The US unveils its peace plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

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The US unveils its peace plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

By Guido Lanfranchi.

On January 28th, 2020, the Trump administration finally unveiled its strategy to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The US proposal – which defines conditions for the formation of two separated states – has generated much controversy. While the Israeli government warmly embraced the strategy, Palestinian leaders – who had not been consulted ahead of the release – firmly rejected it.

After more than three years of work behind closed doors, the United States has finally unveiled its strategy to address the longstanding conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The plan has been drafted by a restricted team of officials close to the President, and it was eventually presented to the world in a ceremony held on January 28th, 2020. Speaking alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, Mr. Trump praised the deal as a “win-win opportunity for both sides”, suggesting that it could serve as the basis for direct negotiations between the warring parties. The unveiling of the plan has generated much controversy both in the region and across the world. What is all this discussion about? 

What does the plan say?

The plan proposed by the US administration is grounded in the so-called “two-state solution” framework, which envisions the creation of two distinct, adjacent, independent states – that of Israel and that of Palestine.

According to the map drawn in the US-proposed plan, Israel would gain full control over the Jordan valley, as well as on its settlements in the West Bank. In exchange for these concessions to Israel, the plan would grant the State of Palestine new land south of the Gaza Strip, to be connected to the West Bank through a tunnel, and a USD 50 billion plan in economic assistance – already presented by the White House in Bahrain in June – to create new jobs and reduce poverty rates among Palestinians.

The US support for the creation of an independent Palestinian state, however, would be subject to a wide array of conditions – which are spelled out in different sections of the plan. In terms of domestic policies, for instance, the Palestinian state would need to hold free and fair elections, respect human rights and basic freedoms, including of press and religion, uphold the rule of law, and accept full demilitarization. Moreover, the Palestinian leadership would have to recognize Israel as a Jewish state and reject all forms of terrorism against it. The fulfillment of these conditions should be jointly assessed by the US and Israel – the US proposal says – “after consultation with the Palestinian authority”. 

Besides the thorny issue of Palestinian statehood, the US plan advances proposals on a number of other contentious points too. Among them there is the status of Jerusalem, which is envisioned by the US plan as the undivided capital of Israel. This would leave the Palestinians with a suburban section of East Jerusalem – within the city’s municipal borders but outside the wall that runs through it – as their potential capital. On the sensitive issue of the displaced Palestinian people, moreover, the US proposal would not grant refugees the so-called “right of return” to their land. Rather, refugees would have to choose whether to be integrated in the new State of Palestine or in third countries. After this relocation process, their status as refugees would cease to exist.

How has the plan been received?

The reactions from Israelis and Palestinians have been widely divergent. On the one hand, Palestinian leaders had rejected the deal already ahead of its release, lamenting not having been consulted and accusing Mr. Trump of pro-Israeli policies, such as the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem. After the launching ceremony, rival factions within the Palestinian leadership met in order to devise a coordinated response, and Palestinian Authority President Mahmood Abbas called for fresh protests against the plan. On the other hand, the US proposal was warmly welcomed by the two main contenders for the role of Israel’s Prime Minister, the incumbent Netanyahu and his rival Benjamin Gantz. 

Countries in the region also had mixed reactions. Leaders in Iran and Turkey rejected the US proposal outright. Jordan, which is heavily involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due its contiguity with the contested territories, also adopted a critical tone, reiterating its support for the Palestinians and warning Israel against any unilateral move. Other countries in the region adopted a milder tone, falling short of endorsing the plan, but praising the US President for his efforts towards peace and encouraging the parties to re-start negotiations. However, in an emergency meeting held a few days later, the Arab League, which groups the governments of Arab countries in the region, unanimously rejected the US proposal. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation followed suit in rejecting the plan a few days later.

The proposal unveiled by the US administration has soon come under heavy criticism by a number of analysts. In particular, the plan has been seen by many as heavily favoring Israel over the Palestinians, as the former would obtain security guarantees, the incorporation of all settlements, and the city of Jerusalem, while the latter would secure a state with a disconnected territory and limited sovereignty. Attempting to address some of these critiques, US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman defended Mr. Trump’s plan, stressing the potential benefits for the Palestinians – notably in terms of statehood and economic assistance – and encouraging them not to reject the proposal.

