A Long-Lasting Vision for Peace and Justice States and the ICJ

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By Edgardo Sobenes. 

It was December 2009 when I first arrived in the city of The Hague, home to 160 international organizations. Ten years since, there is still not a day that I am not taken by the city’s beauty and its tangible relevance as the beating heart of international peace and justice. However, the following paragraphs are not about The Hague, but about the relationship between States and the International Court of Justice, the United Nations’ principal judicial organ that will mark its 75thAnniversary in April 2021.

Since April 1946, over one hundred and fifty contentious cases have been brought before the Court, and more than one hundred countries have been a party to one or more of those proceedings.[1] The merits of the cases have also become more diverse, including, inter alia, cases concerning international environmental law, maritime and territorial delimitation, use of force, nuclear disarmament, discriminations and genocide. The aforementioned is a confirmation of what is already well-known, that the Court not only ‘stands at the forefront of the settlement of disputes relating to contemporary challenges’[2], but also that it is the leading standing forum with a general competence for inter-state disputes involving issues of international law.

Up to the present day, seventy-four States have recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under paragraph 2 of Article 36 of its Statute, many treaties or conventions confer jurisdiction on the Court, and seventeen disputes have been referred to it under a Special Agreement. Noticeably, countries’ sovereign decision to bring their conflicts before the ICJ denotes the trust of the international community in it as a successful means to solve their legal disputes.[3] The underlying reasons behind why States seek, or agree, to resolve their disputes before the Court may vary. However, there is one pillar that unites them all, and that is the will to solve conflict through law rather than force. As stated in the Special Agreement between Guatemala/Belize, States look for the Court to finally put an end to their respective disputes. 

Occasionally, the ghost of uncertainty manifests itself in the form of an unfounded notion that the Court is a means of last resort. This is erroneous. The International Court of Justice is not the last resort for dispute resolution, but rather one of the alternatives from which States can choose to obtain a resolution to their conflicts. As such, it is important to clarify that the idea of the various settlement procedures as a pyramid up which States climb, from the base of negotiation to the apex of the ICJ, is wrong.[4]

Almost 75 years after the World Court was seised for the first time, we can say with certainty that the it will continue in its effort to adjudicate disputes with dedication, impartiality, independence, and innovation. In this respect, we have seen how the Court has rapidly adapted to the unparalleled crisis brought by COVD-19, by amending its Rules and adopting measures that ensure uninterrupted fulfilment of its mandate. There are currently fifteen pending cases before the ICJ, and many more will come. Indicative not of an inability of the States to solve their problems, but a vote of confidence and trust in the rule of law.

It is a great honour and privilege to advise States in the peaceful resolution of their disputes, and to be part of a journey marked by the goals of peace and justice. As H.E. Judge Yusuf, the Court’s current President, so beautifully and succinctly expressed ‘the Court is […] spreading the bright rays of the sun of justice and of the rule of law throughout the world and offering all States the possibility of settling disputes peacefully […].’[5]

About the author:

Mr. Edgardo Sobenes, is a consultant in Public International Law, an international lawyer with extensive experience in international litigation before the International Court of Justice and a unique practice in coordinating and managing international legal team.



[1] Between 22 May 1947 and 11 November 2019, 178 cases were entered in the General List, including 27 Advisory Opinions; see https://www.icj-cij.org/en/cases

[2] Speech of H.E., Judge Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, President of the ICJ, on the occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 2020.

[3] See ‘The International Court of Justice and the Parties: A Statistical Overview’, Edgardo Sobenes,  30 April 2020, Insight Jus Mundi, available at https://blog.jusmundi.com/the-international-court-of-justice-and-the-parties-a-statistical-overview-by-edgardo-sobenes/. For more details on the cases see the Handbook of the International Court of Justice (2019) available at https://www.icj-cij.org/files/publications/handbook-of-the-court-en.pdf

[4] J. Collier & V. Lowe, ‘The Settlement of Disputes in international Law, Institutions and Procedures’ (1999), p.8.

[5] Speech of H.E., Judge Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, President of the ICJ, on the occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 2020

How to Spend it: An Austro-Franco-German Proposal for a European Covid-19 Recovery Programme

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In the picture WIIW Director Dr. Mario Holzner addressing the Conference.

By Tereza Neuwirthová.

The conference named “75 years of Europe’s Collective Security and Human Rights System”, which took place on the 1st of July at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, brought together experts related to the reality of the Old Continent and its Union over the course of the past 75 years of its post-WWII anti-fascist existence.

It was jointly organized by four different entities (the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies IFIMES, Media Platform Modern Diplomacy, International Scientific Journal European Perspectives, and Action Platform Culture for Peace) with the support of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, numerous academia supporting and media partners). 

The conference gathered over twenty high ranking speakers from Canada to Australia, and audience physically in the venue while many others attended online – from Chile to Far East. The day was filled by three panels focusing on the legacy of WWII, Nuremberg Trials, the European Human Rights Charter and their relevance in the 21st century; on the importance of culture for peace and culture of peace – culture, science, arts, sports – as a way to reinforce a collective identity in Europe; on the importance of accelerating on universalism and pan-European Multilateralism while integrating further the Euro-MED within Europe, or as the Romano Prodi’s EU Commission coined it back in 2000s – “from Morocco to Russia – everything but the institutions”. 

The event itself was probably the largest physical gathering past the early spring lock down to this very day in this part of Europe. No wonder that it marked a launch of the political rethink and recalibration named – Vienna Process

The panel under the name “Future to Europe: Is there any alternative to universal and pan-European Multilateralism? Revisiting and recalibrating the Euro-MED and cross-continental affairs”, was focused on discussing the determinants of Europe’s relations with its strategic Euro-MED and Eurasian neighbourhood, the possible pan-European political architecture as well as on the forthcoming post-crisis recovery.
    
On the latter topic, the panellist Dr. Mario Holzner, who is the Executive Director of the WIIW Austria, outlined the policy proposal on the post-pandemic European recovery programme, elaborated by his Viennese Institute in collaboration with the Paris-based research institute OFCE and the German IMK Macroeconomic Policy Institute. The Recovery Fund recently proposed by the European Commission represents a benchmark in the era of stalled European integration, and during the unstable and precarious post-pandemic times it holds a crucial role for overcoming the immense political and economic crisis of 2020. Following on much public debate about the recovery financing, which however has heretofore lacked the proposals for concrete projects that the EU should allocate the funds into, it is now urgently needed to come up with these.


