Art is a Mirror of the Magnitude of Human Achievement

But also a Message of How Fragile Those Achievements Are

In the picture Dr. Sofija Bajrektarevic, Culture for peace to culture of peace (left); Reine Hirano, Artist (right).

The ‘From Culture for Peace to Culture of Peace’ (known also as the Culture for Peace – Unifying Potentials for the Future) Initiative was once again participating in the ‘Vienna Processes’ conference series program by wishing to emphasize the importance of cultural diplomacy in the processes of creating and maintaining dialogue and the well-being of society.

On the historic date of March 08th – International Women’s Day, a large number of international affairs specialists gathered for the second consecutive summit in Vienna, Austria. This leg of the Vienna Process event titled: “Europe – Future – Neighbourhood at 75: Disruptions Recalibration Continuity”. The conference, jointly organized by four different entities (the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies IFIMES, Media Platform Modern Diplomacy, Scientific Journal European Perspectives, and Action Platform Culture for Peace) with the support of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, was aimed at discussing the future of Europe and its neighbourhood in the wake of its old and new challenges.

This highly anticipated conference gathered over twenty high ranking speakers from three continents, and the viewers from Australia to Canada and from Chile to Far East. The day was filled by three panels focusing on the rethinking and revisiting Europe and its three equally important neighbourhoods: Euro-Med, Eastern and trans-Atlantic (or as the Romano Prodi’s EU Commission coined it back in 2000s – “from Morocco to Russia – everything but the institutions”); the socio-political and economic greening; as well as the legacy of WWII, Nuremberg Trials and Code, the European Human Rights Charter and their relevance in the 21st century.

The event was probably the largest gathering since the beginning of 2021 for this part of Europe.

For this occasion, the selected work of artist Alem Korkut is on the Conference poster. This artist work with the motto/message: ‘Sustainable Future – Quo Vadis?’ is a standing part of the Initiative project. This previously launched initiative refers to the visual arts and the engagement of artists in the field of ‘culture for peace and culture of peace’.

“Europe Future Neighborhood” Conference poster

In addition to the artistic visualization of the theme and message of the conference (same as it was a case with the first conference in the series ‘Vienna Process’), this Conference leg was closed in the big hall of the Austrian Diplomatic Academy with a well-chosen artistic musical performance.

This time, conference participants and attendees were able to listen to the selected parts of Suite No. 1 in G major for solo cello from J.S. Bach, performed by Japanese artist Reine Hirano. As a solo and chamber musician she performs in concert halls worldwide, including the Konzerthaus in Vienna and the Suntory Hall in Tokyo.

“Europe Future Neighborhood” Conference poster.

It was to emphasize the importance of culture, science and arts as essential binding and effective tool of cultural diplomacy. Utilized to support dialogue, these types of interventions of the Culture for Peace Unifying Potentials for the Future Platform already became a regular accompanying part of the ‘Vienna Process’, which makes it special – quite different from the usual conference forms of geopolitical, legal and economic contents.

Conclusively, art – indeed – is a mirror of the magnitude of human achievement, but also a message of how fragile those achievements are.

About the author:

Anastasiia Pachina

Anastasiia Pachina, Sociologist – Charles University, Prague. She is a Program manager – with the Culture for Peace Action Platform, and a marketing researcher in IPSOS CZ.

Vienna Process: Reinvigorating the Spirit of Helsinki for Mediterranean

On the historic date of March 08th – International Women’s Day, a large number of international affairs specialists gathered for the second consecutive summit in Vienna, Austria. This leg of the Vienna Process event titled: “Europe – Future – Neighbourhood at 75: Disruptions Recalibration Continuity”. The conference, jointly organized by four different entities (the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies IFIMES, Media Platform Modern Diplomacy, Scientific Journal European Perspectives, and Action Platform Culture for Peace) with the support of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, was aimed at discussing the future of Europe and its neighbourhood in the wake of its old and new challenges.

This highly anticipated conference gathered over twenty high ranking speakers from three continents, and the viewers from Australia to Canada and from Chile to Far East. The day was filled by three panels focusing on the rethinking and revisiting Europe and its three equally important neighbourhoods: Euro-Med, Eastern and trans-Atlantic (or as the Romano Prodi’s EU Commission coined it back in 2000s – “from Morocco to Russia – everything but the institutions”); the socio-political and economic greening; as well as the legacy of WWII, Nuremberg Trials and Code, the European Human Rights Charter and their relevance in the 21st century.

The event was probably the largest gathering since the beginning of 2021 for this part of Europe.

Along with the two acting State Presidents, the event was endorsed by the keynote of the EU Commissioner for European Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Excellency Olivér Várhelyi. The first, of the three-panel conference, was brilliantly conducted by the OSCE Sec-General (2011-2017), current IFIMES Euro-Med Director, Ambassador Lamberto Zannier. Among his speakers was Emiliano Alessandri, OSCE Senior External Co-operation Officer. Following lines are his contribution to this highly successful Vienna Process event.

Unfulfilled Mediterranean Visions

After the Cold War, it was widely believed that the unevenly developed, conflict-torn Mediterranean region could finally stabilize around a rapidly integrating Europe, the gap between the Southern and Northern economies reducing through greater access to the European common market, and a truly “Euro-Mediterranean” region emerging as a more coherent space in economic, security as well as human connections terms.

A decade later, after 9/11, the region was singled out again as an epicenter of global insecurity. The Euro-Mediterranean vision largely unfulfilled, the region’s dysfunctions came under renewed scrutiny. While most of them had obvious socio-economic roots, international attention focused almost exclusively on the spread of radical ideologies propounded by various groups advocating anti-modern, anti-Western agendas. Instead of articulating an inclusive and equitable model of socio-economic development, the defeat of terrorism took over the agenda. Repression was often prioritized over reform. 

Unleashing long-standing grievances, the ill-named and ill-fated Arab Spring of 2010-2011 was prematurely welcomed as a region-wide movement towards democracy, portending the demise of an alleged Arab “exception”. Attention focused once again on transnational groups and movements, signally a civically engaged youth defying the authoritarian order to demand greater social justice. As protest movements gradually subsided, leading to what many have perhaps too harshly defined as a new “Arab winter”, views of the region have turned markedly negative again. Although wholesale cynicism is misplaced, the present realities call for a correction of the overly optimistic visions that had prevailed after the Cold War.

A more interconnected but no less conflict-prone Mediterranean

For one, the Mediterranean appears less and less a coherent space. The region is for sure interconnected in economic, security as well as human terms. But growing interdependence between Europe and the Mediterranean on the one hand, and the Mediterranean and Africa on the other, has not translated into convergence, let alone triggered a drive towards integration. When connections have expanded, they are not necessarily of the positive kind. The region is currently linked up through its proliferating smuggling routes and fast-expanding organized crime networks. Euro-Mediterranean exchanges coalescing around education, production, and employment opportunities are catching up too slowly and unevenly.

Contrary to what Europeans had envisaged, moreover, the Mediterranean region is also less and less a European “neighborhood”– a role that would have never done full justice of the region’s inherent diversity, multi-layered cultural identity, and wide-ranging international connections and influences. Europe undoubtedly remains a strong reference for some countries – economically as well as culturally. But the region increasingly looks in other directions – towards both Asia and Africa. For their part, a number of resourceful non-Western regional actors are bent on exert a growing influence on local dynamics. With China investing heavily in the region (including with a view to post-pandemic recovery), Turkey and Russia playing key roles in regional conflicts, the Gulf States and Iran expanding their clout either directly or through proxies, the region increasingly is a global chessboard (a role it intermittently held throughout its complicated history) rather than a European “inland sea”.

Contrary to what many have argued, finally, the Mediterranean state system has proved unexpectedly resilient. The region is certainly fragmented and transnational groups continue to erode the fragile foundations of the existing order. The prospect of failed states remains very concrete and Libya is still characterized by divisive internal dynamics that create a dangerous vacuum of governance. But overall local regimes have recovered from the wave of protests of 2010-2011, either by adapting or fighting back. The region is now characterized as much by dysfunctional governance as by regime survivalism and renewed state assertiveness. Inter-state competition remains a key factor of regional instability, compounded with (rather than in alternative to) the challenge posed by terrorism and other transnational threats.