The road ahead

In the wake of the launch of the US proposal, the road ahead remains very much unclear. Some analysts predict that the plan will not entail major consequences; others say that the proposal might spur a new wave of confrontations; others again contend that the current developments might re-shape the framework in which peace will be negotiated. Only time will be able to tell what will happen. The only hope is that this longstanding conflict will sooner than later draw to a peaceful end.


About the author:

Guido Lanfranchi is a student and young professional in the field of international affairs. He has pursued his studies both at Leiden University and Sciences Po Paris, where he is currently enrolled. In parallel, he has been gaining professional experience through internships (first at the Council of the European Union, and currently at Clingendael Institute), as well as by working as reporter and associate editor for Diplomat Magazine The Netherlands. His research and work focus on the Middle East and Africa, and especially on conflict situations in these regions.

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Image by olafpictures from Pixabay

ICC Registrar completes first visit to Uganda and Democratic Republic of the Congo

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ICC Registrar completes first visit to Uganda and Democratic Republic of the Congo

ICC Registrar Peter Lewis meets with Ugandan Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Hon. Ephraim Kamuntu ©ICC-CPI

From 3 to 7 February 2020, the Registrar of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “the Court”) Peter Lewis visited Kampala, Uganda and Bunia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). During these visits he met with Government officials and United Nations representatives and had direct interactions with ICC staff members working in these countries. This was the Registrar’s first visit to those countries since his election in March 2018. 

In Kampala, Uganda, the Registrar met with the Ugandan Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Hon. Ephraim Kamuntu as well as the United Nations resident coordinator Rosa Malango. In Bunia, DRC, the Registrar held a courtesy meeting with Cecilia Piazza, Head of Office of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Ituri Province, DRC (MONUSCO). The Registrar of the Court thanked these interlocutors for their support for the ICC’s independent mandate and ongoing operations in these two countries.

“The Court is thankful for the excellent support received over the years in both situation countries,” said ICC Registrar Peter Lewis at the end of his visit. “We look forward to continuing our close collaboration in effectively fulfilling the Court’s mandate.”


Cooperation and support is essential for the Court to deliver on its independent mandate under the Rome Statute. The ICC relies on the cooperation of States and International Organisations for its activities and for the benefit of the affected communities looking for justice and accountability to be done.

During his meetings with ICC staff members in Uganda and the DRC, the Registrar thanked his teams for their constant and valuable efforts. Discussions focused on operational issues and the continuous improvement of the Court’s working methods. 

The ICC has 7 Country Offices in situations where it is conducting investigations, including in Kinshasa and Bunia (DRC) and Kampala (Uganda).  ICC Country Offices are essential to develop and maintain cooperative relationships with key stakeholders in situation countries and to support the Court’s mandate and resulting activities in these countries.

OPCW: Independent Investigation into Possible Breaches of Confidentiality Report Released

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OPCW: Independent Investigation into Possible Breaches of Confidentiality Report Released

OPCW’s Director-General Shares Report Findings with States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention

In the picture H.E. Mr. Fernando Arias, OPCW Director General.

The Hague, Netherlands – 6 February 2020 – In a briefing to States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), H.E. Mr Fernando Arias, shared the findings of an independent investigation into possible breaches of confidentiality.

This investigation was initiated by the Director-General after the unauthorised release of a document in May 2019. This document purported to include information and findings related to the work of the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) pertaining to the allegations of chemical weapons use on 7 April 2018 in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic.

The investigation took place between July 2019 and February 2020 and was conducted in strict compliance with the detailed procedures set forth in the OPCW Policy on Confidentiality (OPOC) as well as other relevant internal legislation such as the Code of Conduct for Staff Members of the Secretariat. The investigation included interviews with 29 witnesses, documents, electronic records, audio-recordings, and forensic analyses.

The report of the independent, external investigators determined that two former OPCW officials violated their obligations concerning the protection of confidential information related to the FFM Douma investigation. This determination is due to their unauthorised disclosure of highly protected information to individuals who did not have a need to know such information.

The two former OPCW officials failed to comply with the specified procedures for the handling, protection, release, and dissemination of confidential information so as to create a clear risk of unauthorised disclosure. The findings of the investigators are included in the Report of the Investigation into Possible Breaches of Confidentiality. The two individuals are referred to in the report as Inspector A and Inspector B to protect their identities and safeguard their due process rights under the OPCW’s internal legislation and general principles of international administrative law.