WIIW, OFCE and IMK, three research tanks dealing with economic topics, suggested two main pillars – an EU one, and a national one- for the spending of the Commission’s recovery programme that reaches the amount of €2tn and is to allotted over a 10-year horizon. The spending of the EU pillar is to be channelled into the area of healthcare, eventually giving rise to a pan-European health project under the name Health4EU. Not least, another efficient allocation of the funds located in the programme’s EU pillar is to projects helping to mitigate the risks resulting from climate change, as well as to develop an EU-wide rail infrastructure that would substantively contribute to achieving the Commission’s goals of carbon-neutrality at the continent.

Among other, the proposal introduces two ambitious transport projects- a European high-speed rail infrastructure called Ultra-Rapid-Train, which would cut the travel time between Europe’s capitals, as well as disparate regions of the Union. Another suggested initiative is an integrated European Silk Road which would combine transport modes according to the equally-named Chinese undertaking. 

Dr. Holzner’s experts team put forward the idea to “electrify” the European Commission’s Green Deal. Such electrification is feasible through the realisation of an integrated electricity grid for 100%-renewable energy transmission (e-highway), the support for complementary battery and green-hydrogen projects, as well as a programme of co-financing member states’ decarbonisation and Just Transition policies. Together, the suggested policy proposals provide the basis for creating a truly sustainable European energy infrastructure. 

From the national pillar, it should be the member states themselves who benefit from the funding allocation in the overall amount of €500bn. According to the experts from WIIW, these resources should be focused on the hardest-hit countries and regions, whereas it is imperative that they are front-loaded (over the timespan of three years). 

The overall architecture of the programme’s spending, involving the largest part of the budget, needs to be focused on long-term projects and investment opportunities that would serve as a value added for the European integration, while also allowing to build resilience against the major challenges that the EU currently faces. The proposed sectors for the initiatives which could be launched from the EU’s funding programme are public health, transport infrastructure, as well as energy/decarbonisation scheme. Accordingly, it is needed that the funding programme is primarily focused on the structural and increasingly alarming threat of climate change. 

As stated in the closing remarks, to make this memorable event a long-lasting process, the organisers as well as the participants of this unique conference initiated an action plan named “Vienna Process: Common Future – One Europe.” In the framework of this enterprise, the contributing policy-makers and academics will continue to engage in meaningful activities to reflect on the trends and developments forming the European reality while simultaneously affecting the lives of millions. The European system, formed over centuries and having spanned to a political and economic Union comprising 27 states, is currently being reconfigured as a result of numerous external factors such as Brexit, the pandemic, as well as the dynamics in neighbouring regions. All of these are engendering the conditions for a novel modus operandi on the continent, whereby it is in the best intention of those partaking at this conference to contribute to a more just, secure, and peaceful European future. 

About IFIMES:

International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses developments in the Middle East, Balkans and around the world. 

About the author:

Tereza Neuwirthová.


Tereza Neuwirthová of Leiden University, International Studies program is the EU and IOs affairs specialist that monitors the EU Council affairs from Brussels. In her text entitled “How to Spend it: An Austro-Franco-German Proposal for a European Covid-19 Recovery Programme” she is summarizing the speech of Dr. Mario Holzner, the director of WIIW Institute, at the July Conference held at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna. 


Ljubljana/Vienna/Brussels, 29 September 2020       

Political will is needed to foster multilateralism in Europe – Dr. Franz Fischler says

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By Guido Lanfranchi.

On July 1st 2020, a large number of international affairs specialists gathered in Vienna, Austria, for the conference “From Victory Day to Corona Disarray: 75 Years of Europe’s Collective Security and Human Rights System”.

The conference, jointly organized by four different entities (the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies IFIMES, Media Platform Modern Diplomacy, Scientific Journal European Perspectives, and Action Platform Culture for Peace) with the support of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, was aimed at discussing the future of Europe in the wake of its old and new challenges. 

The conference gathered over twenty high ranking speakers from Canada to Australia, and audience physically in the venue while many others attended online – from Chile to Far East. The day was filled by three panels focusing on the legacy of WWII, Nuremberg Trials, the European Human Rights Charter and their relevance in the 21st century; on the importance of culture for peace and culture of peace – culture, science, arts, sports – as a way to reinforce a collective identity in Europe; on the importance of accelerating on universalism and pan-European Multilateralism while integrating further the Euro-MED within Europe, or as the Romano Prodi’s EU Commission coined it back in 2000s – “from Morocco to Russia – everything but the institutions”. 

The event itself was probably the largest physical gathering past the early spring lock down to this very day in this part of Europe. No wonder that it marked a launch of the political rethink and recalibration named – Vienna Process

Among the speakers for the conference’s third panel – which focused on universal and pan-European multilateralism – there was Dr. Franz Fischler, a well-known figure due to his previous postings as Austria’s Federal Minister for Agriculture and Forestry (1989-1994) and as European Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries (1995-2004), besides being currently President of the famous European Forum Alpbach. 

Dr. Fischler started his keynote speech by highlighting how the COVID-19 pandemic has the potential to fundamentally change Europe – and even the whole world. In doing so, he referred to the paradoxes outlined by Bulgarian intellectual Ivan Krastev in the wake of the pandemic. Contrasting pushes towards re-nationalization and globalization, the partial interruption of democracy but the decreasing appetite for authoritarian government, the mixed response of the European Union to the crisis – in short, a series of conflicting trends are making the future of Europe, as well as that of the whole world, very much uncertain. 

It was against this backdrop that Dr. Fischler addressed the central question of the panel: What is fundamentally going to happen in Europe in the times ahead? The former EU Commissioner clarified from the very beginning that those who wish a further deepening of the current multilateral system should not be blinded by excessive optimism. An alternative to the current system does exist – clearly symbolized by the combination of nationalism and populism that we can see in many countries, but also by the problems faced by multilateralism in many fields, most notably trade. 

This trend is evident in the case of the European Union too – Dr. Fischler warned. He highlighted that policy tools aimed at stimulating convergence across European countries, such as for instance the EU’s cohesion policies, are becoming increasingly weak, and inequality within the EU is currently on the rise. As a result, traditional goals such as the “ever closer Europe” and the “United States of Europe” do not even seem to be on the agenda anymore. 