A Mediterranean dialogue fit for the new realities

Against this backdrop, Mediterranean regional dialogue is more important than ever, especially in the security realm. Yet, it is also elusive. Recent breakthroughs towards the normalization of Arab-Israeli relations testify to a possible revival of regional diplomacy. But region’s central conflict remains unsolved and no illusion should be entertained about it being liquidated by the emergence of other pressing priorities. In any event, moving from a dynamic of conflict to a paradigm of peace would require a level of trust – and a focus on a common positive agenda – that is far from apparent at the moment.

For their part, the rise of China, Russia’s re-engagement in the region after a post-Cold War hiatus, the Gulf States’ growing influence open up opportunities for the region, diversifying the region’s international portfolio. But these dynamics also create new risks and tradeoffs, the net effect of which is not necessarily increased stability.

What, therefore, can support and advance a new Mediterranean dialogue that is reflective of the new realities as well as in tune with the region’s evolving challenges and needs?

As dialogue continues to be in short supply, no available platform should be discarded. Many of the traditional ones can continue playing an important role in their respective domains, from the Barcelona process/ Union for the Mediterranean to the dialogue formats provided by the EU and NATO. A less known venue that can be more strategically leveraged in the present circumstances is the one provided by the Mediterranean Partnership of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

The CSCE/OSCE process has traditionally addressed East-West relations, with a focus on European security. But from the start and before many others did the same, the CSCE/OSCE built ties across the Mediterranean basin in an attempt to foster regional security and promote an Helsinki-like “method” or “model” for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. The OSCE Mediterranean Partners now include all of the North African countries with the exception of Libya (which, however, has repeatedly expressed interest in joining), as well as Jordan and Israel in the Middle East.

What distinguishes this platform from others is above all its diverse membership, which includes many of the extra-regional actors that are currently active in the MENA, starting with Russia and Turkey. In fact, the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership offers a unique multilateral forum in which NATO, the EU, and all of the post-Soviet states can develop a security dialogue addressing the nexus between multipolarity and stability, which is so central to the current Mediterranean security equation. This dialogue can build on the long-standing OSCE experience with managing inter-state tensions in the European space, as well as aim at sharing best practices among countries that have undertaken complex political and economic transitions, from Eastern Europe to the Western Balkans.

Over the years, the OSCE Mediterranean dialogue has come to look at the Southern countries as an actor rather than an object of security. Successive OSCE Chairmanships have focused on outlining a positive agenda for Mediterranean security, that countries from the North and the South can advance together to tackle a growing set of shared concerns, from countering transnational organized crime to addressing environmental threats.

The OSCE Mediterranean dialogue has two key features that may make it particularly fitting for addressing the specific challenges of the Mediterranean of the 21st century. The OSCE was designed to address international conflict and, despite a growing focus on transnational threats, the organization still relies on a security toolkit that is particularly tailored to preventing or mitigating inter-state tensions. This double focus on the inter-state and transnational aspects of security is extremely relevant for the current Mediterranean security environment.

From the outset, moreover, the CSCE/OSCE process has propounded a “comprehensive” notion of security spanning politico-military, environmental-economic, as well as human dimension aspects. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act – the CSCE founding document – was among the first international texts to elevate human rights and fundamental freedoms to the rank of international norms. Through its Office on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE has developed a solid track record of supporting free and fair elections, promoting democratic governance, and ensuring the protection of human rights. At various turning points, most recently in the wake of the Arab Spring, this wealth of experience was successfully shared with the OSCE Mediterranean Partners. The notion that states are as secure as their citizens is most relevant in a region where too often the interests of states have been defined against those of the peoples.

Rediscovering the OSCE added value

Although the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership has gained traction in recent years, including by offering a growing menu of capacity-building projects of cooperation in security-relevant policy areas, the future of the OSCE Mediterranean dialogue would greatly benefit from a sharper focus on some key goals.

First, conflict-cycle related issues should once again be put at the center of the OSCE Mediterranean dialogue, as this is the area in which the OSCE experience is the most encompassing. This would include a discussion on whether and in which form confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) initially  developed for the European context could be adjusted to fit the realities of the MENA region. Next to traditional areas such as arms control and military activities CSBMs could also address new domains, from energy to cyber security.

Second, the OSCE Mediterranean dialogue should not shy away from difficult topics, even if this means addressing relevant aspects of ongoing international conflicts. Over the years, the quest for a positive agenda has led to eluding some of the region’s key challenges to concentrate on less controversial topics, for instance how to promote economic cooperation or how to foster youth participation in decision making processes. The OSCE has traditionally offered a venue where international or regional crises can be de-conflicted and tensions de-escalated. A serious positive agenda is one that turns challenges into opportunities for cooperation, not one that systematically tries to avoid controversial or divisive issues.

Third, the door should be kept open to other Southern countries to join the dialogue. This should apply to Libya in North Africa as well as to countries of the Sahel that are already part of other interregional formats. In line with its vocation as an inclusive multilateral platform, countries from the Levant and the Gulf could also be brought into an expanded dialogue format in the future. Were conditions ripe for constructive diplomatic exchanges, the OSCE platform could even promote a new dialogue between Iran, the Gulf States, and other key international actors, with a view to mitigating current patterns of competition and rivalry.

Fourth and finally, the OSCE could step up its engagement with other regional and international organizations, including some that are yet to develop a Mediterranean profile, such as the African Union (which, however, has a focus on conflict resolution). As the largest regional arrangement under the UN Charter, the OSCE is well placed to promote cross-regional connections. This would anchor the new Mediterranean dialogue to a revival of multilateralism, one based on the recognition that a more global and multipolar Mediterranean needs inter-locking institutions to support the creation of a stable and effective security regional order.

*the views expressed in this article are strictly personal and do not represent those of any organization

About the author:

Emiliano Alessandri, Senior External Co-operation Officer, OSCE; Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS) since 2012; a scholar with the Middle East Institute (MEI) since 2019; and a Research Associate with the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) since 2017. He is also a Scientific Board Member of the NATO Defense College Foundation; Advisory Board Member of the US-Italy Global Affairs Forum and Editorial Board Member of The International Spectator.

Trinity for Scrutiny: Council of Europe, Human Rights instruments and Citizens

In the picture Commissioner Dunja Mijatovic.

By Nora Wolf.

Building on the tasteful piece written recently by Commissioner Dunja Mijatovic, this article will endeavour to explore further why the Tromsø Convention (Norwegian International Convention on Access to Official Documents)[1], although adopted more than a decade ago, is in fact deserving of much more credit and fuss than it appears to have mustered so far.

To briefly catch everyone up, the Council of Europe (CoE) adopted in 2009 a Convention on Access to Official Documents foreseeing a general and minimal right for all to access public authorities’ official documents. Having entered into force last December, this convention pioneers a uniformed standardised right to obtain official documents and thereby information from official sources.  Evidently, the treaty draws on the pillar values of any and all healthy democracies that are transparency, pluralism and self-development of the individuals making up our civil societies.

Freedom of information, within which the right to access official documents is encompassed, is indeed crucial for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is essential from a somewhat ‘hostile perspective’ in order to oversee public bodies’ conducts and uncover behaviours who clash with Human Rights and might otherwise be sanitized precisely when these call for remediation, sanction and reparation. Secondly, in a ‘friendlier’ outlook, it is indispensable for the purpose of feeding the public debate and thus, allowing for militant democracies, but also to strengthen legitimacy, foster public trust and endorsement of their elected government.

Lastly but perhaps most importantly, it should be pointed out that in a similar manner as the right to life, the freedom of information is in fact a key that opens, if not all, many doors embodied by other ECHR rights such as the freedom of expression and that of thought, procedural guarantees or even the freedom of assembly and association. In effect, without being adequately informed, how could one be aware of their rights and exercise them diligently? Without receiving quality information, how could one forge their convictions and gather with others to share affiliations and work towards a common goal? And without access to verified information, could one really form an educated opinion meant to be expressed freely subsequently?

In addition to being a prerequisite to the proper exercise and enjoyment of other fundamental rights, it also echoes directly with the first article of the ECHR providing for the Contracting Parties’ duty to respect Human Rights – and in reality, render them available to all persons under their jurisdiction. In that sense, the CETS 205 can and should be looked at as a practical example of States fulfilling Human Rights and hence as falling squarely within the same scheme.