With respect to Inspector A, he was not a member of the FFM. As described by the investigators, Inspector A played a minor supporting role in the investigation of the Douma incident, and he did not have access to all of the information gathered by the FFM team, including witness interviews, laboratory results, and analyses by independent experts. Although Inspector A’s assessment purports to be an official OPCW FFM report on the Douma incident, it is instead a personal document created with incomplete information and without authorisation.

With respect to Inspector B, after he was selected to be a member of the FFM for the first time, he travelled to Syria in April 2018. He never left the command post in Damascus because he had not completed the necessary training required to deploy on-site to Douma. Inspector B separated from the OPCW at the end of August 2018; however, he continued to approach staff members in an effort to have continued access to and influence over the Douma investigation. The majority of the FFM’s work occurred after Inspector B’s separation, and during the last seven months of the FFM’s investigation (August 2018 through February 2019).

The investigators concluded that “the deliberate and premeditated breaches of confidentiality committed by Inspectors A and B are considered to be serious”. The report identified several remedial measures to reduce the risk of future breaches of the OPCW’s confidentiality regime. These measures include, but are not limited to, enhanced confidentiality training for OPCW staff as well as an on-going review of the Organisation’s internal legislation.

During the briefing, the Director-General provided States Parties with further context for understanding developments related to this breach of confidentiality:

“Inspectors A and B are not whistle-blowers. They are individuals who could not accept that their views were not backed by evidence. When their views could not gain traction, they took matters into their own hands and breached their obligations to the Organisation. Their behaviour is even more egregious as they had manifestly incomplete information about the Douma investigation. Therefore, as could be expected, their conclusions are erroneous, uninformed, and wrong.”

After the issuance of the interim report on Douma in July 2018, it took an additional seven months for the FFM to further investigate the incident and conduct the bulk of its work. During this period, Inspector A no longer had any supporting role regarding the FFM; Inspector B was no longer employed by the OPCW as of late August 2018.

The Director-General reaffirmed his confidence in the conclusions of the final report of the FFM regarding the Douma incident and stated, “I stand by the conclusions of the final Douma report”.

The report of the Investigation into Possible Breaches of Confidentiality has been shared with all States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Azerbaijan Parliamentary Elections

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Azerbaijan Parliamentary Elections

Azerbaijan prepares for the early parliamentary elections of February 9th, 2020

Baku, Azerbaijan – The elegant and cosmopolitan city of Baku is receiving thousands of local and international observers to cooperate in the upcoming early parliamentary elections of February 9th, 2020. 

The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIH) has dispatched an election observation mission to Azerbaijan. The mission, which is led by Ambassador Peter Tejler, is composed of a 12-members team based in Baku and 26 long-term observers, who have been deployed across Azerbaijan since

Dr Asim Mollazade Parliament Azerbaijan, Democratic Reforms Party.

January 14th. Moreover, 350 short-term observers are set to oversee the proceedings during election day, including voting, counting, and the elaboration of results. 

Besides the OSCE observation mission, 17,733 persons across the country have been accredited as individual observers and further 1,724 have been nominated by non-governmental organization – all this in addition to the 32,106 representatives of the candidates coming from 19 different political parties.

There are a number of international delegations currently in Azerbaijan, featuring the presence of politicians, academics, mostly from the fields of political sciences and international law, diplomats, government officials, and journalists. Their aim is to oversee the parliamentarian elections, which were called ahead of time in order to bridge the gap between the legislative power and the pace of economic, judicial, and social reforms set forth by President Ilham Aliyev. On December 5th, 2019, after the Parliament’s appeal to dissolve it and with the Constitutional Court’s consent, President Aliyev dissolved the chamber and announced early parliamentarian elections to be held on February 9th, 2020. 

Dr. Fazil Mustafa – Parliament Azerbaijan – Great Structure Party.

Some 5.2 million people are registered in the Central Election Commission’s voters list, which is available online for the public to verify their own data and request corrections if needed.

The official election campaign period started on January 17th. It had featured the participation of 272 candidates, coming from 19 political parties. Eighty members of the out-going parliament (64% of the total number) will seek re-election. 

Azerbaijan Parliamentarian Elections February 2020.

In the now-dissolved Parliament, 65 seats were allocated to the ruling New Azerbaijan Party, with the opposition holding 12 seats and further 38 members elected as independent candidates. The upcoming parliamentarian election will be an opportunity for new people to enter in the political arena – including women, who were previously underrepresented. During the previous legislature, women held only 20 seats (16% of the total), 2 positions as state committee’s chairperson (out of 15 such posts), and no ministerial position. In the upcoming election, women now represent 21% of the registered candidates. 

