2021 Early Elections in Kosovo:

End of an era 

The fifth parliamentary (early) elections in Kosovo, since its declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, will take place on 14 February 2021. 

The Kosovo Assembly has 120 representatives, with 20 mandates reserved for members of minority communities. Specifically, the Serb community gets 10 mandates, while the Bosniak community gets three, Turkish two, RAE (Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian) four and Goran community one mandate. 

The early elections were announced after the Kosovo Constitutional Court has ruled unconstitutional the vote of representative Etem Arifi from the Ashkali Party, because he had been sentenced to a prison term of 15 months for fraud related to subsidies, but still participated in the election of the government headed by Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti (LDK) on 3 June 2020, which was elected with the support of 61 representative (61/120). On the basis of the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Acting President of Kosovo Vjosa Osmani announced early elections for 14 February 2021. 

The same decision of the Constitutional Court stipulates that the persons who had been sentenced in the period of the last three years cannot run at the upcoming elections. 

Vjosa Osmani has been the Acting President of Kosovo since 5 November 2020, when Hashim Thaci (PDK) resigned from office, after the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC-SPO – Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office) had confirmed the indictment against him for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 

Analysts assess that the upcoming parliamentary elections are the last chance for a showdown with crime and corruption, as well as war crimes, without which there can be no economic recovery, visa liberalization and integration of Kosovo into modern international trends. This is a matter of ending an era of war leaders in Kosovo, majority of which had been engaged in war crimes, as well as deeply involved in crimes. The election campaign is taking place at the time of the Covid-19 pandemic, when gatherings are limited to a maximum of 4 people, and the major floods in some parts of Kosovo. That is why the media, internet and social networks, dominated by younger population, will play an important role in the election campaign. 

Analysts believe that[2], bearing in mind the recent gatherings of political parties prior to the beginning of the election campaign, the country has become an experimental area in which the fight for power is uncompromising. Many countries that are more stable than Kosovo could not afford to have three governments in a period of one year.

The situation in Kosovo is already alarming, because there are only € 34 million in the budget reserves. The political structures ignore the citizens and the business community, while the workers are suffering major damage. This will strongly reflect on the economic and social aspects, primarily psychological, because Kosovo citizens have already lost hope in a better tomorrow. Remittances from the diaspora were two times bigger than the government’s recovery package. It is assessed that since 1999 the diaspora has sent to Kosovo more than € 40 billion. In 2020 alone, the remittances from the diaspora amounted to € 800 million (€ 1 billion less because of the Covid-19 pandemic). A point of concern is also the fact that more than 50% of the Kosovo budget is spent on salaries and per diems. In comparison to other countries, Kosovo received the smallest amount of resources from international funds for combating the Covid-19 pandemic and the economic recovery. The most responsible for such a situation are the Kosovo Government and Parliament. 

Kosovo is one of the countries in the region that still has a problem with the final electoral register, which is unprocessed and untrustworthy, because it is illogical that there are more voters than citizens in Kosovo. 

Kosovo flag


Kosovo political “Trio”

The early parliamentary elections in Kosovo will be dominated by three main political rivals: the Self-Determination Movement VetĂ«vendosje (LVV) headed by Albin Kurti, Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) headed by Isa Mustafa, and Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) headed by its Acting President Enver Hoxhaj. In addition to the “great Trio”, Ramush Haradinaj with his Alliance for Future of Kosovo (AAK) also trying to impose himself and his party as the fourth main actor at the elections. A new actor that has emerged on the political scene is the Građanska lista /Citizen List/ headed by Vjosa Osmani, which could win over support of a part of LDK voters. That is why the pre-election and winning alliance between Albin Kurti and Vjosa Osmani is the strongest political force, because they represent a new quality, which brings together the broadest political spectrum in Kosovo, and majority of citizens will be able to relate with it. It is interesting that the leading parties did not report any pre-election coalitions to the Election Commission, which is also an illustration of their mutual relations. 

With the introduction of 100% taxes on the import of goods from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, Haradinaj has grossly violated the international Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and caused irreparable damage to Kosovo in international relations and a damage amounting to € 600 million, while the damage caused to Serbia totals € 400 million.

Haradinaj is still under the suspicion that he had committed war crimes and criminal offenses. He is also a symbol of “dark forces from the past” which Kosovo does not need, because such forces cannot provide Kosovo a brighter future- as they have demonstrated over their past 20 years in power. Hashim Thaci exacted for himself the presidential position four years ago, believing that in such a way he could avoid being prosecuted. This was a period of significant regression and deterioration of international image of Kosovo. Haradinaj was also driven by his own selfish and he has nominated himself for the position of President of Kosovo. 

Analysts believe that the new convocation of the Kosovo Parliament could adopt modification of the provision of the Constitution regulating that the Kosovo President is elected in the Kosovo Parliament, so that in the future the president is elected directly at presidential elections. In such a way the president of Kosovo would have a bigger legitimacy – as in such a way, trade among the parties, which is very often at a level of a criminal offense, would be eliminated. Namely, an interparty agreement on who will be the next president of Kosovo were made several months or even years in advance. Such practice includes elements of a criminal offense and has nothing in common with democracy and the democratic election process. 


“Kosovo Four” reminds of so-called “Croatian six”

After the indictments against the four leaders of the former Kosovo Liberation Army (OVK/UCK), Hashim Thaci, Kadri Veseli, Jakup Krasniqi and Rexhep Selimi, for a number crimes against humanity and war crimes, including assassination, forced disappearance of persons, persecution and torture had been confirmed (KSC-SPO), they were transferred to The Hague. Although some experts had expected that mass demonstrations would be organized before their departure to The Hague, nothing of the kind happened. Hashim Thaçi (PDK), Kadri Veseli (PDK) and other indictees listed bear criminal responsibility for almost 100 assassinations. The victims of the crimes listed in the indictment include hundreds of persons whose identity is known and who include Kosovo Albanians, Serbs, Roma and persons of other ethnicities, as well as political opponents. 