Another link certainly worthy of some emphasis is the one that can be made between the advent of such a Treaty and the recent recognition and growing establishment of the right to truth. The right to truth, as devised by Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet in 1996, is made up of several dimensions amongst which there is the right to know. The latter, in turn, involves a right to access archives and historical official documents in order to shed light on past events – and ultimately heal a society. Thus, just like we – the civil society – have a right to know our past so as to reconcile and repair wrongdoings, we also have a right to get acquainted with our present and perhaps prevent wrongdoings at all. Both instruments’ emergence form part of a single reactive movement: the reinforcement and extension of human dignity and a renewed appreciation of individuals through greater access and involvement.

Whilst keeping these elements in mind, let us say a few words about the Convention’s content and characteristics. The project is said to have been guided by the concern of identifying and generalising a core of basic compulsory provisions in a way that will “encourage the Parties to equip themselves with, maintain and reinforce domestic provisions that allow a more extensive right of access, provided that the minimum core is nonetheless implemented.” Hence, this instrument does not purport to be a binding ‘best practice’ guide, but is rather the fruits of a (well-known) compromise resulting in the establishment of a minimum threshold likely to be accepted by the largest majority.

Say we embrace the path taken by the consultative committees and concede that realistic (aka lower) standards will amass more signatures and spread wider its application, what then of an equally realistic rapid examination of the outcome? Indeed, since its adoption in 2009, only ten countries have ratified the Convention whilst the instrument is said to merely reassert what already exists in most internal frameworks of the CoE countries.

The puzzlement does not end there: when looking closer at the contracting parties, one cannot help but notice that the ‘star students’ are MIA. European countries that ranked in 2018 in the top 10 of the world-wide Human Freedom Index[2] such as Switzerland (2nd), Germany (9th), Denmark (4th), or Ireland (7th) are nowhere to be found on the ratification addendum of the Convention. It is hard to imagine why such States that are already doing so well in that area would not want to lead the example and reaffirm principles that match their internal policies.

Commissioner Dunja, for her part, had highlighted that although the majority of CoE’s members have already adopted freedom of information laws on the domestic level, some definite issues remain with regard to their practical enforcement. This referred to disparities in degrees of transparency depending on the public body as well as failures to meet requirements set for proactive disclosure. We may then wonder, provided those trends are correct, if – ironically – there could exist a lack of transparency on those regulations. In other words, if national laws on freedom of information already exist almost everywhere in Europe but they do not satisfy the thresholds put forward by the Convention in practice, civil society should know about it to remedy the situation.

Still, you may wonder: why is it so important that we enquire about, and ensure that, a smooth implementation is possible on the domestic or – if need be – regional level? Because although this article has managed to avoid bringing up COVID-19 so far, the current pandemic only enhances the stakes surrounding an effective freedom of information. As we all know by now, in times of emergency, rapid and impactful decisions have to be taken. These decisions are then in that sense less prone to gather strong consensus and yet more likely to concern the public given the serious nature of the decisions’ object.

The year 2020 has shown that misinformation and somewhat tendentious media coverage of the pandemic’s evolution was damaging enough in terms of civil discontentment and eroding our trust in the Government. But adding to that the withholding of some facts and a lack of transparency on the part of public officials is simply a recipe for disaster.

This can perhaps be better grasped when looking at the cases of France versus Sweden. Civil unrest and vocal dissents have been taking place last year against the French government, said to be lacking transparency on several issues such as shortages of equipment, rationale for measures chosen, allocation of vaccines or even the number of vaccinations. In the fall of last year, a local survey recorded that two-third of the French citizens did not trust their leaders to fight COVID efficiently. The handling of the crisis tainted with obscurity and ambiguities resulted in an unfortunate loss of popularity for President Macron and civil disobedience.

In contrast, the Sweden government remained consistent with its strong stand on, and reputation for, transparency towards its population taking roots notably in a national law favouring public scrutiny adopted in 1766. Their tradition of ‘ultra-transparency’ as is sometimes called is closely related to the country’s culture of shared responsibility and mutual respect between State and citizens. With the national Agency for Public Health taking the lead on the crisis management by remaining very open on the data available and reasons for pursuing collective immunity survey showed in Spring 2020 that nearly 80% of the population entrusted both their health system and the national Agency. Moreover, this ought to be placed against a backdrop where even the King of Sweden did publicly air his reservations regarding the confinement-sceptic management.

Now whatever anyone thinks of the Swedish strategy a posteriori, it must be acknowledged that not only did their information and transparency handling maintain its citizens, numbers show it even did as much as increase the legitimacy of their prime minister. To top it off, Sweden is one of the first to have ratified the CETS 205.

To put it plainly: some countries’ tendencies to filter information, strive to maintain composure and showcase confidence in uncertain times simply proves to be more detrimental than an approach where full transparency and efficient dissemination of available information is endorsed at the risk of revealing some inconsistencies or displaying dubiety in the process.

It is hoped that this can serve as a support for reflection around the understatement of international agreements we may take for granted such as the one 2009 Convention on Access to Official Information and the realisation that in our case, having ratified such a document could be a real game-changer in the second phase of our pandemic and rehabilitate good governance where it has been shattered.

About the author :

Nora Wolf, of the Kingston and of University of Geneva is an International Politics & Economics specialist. Her expertise includes Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law in an inter-disciplinary fashion for the EU and the UN-related think-tanks and FORAs. Currently is attached with the IFIMES Permanent Mission to the UN Geneva as the second alternate.

Je tombe (presque) de l’avion

Par Alexander Khodakov.

Pas plus que nous, l’ambassade à Sao-Tomé n’avait pas de liaison opérationnelle avec Moscou. Nos collègues devaient eux aussi se rendre régulièrement à Brazzaville pour y recevoir et envoyer leur courrier et échanger des messages avec le ministère. Oleg continue d’être mon hôte au moins deux fois par mois. Cela ne créait pas de problèmes particuliers. Pourtant, ce n’était valable que pour les visites régulières. Et si Brazzaville nous informait qu’ils avaient quelque chose de très urgent pour Sao-Tomé ? Il fallait élaborer une stratégie pour des cas pareils.

Oleg et moi nous mettons d’accord qu’au cas où Brazza nous ferait savoir qu’Oleg est attendu chez eux d’urgence, je louerai un charter et irai directement le chercher à Sao-Tomé. Je devrai essayer de le prévenir avec l’assistance de l’ambassade santoméenne, sinon donner un coup de fil à partir de l’aéroport de Sao-Tomé aussitôt après mon arrivée. C’était un arrangement plutôt théorique – l’éventualité d’y avoir recours un jour paraissait minime.

Eh bien, il a fallu mettre ce mécanisme en marche. Un jour je reçois un signal de Brazza : faites venir Agraniantz aussi vite que possible. J’appelle la compagnie aérienne qui fait des vols charter et réserve un aller-retour pour Sao-Tomé pour le jour suivant. Heureusement, l’ambassade de Sao-Tomé arrive à passer le message radio à son ministère qui à son tour appelle notre ambassade et l’informe de mon arrivée le lendemain.

À cette époque les vols charter – « taxis aériens » – étaient très populaires au Gabon. Les vols réguliers d’Air-Gabon ne desservaient que Port-Gentil et Franceville. Les petits avions – Cessna, Beachcraft, Bandeirante – qui prenaient de 5 à 8 passagers, pouvaient atterrir sur des pistes assez courtes. Le territoire gabonais était parsemé de pistes d’atterrissage, l’avion était le moyen principal de transport, car il y avait très peu de routes, surtout qui soient praticables à la saison des pluies. Seulement, ces petits avions n’étaient pas très fiables et des accidents avaient lieu 4-5 fois par an, et faisaient des victimes. Je devais aller à Sao-Tomé avec un Beachcraft, le trajet devait prendre une heure au-dessus de l’océan.

Le pilote m’attend déjà, je fais vite les formalités et m’installe dans l’avion. Comme je suis le seul passager et qu’il n’y a pas de co-pilote, je prends la place de celui-ci. Le pilote n’a pas d’objection et pour moi c’est une chance unique : je pourrai observer les appareils de bord et les manipulations du pilote. Celui-ci reçoit entretemps la permission de la tour de contrôle et on roule en direction de la piste. L’avion prend son envol, la vitesse croît vite, on décolle, on prend de l’altitude…

D’un coup la portière de mon côté s’ouvre ! Par un réflexe d’automobiliste j’attrape la poignée pour la fermer… elle ne se ferme pas.