What can then be done to deepen the EU’s integration process and strengthen Europe’s multilateral system? Towards the end of his speech, Dr. Fischler outlined a few entry points for reform and further cooperation. His suggestions revolved around increasing cooperation on a number of specific issues, ranging from high-tech research to the development of a common European passport.

He also proposed that European countries should strengthen their common diplomatic initiatives, including by speaking with a single voice in international institutions, as well as increasing the EU’s soft power. On top of that, deeper institutional and political modifications might be needed for the EU, Dr. Fischler hinted – citing as examples the relaxation of the unanimity voting procedure on some foreign policy issues, as well as an intensification of the EU’s enlargement process. 

Closing his highly absorbing speech, Dr. Fischler – champion of multilateralism, and guru of the current EU CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) made clear which ingredient is, in his opinion, the cornerstone for reviving multilateralism in Europe: “All I would like to say is that there are possibilities out there. The question is, as always in these times: is there enough political will?”

About the author:

Guido Lanfranchi

Guido Lanfranchi is an international affairs professional based in Den Haag, Netherlands. He studied at the Leiden University and Sciences Po Paris, and got with the Council of the European Union in Brussels. His research focuses on the EU, the Middle East and Africa.

Holding On and Letting Go

By Nur Hani Laily Ramli.   

The day that I came to know that Kenya is going to be my county of residence for the next foreseeable future, a plethora of feelings hit me: pleased and terrified. Pleased, since living overseas is in my bucket list but at the same time I am terrified due to the fact that things will change as I will be dragged away from my comfort zone I called home. Am I strong enough to leave my family behind? Believe me, this question lingered around long enough without any realized answer.

The reality remains, leaving my baggage behind is the sacrifice I need to take as I take this leap of faith.

Fast forward to almost three years of living in Kenya, surprisingly, I came to realize that this momentous change brought with it a new perspective on life and along with it comes a valuable lesson. 

The biggest benefactor in this social endeavor I put myself in, is my family. I was raised in a family steeped in traditional eastern values: no shoes in the house, eat with your bare hands, daily diet of chili sauce and thick chili paste, among others. My current reality permits my children to be raised in a global setting, where cultural appreciation is celebrated monthly, be it at school, in the community we live in, and at the various diplomatic gatherings they are invited to.

Little did I know, the global setting my children are exposed to, cultivate their own cultural identity. Surprisingly, these early exposures for cultural appreciation create a conducive environment or my children to be acclimated to our own customs and traditional practices.  

My biggest baggage I left home is my career. I was a trained educator, with the freedom to set my own curriculum in my class, was also responsible to lead a team of fellow educators with the task to make education fun for eager learners. That all changed when I was told I would be a travelling spouse for the next foreseeable future. But as an educator, I stick with the mantra that all educators were trained to repeat, “education never really stops, it evolves”. My present reality could not be more relevant to my training. If before I was trained to educate others, now it is my turn to educate myself. Un-learning what you knew, and re-learn new skills indeed filled my time as a travelling spouse. 

Truly, as a travelling spouse leaving your baggages behind is a norm, and acquiring new set of skills is a must. But one aspect that must never be left behind and holding on to for as long as possible is one’s identity. Be proud of your traditional heritage, be noble in projecting your national image, and forever be humbled in the world of diplomacy.

Cheers to all travelling spouses!

China in Europe: Hit the (Belt and) Road Jack

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By Maria Smotrytska

Today at a broader diplomatic and strategic level, the BRI has become a symbol of China’s growing importance in international affairs, changing regional dynamics in geographical areas close to or even within Europe. At the most basic level, the strategic implications of expanding China’s policy in the EU stem not so much from a set of projects with a single link, but from its comprehensive nature.

China-related initiatives, such as the AIIB and the BRI, – it is ample clear – have already changed the global financial development landscape. Similarly, in the sphere of security relations, there is a need to protect assets and citizens abroad leading to the “securitization” of Chinese BRI participation abroad, which is likely to significantly change China’s role in the regions of European interests. Within Europe, and in conjunction with sub–regional “mini-initiatives” in China, such as CEE 16 + 1, the BRI also contributes to changes in the policy-making landscape in Europe and China. 

When analyzing China’s relations with CEE countries in the framework of the BRI initiative, it should be noted that the initiative was put forward with the principle of mutual complementarity of economies, taking into account the differences between China and neighboring countries, as well as taking into account all existing shortcomings in the infrastructure of all prospective participants in this economic project. Such complementarity provides an important basis for long-term business cooperation between China and neighboring countries, and even the creation of the Eurasian Union could not affect the complementarity of the economic systems of China and neighboring countries, because only in the process of joint efforts to create the “Silk Road Economic belt” will it be possible to fully overcome the underdevelopment of infrastructure in this region. 

The Chinese government emphasizes that the “One belt, One road” initiative “complements” existing national and European plans (for example, the so-called “Junker plan” or plans promoted by individual EU member States) to develop infrastructure and expand connectivity in Europe and beyond. Most of the ambassadors in European countries note the importance of the BRI and its significance for the development of relations between China and European countries. 

Analyzing the role of CEE countries in the implementation of the Chinese “One belt, One road” initiative, it can be noted that the specifics of the region’s countries are the potential for market development and geographical advantages. An important role is played by projects to create continental and Maritime transport routes that can transport goods between China and Europe. In developing cooperation, first of all, it is necessary to focus on market requirements, follow the principle of “first simple – then complex”, avoid political risks, give enterprises a guiding role and take into account the leading role of important projects.

It should also be underlined that in the format of the initiative, there are equal partnerships between all countries, it does not have strict mechanisms, and its structure allows for multi-level, multi-layered cooperation that covers all areas of collaboration, including politics, economy and humanitarian exchanges. This multi-functional format is useful for promoting bilateral relations between China and the CEE countries, and it can also play a stimulating role in the development of China – Europe relations. At the same time , when building ties between within the 16 + 1 format and China – EU cooperation, a number of questions arise that cause concern in the EU government circles about the role played by the PRC in the region.