Analysts believe that the departure of the four OVK/UCK leaders remind of the departure of the so-called “Croatian six” (Jadranko PrlićSlobodan PraljakMilivoj PetkovićValentin ĆorićBerislav PuĆĄić and Bruno Stojić) to The Hague in 2004. They were first indicted and later sentenced for the war crimes they had committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Except for the brief “mourning period” and “expression of bereavement”, accompanied with an emphasis on the stance that they are “the heroes”- nothing spectacular happened. The situation was similar with the so-called “Kosovo Four”- which was not only accused of war crimes, but majority of them were also involved in and/or connected with crimes in peacetime. If they were not to be tried for war crimes, they would be tried for the crimes they had committed in peacetime. The situation is the same with the so called “Croatian Six”. They are proven criminals and their prosecution brought a relief to their countrymen and other citizens from the area.

The so-called “Kosovo Four” will be very quickly forgotten and their influence will gradually waken, because Kosovo needs to be developed as a modern society based on the rule of law and respect of true European values. The priority is the visa liberalization, which is now getting a chance to be implemented, while the so-called “Kosovo Four” will very quickly be forgotten, just like Croatian one was. 

Analysts warn of the threat of assassination of the protected witnesses and the danger of release of the so-called “Kosovo Four”, because Thaçi and Veseli  have already been accused by the Kosovo Specialist Chamber for obstruction of the work of the court[3], which they later manipulated through the Association of OVK/UCK Veterans and its engagement in the criminal offences against the judiciary, obstruction of officials in the exercise of their official duty, intimidation of witnesses, retaliation and breach of the secrecy of the proceedings before the KSC-SPO. It is necessary to conduct an investigation into how and why have 13 protected witnesses been killed so far, and to sanction both the order-givers and the perpetrators. 


Hoxhaj and Rama stopped international recognitions of Kosovo 

Enver Hoxhaj (PDK) stated in late December 2020 in Tirana: “We will also have concrete proposals on integration of economies of Kosovo and Albania.” Hoxhaj evidently does not understand economy and obvious lacks vision, because Kosovo needs to be integrated into the modern European and global economic trends, not Albanian trends. 

Kosovo has not seized the favorable moment for its recognition. Serbia got actively engaged on stopping new international recognitions of Kosovo and having some existing recognitions withdrawn. In fact, it was partly successful in that respect. The then coalition partners, Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) headed by Prime Minister Isa Mustafa and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) headed by Kadri Veseli brought Kosovo into a difficult situation- in all the segments and particularly with respect to international recognitions. Their mutual rivalries went so far that the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo Enver Hoxhaj (PDK) blocked the activities on further international recognition of Kosovo, so that any possible success could not be attributed to the then Kosovo Prime Minister Isa Mustafa and the LDK. 

With the rhetoric about annexation of Kosovo to Albania, the Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama (PS) discouraged the states that had intended to recognize Kosovo – and they eventually gave up on their intentions to recognize Kosovo. This created irreparable damage to Kosovo. 


“Srpska lista”  targeted by Albanian parties and Serb opposition 

Analysts believe that the upcoming early parliamentary elections in Kosovo will be marked by a new showdown between a part of the Serb opposition and the Albanian political parties, including the Serb List (SL – Srpska lista), which is supported by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić (SNS). In fact, through the Serb List (SL), which is the favorite of the Kosovo Serb community in the elections, they will try to “settle the accounts” with the Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. As a result, in Kosovo, in the final phase of the election campaign   the tensions against the Serb List will significantly increase- not excluding the possibility of use of violence. It is of exceptional importance to finalize the dialogue between the official Belgrade and PriĆĄtina with the signing of a legally binding agreement, to “abolish” borders in the region and remove the barriers, and in such a way commence intensive mutual cooperation, which would constitute true European behavior. In fact, the “Mini Schengen” regional initiative is aimed at fulfillment of such goals. This is confirmed also by the fact that in the past year Serbia attracted 60% of all direct foreign investments in the region, while the percentage of such investments in Kosovo is negligible. 

Who is against “Vučić’s” vaccines in Kosovo?

The Kosovo authorities have not adequately responded to the Covid-19 pandemic. Kosovo citizens are distraught, as they constantly hear that the vaccines have still not been procured for Kosovo, nor have they been ordered, as well as that it is in spring 2021 that they can expect arrival of a small quantity of vaccines, which will be provided as a part of international assistance. 

It was announced that the vaccination of a larger part of population will take place next autumn or in 2022. Both Kosovo and international media report on the dramatic situation in the Kosovo healthcare system. 

Serbia was the first country in the region and the second in Europe to procure a contingent of vaccines from the US Pfizer company. In Serbia the vaccination of population begun on 24 December 2020. Serbian healthcare institutions expect arrival of significant quantities of vaccines of other manufacturers, including the Russian and Chinese ones, in January 2021. Serbian Minister of Health Zlatibor Lončar stated that he had been instructed by Serbian President Vučića that there must not be any segregation of people on ethnic, religious or any other basis, because vaccines delivered to Kosovo were intended for all those who need them. After the vaccines, which were dubbed “Vučić’s” vaccines, were delivered, Kosovo authorities protested. This generated disappointment among Kosovo citizens, because they badly need the vaccines. The vaccines sent from Serbia are intended for Kosovo citizens independent of their ethnic affiliations, which is why the citizens do not understand who is against “Vučić’s” vaccines? In the current difficult situation in the healthcare sector any humaneness and humanity is priceless. There is a reasonable possibility that the negligence of the Kosovo Government and its failure to undertake appropriate measures in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the delayed procurement of vaccines, could result in additional 5,000 victims. 