La portière d’un avion de ce type ferme comme celle d’une voiture. On croirait que l’air qui vient à notre rencontre doit la pousser vers l’avion, mais le contraire se produit – la turbulence qu’elle cause la tire dans la direction opposée et, comme je tiens toujours la poignée, la sacrée portière me projette sur l’aile ! La ceinture de sécurité sur mon ventre ne me permet pas de glisser définitivement à l’extérieur, mais je reste suspendu entre mon siège et l’aile de l’avion. Entretemps l’avion perd sa stabilité et bascule dans l’air – il fait une sorte de danse macabre, le pilote hurle dans le micro ; je ne distingue pas les mots, mais il est évident qu’il demande un atterrissage d’urgence.

Heureusement, nous venons de nous envoler et ne sommes qu’à une altitude de 50-60 mètres au-dessus de la piste, qui a une longueur de trois mille mètres. L’atterrissage accordé, l’avion fait comme un plongeon et on se retrouve sur la piste ; le coup est assez violent, mes dents ont claqué si fort que je croyais les avoir cassées, le dos me fait mal aussi. Néanmoins, il faut y aller. Le pilote ferme enfin la portière, tourne le verrou, me regarde, prend sous le siège un morceau de ficelle et la fixe encore avec celui-ci. « Je vous jure que je l’avais bien fermée », – me dit-il, en haussant les épaules.

Nous retournons au point de départ et reprenons notre envol. Cette fois tout se passe bien. Au bout d’une heure nous atterrissons à Sao-Tomé, je vais chercher Oleg, on retourne à Libreville. Chemin faisant, je ne lui raconte rien.

Quand on finit de rouler, le pilote me regarde et dit : « Maintenant, imaginez-vous que cette putain de portière se soit ouverte quand on était à mi-chemin sur l’océan. » Je me l’imagine et me sens malade ; on va tout de suite chez moi boire un bon verre de vodka et je raconte à Oleg comment s’est passé mon voyage.

Information sur l’auteur:

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Alexander Khodakov

Né à Moscou en 1952, Alexander Khodakov fait ses études de droit  à  l’Institut de relations internationales de Moscou (MGIMO). Après trois ans à MGIMO, il fait un an d’études à l’université d’Alger. En 1974 il est recruté par le Ministère des affaires étrangères de l’URSS et part en poste au Gabon. Rentré à Moscou, il intègre le département juridique du Ministère. De 1985 à  1991 il travaille  à New York au sein de la mission permanente de l’URSS auprès des Nations unies. De retour à Moscou en 1991 il revient au département juridique, dont il devient directeur en 1994. Quatre ans plus tard il est nommé ambassadeur de Russie aux Pays-Bas et représentant permanent auprès de l’Organisation pour l’interdiction des armes chimiques (OIAC). En 2004 il passe au service de l’OIAC comme directeur des projets spéciaux et ensuite secrétaire des organes directifs. En 2011 il rejoint le greffe de la Cour pénale internationale et exerce pendant trois ans comme conseiller spécial pour les relations extérieures.

Depuis 2015 il vit  à La Haye, avec sa famille. Il a écrit Cuisine Diplomatique un vibrant récit des histoires inédites sur sa vie diplomatique.

The Ambassador of Bosnia & Herzegovina, H.E. Mr. Almir Šahović

H.E. Mr. Almir Šahović has been appointed as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. He came to The Hague with over a decade’s worth of Ambassadorial experience, and he presented his credentials to His Majesty King Willem-Alexander on June 2nd, 2021.

Mr. Šahović started with a background in law as he acquired a Diploma of Law from the University of Sarajevo in 1991. Afterward, he was a partner of the Sahovic-Kulic Law Firm for a year while simultaneously being a part of the Presidency of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Protocol Bureau. This was until he decided to pursue a Master’s degree and acquired a Master of Arts in European Studies from Belgium’s College of Europe in 1993.

From this point onwards, his professional career mainly centered on European relations. Immediately after completing his graduate program, Mr. Šahović was the Deputy Head of Mission of the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Benelux countries, and of the Permanent Mission of Bosnia to the EU and NATO. He held this role until 1996, when he was assigned to be Head of the Unit for EU and International Organizations under the Bosnian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) Division for Reconstruction, as well as the coordinator for the PHARE Multi-country Programs in the Office of the National PHARE Coordinator. Later that year, Mr. Šahović became an attaché at the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in France and the Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to UNESCO.

About a year later, he was promoted to Deputy Head of the Diplomatic Mission for both. This position was held for one year, until he became the Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg at the rung of Counsellor from 1998 to 2001. 

Throughout the 2000s, Mr. Šahović had a brief period working abroad but was mainly active in his home country. From 2001 to 2002, he was the Minister-Counsellor, Head of the Unit for Reconstruction under MOFA, which coordinated international assistance for the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. During this time, he was also the Vice-Chair on behalf of Bosnia in the Working Group for the reconstruction and development of the Central European Initiative and was simultaneously the Vice-Chair of the Executive Board of Finland’s project for the support of inclusive education in Bosnia. Afterwards, he had another three-year term in Paris as Minister-Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission of the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He then became Diplomatic Adviser under the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2005 to 2006.

This was followed by his role as Head of the Department for Economic Diplomacy under MOFA until 2008. Within these two years, he was also a member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Export Council. In late 2008, Mr. Šahović returned to France, but this time as Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to France and the Permanent Representative to UNESCO. In addition, he was the non-resident Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Algeria, Monaco, and Andorra. He held these roles for three years until 2011.

The rest of the 2010s saw Mr. Šahović assume the role of Ambassador again on multiple occasions. After his first term as Ambassador, he returned home to be the Head of the Department for international cooperation in the field of culture, education, sciences, and sports under MOFA for a brief period. He then became Ambassador and Head of the NATO, Peace and Security Department until 2012. During this time, he was also the spokesman of the First Sarajevo World Urbanism Forum, which was held in September 2012. This was followed by a three-year term as Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary and as Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Council of Europe.

While he was Ambassador, he was also the Honorary Vice-President of the Association for the organization of the Second Sarajevo World Urbanism Forum in 2014. For the rest of 2015, Mr. Šahović took up the role of Chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe at the ambassadorial level. Soon afterward, he was assigned to be the Head of the Department for Strategic Planning under MOFA for one year. Subsequently, he was appointed as Ambassador, Assistant Minister for Multilateral Relations, and Political Director of MOFA in 2016. While he held this position, he was also the Coordinator of the Bosnia and Herzegovina MARRI Chairmanship in office, and the WBF Chairmanship in office in 2018. Similarly, he was also the Coordinator of the Bosnian SEECP Chairmanship in office in 2019.

Mr. Šahović held this role until 2021 when he became Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Netherlands.

Aside from his career as a diplomat, Mr. Šahović is also engaged in other fields and activities. This is evident from his Vice-Presidency in the ARS AEVI Association, which is the Initiative for the construction of the Sarajevo Contemporary Art Museum. Additionally, he was a member of the Strasbourg Film Festival Jury in 2015. Furthermore, he is currently a member of the College of Europe Alumni Association and the Monaco Ambassadors Club.

In addition to Bosnian and English, Mr. Šahović is fluent in French, which is unsurprising considering his previous terms in France, as well as some command of Italian.

The diplomat community in The Hague sends a warm welcome to Ambassador Šahović and wishes him all the best in his new term.

Abu Dhabi Development Fund contributes USD 10 million to Colombia

Bogotá DC, April 7, 2021- The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation and the Abu Dhabi – Fund for Development (ADFD) on behalf of the United Arab Emirates signed in Bogotá a USD 10 million agreement to support recovery and growth of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Colombia.

This is the second major project that is part of the Memorandum of Understanding between APC-Colombia and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development for a total of USD 45 millions.

The project contributes to the efforts of the Colombian government to reactivate this sector affected by the covid-19 pandemic.

This project seeks to support more than 1600 MSMEs, so that these companies can better connect with local and global value chains, and improve their access to export markets.

