of course, to promote Mexico and keep on growing together.”
H.E.Ms. Sally Loo Hui, Ambassador of Panama, H.E. Ms. Gracita R. Arrindel, Ministry Plenipotentiary of Sint Maarten and H.E. Ms. Sahar Ghanem, Ambassador of Yemen and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps.
Mexico and the Netherlands: complementary strengths
The Ambassador highlighted the long-standing friendship between Mexico and the Netherlands and the opportunities offered by the complementary strengths of the two countries.
“Mexico and the Netherlands, two countries with a long-standing friendship and remarkably complementary strengths, have built a solid relationship based on dialogue, trade, investment, cultural exchange and, above all, mutual respect,” she said.
At the same time, she emphasised that there remains considerable potential to deepen the relationship, particularly at a moment when international cooperation is facing significant challenges.
“Our countries share a strong commitment to multilateralism and to the principles that sustain the international system: democracy, the rule of law, respect for international law and gender equality. We also share the conviction that dialogue, cooperation and common rules remain indispensable to addressing global challenges.”
H.E. Ms. Tomoko Akane, President of the International Criminal Court (ICC), H.E. Mr. Rokuichiro Michii, Ambassador of Japan and H.E. Mrs. Eva Yelina Silva Walker , Ambassador of Cuba.
Addressing the wider international context, Ambassador Buenrostro Massieu called for renewed commitment to multilateral cooperation.
“At a time when these principles are increasingly tested, countries such as ours have a responsibility to work together in their defence,” she stated. “We need to work together on a constructive and efficient multilateralism, one that dignifies, one that respects, that listens and stands on moral values and cares for solidarity and prosperity.”
She also reflected on the importance of the international institutions and rules developed over generations, noting that, despite their imperfections, they have provided an important framework for international cooperation and peaceful coexistence.
H.E. Mr. Shahir Khalid A Al Khaniny, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia and H.E. Mr. Marcin Czepelak, Secretary General · Permanent Court of Arbitration.
New opportunities for cooperation
Looking towards the future, the Ambassador pointed to the transformation taking place in areas ranging from artificial intelligence and emerging technologies to climate change, water management, energy and global value chains.
“Artificial Intelligence and emerging technologies are transforming our society. Climate change is forcing us to rethink how we manage water and energy. Global value chains are being reshaped, creating both opportunities and new dependencies.”
In this changing environment, she sees considerable scope for Mexico and the Netherlands to combine their expertise.
“Mexico and the Netherlands can combine their experience and capabilities to develop solutions that embrace innovation, while remaining grounded in international cooperation and the values we share,” she said.
The economic relationship was also highlighted as an important area for further development. The modernisation of the agreement between Mexico and the European Union, she noted, presents opportunities for increased trade and investment, with potential cooperation in areas including water management, semiconductors and advanced technologies, sustainable agriculture, energy and innovation.
H.E. Dr. Alvaro Gonzalez Otero, Ambassador of Uruguay, H.E. Mrs. Ann Derwin, Ambassador of Ireland and the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, H.E. Ms Sahar Ghanem, Ambassador of Yemen.
Yet the Ambassador stressed that bilateral relations extend far beyond government and economic ties.
“Our relationship is, of course, about much more than governments and economies. It is lived every day by entrepreneurs who invest and create jobs, researchers and universities that exchange knowledge, artists and students who bring our cultures closer together, and all those who create connections between our societies.”
She expressed her intention to travel across the Netherlands, meet different communities and listen to ideas, while inviting Dutch partners to discover Mexico as a country offering opportunities, talent and creativity.
“As Mexico’s Ambassador, I want to meet these communities, travel across the Netherlands, listen to ideas and identify where Mexico can be a partner. And I invite all of you to look at Mexico in the same spirit: as a country of opportunities, talent, creativity, friendship and a great future.”
Corinne Suzanne Cicéron Bühler, Ambassador of Switzerland and H.E. Nicole Shampaine, U.S. Ambassador to OPCW.
A Mexican evening
Following the national anthems and the Ambassador’s address, introduced by Desirée Colomé of the Department of Economic Affairs & Press Attaché, the formal part of the evening gave way to a celebration of Mexican culture and hospitality.