Kurti has no obstacles to become a representative or prime minister

The decision of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo ruling the Kosovo Government headed by Avdullah Hoti unconstitutional also stipulates that persons who in the past three years had received a final sentence cannot run at elections. Such a decision is primarily related to Albin Kurti and his LVV.

The criminal offense for which Kurti was issued a suspended sentence had been committed in 2015, when Criminal Code no. 04/L-082 was in force. Namely, Article 100/2 of the Law regulated that legal consequences of the punishment cannot be created where a fine, suspended sentence or judicial admonition is imposed on the perpetrator. 

Article 3 of the Code envisages that the law in effect at the time a criminal offense was committed shall be applied to the perpetrator.

The situation would be completely different had the offense been committed after 2019, that is after the new Code no. 06/L-074 had entered into force. Pursuant to Article 93/2, of the aforementioned Code, legal consequences of the punishment cannot be created where a fine or judicial admonition is imposed on the perpetrator. 

Analysts believe that it is a paradox that those who had voted in favor of the illegal Government of Kosovo, as was confirmed by the relevant ruling of the Constitutional Court, are now trying to dispute Kurti’s democratic right to be a candidate for the Kosovo Parliament and the position of the Kosovo Prime Minister, despite the fact that there are no legal obstacles for him to run at the elections. In fact, the ones who had appointed an illegal government and who have no credibility, nowadays argue that Kurti cannot run at the elections because a suspended sentence- which has already expired- had been issued against him. The Kosovo Election Commission is still under the influence of Hashim Thaci and the PDK, and, therefore, special attention should be paid to it.


Respect of international obligations and signed agreements

The new Kosovo Government will have to respect the undertaken international obligations and the signed agreements such as the Brussels Agreement, which also includes the obligation to establish the Community of Serb Municipalities (ZSO), the CEFTA Agreement, the Washington Agreement, etc. A positive example can be found in the the Government of Montenegro, which after the fall of the autocratic Milo Đukanović‘s (DPS) regime, has taken over all the international obligations and the agreements signed. 

The undertaken obligations cannot be avoided but are to be fully, not selectively, implemented. The achieved agreements can be reconsidered, but in no way negated. 

The dialogue will not be simple at all, because once again the focus will be put on the painful issue of missing persons, as well as the non-fulfillment of what has been agreed and signed in Brussels in April 2013 – the Community of Serb Municipalities (ZSO).

A testimony that the dialogue between the official Belgrade and PriĆĄtina cannot be observed through the “black-and-white” prism are the words of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić (SNS), who had stated on several occasions: “We can talk about everything only in the context of a compromise.  You will never get my signature for an option in which the Albanians get everything, while Serbia gets nothing. You will also not have my support for something of the kind. Currently, I am the President of Serbia. Maybe you will find someone else who will be willing to accept something of the kind -without achieving a compromise, but just by following ultimatums.“ 

Analysts believe that key importance should be attached to finalization of the dialogue between the official Belgrade and PriĆĄtina under EU mediation and the full implementation of the agreed – particularly bearing in mind that the implementation of the Brussels Agreement was proven faulty. 

Ljubljana/Washington/PriĆĄtina, 18 January 2021

Published by IFIMES – The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyzes developments in the Middle East, the Balkans and around the world. IFIMES has analyzed the current political situation in Kosovo in the context of the early parliamentary elections, which are to take place on 14 February 2021.

Malaysia Contributes €10,000 to Future OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology

The Hague, Netherlands–14 October 2020–The Government of Malaysia has contributed €10,000 to a special Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Trust Fund to support the project to upgrade the current OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store.
This project will result in the construction of a new facility, the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology (“ChemTech Centre”).The contribution was formalized during a ceremony between the Charge d’Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Representation of Malaysia to the OPCW, Dr Mohd Norhisyam Mohd Yusof, and OPCW Director-General, H.E. Mr Fernando Arias, which was held at OPCW Headquarters in The Hague.
Charge d’Affaires a.i. Dr Mohd Yusof remarked: “Malaysia views the upgrading of the current OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store to the ChemTech Centre as a crucial step in strengthening the Organisation’s capabilities to comprehensively address new and re-emerging chemical weapons threats. The new ChemTech Centre will also catapult capacity-building efforts for OPCW Member States, particularly in developing countries.
Malaysia, for instance, is interested in advancing our expertise as a nation and a regional player. As a highly principled and committed member of the OPCW, Malaysia stands ready to contribute to our joint efforts to end the use of chemical weapons.

”While thanking Malaysia for its contribution, Director-General Arias emphasized the importance of having Malaysia in the list of contributors and recognized the support of Malaysia to the OPCW.The Director-General also renewed his appeal to all OPCW Member States in a position to make voluntary contributions to do so. He further emphasised the important role the new ChemTech Centre will play in strengthening the OPCW’s ability to address chemical weapon threats and enhance capacity building activities. He highlighted that “all contributions, regardless of size, are greatly appreciated”.So far, 45 countries, the European Union, and three other donors have contributed or pledged to contribute financially to the ChemTech Centre project, and a considerable amount has been raised to date.

Billions in economic damage worldwide saved by the international Courts in the Peace Palace

A recent study shows that the Peace Palace in The Hague (Netherlands) contributes very positively to the international economy. The Peace Palace houses two of the most important Courts in the world, the United Nations International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. By solving conflicts in the courtroom, the Courts in the Palace help avoiding billions of damage and loss as a result of warfare.

Economic impact
The recently published study by Decisio, shows that the Peace Palace has great value for the world economy as the institutions located at the Palace are saving the international community billions of euros in economic damage.