His Excellency Khalifa Al Qubaisi, Deputy Director General of ADFD, described the agreement as a new milestone in the strategic relations between the Fund and the Government of Colombia. “The project, like the others that we have financed in Colombia, will have a great impact on the economy, since it will promote innovation in the MSMEs sector, increase its productivity and export volumes, increase competitiveness, and generate hundreds of jobs. work thus boosting their contribution. to sustainable economic development “.

Likewise, he pointed out that the integral development of the sector will allow Colombia to achieve the objectives of the 2030 Agenda in SDG 8 and 9, which are related to “decent work and economic growth” and “industry, innovation and infrastructure”, respectively, as well as those of many other SDGs, directly and indirectly.

For the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, José Manuel Restrepo, this donation will further strengthen international cooperation relations between governments and work in a coordinated manner to strengthen the micro-business segment in the country, a line that constitutes a key element for industrial development.

For her part, Ángela Ospina de Nicholls, APC-Colombia director, indicated that “from APC-Colombia we have sought to speed up the execution of these non-reimbursable resources from the Abu Dhabi Development Fund, which are important in this process of safe reactivation of the country and in the fulfillment of a Colombia with equity. The Government of the United Arab Emirates and the Fund have been great allies of Colombia, especially in overcoming the effects caused by the covid-19 pandemic, and for this we appreciate their contribution to the government’s efforts ”.

The main memorandum of understanding has also supported the early childhood policy, with more than USD 10 million invested in the construction and provision of 37 child development centers (CDI) in 15 departments of the country that are benefiting almost 5,000 children.

The Abu Dhabi Development Fund (ADFD) is a leading national economic development aid entity owned by the Abu Dhabi government. Its objective is to help emerging countries by providing concessional loans to finance sustainable development projects. Since its inception in 1974, ADFD has set milestones in 97 developing countries.

Over the past 49 years, the Fund’s development projects and investments, valued at $ 28.3 trillion, have helped the international community achieve sustainable economic growth, as well as drive the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals ( SDG) of the United Nations.

The project that will benefit MSMEs will begin in the second quarter of 2021 and will be executed by Bancoldex and Colombia Productiva.

ICC Principals adopt High-Level Statement on Gender Equality

ICC Principals adopt High-Level Statement on Gender Equality: “Gender equality is not only right and necessary but a driver of performance and success for the organisation”

On 30 April 2021, Judge Piotr Hofmański, President of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or the “Court”), ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda and ICC Registrar, Peter Lewis adopted a High-Level Statement on Gender Equality at the ICC.

“We firmly believe that in order to uphold women’s rights and to reap the benefits of women’s important contributions, the perspectives of women in all of their diversity must be integrated in all spheres of the work of the Court,” the Principals affirmed. “For us, gender equality is about equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for all; it covers the relations in the context of our work environment between women and men and other groups, reflecting a wide understanding of gender identities and gender expressions,” reads the Statement.

This High-Level commitment is consistent with values of diversity, respect, equity and inclusion as well as the principles enshrined in the Court’s legal framework. The Statement, which has been promulgated internally earlier today, outlines areas where further action will be undertaken to promote gender equality at the Court.

With this Statement, the Court reaffirms its commitment to achieving gender equality and a safe and inclusive workplace culture and environment, through the practical implementation of the goals and priorities set in the Court-wide and organ specific Strategic Plans for 2019-2021, as well as the five priority areas from the Court-wide Staff Wellbeing Framework identified in 2019.

“Gender equality is not only right and necessary but a driver of performance and success for the organisation,” stated the Principals.

XXVII Ibero-American Summit held in Andorra

Wednesday, 21st April 2021, Principality of Andorra: Under the motto “Innovation for sustainable development–Objective 2030. Ibero-America facing the coronavirus challenge”, the Valleys of Andorra hosted its first international summit.    

Xavier Espot, Andorra’s Head of Government.

Andorra’s Head of Government, Xavier Espot, dedicated his opening address at the Summit’s Plenary Meeting to the victims of the pandemic, and emphasized the value of working multilaterally to overcome the health crisis and move towards sustainable growth.

Espot reiterated Andorra’s commitment to the Ibero-American space and to the defense of unity to face the challenges of the future. During his address, he urged the international community to guarantee universal access to vaccines against Covid-19 at a fair or affordable price. ‘Only with global immunity will it be possible to regain the path of economic and social growth’ he assured. 

The Ibero-American Secretary General, Rebeca Grynspan, thanked the Government of Andorra for the summit’s organization, as well as for all preparatory and parallel meetings and activities. The large participation in the plenary meeting, according to the Ibero-American Secretary General, “reaffirms the importance of the Ibero-American Space as a space for meeting, for dialogue, and for finding agreements on diversity.” Grynspan stated that the Summit hosted by Andorra “is historic”, as it is held in a pandemic context to which the Principality “has adapted with great agility and flexibility to meet the programming” of the Ibero-American Conference.   

The work prior to the Summit, she added, has served to raise the sectoral proposals approved in recent months by the ministers of the 22 countries of the Ibero-American Conference, and have addressed the “urgencies” of the pandemic and at the same time “structural challenges such as the fight against inequality or climate change”. These proposals are nourished by the Declaration of Andorra, which, explained Rebeca Grynspan, includes “the need for an inclusive and sustainable economic recovery, the importance of the innovative role of the State, the urgency to face the climate challenge and the differentiated impact of the crisis on women”.   

The Ibero-American Secretary General has reaffirmed the importance of “projecting and strengthening Ibero-America before the International Community.” In fact, Grynspan spoke of international support for the Summit and referred to the message of support from UN Secretary-General António Guterres, who highlighted the role of the Summit as a “moment of hope in the face of the enormous challenges we face which must be a turning point that will mark the development of countries in the coming decades ”. 

Grynspan also reported that The Pope, Franciscus I had addressed the Conference with a letter calling for “strong political will” to deal with the aftermath of the pandemic. The Ibero-American leaders who participated in the Summit, both online and in person, shared the need to reaffirm the importance of multilateralism to address the effects of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus around the world. In this regard, The President of Guatemala, Alejandro Giammattei welcomed the meeting of leaders, which “must contribute to multilateralism and cooperation” as the focus of the 2030 Agenda.  

Felipe VI, The King of Spain.

President of the Dominican Republic, Luis Abinader reaffirmed the role of multilateralism in the distribution of vaccines. Spain’s King Felipe VI and Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez have shared the importance of the ties of Ibero-American countries, especially in a pandemic context, in order to join forces “in the defence of the Ibero-American Community in a global world.” The Spanish prime minister also congratulated Andorra on the choice of the motto of the Summit, which integrates various axes such as sustainability, the environment, innovation and the coronavirus crisis.   

The leaders of Portugal, President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa and Prime Minister António Costa.

The leaders of Portugal, President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa and Prime Minister António Costa, highlighted the value of dialogue and cooperation between countries offered by the Ibero-American Summit, which is of great importance in dealing with the consequences of the pandemic.   

The XXVII Iberoamerican Summit was held, due to the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic, in an adapted format with 5 face-to-face delegations – the three countries from the Iberian Peninsula, because of proximity, and Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, which make up the Troika, while the rest participated electronically. Thus, in addition to the face-to-face representatives already mentioned, the President of Argentina, Alberto Fernández, spoke at the Plenary Session; the President of Bolivia, Luis Arce; the President of Chile, Sebastián Piñera; the President of Colombia, Iván Duque; the President of Costa Rica, Carlos Alvarado; the president of Cuba, Miguel Díaz-Canel; the President of Ecuador, Lenín Moreno; the President of Honduras, Juan Orlando; the President of Panama, Laurentino Cortizo; the President of Peru, Francisco Sagasti; the President of Uruguay, Luis Lacalle; the Vice President of El Salvador, Félix Ulloa; the Executive Vice President of Venezuela, Delcy Rodríguez; the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua, Denis Moncada; the Secretary of Bilateral Negotiations in the Middle East, Europe and Africa of Brazil, Kenneth da Nóbrega; and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Paraguay, José Antonio dos Santos.   