Today the CEE region is located at the junction of the “Economic Belt of the New Silk Road” and the “Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century”. Both routes connecting the markets of Europe and Asia – sea and land-pass through it; it performs an important function of ensuring the passage of commodity flows. The CEE region has the advantage of location; through it, cargo is sent overland from Western China via Russia or Central Asia to Western Europe. China gains a strategic advantage from redistributing some of its Maritime supplies, reducing the use of the Strait of Malacca. In addition, there are commercial considerations: in terms of time, this overland route speeds up transportation twice as compared to the usual way of delivery by sea with reloading to the railway, and at a price it is much more profitable than air transportation.

The sea route from China to the Greek port of Piraeus for the delivery of goods to the Balkan Peninsula, which lies at the intersection of transit communications in Europe, Asia and Africa, has great prospects. Currently, 80% of cargo from China to Europe goes through the Atlantic ocean to the ports of Northern Europe. The sea route through the Arabian sea and the Suez canal to the Balkans will reduce the transport time by 7 – 10 days: this is the shortest sea route from China to Europe. However, to do this, CEE needs to build transport infrastructure, which the region has a huge need for. This is especially true for the Balkan Peninsula, which has entered a period of stable development after riots and wars that caused serious damage to infrastructure.

The membership of 11 of the 16 CEE countries in the EU is an advantage that provides “system guarantees”. EU members and candidates comply with European laws and standards, which reduces the risks for Chinese investment in infrastructure projects. According to the researcher, continuing economic growth and expanding market demand make the CEE region an ideal “target market”. Thus, political stability has bring results, and in the first decade of the XXI century many Central and Eastern European countries have gone from “transition countries” to European representatives of “new markets”. This is not only a transport corridor on the way to the core of traditional Europe, but also an increasingly important investment and consumer market in itself. It is attractive because the laws there are European, but land and labor are cheaper than in Western Europe. 

Based on the analysis of China – CEE relations, it can be seen that cooperation between China, the EU and CEE countries can also contribute to the balanced development of Europe. The bilateral ties between China and CEE for 70 years have laid a solid Foundation for cooperation in the 16 + 1 format. The relationship is now entering a new era of multilateral cooperation that is not focused on a single European sub-region, but reflects Trans-regional characteristics. Thus, when analyzing the relations between China and the countries of the region, we should not limit ourselves to the regional level, but we should go to the Trans-regional and global scale.

For example, the 16 + 1 initiative is an inter-regional cooperation in which China focuses on linking its efforts with those of Europe and considers rail links, ports and foreign direct investment as the basis for ensuring balanced development and social cohesion in European countries. For example, the construction of a railway between Hungary and Serbia was far more important for both countries than obtaining short-term economic benefits. It is part of an Express route connecting land and sea from the port of Piraeus across the Balkan Peninsula to the main corridor in Europe. In the future, the Express route will be extended to cover new areas near the three seas that wash the coasts of the CEE countries.

However, the economic relations between China and the CEE countries are still underdeveloped, – as one of the most influential institutes from Eastern Europe, the Balkan-based IFIMES of Ljubljana constantly argues: “Sino-Balkans relations have a great future due to the fact that China is one of the most important investors in Europe“. Thus, it is worth noting that before the start of cooperation in the 16 + 1 format, Chinese investment and trade were not spatially balanced and were concentrated in the North – Western part of Europe. Due to the poorly developed transport infrastructure, trade between China and the CEE countries was carried out through the ports and railways of Germany, Holland and France.

More importantly, China has begun to develop cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries in the field of innovation. This is a very promising direction. At the summit in Dubrovnik in 2019, China and the CEE countries expressed the idea of building a bridge as a sign of strengthening cooperation between China and the EU, which would reflect the great potential of China and Eastern European countries as partners with the same level of development. 

The projects that China is able to offer are thought out comprehensively and can be effectively implemented with the participation of state corporations. They will help countries like Croatia achieve their goals faster and more effectively. In short, the 16 + 1 Initiative will help transform this region from a marginal region of Europe to a link between Europe and China.

Cooperation in the 16 + 1 format is sub-regional in nature, but the PPI will help it become a Trans-regional way of developing connectivity on land, in the air, in the ocean, and on the Internet. Now even North Africa and the middle East can become part of this interface. Its results will be systemic in nature.

The goal of China’s cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries is not to continue to use CEE countries as a trade route, but to combine the industrial development needs of these countries with China’s large production capacity, using the potential of Central and Eastern European countries in the Chinese market. If Chinese products are close to the Central European market, it is necessary to ensure the presence of high-tech products from CEE countries in the Chinese markets.

Cooperation between China and CEE countries should reflect the future development trends. The interface includes not only traditional modes of transport, energy, labor and capital, but also digital infrastructure and data flows based on new technologies. There are huge opportunities for expanding cooperation between China, the 5G industry and service businesses. Cooperation with China is also intended to contribute to the economic revival of the Balkan region, the implementation of Internet and smart city projects. Small countries can play the role of connecting links between China and Europe.

However, despite the positive aspect of the development of relations between China and CEE countries within the framework of the BRI initiative, they also continue to face new challenges and problems.

1. The first challenge is how to balance China and CEE relations with China’s relations with the European Union. China, when developing relations with the CEE countries, now has to think about the concerns of the EU and some Western European countries. They fear that the countries of the Western Balkans that have not yet joined the EU will “choose China and reject the EU”, and the countries that have already joined the EU will “move closer to China and away from Europe”, which will lead to a split in Europe.

2. The second challenge is how long it will be possible to maintain China’s economic advantages and how to make the development of economic cooperation sustainable. Thus, today the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are showing interest in cooperation with China, and after the financial crisis they wanted to get Chinese capital. However, the indispensability of Chinese investment for CEE is not so high. Mutual complementarity in trade and economic cooperation is increasing, but at the stage of the rise of the EU – China proto-languages is also increasing. When the European and American economies recover after the crisis, there is a risk that Chinese investment in CEE will be in a state of fierce competition with investors from Europe and the United States. This is not only a question of the size and volume of investments, but also their competitiveness, degree of interdependence and attractiveness. In trade, the main partner for the CEE countries is Western Europe – their mutual complementarity and mutual dependence is much greater than with China.

3. The third challenge is the asymmetry of the strategic needs of the two sides. There are no historical problems between China and the CEE countries, and there is no serious conflict of interests. Nor do they have a strategic mutual need for each other. Thus, in fact, there is not a single important issue where CEE countries need China’s support (the problem of Kosovo is an exception for China and Serbia).