It is hard to measure exactly what would have happened without the intervention of the two Courts housed in the Peace Palace, which is why three scenarios with variations in the type and number of conflicts were applied during the study. In the lowest scenario, it was conservatively assumed that in the history of the Courts only 1 small-scale conflict was solved, and in the highest scenario 4 small-scale conflicts and 2 large-scale conflicts were prevented or solved. Of course, ensuring peace and saving human lives are of paramount importance, but the economic value of these scenarios is also enormous: billions in costs of damage and loss are saved by preventing wars.

Even on a national level, the Peace Palace contributes positively to the economy:It accounts for more than 720 jobs (of which 229 within the Palace) and the institutions located at the Peace Palace annually spend 120 million euros in the Netherlands, contributing an added value of 70 million euros to the Dutch GDP.

Societal impact and improvement of international law
In addition to the economic impact, the study also demonstrates that the Peace Palace and the Courts housed in the Palace serve societal development. The researchers state that “a high rule of law score saves money, brings trust and investments and prevents people from getting stress-related diseases.”
In addition to the facts and figures, the report shows that the development of international law provides additional social impact coming from the Peace Palace. It facilitates conferences during which concepts for important regulations such as international adoption law are elaborated. At the same time, The Hague Academy of International Law, since its establishment, has educated more than 50,000 students and lawyers from all over the world, the future ambassadors and judges of their countries.

International radiance of the cultural heritage site
Only one of the six principal organs of the United Nations is located outside of New York – and that is the International Court of Justice based in The Peace Palace in The Hague. The more than a century old Palace is also the oldest of a small number of buildings related to the UN. It is registered as a National Monument and carries the European Heritage Label. According to the researchers, the Peace Palace therefore has a high cultural, historical and architectural value.
“In the Peace Palace, international jurisdiction, cultural heritage and international relations come together on neutral ground and the fruits of these endeavors are made accessible to a broad public. We can be proud of this, but at the same time, we also have an obligation to maintain this successful concept for future generations” explains Mr. Piet Hein Donner, chairman of the board of the Carnegie Foundation and former Minister of Justice of the Netherlands.

The Peace Palace
The Peace Palace was built after the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 in which many countries at that time participates. It opened its doors in 1913, thanks to a donation from the philanthropist Andrew Carnegie who established the Carnegie Foundation to build and maintain the Palace in perpetuity. Today, the Peace Palace houses the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the United Nations International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Hague Academy of International Law. The two Courts settle international disputes through arbitration and jurisdiction. The Carnegie Foundation also manages the Peace Palace Library that supports the Courts and the Academy with its collection of international law since their beginning.

Full report
A group of international experts with, among others, a Judge from the International Court of Justice, as well as experts from Leiden University, the municipality of The Hague, the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), and several ambassadors contributed to the report. Decisio’s researchers collected and analyzed all figures, facts and interviews independently and neutrally, with the support of the Municipality of The Hague, and the commissioning party being the Carnegie Foundation that owns and manages the Peace Palace.

The full report can be read and downloaded on the website of the Peace Palace:
https://www.vredespaleis.nl/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Decisio-Economic-and-social-impact-of-the-Peace-Palace.pdf

Derecho Penal Internacional en español

Nueva base de datos

La Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) ha publicado en su sitio web una Base de Datos sobre Programas de Estudio sobre Derecho Penal Internacional en Español la cual compila una serie de programas académicos como maestrías virtuales y presenciales, diplomados, cursos de especialización, entre otros, que se enfocan en el estudio del Derecho Penal Internacional (DPI) y/o de la CPI.

El objetivo de esta base de datos, es poner a disposición de la comunidad académica información acerca de distintos espacios de capacitación en lengua española que puedan contribuir a fortalecer su conocimiento respecto al DPI en general, así como acerca del funcionamiento, objetivos y desafíos de la CPI.

Este proyecto se suma a otras iniciativas que viene impulsando la CPI destinadas a la creación y el desarrollo de herramientas y plataformas que funcionen como recursos de apoyo para la comunidad académica interesada en el trabajo de la CPI y la promoción del DPI.

Por ejemplo, como parte de tales iniciativas, la CPI lanzó durante el año 2020 un Curso Modelo sobre Derecho Internacional Penal y Corte Penal Internacional en español de 16 semanas que incluye una lista exhaustiva de lecturas abiertas y gratuitas que ofrecen una visión completa de las publicaciones en español en línea existentes sobre DPI y la CPI.

Puede contribuir con la ampliación de esta base de datos, mediante el envío de información sobre programas académicos similares a los que aquella incluye a la siguiente dirección de correo electrónico: Academia@icc-cpi.int.

2021 Early Elections on Kosovo: Chance for New Beginning?


For Kosovo, 2021 is a year of elections. The fifth parliamentary (early) elections will be held on 14 February 2021. After establishment of the parliamentary majority the next President of Kosovo will be elected, after what regular local elections will follow.

In such a situation there is no ambiance for serious work, particularly with respect to combating the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as strengthening civic and other freedoms. The entire social-political life revolves around the elections and election campaigns.

In January 20211, the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) publicized an analysis titled “2021 Early Elections in Kosovo: End of an Era”, link: https://www.ifimes.org/en/9964  (17-01-2021).
 
The Kosovo Assembly has 120 representatives, with 20 mandates reserved for members of minority communities. Specifically, the Serb community gets 10 mandates, while the Bosniak community gets three, Turkish two, RAE (Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian) four and Goran community one mandate. 

According to the records of the Kosovo Central Election Commission, 1.9 million voters have been registered for the upcoming early elections. They are administratively divided into 38 municipalities with 1.8 million citizens. Citizens from the diaspora are due to vote by 13 February 2021. The Central Election Commission has accepted 175,273 voters who will vote by mail. At the previous elections, 35,087 voters were allowed to vote by mail from outside of Kosovo. A total of 28 political subjects will participate in the elections. Specifically, 21 political parties, two coalitions and five civic initiatives. The election campaign commenced on 2 February and will last only 10 days. However, the informal campaign has been going on for several months already. 