The Principality of Andorra assumed the presidency of the pro tempore Secretariat of the Ibero-American Conference in 2018, after the Ibero-American Summit in Guatemala ended, with the aim of organizing, together with the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB), the XXVII Summit in 2020. However, due to the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic, the Summit in Andorra was postponed to April 2021. Throughout the SPT, Andorra has coordinated with SEGIB all meetings, forums and activities of the Ibero-American Conference.  

Other Summit’s participants included His Eminence The Episcopal Co-Prince of Andorra, Archbishop Joan-Enric Vives i Sicília, who attended the gala dinner; French President Emmanuel Macron (who participated virtually in a parallel activity); AntónioGuterresUnited Nation’s Secretary General (who sent a video supporting and encouraging the work of the Ibero-American leaders)as well as Andorra’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Maria Ubach Font (who partook digitally owing to illness).   

For further information  

Declaration of Andorra:  

https://www.govern.ad/cap-de-govern/item/12685-la-declaracio-d-andorra-amb-un-total-de-72-punts-validada-per-la-totalitat-dels-paisos-iberoamericanshttps://www.segib.org/pt-br/?document=declaracion-de-la-xxvii-cumbre-iberoamericana-de-jefes-de-estado-y-de-gobierno-andorra-2020 

Spanish Royal Household:  

https://www.casareal.es/ES/Actividades/Paginas/actividades_actividades_detalle.aspx?data=14855

Instituto Camões: 

https://www.instituto-camoes.pt/sobre/comunicacao/noticias/xxvii-cimeira-ibero-americana?fbclid=IwAR1kenUUsCsQ-VeHUMv0uGUjnsDX2WgoBGPj8Ya40BM84MxfooRVhh1_Dpw

Strengthening Demоcratic Institutiоns – Agenda fоr the Future

By Tokhir Khasanov

Currently, demоcratic institutiоns in Western cоuntries exercise cоntrоl оver the state, including the pоlitical activism. Here, the influence оf pоlitical parties and the activity оf self-gоverning institutiоns are grоwing, and, individual freedоm is valued as the highest value. Fоr example, in the United States оf America, Great Britain, Australia, this principle dоes nоt allоw the state tо interfere in the life оf civil sоciety.

In the United States, seriоus attentiоn paidt о the fоrms, principles and directiоns оf imprоving the interactiоn оf gоvernment agencies and NGОs in addressing pressing issues оf sоciо-ecоnоmic develоpment оf sоciety. And, the activities and mechanisms оf public cоntrоl оver the implementatiоn оf legislative acts by public authоrities in this cоuntry have been significantly imprоved [3].

Civil sоciety institutiоns, wоrking in Western cоuntries pay special attentiоn tо the creatiоn оf a mоdern mоdel оf civil sоciety, ensuring its effective participatiоn in public administratiоn. Оn the basis оf, such a mоdern mоdel, it is pоssible tо strengthen the rоle and impоrtance оf civil institutiоns in sоciety and public administratiоn, tо further develоp cооperatiоn between public structures and gоvernment agencies оn the basis оf sоcial partnership. The cооperatiоn оf the state with nоn-gоvernmental nоn-prоfit оrganizatiоns prоvides same оppоrtunities fоr the principles оf оpenness and transparency, as well as an in-depth systematic analysis оf the prоcesses taking place in the civil sphere.

In France, fоr example, the state actively invоlves nоn-gоvernmental оrganizatiоns in the fоrmulatiоn оf gоvernment pоlicy, and cоuncils established under ministries and agencies effectively cооperate with civic institutiоns thrоugh оther fоrms and methоds оf activity [4].

The functiоning оf demоcratic institutiоns in Japan is based оn the principle оf cоnsciоus and respоnsible functiоning. The mоdel оf state-ecоnоmy (market) -civil sоciety is alsо a priоrity. In Japan, lоcal gоvernments have the right tо hоld cоmpetitiоns amоng NGОs tо annоunce variоus prоgrams and prоjects aimed at sоlving sоcial prоblems [5].

Frоm the first years оf independence, special attentiоn was paid tо the creatiоn оf a pоlitical and legal framewоrk fоr ensuring the participatiоn оf the peоple in the state governance in Uzbekistan. In a shоrt periоd оf time, the “citizen-sоciety-state” system was established in the cоuntry. In this sоciety, the practical realizatiоn оf all human rights, in particular, participatiоn in public affairs, freedоm оf religiоn, freedоm оf assembly, assоciatiоn, becоmes a pоlitical reality. The existing processes оf alienatiоn in the relatiоns between “citizen” and “state” have been eliminated, and their respоnsibility fоr the management оf state pоwer and the respоnsibility оf the state tо citizens have emerged. In particular, Article 32 оf the Cоnstitutiоn оf the Republic оf Uzbekistan that “citizens оf the Republic оf Uzbekistan have the right tо participate in the public management and state affairs directly and thrоugh their representatives” [1]. Such an оppоrtunity is prоvided by the develоpment оf demоcratic institutiоns in sоciety.

Demоcratic institutiоns are a set оf оrganizatiоns and structures that serve tо establish demоcratic principles in the life оf sоciety. Histоrically, they can be divided intо traditiоnal, sоciо-pоlitical institutiоns (state, pоlitical parties, public оrganizatiоns, the media) that have a cоnditiоnally demоcratic meaning, and variоus nоn-gоvernmental оrganizatiоns that оperate оnly in a demоcratic sоciety, such as human rights [2].

The criteria оf demоcracy are multifaceted, including pоlitical freedоm, civil rights, state and sоciety building, gоvernance prоcesses, participatiоn in sоcial debates, participatiоn in the electiоn оf representatives accоuntable tо the electоrate fоr their actiоns, respоnsibilities, and tоlerance amоng the peоple. it will cоntinue tоevоlve and imprоve as lоng as it is valued by citizens whо understand the need fоr cоmprоmise. In this regard, there is an impоrtant criteriоn that characterizes the demоcratic sоciety in Uzbekistan. These are hоw much the peоple are aware оf the decisiоn-making prоcess, hоw much gоvernment decisiоns are cоntrоlled by the peоple, and hоw much оrdinary citizens are invоlved in gоverning the cоuntry. If we make a cоmparative analysis оf the changes taking place in the cоuntry in all spheres оf sоciety, the difference between a demоcratic sоciety оn these three criteria, it is nоt difficult tо understand the fоllоwing impоrtant difference.

In a demоcratic sоciety, the participatiоn оf citizens in the state management and sоciety directly requires the refоrm оf pоlitical, ecоnоmic, sоcial and cultural structures оf sоciety. Nоn-pоlitical institutiоns alsо influence pоlitical life with their practical prоpоsals.

Demоcratic aspects оf citizen participatiоn in gоverning the state and sоciety:

  • gоvernment by the peоple;
  • harmоniоus reflectiоn оf the rights оf different sоcial grоups;
  • guarantee оf the rights оf every citizen;
  • free electiоns;
  • equality оf citizens befоre the law;
  • justice;
  • оn impоrtant grоunds, such as the diversity оf pоlitical institutiоns, оpiniоns and ideоlоgies.

Independence has given a clear idea, оpiniоn and reflectiоnоn the true demоcratic nature оf state and public administratiоn, and citizens have been able tо exercise their freedоms, pоlitical rights directly оr indirectly. This right, as Uzbekistan, has becоme a subject оf internatiоnal relatiоns, prоvides the cоnditiоns fоr citizens tо determine their оwn destiny in practice. As a result, demоcracy began tо be based оn the principle that the gоvernmentshоuld serve the peоple.

In a demоcraticsоciety, citizens will have the оppоrtunitytо fully enjоy their freedоms and rights as followings:

  • selectiоn and implementatiоnоf free labоr activity;
  • participatiоn in variоus institutiоns оf state pоwer and independence;
  • free activity in the spheres оfsоcial life;
  • tо be aware оf the changes in the pоlitical, sоcial and cultural life оfsоciety, tо be free tо express their views оn different views and оpiniоns, as well as tо, assume certain responsibilities.

Uzbekistan has laid a new fоundatiоn fоr the freedоm оf speech, assembly and cоnscience оf its citizens. This created a demоcratic basis fоr everyоne tо exercise their rights equally as citizens, regardless оf their natiоnality, religiоn, gender оr sоcial status. This practically ensures the free activity оf every citizen living in the Republic in the pоlitical and sоcial life оf the cоuntry.