Traditional Mexican dishes were served to guests, while live marimba and guitar music duo from Chiapas brought the sounds of Mexico into the garden of the residence. Songs from the Mexican repertoire added to the festive atmosphere, transforming the reception into a lively celebration of Mexican identity and tradition.
The event was particularly well attended, taking place at the beginning of the new diplomatic season following the summer period, when ambassadors, international officials and members of the diplomatic community return to The Hague.
Isabelle Wittoek, Minister Counsellor of Belgium and Stany Muhizi, Charge d’affairs of Burundi.
As Mexico celebrated its independence, Ambassador Buenrostro Massieu also looked towards the future of Mexico–Netherlands relations.
“Today, as we celebrate Mexico’s independence, we celebrate our history, our identity and the values that have shaped our nation. But we also look forward.”
She concluded by emphasising the strong foundation created by decades of bilateral relations and the responsibility of the present generation to build upon it.
“Our task now is to build upon it, to create new partnerships, address new challenges together and ensure that our friendship continues to deliver tangible benefits for our societies.”
The evening offered a warm introduction to Ambassador Alicia Buenrostro Massieu and her priorities for her tenure in the Netherlands, while bringing together the diplomatic and international community in The Hague to celebrate one of Mexico’s most important national traditions: El Grito de Dolores and the anniversary of Mexican Independence.
Ní neart go cur le chéile. Strength with unity. We are thrilled to announce Ireland’s presidency of the EU under the motto “Strength with unity.”
Ireland will be focusing on important themes like competitiveness, values, and security throughout the presidency. The presidency will wrap up on December 31, 2026, and then Lithuania will take the reins for the first half of 2027, from January to June
To celebrate this special occasion, the Embassy hosted a delightful diplomatic reception and an art exhibition called “Carrying the Songs.” This wonderful event featured nearly 300 paintings by talented artists from the Netherlands and across Ireland.
Special thanks went to Ms. Moya Cannon for sharing her beautiful poem, which has been instrumental in this project. The celebration at the Pulchri Studio on July 7, 2026, was truly memorable.
Carrying the songs’s exhibition. Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2026
Many members of the diplomatic community, including Ambassadors, representatives from international institutions, NGOs, the Irish diaspora in the Netherlands, and various other guests attended the celebrations. The 2026 stint however, is another fantastic opportunity to steer the EU forward, using our experience and a spirit of cooperation.
At the opening event H.E. Ambassador, Ann Derwin warmly welcomed everyone, saying, “I am delighted to welcome you all here for the Opening Event of the Irish Presidency of the Council of the EU at Pulchri Studio. Let’s make this an unforgettable journey together!”
The Ambassador went on to say:
“For the next six months, Ireland will be at the forefront of EU decision-making, leading essential negotiations that affect around 450 million people! It’s not our first time at the EU Presidency rodeo—Ireland has proudly stepped up to this role seven times before, often during exciting times of change. The 2026 term gives us another fantastic chance to guide the EU, drawing on our experience and commitment to working together.”
As Ambassador Ann Derwin enthusiastically shared in her opening remarks, “I am delighted to welcome you all here for the opening event of the Irish Presidency of the Council of the EU at Pulchri Studio. Since July 1, Ireland has had the honor of holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, and we’re thrilled to roll out an ambitious agenda. We’re focused on boosting the competitiveness of the EU economy, protecting our shared values both at home and abroad, and ensuring the safety of all our citizens.
Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2026 at Pulchri Studio.
You might have noticed that Ireland’s Presidency logo features a stunning spiral structure of galaxies, which was first spotted in Ireland back in the 1840s using the Great Telescope at Birr Castle. This beautiful spiral represents growth and suggests energy and movement—just like our goal to inspire positive change. And here’s a fun tidbit: the sketch of the spiral structure of the Whirlpool Nebula, created in the 1840s, is thought to have inspired Vincent van Gogh’s iconic painting, “The Starry Night.”
The motto, “Strength with unity,” perfectly captures the warm and inviting atmosphere at Pulchri Studio. It truly was a wonderful evening filled with joy and togetherness!