Kosovo is one of the countries in the region that still has problems with the final electoral register, which is unprocessed and untrustworthy, because it is illogical that there are more voters than citizens in Kosovo. A special point of concern is the fact that an extremely high number of 175,273 voters has applied to vote by mail, which understandably creates suspicions about possible manipulations. After the evaluation of applications, 101,839 applications for registration were approved, while 29,633 were denied. 
 

Devastating indicators of the situation on Kosovo


Each year the World Justice Project (WJP)[2] publishes the Rule of Law Index list, which is considered a leading global source for reliable and independent data on the rule of law and ranks the countries with respect to their rule of law performance. 

While countries with strong and independent judiciary rank high, countries with corrupted judges are ranked at the bottom of the list. The ranking of Kosovo on the recently published Rule of Law Index for 2020 is devastating. Specifically, out of 128 countries Kosovo is ranked 54th with respect to the rule of law, 97th with respect to regulatory enforcement, 62nd with respect to absence of corruption, 93rd with respect to civil justice and 56th with respect to criminal justice. 

On the Corruption Perceptions Index list compiled by Transparency International[3] for 2020, Kosovo ranked 104th on the list of 179 countries. Specifically, it was in the same group as Vietnam, Albania, Cote d’Ivoire, Thailand, Algeria and El Salvador. (Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2020). 

In the report by the Reporters Without Borders[4], Kosovo is ranked 70th on the list of 180 countries, which indicates that it is in the group of “partly free” countries with respect to media freedom. (Source: Reporters Without Borders 2020).


Political-criminal structures do not build a country and institutions 


So far, after coming to power, all Kosovo governments announced rapid development and promised to build strong institutions that will be a factor of internal stability and peace, and in such a way contribute to stability and peace in the region.  However, the promises were not fulfilled and Kosovo citizens are deeply disappointed with the ruling political structures, because in the entire region only Kosovo has not granted a visa-free regime. The practice shows that nowhere in the world have political-criminal structures developed strong state institutions. In fact, they did just the opposite. The permanent political crisis in Kosovo is a political concept and the method of survival in power for the current political structures. 

The roots of crimes in Kosovo go back to the period of the government in exile. The nucleus of the crimes includes commanders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK-OVK) and (para)intelligence service (ShIK), who operate in cooperation with political structures. ShIK was to be dissolved in 2008, because in 2009 the official Kosovo Intelligence Agency (AKI-KIA) was established.  

A perusal of the recent history reveals strong connections between current political leaders and enormous amounts of money collected through various funds. Specifically, “Vendlindja thrret” (Homeland is Calling) Fund, “Levizja Popullore e Kosoves” (People’s Movement of Kosovo), which was initially established in 1997-98 and tasked to collect money in the diaspora (in 1999 the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) was created from it), and the “3% Fund” established in 1991 under the control of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). Their activities lacked transparency and were connected with enormous enrichment of specific current and former political leaders and members of their immediate families.  

Crime and corruption continued also after the international intervention and the war on Kosovo in 1999. Nepotism is omnipresent is all segments of the society. In fact it is directly controlled and directed by the leaderships of the political parties. 
 

Specialist Chambers and Prosecutor’s Office key for the future of Kosovo 


The Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (KSC-SPO)[5] were established in 2015. They became operational in July 2017, and started functioning at full capacity in the second half of 2020. 

In Kosovo there is the national judiciary, as well as the international mission of the European Union named Eulex, which was mandated to establish the rule of law in Kosovo. This is also the biggest EU mission that has turned out to be a complete fiasco. 

Hashim Thaci, instituut Clingendael.(Den Haag 23-04-18) Foto:Frank Jansen

The Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (KSC-SPO), were envisaged as the response of Kosovo to the allegations from the Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Council of Europe (CoE) Dicky Marty about illicit trafficking of human organs and an additional impetus to Kosovo to embark on the process of de-Thaçization of Kosovo. Specifically the process of dismantling of the Thaçi’s regime, which was to lead to internal consolidation of the country. That is why it is important that the KSC-SPO has become fully operational, as it will contribute to achievement of justice, which will be a satisfaction to the victims and their loved ones, as well as relax the relations in Kosovo and ensure a better and more certain future. 

The report stipulates that the crimes had been committed by members of the Kosovo Liberation Army in the period from 1998 to 2000. The court has jurisdiction over crimes committed in Kosovo from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2000. Although it is a Kosovo court, it is funded by the EU and has international staff. Indictments against four leaders of the former Kosovo Liberation Army (OVK/UCK), Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Jakup Krasniqi and Rexhep Selimi, for a number of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including assassinations, forced disappearance of people, persecution and torture, have been confirmed.

Kadri Veseli, in The Hague July 2918.

The indictees were not granted provisional release, because Thaçi and Veseli had participated in the obstruction of justice, and because some witnesses in their case, as well as in the Ramush Haradinaj  (AAK) case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, had been assassinated. 
 

Strong trend of growth of popularity of Albin Kurti and LVV


The conducted public opinion polls in Kosovo show a strong trend of growth of popularity of the Self-Determination Movement (LVV).  Analysts believe that so far these are the only elections that will have a convincing winner. Specifically, the Self- Determination Movement, which is why this is a chance for a new beginning for Kosovo and its citizens. A convincing victory by the LVV at the recent local elections in Podujevo, the bastion of the LDK, gave a strong impetus to the election campaign of the LVV. 

The situation on the political scene in Kosovo will be informed by the level of public support directed to the Self-Determination Movement (LVV). Namely, the LVV has a significant lead ahead of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Kosovo Democratic Party (PDK), which are competing for the second position. The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and its leader Ramush Haradinaj are trying to draw attention to themselves by only nominating Ramush Haradinaj for the position of the Kosovo President and offering themselves as coalition partners to the LVV for the purposes of establishment of the government.