4. The fourth challenge is the issue of roadsafety, caused by the unstable political situation in the Balkans, as well as the Eastern borders of CEE. Also problematic issues include the strained economic relations between the EU and the Russian Federation, which provoke difficulties in transporting goods across the borders of these countries. Central and Eastern European countries are closely monitoring China’s position on this issue. They are concerned about security and are moving closer to NATO, and the growing level of Sino – Russian relations may arouse suspicion in some EU states. In the construction of the “One belt, One road”, any traditional threats, especially security – challenging geopolitical games, can have an impact on the participants. Therefore, China’s reaction to the violation of international norms becomes an important criterion for psychological judgment in the development of CEE countries ‘ relations with China. 

Thus, according to the researcher, China, as a towering large state, should pay attention to not taking a position and not making statements that can give rise to security concerns and distrust in the CEE countries.

5. As a fifth challenge, we should point to the problem of the balance of large States and external pressure on the development of China’s relations with CEE. Thus, after the end of the Cold War, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe became truly subjects of international relations with their own interests. The US does not want the deepening of CEE countries ‘ relations with China to harm their strategic interests in Europe. Russia also allegedly fears that China, relying on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, will penetrate to its Western borders and take its place there. Therefore, in some areas and issues, these countries can put pressure on China and the CEE countries.

6. Wasted or misdirected investment should be considered as a threat as well. Thus, South East Europe Transport Observatory (Hereinafter SEETO – Auth. said that the availability of Chinese funding can be an advantage and an opportunity. While the availability of Chinese funding might pose a threat on the EU financial institutions, which would have to compete with Chinese institutions for clients, alternative sources of financing might represent a positive development for the business sector or the countries accessing such sources (see Map 1 below).

Map 1.: China`s 16+1 grouping built around EU`s newer, poorer members

55. Appendix 22 Chinese_investment_E_Europe_2

Source:IMF, FT research

7. The EU is also concerned at the potential dominance of rail transit by Chinese parties. The apparent implication was that this would give China market power over the EU’s trade (For example Apple, Boeing, Google and Microsoft all originated in the USA, but this does not mean that the US Government manipulates access to their products to disadvantage the EU.). A large global economy such as China will almost inevitably gain market power through its economic size and its importance as a trading partner.

8. Another challenge can be new Chinese investments in transit countries. Thus, it is suggested that Chinese companies may begin production not only in north – eastern China but also in transit countries such as Kazakhstan and Russia. This would make EU consumers more accessible to Chinese industry without making Chinese consumers more accessible to EU industry. Nonetheless, consumers in the EU would in principle benefit from wider choice or lower costs. The extent of this effect would, however, depend on the extent to which transit countries, or China itself, were open to inward investment from the EU.

9. Also there is a risk for the EU to ensure that transport infrastructure being developed not only in China but also elsewhere in Asia would meet the EU’s needs. At the same time, a supplier of rail services outside the EU suggested that the focus of the TEN-T has been building the single market, and that it has not been sufficiently outward-looking. 

Thus there is an urgent need to upgrade the rail infrastructure in Belarus and Ukraine, which caters for transit traffic to and from the EU. And also conflicting views appeared on whether and how Chinese parties, and particularly contractors, would adapt to, and comply with, EU standards in areas such as construction. 

A related concern was that weak legislation in rail transit countries might permit environmental damage. The EU cannot impose higher standards on the construction or operation of railways in non-EU states such as Russia and Kazakhstan. There are, however, a number of mechanisms by which the EU can encourage higher standards:

-through the terms and conditions of EU involvement in financing or supporting infrastructure projects;

-through the supply of products compliant with (high) EU environmental standards; and

-through operating, or encouraging other parties to operate, through rail services using locomotives and other equipment with a high environmental performance.

An institutional stakeholder made the point that EU standards could always be imposed and, in principle, enforced if a project was funded by the EU, but that this was less likely to be possible if the same project was funded by China.

10. One the the challenges, which causes the emergence of many contradictory and negative opinions about the Chinese initiative in European political and business circles is primarily due to Europe’s low awareness of the project, its main goals and structure. Thus, analysis found the the BRI is generally positively perceived, but differences are marked at the country level with some countries having negative perceptions.

Figure 1.: Media sentiment for most positive countries  Figure 2.: Media sentiment for most negative countries

Source : Bruegel based on https://www.gdeltproject.org/

Figure 1 and Figure 2 above further report the countries with the most positive and negative sentiments towards the BRI. The first impression is that Europe and Asia both extremes of positivity and negativity. That means China`s initiative has particularly penetrated the two regions, but is evaluated very differently by different countries and regions.

Within Europe, BRI members tend to have a much worse view of China`s initiative (especially Bosnia and by Poland), compared to others, especially the Netherlands. Thus, China does not seem to be necessarily improving its image through efforts made under the auspices of the BRI projects or, at least, not when the way it is perceived in non-BRI countries. It is increasingly perceived by many on both sides of Atlantic as “opaque, imitative, assertive and ‘suddenly’ omnipresent” – as prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic detailed in his luminary work ‘The post-C-19 epilogue of Sino-American relationship’. 

Thus, as a result of the analysis of China – CEE relations in the framework of the BRI project, it can be concluded that there are both positive trends and possible challenges in China – CEE relations and their role in China’s relations with the EU.

While the specific impact of the “integrity” of the BRI on European territory is still limited, new transport corridors are already emerging, and their frequency of use is growing rapidly. One is a rail link between China and Western Europe via Poland to Germany and beyond; the other is a North – North corridor between Greece and the Baltic region through Central Europe, and Piraeus as a fast–growing center in the Mediterranean, and actors in Italy are involved in expanding their profile as part of an expanding South – North logistics network. At the same time, cooperation with third countries (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus) remains at very early stages, as the degree of readiness of European companies to participate in Chinese-led infrastructure projects outside Europe remains unclear.

About the author:

Smotrytska Maria  is a Senior research Sinologist, specialized in the Investment policy of China; BRI-related initiatives; Sino – European ties, etc. Distinguished member of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists. PhD in International politics, Cental China Normal University (Wuhan, Hubei province, PR China)

Main image Great Wall of China Foto Jakub Hałun.

Of Privacy, EU and of Human Rights – 75 years After

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By Nora Wolf.