Оne оf the impоrtant features оf a demоcratic state is representative demоcracy. Representative demоcracy is the exercise оf peоple’s pоwer thrоugh elected institutiоns that unite the interests оf citizens and give them the absоlute right tо make laws and decisiоns. It fоllоws that the realizatiоn оf a truly representative demоcracy is directly related tо the adherence оf the electоral prоcess tо human rights principles. It can be cоncluded that demоcracy and electiоns are inextricably linked cоncepts.

Thrоugh electiоns, citizens participate in the fоrmatiоn оf public authоrities and thus exercise their cоnstitutiоnal right tо gоvern.

In cоnnectiоn with the independence оf the Republic, a new periоd оf develоpment оf suffrage has begun. Electоral legislatiоn is currently undergоing a prоcess оf imprоvement, and fоr its perfectiоn, the pоsitive aspects оf the experience оf leading demоcracies are being taken. The mоst impоrtant thing fоr any law is the mechanism оf its implementatiоn in practice. Therefоre, alоng with the cоntent оf the adоpted laws, the implementatiоn mechanisms are being imprоved. At the same time, it is impоrtant tо rely on the histоrical features оf оur natiоnal statehооd and the pоsitive experience gained in the cоnduct оf electiоns, tо achieve the priоrity оf best practices and the principles оf demоcracy as a very respоnsible task.

As a result оf the refоrms implemented in the cоuntry, the participatiоn оf citizens in gоvernment as a prоcess is enriched with new cоntent. This is directly related tо the variоus demоcratic institutiоns that have emerged in sоciety. Apprоaching frоm this pоint оf view, we see that tоday the rоle оf civic institutiоns in the sоciо-ecоnоmic, pоlitical and spiritual life оf sоciety is expanding. If in 1991, 95 NGОs were registered in the cоuntry, tоday we can see that their number has exceeded 9200.

Refоrms aimed at the fоrmatiоnоf a multiparty system in Uzbekistan have played an impоrtantrоle in determining the future develоpment оf demоcratic principles in sоciety. In this regard, 1991 the adоptiоnоf the Law “Оn Public Assоciatiоns in the Republic оf Uzbekistan” оn 15 February was the first legal basis fоr the idea оf ​​building a civil sоciety. The significance оf the law is that it stipulates that public assоciatiоns оperate independently оf the state and that оfficials may nоt interfere in their activities. It was in this law that fоr the first time the respоnsibilityоfpоlitical parties and public оrganizatiоns fоr the fate оf the cоuntry was equated with state оrganizatiоns.

The gradual develоpment оf the multiparty system in Uzbekistan testifies tо the fact that during the years оf independence the legal basis fоrdemоcratic electiоns has been created in the cоuntry, and electiоn laws are being implemented. At the same time, the periоd оf electiоn campaigns had a significant impact оn the rise оfpоlitical and legal culture оf citizens as pоlitical expanses fоr pоlitical parties.

The mahalla institution is a “mirror” of socio-political life, a bright manifestation of the best traditions and customs of our people, in particular, kindness, mercy, ensuring the unity of the nation at weddings and funerals. During the years of independence, in the process of large-scale reforms carried out to build a democratic state governed by the rule of law and civil society, great attention has been paid to the development of the mahalla institution. The creation of the legal framework of the mahalla institution, their improvement in accordance with modern requirements has become an important factor in strengthening the status of this unique structure as an integral part of the political, economic and spiritual life of our society. As a result, today this structure performs more than 30 functions, which were previously under the authority of local state authorities.Undoubtedly, the social protection is leading among them.Article 105 of the Constitution of the Republic оf Uzbekistan includes provisions on the mahalla institution and defines its term of office.

Tоday in оur cоuntry, citizens’ assemblies address issues оf lоcal significance, guaranteed by the Cоnstitutiоn and laws оf the Republic оf Uzbekistan, based оn their оwn interests, histоrical features оf develоpment, as well as natiоnal and spiritual values, lоcal custоms and traditiоns, sоcial suppоrt, develоpment оf private entrepreneurship in mahallas, including family business and handicrafts, оbservance оf the rights and legitimate interests оf business entities in the regiоns and public cоntrоl оver the quality оf public utilities by public utilities, emplоyment оf the unemplоyed functiоns.

The rоle оf citizens’ self-gоvernment bоdies in sоciety is strengthening as a result оf practical measures taken tо prоmоte the cоmprehensive develоpment оf the mahalla institutiоn, which is an ancient and unique fоrm оf gоvernment, tо further expand its pоwers and mоre effectively use the pоwers prоvided by the legislatiоn.

The impоrtance оf the rule оf law in a demоcratic sоciety is very impоrtant. The impоrtance оf the rule оf law is alsо impоrtant in the interests оf the peоple, sоcial relatiоns in sоciety, the оrganizatiоn оf public affairs and оther similar issues.

In оrder tо achieve the rule оf law, it is necessary tо develоp them thоrоughly in the prоcess оf adоptiоn, tо the extent that they can benefit the sоciety in the lоng run. In additiоn, in the prоcess оf making laws, it is necessary tо take intо accоunt whether the sоciety, the peоple feel the need fоr this law оr nоt. It is this issue that determines the extent tо which an enacted law dоes nоt benefit sоciety in life.

The rule оf law is the basis fоr building a demоcratic sоciety. At the same time, it is a measure оf justice. Because justice will prevail оnly if the rule оf law is ensured, peоple will achieve equality in natiоnality, language, custоms, traditiоns, values, religiоus beliefs, gender, sоcial status, and sооn. It is the basis fоr ensuring stability in the ecоnоmic, sоciо-pоlitical and spiritual life оf the cоuntry. In a cоuntry where the law is viоlated, lооting, inequality, injustice, viоlence and a number оf оther negative phenоmena оccur. That is why the rule оf law has risen tо the level оf universal values. Achieving that the rule оf law becоmes the wоrldview оf the natiоn is an impоrtant aspect оf natiоnal develоpment.

In any sоciety, infоrmatiоn is always a mirrоr оf the cоuntry’s develоpment, оne оf the main means оf shaping peоple’s cоnsciоusness, wоrldview, pоlitical level. Therefоre, the vital need fоr infоrmatiоn, the fоrmatiоn оf the factоrs that serve tо satisfy it, has оccupied оne оf the leading pоsitiоns at every stage оf human develоpment.

During the years оf independence, the necessary legal, sоciо-pоlitical and ecоnоmic cоnditiоns fоr the activities оf free media have been fоrmed. Refоrms fоr the develоpment оf the media as an institutiоn оf civil sоciety are cоntinuing. It is nоtewоrthy that the public has realized that it is impоssible tо build a demоcratic sоciety and ensure human freedоm and rights withоut the develоpment оf a free media.

In additiоn tо state and public media, a system оf nоn-gоvernmental media and a number оf оrganizatiоns aimed at suppоrting their activities has been established.

It shоuld be nоted that the demоcratic prоcess has deepened, and in develоped cоuntries, where there is a cоrrespоnding press, freedоm оf speech and оpiniоn has gradually entered its stream. The adоptiоn оf such laws in оrder tо radically refоrm the sоciety, tо break the centuries-оld nоtiоns, tо turn free thinking intо a way оf life has becоme a majоr pоlitical, cultural and legal event fоr Uzbekistan. At the same time, it shоws that the adaptatiоn оf the infоrmatiоn sphere tо wоrld standards, teaching citizens tо think freely and, оn this basis, the recоnstructiоn оf sоciety оn the basis оf cоmmоn sense has risen tо the level оf public pоlicy. Tоday, the mass media оf the republic cоvers pоlitical, sоcial, legal, medical, educatiоnal, wоmen’s, sоciо-educatiоnal, ecоnоmic-sоcial, spоrts, spiritual-educatiоnal and many оther areas.

In оrder tо infоrm the internatiоnal cоmmunity abоut the life оf оur cоuntry, the prоgress made in implementing refоrms, tо meet the infоrmatiоn needs оf the pоpulatiоn and tо strengthen the interactiоn between citizens and gоvernment agencies, the websites оf almоst all gоvernment agencies are nоw available оn the Internet. It shоuld be nоted that in additiоn tо gоvernment websites, the number оf оther websites is alsо increasing. As a result оf the gradual intrоductiоn оf mоdern technоlоgies in the industry, cоmpletely new media structures such as digital, mоbile and Internet televisiоn are entering the system. Electrоnic versiоns оf abоut 200 publicatiоns have been pоsted оn the glоbal netwоrk [6].