However, as Ramush Haradinaj is the symbol of the dark past, any public engagement of his would be to the detriment of Kosovo and its future. 

The voters are not supportive of a coalition between the LVV and other parties, because the prevailing opinion among the public is that the political-mafia structures had unconstitutionally and illegally removed the government headed by Prime Minister Albin Kurti. The youth is particularly not supportive of such a coalition because they have recognized the LVV and its leader Kurti as “fresh air” on the political scene. The disputed decision of the Kosovo Constitutional Court to ban Albin Kurti from running at the parliamentary elections because of a suspended sentence, additionally contributed to Kurti’s popularity. 

Voters believe that the current coalition government (LDK – AAK – Nisma – SL) should be sanctioned, and it is expected that the voters will punish the unprincipled coalition and its policies, which are burdened with crimes, corruption, nepotism, intimidation, threats, war crimes, assassinations and blackmails. The legacy of the previous Kosovo governments include only empty premises and damages, which the next generations of Kosovars will have to pay for. The political-criminal and mafia structures will not be able to prevent Kurti from becoming the new President of the government after the victory of the LVV, as what is required for his appointment as the president of the government is the victory of his movement at the elections, not his candidacy or election as a representative. 

Analysts warn of the synchronized campaign and intensified attacks by political-criminal structures in Kosovo, as well as the attempts of discrimination aimed against the left-wing Self-Determination Movement and its President Albin Kurti, because after these elections  a successful response to the Covid-19 pandemic, recovery from floods,  decriminalization of Kosovo and its political scene, dismantling of Hashim Thaçi’s regime, stopping of the trend of emigration of population, securing better living conditions for citizens through economic development and recovery, establishment of the rule of law and affirmation of Kosovo through regional and international cooperation will follow. The victory of the LVV will stabilize the political situation, if the LVV manages to establish on its own the new government of Kosovo. The LVV needs to demonstrate political sensibility towards minorities, particularly the Serb community. 
 

Serbia became epicenter of developments in the region


Thanks to President Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia became the epicenter of developments in the region and key to peace and stability in the region. Joint economic development and establishment of “Mini Schengen” are the priorities in regional cooperation. Individual small countries cannot attract global investors and will have more difficulties ensuring sustainable economic growth and development. That is why in the context of elimination of internal borders and administrative barriers, customs, etc., it would be more efficient for Western Balkans countries to have an agreed infrastructure policy and work together on economic recovery of the region. Opening of the integrated border crossing “PreĆĄevo/Tabanovce” between Serbia and North Macedonia is a step in that direction.

The announced opening of an integrated border crossing “Kafasan/QafĂ« ThanĂ«â€ between North Macedonia and Albania is a continuation of the initiated activities. This will lead towards establishment of a customs union, which is one of the intents of the Berlin Process. So far, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has met with the French President Emmanuel Macron 11 times, which is an illustration of affirmation of the position of Serbia in international relations. Vučić insists on a compromise, that is a “win – win” solution, between the official Belgrade and Pristina, for what he has received the support of the French President. 

“The only solutions that can pave the way to a breakthrough in the matter, which is essential for your state and your people, are those that are accepted by both sides and recognized, allowing us to resolve the important concern at the heart of our Europe[6]”, President Macron underscored. He supported the readiness of the Serbian President and “the risk he took” by proposing, as he said, innovative solutions. 

While Vučić is successfully rebranding Serbia, Kosovo is continuously regressing because of its irresponsible political elites, which hold public and responsible offices but primarily focus on their parochial interests and increasing their wealth- not the interests of Kosovo. 
 

Serbia tops global lists, Kosovo did not even begin the vaccination process


According to analysists, Serbia has further strengthened its position during the Covid-19 pandemic because of its successful response to the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020, and an even more successful vaccination of its population. According to official indicators, specifically the average data for the last seven days published on the website of the Our World in Data[7], which is associated with the University of Oxford, Serbia is ranked first in Europe and third in the world with respect to the total number of vaccination doses administered per 100 people in the total population. At the same time, in Kosovo the vaccination process has not even started. Vaccination is a complete fiasco of the government headed by Avdullah Hoti (LDK), who will probably be recorded as the most incapable prime minister of Kosovo. The number of victims of the Covid-19 pandemic will exceed all the expectations. 

At the time when Kosovo run out of PCR tests, it was Belgrade that sent 1,000 tests as assistance. “We are willing to assist, just as we would be willing to assist Albanians with vaccines,” Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabić emphasized.

The upcoming early parliamentary elections in Kosovo will be marked by a new showdown between a part of the Serb opposition and the Albanian political parties, including the Serb List (SL-Srpska lista) headed by Igor Simić, which is supported by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. In fact, through the Serb List (SL), which is the favorite of the Kosovo Serb community in the elections, they will try to “settle the accounts” with the Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić.

As a result, in Kosovo, in the final phase of the election campaign the tensions against the Serb List will significantly increase- and could even include use of violence. Therefore, it is of exceptional importance to finalize the Brussels dialogue between the official Belgrade and Pristina with the signing of a legally binding agreement, to abolish borders in the region and remove the barriers, and in such a way commence intensive mutual cooperation, which would constitute true European behavior. 

Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels/Pristina, 6 February 2021  

Published by IFIMES – The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyzes developments in the Middle East, the Balkans and around the world. IFIMES has analyzed the current political situation in Kosovo in the context of the early parliamentary elections, which are to take place on 14 February 2021.

Mahamat Said Abdel Kani makes first appearance before the ICC

Mahamat Said Abdel Kani appearing for the first time before the ICC via video-link from the ICC Detention Centre on 28 January 2021 ©ICC-CPI

On 28 and 29 January 2021, Mahamat Said Abdel Kani appeared before Judge Rosario Salvatore Aitala, Single judge of Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”). Mr Said is suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Bangui, Central African Republic (CAR), in 2013.