Early summer days of 2020 in Vienna sow marking the anniversary of Nuremberg Trials with the conference “From the Victory Day to Corona Disarray: 75 years of Europe’s Collective Security and Human Rights System – Legacy of Antifascism for the Common Pan-European Future”. This was the first public and probably the largest conference in Europe past the early spring lockdown. It gathered numerous speakers and audience physically in the venue while many others attended online. 

The conference was organised by four partners; the International Institute IFIMES, Media Platform Modern Diplomacy, Academic Journal European Perspectives, and Action Platform Culture for Peace, with the support of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna that hosted the event in a prestigious historical setting. 

Media partners were diplomatic magazines of several countries, and the academic partners included over 25 universities from all 5 continents, numerous institutes and 2 international organisations. A day-long event was also Live-streamed, that enabled audiences from Chile to Far East and from Canada to Australia to be engaged with panellists in the plenary and via zoom. (the entire conference proceedings are available: https://www.facebook.com/DiplomaticAcademyVienna ) 

Among 20-some speakers from Canada to Australia, talking in three event’s panels was also the well know author and Human Rights activist Dr. Lizzie O’Shea. This text is a brief reference on her highly anticipated and absorbing speech prepared exclusively for this conference. 

Some argue that with the advent of the numeric age, privacy is dead and the sooner we accept it; the sooner we can all move past our frivolous concerns of personal data misuses and what is really just a reluctance on our part to change. As such, privacy decline and the related loss of control would merely constitute an inevitable consequence of the world’s digitalization. 

Others seem to think that Europe is at the forefront of the fight to preserve its constituents’ privacy – GDPR, after all, is proof of that. Moreover, article 8 of the ECHR combined with the Court’s evolutionary jurisprudence on the topic are robust safeguards in place ensuring that people’s privacy remains bulletproof and a top priority.

While it is true that on the outset Europe has been conceived as a ‘leader’ for its – at the time undoubtedly ground-breaking – Data Protection Regulation Act and other national initiatives stemming from the consolidated efforts of EU institutions, such a crucial multi-dimensional and far-reaching right as privacy requires more steps from each governments, we argue here. 

First, in our ever-fast-changing digital world, where privacy is threatened in more ways than we could predict, it is the States’ place to be in the first line of defence:  they shall be accountable and actively responsible for the protection – or lack thereof – of their citizens’ privacy. Indeed, State obligations remains unchanged, that is to respect, protect and fulfil. Needless to say, the heavy and complex task of defending the integrity of one’s privacy, surely, cannot simply fall onto each and every individual’s shoulders.

That being said, if and when governments decide to get more involved and concerned with overall privacy challenges we face, a risk of considerable concentration of power arises and ought to be managed as well.

Lizzie O’Shea, Human Rights lawyer and writer, effectively underlines some of the shortcomings of the current EU approach to privacy in her intervention during the Vienna Diplomatic Conference of July 2020. More precisely, she hints at the dangers of the current power balance being held by Governments and the absence of a corresponding amount of accountability. She suggests that it reflects an overwhelming trust of the people in their State leading to an erosion of any culture of criticism. This phenomenon of “complacency”, as O’Sheal phrases it, whilst seemingly perhaps counter-intuitive, is not in fact desirable. Criticism of one’s own government policies and, thereby entertaining public debates on State strategies, is an essential component of militant democracies and vital contribution to checks and balances. 

Even more pressing, another consequence derived from the current European States’ penchant for power monopoly in deciding privacy management is the wide door opened to state surveillance and abuses. Let us be clear: GDPR is of no help in terms of citizens’ safeguards against governmental intrusions in privacy and abusive use of personal data. This is why it is time to remind ourselves that protection of our fundamental right to privacy ought to be guaranteed against businesses, other private parties, and State actions. 

Another criticism that aims to be constructive for the further shaping of our European approach to privacy is the common restricted conception of privacy as a B2C relationship. The GDPR’s architecture revolves around the assumption that privacy issues solely regard individual rights, individual situations, and individual informed consent. There is no acknowledgment of, or infrastructures related to, any type of collective dimension. And while there is no question that individual, case-by-case informed consent represents a corner-stone in privacy protection policies, it is also insufficient in view of the overall goal that is to build a global online community that respects privacy in its fullest form.

So how can we truly be content with an individualistic-only, corporates are the villains-only plan to counter and mitigate the multiplying threats to our wholesome privacies? Perhaps this will serve as food for thoughts and refuel some welcome public debate on the matter.

About the Author:

Nora Wolf

Nora Wolf, of the Kingston and of University of Geneva is a Swiss-based International Politics & Economics specialist. Her expertise includes Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law in an inter-disciplinary fashion for the EU and the UN-related thinktanks and FORAs.

The EU should live up what it stands for: We might be all Hong Kong tomorrow

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By the Hong Kong Global Research Council.

On 26 June 1963, the then-President of the United States John F. Kennedy delivered his famous “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech, underlining the support of the Free World for West Berlin and West Germany.

47 years later, the Special Procedure 50 of the UN Human Rights Council has issued a statement denouncing Beijing’s repression of Tibet and Hong Kong. The statement came just before the National Security Law in Hong Kong was approved by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.

The Pearl of the Orient has suddenly earned a new name, as the “West Berlin” of the New Cold War.

However, unlike in West Berlin, Beijing did not build a wall to prevent its corporations from investing in Hong Kong, nor did it ask foreigners to leave the territory. Beijing has instead always proclaimed that the National Security Law’s introduction was to provide extra assurance of the famed “One Country, Two Systems” doctrine coined by Deng Xiaoping, a leader China has long outgrown.

However, it is precisely this kind of attitude that should push the European Union to act – beyond expressing “grave concern” – and take the Hong Kong question seriously. The enactment of the National Security Law is a litmus test of the EU’s capacity to defend its interests and universal values in the context of the “Great Decoupling”.

International relations academics and EU specialists agree that contemporary EU-China relations are determined by two factors (as suggested by Michael Yahuda) First, the tyranny of distance, and second, the primacy of trade. In short, owing to the lack of geopolitical ambition of the EU and the absence of shared geographical boundaries (terrestrial or maritime), the protection and promotion of EU economic interests in China is the core driver of EU action towards China.

As a result, the European Union has long been satisfied with the current model of cooperation. In the field of trade and investment, the EU opts for a good trade agreement with the absence of a human rights clause (from the Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1985, to the long-awaited conclusion of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment). Unlike its “selective engagement” approach with Russia, the European Union currently does not link its business presence in China with better political development and social reform – not to mention the suspected violation of citizens’ safety in Hong Kong.