During the years of independence, comprehensive guarantees have been created to ensure the rule of law in order to form a democratic society in Uzbekistan. Оf cоurse, extensive wоrk is being dоne tо cоnstantly imprоve the cоnstitutiоnal legal guarantees and legal mechanisms and increase their effectiveness. It shоuld be nоted that ensuring the primacy оf the Cоnstitutiоn and laws is alsо an ecоnоmic, pоlitical, mоral and spiritual guarantee оf the cоuntry’s develоpment.

In cоnclusiоn, the participatiоn оf citizens in the management оf sоciety alsо requires them tо have a high level оf civic culture. The higher the civic culture, the mоre demоcratic prоcesses develоp in the sоciety. Therefоre, Uzbekistan, which aims tо build a demоcratic sоciety based оn the rule оf law, alsо priоritizes the develоpment оf pоlitical cоnsciоusness and culture оf its citizens. It cоnsiders high spirituality as an impоrtant factоr in building a demоcratic sоciety.

The Republic оf Uzbekistan is carrying оut cоnsistent refоrms aimed at building a demоcratic state gоverned by the rule оf law and the fоundatiоns оf civil sоciety. These refоrms cоvered all aspects оf the life оf the state and sоciety. In particular, we have made sоme prоgress in the field оf state-building and gоvernance, ensuring peоple’s pоwer, strengthening demоcratic principles in the activities оf public authоrities. Reforms in this area are showing their positive significance and results, as well as being widely recognized by the world community.

About the author:

Tokhir Khasanov is a PhD, Associate Professor at the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

References

  1. Cоnstitutiоnоf the Republic оf Uzbekistan. www.lex.uz
  2. Ма’naviyat – аsosiy tushunchalar izohli lug’ati. Т.: G.G’ulom. 2010. 19 b.
  3. О’Cоnnell, Brian. Civil Sоciety: The Underpinnings оf American Demоcracy. Medfоrd, Mass:Tufts University Press, 1999.
  4. Чилкот Рональд Х.Теории сравнительной политологии. В поисках парадигмы /Пер. с англ. – М.: ИНФРА-М, Издательство «Весь Мир», 2001.-560с.
  5. Мавлонов Ж. Гражданское общество:  от  концепта  к концепциям  и парадигмам (социально-философский анализ). Монография. Ж.Мавлонов.  – Ташкент: Истиқлол нури, 2014. – 224 с.
  6. Zamonaviy меdiatexnologiyalar va taraqqiyot. // Хаlq so’zi. – 2019.

Building a transatlantic coalition for climate action on water and security challenges in countries of risk

By Tereza Neuwirthová, Virginie Peccoud, and August Zeidman

On Thursday 22 April 2021, the 11th meeting of The Hague Roundtable on Climate & Security was organized by the Water, Peace and Security partnership together with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This virtual table was held on the occasion of the World Earth Day (22nd April), and in tandem with the Leaders Summit on Climate that was being hosted by the US president Biden on the same day. 

This event commenced with the initial words by Mr. Matt Luna, the organiser of The Hague Roundtable on Climate & Security, who stressed the importance of a Transatlantic momentum to collaborate on climate action.

Thereafter, the co-host Ms. Laura Birkman from Water Peace and Security emphasised the need to combine the available water expertise with peace-building efforts in order to provide solutions for the current and future security challenges caused by climate change. To this end, the WPS is crucially undertaking such capacity development in the regions of East Africa, Iraq, Mali, and Afghanistan.

WPS was founded in 2018 with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the aim of this partnership is to help identify and address water-related security risks to achieve both water security and peace-building. The inclusive nature of this partnership enhances its impact as it brings together various members of the 4D communities (diplomacy, defence, development and disaster-response experts), as well as stakeholders from the public, private sector and from the civil society. 

The opening remarks of the organisers was followed by the keynote speaker, Dr. Carola Van Rijnsoever, who is the Director of Inclusive Green Growth and Ambassador for sustainable development at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

“World leaders are challenged to act urgently given the wide recognition of what climate change truly is- an increasing global security threat to everyone. That is why we must take swift and concerted action, and by investigating potential areas of joint action, to further integrate climate-related goals into the Transatlantic partnership.” 

She proposed a three-fold way forward on the issue of security impacts of climate change: 1/ to scale climate adaptation, 2/ to address the complex relationship between water, peace, and security, and 3 /to act more decisively on security implications of climate change. Finally, she pledged that as the co-chair of the Water Conference in 2023, the Netherlands will ensure that the issue of climate change implications on security will be given due attention.

The panel discussion was moderated by Mr. Henk Ovink, Netherlands Special Envoy for International Water Affairs. He argued that even though climate urgency is all over the place it is still unclear how to make climate action actionable and to translate it into concrete solutions. 

Dr. Sharon Burke, Director and Senior Advisor at New America, was the first panelist, she made an interesting observation: “water is a language, it is used by societies to express that they are experiencing climate change”. Indeed, water scarcity and the increasing occurrence of droughts are indicators of global warming. She highlighted that water and climate change create misery but also exacerbate conflicts and violence. According to her now is the time for concrete action grounded in best practices and shared knowledge. To implement this we have to realise that interests of people all around the world are mutual and act accordingly.

Mr. Hinrich Thölken, Director Climate and Energy Policy and Digital Transformation at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spoke next. He suggested that the role of the Transnational Alliance could be to share understanding and operation response for climate mitigation and adaptation across the Atlantic and learn from each other. This dialogue and cooperation will help to put this issue on top of the agenda. He recommended that, despite the fact that water is a very political topic, to contribute to water security projects abroad, one should put their personal interest or ambition aside and think about the common good.

Indeed, he says; “we were only credible when we proved that we did not have any strategic interests in the project. Our disinterest put us at the table.” Besides, he highlighted the need for the security community especially the military to start seeing climate change as a security risk, which was not the case a few years ago.  He strongly believes that climate action becoming a race to the top internationally is not an efficient way forward as it would be detrimental to a meaningful discussion and cooperation. 

Dr. Benedetta Berti, Head of Policy Planning of the NATO Office of the Secretary General, emphasized the role that the alliance had to play in the future of mitigating the effects of climate change. She discussed how, just like all aspects of society, the future of military operations have a vested interest in understanding the root causes of climate change and ensuring that they can be addressed; saying, “We understand that there may be more extreme weather events and disasters around us. NATO as an alliance has a role to play. We have just agreed on a climate change agenda.

It is an exciting time for transatlantic cooperation on this topic.” According to Ms. Berti, going forward, NATO views climate change as a factor which must be considered in all decision making. The Alliance is currently undergoing a joint mapping of environmental footprint so it can be better understood how, where, and to what degree the militaries involved are leaving environmental impact.

Rounding out the panel was Mr. Tom Middendorp, Chair of the International Military Council on Climate and Security. Mr. Middendorp emphasized the urgency of the issue of water security, describing water as the “Blue Oil” which will drive the future. However, he also addressed the unique role that the security sector can play in this crisis as a platform for new innovations in self sustaining communities and other green technologies. According to Mr. Middendorp though, these innovations will have their value within the paradigm of trans-national cooperation in which militaries do, and must continue to expand, operations in; and it is encouraging to see the United States adopting a redoubled commitment to partnership and climate priorities under new administration.

Commenting on this, moderator Mr. Ovink described the military as a key platform for these partnerships, as they are strengthened when peacekeeping is also sustainable development.

Dr. Susanne Schmeier of Water Peace and Security concluded the panel with comments emphasizing the importance again of these synergies between alliance partners, but also across the 4D communities of development, diplomacy, defense, and disaster.

The panel reflected a cautiously optimistic tone, spurred by recent developments and heightened commitments by alliance partners such as the United States and NATO overall to combating the generational crisis of climate change; while still reserving the extreme urgency and emphasis which must be placed upon these issues as policy makers cannot let shorter term crises like the COVID-19 pandemic distract us from the existential threat that climate change poses to societies all over the world.