The new elections will also be a new opportunity for young people, as 18 years-old youth will be able to vote or to set themselves forth as candidates. “If we pay attention to the age of the candidates, it is possible to say that the interest of young people in this process is growing,” Rasim Guliyev, political expert and head of the Azerbaijani Resource Analytical Information Center, said. “This time, 82 candidates aged 18 to 28, including eight 22 years-old candidates, registered, together with 407 candidates aged 29-39 and 542 candidates aged 40-45, and 251 candidates aged 56-66 and 43 candidates older than 67.”

Mr. Guliyev also analyzed the dynamics of voters’ turnout during the last Azeri elections. “The voter turnout was 42 percent during the parliamentary elections in 2005 and 46 percent in 2010. While the voter turnout during the recent parliamentary elections in 2015 was 55 percent, during the presidential election it was 85 percent. So, the interest in municipal [GL1] elections is not high enough.” – he explained. 

In Azerbaijan, members of parliament are elected by simple majority for a five-year term, and elections are regulated by the Constitution and Election Code. Elections proceedings are administrated by the Central Election Commission. The legislation on campaign financing does not foresee direct public funding of the campaign, it sets limits for donations and expenditures, and it obliges candidates to report on their campaign financing. Parties and candidates can use their own finances, and donations can come by individual or legal entities. Anonymous and in-kind donations are prohibited.

Picture Heydar Aliyev Centre, Baku.

Turkey. Erdogan seeks to achieve the dream of the empire’s rebirth

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Turkey. Erdogan seeks to achieve the dream of the empire’s rebirth

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. (Photo by Hamed Malekpour: Courtesy of WikiCommons).

By Corneliu Pivariu.

We are coming closer to the centennial celebration of Atatürk’s establishment of the modern Turkish state while 100 years have already passed since the Ottoman Empire’s sunset. During the last decades, under Recep Tayyp Erdogan’s leadership as prime minister or president, Turkey has continuously grown economically and, in spite of certain domestic  divisions (see the aborted coup of July, 2016), succeeded in strenghtening an important regional geopolitical position and sought to become a global geopolitical power. Although Ankara denies officially it seeks the restoration of the Ottoman Empire, president Erdogan’s political and military moves prove otherwise.

In an article published at the end of last year by a Turkish journalist specialised in foreign affairs[1], Atatürk’s principle evoked in his celebrated speech concerning the battle of   Sarakaya[2] according to which not only a single line should be defended but an entire area was recalled.


Consequently, Turkey must reconsider presently its defence zone which spreads from Qatar to Libya with Cyprus in the middle.

Assessing this fact, one finds that Turkey’s general policy of the last decades was circumscribed to this purpose and that political, military, economic and of other nature steps were taken to this end. The establishment of Turkey’s military bases abroad starting with the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 until the beginning of 2020, when the military involvment in Libya was decided (with a number of troops for training and cooperation; certain sources mention the readiness of sending around 2,000 men who fought on the Syrian front) underlines the said policy. In fact, sustaining such a number of troops in Libya generates tough logistical problems for Turkey as it has no efficient means for that yet. The display of a Turkish drone which left the country and reached Libya after landing in Cyprus only is not enough and, on the contrary, highlights the difficulties of securing the logistical support of an important number of troops in Libya. 

Establishing Turkey’s military bases abroad was done by skillfully using the regional political and military developments. The most telling example besides Libya is the Tariq Ibn Ziyad base in Qatar completed in 2019. In Irak, Turkey has around 20 small-scale military bases predominantly for intelligence gathering. Six bases were established in northern Syria with a publicly unknown number of military assigned there. Most probably each of them are equaling at least an infantry company with additional units of artillery and tanks. The intent of setting up a military base in Georgia did not materialise.

Turkish diplomacy plays an important part in materialising president Erdogan’s geopolitical plans and when Ahmed Davudoglu was minister of foreign affairs (2009-2014) important steps were adopted for expanding the diplomatic component of Turkish foreign policy. It seems that now the diplomatic apparatus put in place by Turkey and its quality represents an efficient support for the foreign policy Ankara is currently promoting.