However, the new reality after the enactment of the National Security Law in Hong Kong demands exactly this. As detailed in Article 38, the Law will have extraterritorial effects, as it applies to offences committed outside Hong Kong by a person who is not a permanent resident of the Region. For example, any person who joined the Martens Centre’s recent online webinar discussing the situation in Hong Kong is at risk of prosecution under Article 38, as participating can be viewed as provoking hatred, or even sanctions towards Beijing.

The National Security Law is without a doubt a threat against the fundamental rights and freedoms enjoyed by European citizens, political parties, think-tanks, or activist groups. The message from Beijing is clear: anyone who wishes to do business in Hong Kong must respect China’s concept of national security – regardless of that person’s nationality or their locality.

The National Security Law impacts European corporations as well. According to the latest implementation rules, the authorities are empowered to “freeze, restrain, confiscate, and forfeit any property related to offences endangering national security”. They also may require foreign political organisations and agents to provide information on activities concerning Hong Kong. The Law deliberately creates a dilemma and makes it clear to European companies. If a company surrenders information to the authorities, they violate their clients’ goodwill. If a company does not cooperate, its business interests in Hong Kong and mainland China will suffer. Beijing is effectively leveraging the West’s extensive business network and economic interests in Hong Kong, in order to test the European Union’s ability to balance its pursuit of commercial benefits and commitment to universal values.

From Beijing’s perspective, should European companies and EU Member States kowtow to the new arrangement in Hong Kong, Beijing will have full confidence that economic interests will always serve as good diplomatic leverage against the EU. In this case, the comprehensive investment agreement in its current form serves the foremost political interests of Beijing. Maintaining the status quo does not give the European Union any competitive edge against China’s sharp power in Europe. Only by acting in one voice and addressing the Hong Kong question seriously, can the European Union change the status quo and explore new possibilities in EU-China relations.

This article does not advocate for sanctions against Beijing, nor does it ask the EU to provide a UK-esque lifeboat policy to the citizens of Hong Kong. Instead, this thesis pleads for Europeans to act with one voice, and for the European Union to re-discover its diplomatic capacity, rooted in the commanding strength of the Common Market, and its formidable global regulatory regime. As history once showed, any hesitation would turn Europe into an ideological battlefield. Should there be a New Cold War in the 21st century, Brussels ought to utilise its structural strength to protect the very foundation of Europe’s peace, prosperity, and the well-being of its citizens.

The earlier version of this article under the name More than “West Berlin”The EU should reclaim its diplomatic tools by Taking the Hong Kong Question Seriously was published by the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies

https://martenscentre.eu/blog/more-west-berlin-eu-should-take-hong-kong-question-seriously )

AI(Artificial Intelligence): The Italian National Strategy Revisited

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By Cristina Semeraro.

Increasing trust in and adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) are necessary ingredients for economic growth and the fuel for future innovations that can benefit society as a whole.

In this complex context which stimulates and promotes the use and dissemination of AI technologies, also Italy has developed its AI national strategy as part of the Coordinated Plan launched by the European Commission in December 2018. Over the period until now, the Italian government has stressed the importance of discussing about the specific approach that the country should adopt to fully benefit from the advantages of AI, while mitigating the risks that are often associated with its use.

As prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic pointed out in his report: “Artificial Intelligence is essentially a dual-use technology and its mighty implications, either positive or negative, will be increasingly hard to anticipate, frame, and restrain, let alone mitigate and regulate” (The answer to AI is intergovernmental Multilateralism, New Europe, Brussels, March 2020).

Therefore, a national strategy is more than ever essential because AI can represent the starting point for a new edge filled with economic, social and cultural prosperity for Italy. To date, the country has been struggling to keep up with the other major European economies either from the point of view of the industrial production or companies competitiveness.

To make the matter worse, the Italian economy does not seem to be heading towards an important sustainable development yet, which represents a long-standing issue for its society: the growing poverty and the inequality go hand in hand with an increasing gap between North and South and a strong need for investments in infrastructures and social and environmental policies. In sight of this, Italy is leverage the development of AI and related digital technologies to earn a golden opportunity in inaugurating a new social, economic and environmental “spring”. 

The official document picturing the national strategy – performed by an experts team at ministry of Economic Development – consists of three parts: the first one shows an analytical overview upon the global market, with a focus on the European and national framework in terms of AI; the second part itemises the paramount principles of the strategy which inspired the experts in formulating the proposals: humanism (human beings at the centre), reliability and sustainability; the third and last part examines the policy to be adopted and sets out the proposals for the implementation, monitoring and communication of the Italian strategy.

In detail, the work of the experts has drawn up 82 proposals (also called “recommendations”) which take into account the peculiarities of the Italian system and tend to reconcile the international competitiveness with a sustainable development, in compliance with the European guidelines for a reliable, resilient and anthropocentric AI. These proposals/recommendations have, specifically, the purpose of “allowing Italy to start a phase of economic, social and environmental renaissance, marked by a focus on sustainability and by the digital transformation of the institutional and socio-economic business of the country”.

Below, an excerpt of the most significant proposals – in my opinion – contained in the Italian AI strategic plan.

Recommendation 3

In line with the European trends, the primacy of the human being over AI technology is affirmed and must be understood as a support to humans and not a substitute for them.

Recommendation 5

The Italian strategy puts its focus on embedded AI (as known also as “edge AI”), or those artificial intelligence systems that are present directly on the device (embedded, precisely). In the broadest terms, Embedded Intelligence is the definition of a self-referential process in which a specific system or program has the ability to analyse and refine its operations on its own.

Recommendation 10

It promotes the institution of a central body for the coordination of European initiatives and the definition of a national pattern for AI technologies development.

Recommendations from 11 to 16

Italy must invest in digital education by promoting up-to-date and qualified classes of teachers and learners on the subject of digital technologies, inaugurating new national degree courses on AI and up-skilling and re-skilling the workforce. This latter will allow an increasing number of people a job opportunity in this new technological field.

Recommendations 23 and 27

These proposals encourage information campaigns – both in Italian and English language – in order to make the national population aware of the main characteristics, opportunities and risks determined by the use of AI. In support of these recommendations, the Government will create a national platform – accessible to all citizens – as a permanent consultation/information tool on AI issues.