The Single Judge verified the identity of the suspect, and ensured that he was clearly informed of the crimes he is alleged to have committed and of his rights under the Rome Statute of the ICC in a language he fully understands and speaks, which is Sango for Mr Said.

The hearing was held in the presence of the Prosecutor and the Defence. Mr Said was represented by his Counsel Jean Pierre Madoukou and appeared via video-link from the ICC Detention Centre. Due to the current situation linked to Covid-19, some of the hearings participants took part in the hearing via video-link.

The opening of the confirmation of charges hearing was scheduled provisionally for Tuesday 5 October 2021. The purpose of the confirmation of charges procedure is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged. If the charges are confirmed, totally or partly, the case will be transferred to a Trial Chamber, which will conduct the subsequent phase of the proceedings: the trial.

Paul Gicheru on interim release with conditions in Kenya

On1 February 2021, Paul Gicheru was released to Kenya with specific conditions restricting liberty, during the confirmation of charges proceedings against him at the International Criminal Court (ICC). This follows Pre-Trial Chamber A’s decision on 29 January 2021, granting Mr Gicheru interim release with conditions. Mr Gicheru is suspected of offences against the administration of justice consisting in corruptly influencing witnesses of the Court. 

The confirmation of charges procedure in this case will, in principle, be conducted in writing to determine whether or not there is sufficient evidence to conduct the subsequent phase of the proceedings: the trial.

Background:  Pre-Trial Chamber A imposed the following conditions restricting Mr Gicheru’s liberty. Mr Gicheru:

‱         shall provide financial security to the ICC Registrar in the form of cash or bank order to the value of KSH 1,000,000 (one million Kenyan shillings);

‱         shall comply fully with all orders issued in this case and surrender himself immediately to the relevant authorities if required by the Chamber;

‱         shall appear before the Chamber at the date, time, place, and in the manner ordered by the Chamber and shall remain in attendance until excused;

‱         shall not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the court proceedings and shall not engage in any activities, directly or indirectly, that are prohibited under article 70 of the Statute;

‱         shall not contact, directly or indirectly, any of the Prosecutor’s witnesses or victims in this case, except through counsel authorised to represent him before this Court and in accordance with the applicable protocols;

‱         shall not, directly or through any other person, make any public statements, social media post, or communicate with the media about the merits of the case;

‱         shall reside in Kenya at a specific address for the duration of the proceedings when not present in the Netherlands for the purposes of court proceedings, unless otherwise authorised in advance by the Chamber;

‱         shall provide the Registrar with copies of all passports, visas, identity documents, and any other travel documents issued to him; shall not travel internationally except to the extent permitted by the Chamber and shall inform the Registrar or his delegate, no later than seven days prior to any international travel;

‱         shall report once a week to the Registrar, his delegate, or other person(s) on the date and time and in the manner to be determined by the Registrar, which may include the use of video conferencing technology; and

‱         shall provide the Registrar with all mobile and other telephone numbers and shall ensure that at least one of his mobile telephone numbers remains active and with sufficient credit to be reachable at any time.

The Chamber found that, in the event that Mr Gicheru would fail to comply with any of the conditions restricting liberty specified in its decision, the Chamber may declare the financial security provided by Mr Gicheru forfeit to the Court, issue a warrant of arrest in respect of Mr Gicheru at the request of the Prosecutor or on its own initiative, and/or issue any other order it deems relevant in relation to a failure to comply with these conditions.

The arrest warrant against Mr Gicheru and Philip Kipkoech Bett was issued under seal on 10 March 2015 and unsealed on 10 September 2015 for offences against the administration of justice consisting in corruptly influencing witnesses of the Court. On 2 November 2020, Paul Gicheru surrendered in The Netherlands and was surrendered to the ICC custody on 3 November 2020. His first appearance before the ICC took place 6 November 2020. On 11 December 2020, Pre-Trial Chamber A severed sever the cases against Paul Gicheru and Philip Kipkoech Bett.

Dominic Ongwen dĂ©clarĂ© coupable de crimes de guerre et de crimes contre l’humanitĂ© commis en Ouganda

Dominic Ongwen during the verdict before the International Criminal Court on 4 February 2021 ©ICC-CPI

Today, 4 February 2021, Trial Chamber IX of the International Criminal Court found Dominic Ongwen guilty for a total of 61 comprising crimes against humanity and war crimes, committed in Northern Uganda between 1 July 2002 and 31 December 2005. The verdict may be appealed by either party to the proceedings within 30 days after the notification of the Judgment.

ICC Trial Chamber IX, composed of Judge Bertram Schmitt, Presiding Judge, Judge Péter Kovåcs and Judge Raul Cano Pangalangan, analysed the evidence submitted and discussed before it at trial and found, beyond any reasonable doubt, that Mr Ongwen is guilty of the following crimes:

(i)     attacks against the civilian population as such, murder, attempted murder, torture, enslavement, outrages upon personal dignity, pillaging, destruction of property and persecution; committed in the context of the four specified attacks on the Internally Displaced Persons camps (“IDP camps”)  Pajule (10 October 2003), Odek (29 April 2004), Lukodi (on or about 19 May 2004) and Abok (8 June 2004);

(ii)   sexual and gender based crimes, namely, forced marriage, torture, rape, sexual slavery, enslavement, forced pregnancy and outrages upon personal dignity he committed against seven women (whose names and individual stories are specified in the judgment) who were abducted and placed into his household;

(iii) A number of further sexual and gender based crimes he committed against girls and women within the Sinia brigade, namely forced marriage, torture, rape, sexual slavery and enslavement; and

(iv) The crime of conscripting children under the age of 15 into the Sinia brigade and using them to participate actively in hostilities.