On the military component which is supposed to play  an even more important role in strengthening and preserving the influence area wished for by Ankara leadership, one should mention that although Turkey has one of the strongest armies in the world (NATO’s second and the 19th worldwide, according to Global Fire Power) it is not fully equiped to meet that challenge. After the aborted coup of July 15th, 2016, the management capacity of the army was severely damaged by the arrests, sentencing and dismissals that followed thereafter and even in 2019 (163 generals and admirals – 45% of the army’s total) the effects of which could be offset within around 5-10 years.

President Erdogan (prime minister between 2003-2014, president thereafter and re-elected in 2018) rules with a firm hand the country and, through the constitutional ammendments that were adopted, he succeeded in concentrating the executive power in his hands and to compete for a third term in 2023. Hakan Fidan, the powerful head of MIT (National Intelligence Organization) who secures the president’s position played a pivotal role in annihilating the 2016 coup attempt and is considered one of the president’s main proponents. 

Notwhistanding the achievements and the long political career, president Erdogan’s regime begins to present some signs of weakness and the most recent and important one was the presidential party AKP loss of Istanbul’s mayorship which was taken over by the candidate of the main opposition party, The People’s Republican Party (CHP) – Ekrem Imamoglu. The latter opposes the Istanbul Channel project[3], an idea launched by president Erdogan in 2011 and which materialisation the government intends to get started as of 2020.

The current Turkey’s economic condition is relatively healthy although in 2018 the economy contracted shortly and the national currency devaluated by 30%, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development assessed in May 2019 a gradual recovery and an economic growth of 2.5% in 2020.

Turkey, which is dependent on energy imputs, cares about making best use of its geostrategic position by building gas pipelines (Turkish Stream started in 2017 and was commissioned on January 1st, 2020) and seeks favourable conditions for exploiting the Mediterranean Sea resources in spite of the tense situation resulted from delineating the marine economic zones (see the map bellow).

Moreover, in a move intended to make it an unavoidable arbiter in the Mediterranean, Ankara signed with Libya, on November 27th, 2019, a MoU on delineating the continental shelf of the two countries which would practically divide the Mediterranean in two.

The move could hinder the 1,900 km East Med pipeline to be built by Greece, Cyprus and Israel for which the final decision should be taken by 2022 and to be completed by 2025.

Imagini pentru Est Med Pipeline

Libya represents an important pole for carrying out Ankara’s plans. The situation in the country is complicated and fluid not only as a result of the domestic developments but also especially due to the conflict between the two powerful groups of prime minister Fayez al-Serraj who heads the Government of National Accord (GNA), recognized by the UN and General Khalifa Haftar who, supported by Russia, France and the United Arab Emirates, controls a great part of the country and who, during the Berlin conference, suspended most exports of Libyan crude in order to have a stronger negotiation position. 

Furthermore, in spite of the recent agreement reached in Berlin with provisions prohibiting arms deliveries and foreign intervention in Libya, an important trafic including weapons and ammunition deliveries and foreign ”counsellors” was noticed at Tripoli Airport at the end of January. Turkey’s consolidation of its presence and influence in Libya is seen by certain forces as a danger that may lead to the establishment of an Islamist regime  in the country given that GNA has the backing of several Islamist groups as well as the well-known support Turkey extended to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It is believed that if there is no international intervention for a cease fire – which I don’t see materialised  in the coming future – the most probable result of the Turkish intervention will be the establishment of another Islamist regime in the Mediterranean.

The accomplishment of Turkey’s plan of restoring an important influence area from the Gulf to the Mediterranean, between Doha and Tripoli, seems doable given the uncertain geopolitical developments regionally and globally. Ankara used to this end the most modern means and international media outlets emphasized that cyber attacks in 2018 and 2019 that would have originated in Turkey against around 50 state and not only institutions in Greece, Cyprus and Iraq were recently exposed.

The latest developments by the end of January 2020 prove once more the fragility and complexity of the situation in the Mediterranean and the inefficiency of the Berlin Agreement: France accuses Turkey of not observing the agreement signed in the German capital and sent to Libya Syrian mercenaries landed off Turkish vessels while Turkey accuses France of supporting Khalifa Haftar in search of benefits in the oil field. Moreover, France decided to dispatch military frigates to the east of the Mediterranean to assist  Greece, a decision applauded by the Greek prime minister while visiting Paris.