Recommendation 29

Italy should adopt the Trustworthy AI Impact Assessment (TAIA), currently studied at European level, as a risk assessment tool. The “actors” – those ones who use AI technologies – will perform a real risk assessment by identifying, first, the risks deriving from their activity and then indicating the strategies adopted to mitigate negative impacts.

Recommendation 38

The experts have highlighted the advantages through the creation of an Italian Institute for Artificial Intelligence (IIIA) for the research and the transfer of AI applications to companies and the Public Administration.

Recommendations 47-48

These recommendations are aimed at enhancing public tools (such as development contracts and innovation agreements) to support investments and strengthen public and private support for venture capital.

Recommendations from 55 to 68

It is a group of recommendations with a focus on data, on the optimization of their collection and subsequent management.

Recommendations from 69 to 75

These proposals are dedicated to sustainable AI, in full alignment with the European guidelines. The Government will work on a regulation which will ensure a sustainable development in support of the energy sector, disabled people and disadvantaged ranks. Another noteworthy purpose is the national prestige that Italy will straighten in the international competitiveness in terms of AI. Not by chance, several countries are making significant investments in AI, especially for military purposes, and it undoubtedly shows up how each of them is strong-willed to achieve a leadership in the AI field.

The document ends with an annex that points out the investment planned to implement the AI strategy. It counts 888 million for the first five years, in addition to another 605 million (121 per year) from private contributions.

“The disclosure of this ambitious strategic plan suggests an unprecedented and responsible use of Artificial Intelligence, lighting the way for a leap towards new levels of efficiency and sustainability for Italian businesses” said Mirella Liuzzi, Undersecretary at ministry of Economic Development. “The goal – she added – “is to gather the benefits that AI can bring to the country, with an approach that includes technology and sustainable development and always puts the individual and his context at the centre”.

However, in order to put into effect the above mentioned proposals and the overall efforts made, it is essential to better coordinate all the AI stakeholders, to distribute funding fairly and avoid waste of money.

About the author:

Cristina Semeraro, Analyst with the Rome-based Vision & Global Trends, International Institute for Global Analyses of Italy.

Cristina Semeraro, is an Analyst with the Rome-based Vision & Global Trends, International Institute for Global Analyses of Italy.

Diplomacy by design

Anjana Das, Founder and Creative Director WHITE CHAMPA

By Alexandra Paucescu.

Diplomatic life often gives you the chance for memorable encounters, fine and interesting people that you will be grateful you had the opportunity to meet.

When she enters the room, you first notice her dark, sparkling eyes and her exotic beauty…then she talks, confident and relaxed. 

Meet Anjana Das, born in Braunschweig, Germany from Indian highly educated parents, the pure definition of a global citizen of today. Smart, cheerful, energetic and friendly, it takes just a glance to figure out that she is really one of a kind. Within the diplomatic circle she is the supportive and full of initiative spouse… but she is so much more!

With her surprising resume she could impress anyone. She has postgraduate degrees in ‘South-Asian Studies’, ‘German Literature’ and ‘Political Science’ and co-authored a book about ‘Racially Motivated Crime in Europe’. But with her family’s first posting abroad, to India, her destiny called for a full turn-around in her career. 

By Anjana Das.

‘I had the great opportunity to meet Jean-Francois Lesage, the renowned French embroiderer and we became friends’, she recalls. ‘He recognized what was in fact always inside me, my passion for design, my artistic eye and he supported and encouraged me to follow my heart’

So, she soon started working with him, designing embroidery for interiors, for almost 15 years, working from all over the world. You could say that she mastered the art of reinvention and the secret of having a portable career, what is in fact the dream to many of us, diplomatic spouses. Of course, maybe she had the chance to meet the right people along the way, to start ‘big’ from the beginning, but we all know that talent speaks often by itself… and Anjana is a monument of talent, for sure!

She did interior design for office buildings, foreign residencies, wherever her husband’s job took them on the Globe.

‘Travelling is always a privilege. I take every move as an adventure, an opportunity that not all of us have, to meet new people, discover new places, to learn more’. 

Indeed, she took advantage of every new destination and made the best out of it. In Thailand she learned pattern design, in the Philippines she started creating jewelry, but it was New Delhi that inspired her to start her own company, ‘White Champa’, almost 15 years ago.

‘I was drawing my designs in my garden, under these marvelous, fragrant trees called ‘champa’. Their beautiful white flowers offered me the inspiration in choosing the perfect name for my clothing company.’

What started out of pure passion and talent, transformed into an international brand, with affiliated stores in Canada, Japan and India and worldwide distribution.  She tells me candidly: ‘With each destination, I bring different elements to my designs, I get inspired. To me, clothes are more than just fashion, I look at them from a sociological point of view, I look at history and human relations.’ White Champa produces unique clothes, handmade and carefully crafted, with great attention to detail.

‘Working with passion at something of your own provides continuity in this diplomatic life of ours. But it is not easy to keep up, to manage a business from the distance and, in the same time, to fulfill diplomatic assignments. Of course, nowadays technology helps tremendously. Also, I am forever grateful to my husband for all his constant support, for encouraging me when thigs were rough and also for carefully choosing his foreign postings, so that I’d be closer to my business as well.  That’s why I would give an advice to others, at the beginning of this diplomatic road: don’t think you cannot design your own life while accompanying your husbands! In fact, my company initiated BECAUSE I was abroad.’ 

She says that maybe she could have achieved more, she could have continued with her academic career, maybe she doesn’t have a ‘catchy’ business card, full of pompous titles, but she is certainly proud of what she has achieved, when she looks back. 

‘I feel good about my life… I lived interesting times, I built a solid business and a wonderful family. In the end, I think you can judge your success in life by the impact you had on others.’

Smart words from an inspiring woman, living proof that anything is possible when passion, talent and determination are involved.

Go for it, don’t  be discouraged, dream big! After all, sky is the limit!

Information:

WHITE CHAMPA
www.whitechampa.com instagram:white_champa

About the author:

Alexandra Paucescu- Romanian, Management graduate with a Master in Business,  studied Cultural Diplomacy and International Relations.

She speaks Romanian,  English,  French,  German and Italian. Turned diplomatic spouse by the age of 30, she published a book about diplomatic life, writes articles and also gives lectures on intercultural communication.