Judges of ICC Trial Chamber IX pronouncing the verdict against Dominic Ongwen on 4 February 2021 ©ICC-CPI

The Chamber found that these crimes were committed in the context of the armed rebellion of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)against the government of Uganda. The LRA, including Dominic Ongwen, perceived as associated with the government of Uganda, and thus as the enemy, the civilians living in Northern Uganda. This concerned in particular those who lived in government-established IDP camps.

The Chamber found that Dominic Ongwen is fully responsible for all these crimes. The Chamber did not find evidence that supported the claim that he suffered from any mental disease or disorder during the period relevant to the charges or that he committed these crimes under duress or under any threats.

Following this verdict, the Chamber will impose on Dominic Ongwen the sentence for the crimes of which he has been convicted. For this purpose, it will receive submissions on the appropriate sentence by the Prosecutor, the Defence for Dominic Ongwen and the legal representatives of the participating victims.

A decision in this regard, including as concerns the timeline of the proceedings leading to the imposition of the sentence, has also been issued by the Chamber today. The ICC’s founding treaty, the Rome Statute, does not provide for a death penalty; the sentence may be up to 30 years of imprisonment (and under exceptional circumstances a life imprisonment) and/or a fine. Furthermore, a phase dedicated to the reparations to victims will be opened. 

American Chemical Society Contributes to OPCW

American Chemical Society Contributes $10,000 to Future OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology

The Hague, Netherlands – 5 February 2021 – The American Chemical Society (ACS) has contributed $10,000 to a special Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Trust Fund to support the construction of a new facility, the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology (“ChemTech Centre”).  

The contribution was formalised on 14 December 2020 through an exchange of letters.  

ACS Chief Executive Office, Dr Tom Connelly, stated: “The ethical practice of chemistry is a core value of the American Chemical Society. We are honoured to support the new OPCW ChemTech Centre and its mission to train scientists and policymakers to protect humanity from future chemical weapon threats. The safe practice of chemistry requires collaborations between the public and private sectors and ACS is proud to support the OPCW’s vital role in ensuring a safe global chemistry enterprise.”  

The Director-General expressed: â€œI am deeply grateful to ACS, the first chemical science organisation to support this crucial project. The new Centre will build on our existing technical and analytical capacity and bring us closer to our goal of achieving a world free of chemical weapons.” 

Director-General Arias appealed to all OPCW States Parties and other donors in a position to make voluntary contributions to do so. He further emphasised the important role the new ChemTech Centre will play in strengthening the OPCW’s ability to address chemical weapon threats and enhance capacity building activities to the benefit of all 193 OPCW Member States. He highlighted that “all contributions, regardless of size, are greatly appreciated”. 

So far, 45 countries, the European Union, and four other donors have contributed or pledged to contribute financially to the ChemTech Centre project, and a considerable amount has been raised to date.  

In the icture Dr. Thomas M. Connelly Jr.
Executive Director & Chief Executive Officer, American Chemical Association.
Photography by the America Chemical Association.

ICC decision to territorial jurisdiction over Palestine

ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issues its decision on the Prosecutor’s request related to territorial jurisdiction over Palestine

Today, 5 February 2021, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”) decided, by majority, that the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in the Situation in Palestine, a State party to the ICC Rome Statute, extends to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, namely Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

On 20 December 2019, the ICC Prosecutor announced the conclusion of the preliminary examination of the Situation in Palestine. The Prosecutor determined that all the statutory criteria under the Rome Statute for the opening of an investigation have been met. A decision on opening the investigation in this situation is in the remit of the ICC Prosecutor. On 22 January 2020, the Prosecutor seized the Chamber under article 19(3) of the Rome Statute, requesting a ruling only on the scope of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in the Situation in the State of Palestine

In today’s decision, Pre-Trial Chamber I recalled that the ICC is not constitutionally competent to determine matters of statehood that would bind the international community. By ruling on the territorial scope of its jurisdiction, the Chamber is neither adjudicating a border dispute under international law nor prejudging the question of any future borders. The Chamber’s ruling is for the sole purpose of defining the Court’s territorial jurisdiction.

Pre-Trial Chamber I examined the Prosecutor’s request as well as the submissions of other States, organisations and scholars who participated as amicus curiae and groups of victims. The Chamber held that, in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to its terms in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the Statute, the reference to ‘[t]he State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred’ in article 12(2)(a) of the Statute must be interpreted as a reference to a State Party to the Rome Statute.

The Chamber found that, regardless of its status under general international law, Palestine’s accession to the Statute followed the correct and ordinary procedure and that the Chamber has no authority to challenge and review the outcome of the accession procedure conducted by the Assembly of States Parties. Palestine has thus agreed to subject itself to the terms of the ICC Rome Statute and has the right to be treated as any other State Party for the matters related to the implementation of the Statute.

Pre-Trial Chamber I noted that, among similarly worded resolutions, the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 67/19 â€œ[reaffirmed] the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to independence in their State of Palestine on the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967”. On this basis, the majority, composed of Judge Reine AdĂ©laĂŻde Sophie Alapini-Gansou and Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, found that the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in the Situation in Palestine extends to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, namely Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

In addition, the Chamber found, by majority, that the arguments regarding the Oslo Agreements, and its clauses limiting the scope of Palestinian jurisdiction, are not pertinent to the resolution of the issue of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine. Such matters and other further questions on jurisdiction may be examined when and if the Prosecutor submits an application for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or summons to appear.

Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut appended a partly separate opinion on the reasons for which article 19(3) of the Statute is applicable in the present situation. Judge PĂ©ter KovĂĄcs, Presiding Judge, appended a partly dissenting opinion, in which he disagrees on the fact that Palestine qualifies as ‘[t]he State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred’ for the purposes of article 12(2)(a) of the Statute, and that the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in the Situation in Palestine extends – in a quasi-automatic manner and without any restrictions – to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, namely Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.