Under Erdogan’s leadership, Turkey moves resolved towards maximizing its geopolitical role and position capitalizing on great players’ hesitations (the US, China, Russia). It is difficult to estimate to what extent it will accomplish such plans.

“If you are not fighting for what you want you deserve what you have”, a renowned American speaker and writer said. How great it would be if this phrase were put into practice with due regard for all principles and norms of international law. Unfortunately, the right of force is still stronger than the force of rule and therefore vae victis.

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About the author:

Corneliu Pivariu. Photographer: Ionus Paraschiv.
Corneliu Pivariu. Photographer: Ionus Paraschiv.

Corneliu Pivariu Military Intelligence and International Relations Senior Expert

A highly decorated retired two-star general of the Romanian army, during two decades he has led one of the most influential magazines on geopolitics and international relations in Eastern Europe, the bilingual journal Geostrategic Pulse.


[1]Turkey’s new geostrategy from Tripoli to Doha: “Defending an area” – Mehmet A. Kanci

[2] 23.08-13.09.1921, a battle known also as the “officers war” (in the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-1922), as a result of the great number of losses among those ranks (70-80%) during Turkish War of Independence. It is considered a milestone of the said war. According to the Turkish historian Ismail Habip Sevuk, the battle marked an important moment in Turkey’s history: “the retreat that get started at Vienna on 13th of September 1683 came to a stop 238 years later”

[3] A 50 km long channel which is to connect the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara allowing for decongesting the Bosphorus strait which was transited in 2018 only by 41,000 vessels. The cost of the project would rise to 11 bn euro while the related investments (port, artificial islands, a new town for 500,000 inhabitants etc) would add another 10 bn euro. The Turkish government estimates that the project could bring in yearly revenues of 8 bn euro. The opponents of the project argue it will damage the environment and provoke ecological changes difficult to estimate. The timeframe suggested by the central government for the project completion, i.e. 2023, is considered unrealistic by some specialists.

Darius Semaška welcomed in Bavaria

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Darius Semaška welcomed in Bavaria

Minister Dr. Florian Herrmann & Ambassador Darius Semaška – Picture by Bayerische Staatskanzlei.

Monday, 27 January 2020, Munich, Free State of Bavaria, Germany: State Minister Dr. Florian Herrmann, Head of the State Chancellery and Minister of State for Federal and European Affairs and Media, received for a bilateral meeting the Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania to Germany, Darius Semaška, for a meeting on the economic ties between the two countries. 

Ambassador Semaška was accredited to the Federal Republic of Germany on 29 August 2017 after having served previously as the chief diplomat in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The Ambassador entered the Lithuanian foreign service in 1992. He holds degrees in Mathematics and International relations from Vilnius and Aarhus (Denmark). 

For further information: 
Embassy of Lithuania in Germany: http://de.mfa.lt/de/de/vertretung/uber-botschaft/botschafter

Government of Bavaria: https://www.bayern.de/service/fotoreihen/?frid=in131017

Serbia and Kosovo to reestablish transport connections

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Serbia and Kosovo to reestablish transport connections

Richard Grenell – Picture by State Department.

20 January 2020, Berlin, Embassy of the United States to Germany: US Special Presidential Envoy for Serbia and Kosovo Peace Negotiations, Ambassador Richard Grenell crafted an agreement in the path to normalise relations between Serbia and Kosovo; a flight and train line is to be re-establish between Belgrade and Prishtina. If implemented, the agreement would allow for the first direct air travel between the two countries since 1998. However the plan is contingent on Kosovo lifting a 100% tax on Serbian goods.

The air link between Belgrade and Prihstina is set to be provided by Eurowings, Lufthansa Group’s low-cost subsidiary. The distance between the cities is around 520 km, and takes around 5.5 hours by car.

If the two countries manage to normalise relations, Kosovo would also be able to apply for United Nations membership – a move currently blocked by the Russian Federation.

For further information:
https://diplomatmagazine.eu/2019/10/08/ambassador-grenell-for-the-kosovo-process/

The Maldives rejoin the Commonwealth

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The Maldives rejoin the Commonwealth

1 February 2020: The Commonwealth welcomed its 54th member state after The Maldives’ application for re-admission was approved. 
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This marks the end of a process that began 13 months ago, in December 2018, when President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih wrote to the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Baroness Scotland, expressing the country’s interest in re-joining. The Secretary-General subsequently consulted with all 53 Commonwealth members and received no objections.

Maldivian Ambassador to St James’s Court thus becomes its High Commissioner, as a sign for Commonwealth membership.

For further information:
https://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/maldives-becomes-54th-member-commonwealth-family

Image by the Commonwealth of Nations.

Swarovski promotes the UN SDG

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Swarovski promotes the UN SDG

Prof Jonathan Baillie, Moderator Tania Bryer, Author Suzy Amis Cameron, WWF DG Marco Lambertini and CEO Nadja Swarovski – Picture by Swarovski.

Wednesday, 22 January 2020, Davos, Canton of the Grisons, Swiss Confederation: Chairperson of the Swarovski Foundation, Nadja Swarovski invited during the 50th World Economic Forum to a discussion panel round “Action for Nature”.

Top-class guests spoke about the possibilities of preserving resources and promoting sustainability through our own food consumption, and local responses to a global challenge. 

Nadja Swarovski, Suzy Amis Cameron and Gucci CEO Marco Bizzarri – Picture by Swarovski.

The ‘Action for Nature’ panel included Prof. Jonathan Baillie, Moderator Tania Bryer, Actress and author Suzy Amis Cameron, Director General of World Wide Fund for Nature Marco Lambertini and Nadja Swarovski.

For further information:

Nadja Swarovski at the World Economic Forum: https://www.facebook.com/DACH.Swarovski/videos/318145902445721/

https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300

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Picture by Jürgen Hammerschmid 

75th years since the liberation of Auschwitz

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75th years since the liberation of Auschwitz

Wednesday, 29 January 2020, Berlin, Germany: On the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the liberation of the German Nazi concentration and extermination camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau, the German Bundestag -Federal Parliament- commemorated the victims of National Socialism during a special ceremony.

Commemorative allocutions were delivered by the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and the President of the State of Israel, Reuven Rivlin.

After Bundestag Speaker, Wolfgang Schäuble opened the hour of remembrance, compositions by the Polish-French composer and Auschwitz survivor, Szymon Laks, were performed with texts by the Polish author Mieczysław Jastrun and the Polish musician and Holocaust survivor, Ludwik Żuk-Skarszewski. 

For further information:
http://www.bundespraesident.de/DE/Home/home_node.html#-gallery

On the image: From left to right
1st row: US Deputy Head of Mission, Robin Quinville; Czech Ambassador Tomáš Podivínský; Russian Ambassador, Sergej Netschajew; Israeli Ambassador Jeremy Issacharoff; Apostolic Nuntio, ArchbishopDr. Nikola Eterović; Polish Ambassador,Prof. Dr. Andrzej Przyłębski; French Ambassador Anne-Marie Descôtes; British Ambassador Sir Sebastian Wood. 
2nd row: Norwegien Ambassador, Petter Ølberg; Deputy Head of Mission – Embassy of Sweden, Johan Frisell; Ambassador of Belarus, Denis Sidorenko; Irish Ambassador, Dr Nicholas O’Brien; Estonian AmbassadorAlar Streimann; North Macedonian Ambassador, Ramadan Nazifi; Turkish Ambassador, Ali Kemal Aydin; Kuwaiti Ambassador, Najeeb Al Bader; Israeli Ambassadress, Laura Kram. 
3rd row: Cypriot Ambassador, Andreas Hadjichrysanthou; Hellenic Ambassador, Theodoros Daskarolis; Canadian Ambassador, Stéphane Dion; Australian Ambassador, Lynette Wood; Costa Rican Ambassador,Lydia Peralta Cordero; Salvadorean Ambassador, Florencia Vilanova de von Oehsen. 
4th row: Bangladeshi Ambassador, Imtiaz Ahmed; Spanish Ambassador Ricardo Martínez Vázquez; Peruvian Ambassador Elmer Schialer; Bulgarian Ambassador, Elena Shekerletova; Slovak Ambassador, Marián Jakubócy; Argentinian Ambassador, Pedro Villagra Delgado. 
5th row: Georgian Ambassador, Dr. Elguja Khokrishvili; Icelandic Ambassador María Erla Marelsdóttir; Egyptian Ambassador, Khaled Abdelhamid; Lithuanian Ambassador, Darius Semaška; Bosnian and Herzegovinan Ambassador, Jadranka Winbow. 
6th row: Austrian Ambassador Dr. Peter Huber. 

Picture by Embassy of Poland to Germany.

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