Romania “at the Gate of Storms[1]” and Without a Strategic Narrative

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Romania “at the Gate of Storms[1]” and Without a Strategic Narrative

“A nation without a strategic vision has no future, only reflexes.”
— adaptation after Raymond Aron


By Lieutenant General Corneliu Pivariu (ret)

 

The Meaning of a Strategic Signal

The announcement regarding the withdrawal of part of the American troops from Romania[2] is not merely an operational adjustment of the U.S. presence on NATO’s eastern front. Rather, it is a strategic signal that must be read in the context of a world undergoing reconfiguration. At a time when the global balance of power is under multiple pressures — from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East to the emergence of a new Eurasian economic axis — any change in the U.S. military footprint in Eastern Europe carries major significance. It demonstrates the evolution toward a multipolar world in which the United States can no longer act as “the world’s policeman.”

Romania, situated “at the gate of storms,” in a buffer zone between Russia, the Balkans, and the Black Sea, is directly exposed to these shifts. This partial withdrawal should not be viewed through panic or conspiracy theories, but as a test of strategic maturity: does Romania have its own vision of its place in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture? Or does it continue to define its position merely through reflexes of loyalty to its partners?

Unable to properly assert its own interests and present its true strategic importance, Romania must escape the political stagnation in which it finds itself and act with strategic vision to preserve its future.

The Political Level – Between Loyalty and Lack of Vision

Politically, Washington constantly adjusts its global posture. If during 2022–2024 the focus was on consolidating the eastern flank, we are now witnessing a rebalancing — a redistribution of resources toward other areas of interest, including the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. This is not a withdrawal from NATO commitments, but a strategic optimization, in a world where the United States must carefully calibrate its military and financial presence.

Nevertheless, we cannot fail to observe that this rebalancing takes place in Romania and not in Poland, which is also on the eastern flank. Most likely, this is due to a certain political “de-synchronization” that Romania has demonstrated over the 35 years since the events of December 1989, during which it has had to live under the vision of the politicians who governed it[3].

The problem is not what the United States is doing, but what Romania is not doing. For more than three decades, Romania’s strategic discourse has been limited to formulas such as “strategic partnership”, “firm commitment”, “full support for allies.” Although diplomatically correct, these do not constitute a strategic narrative. Romania needs its own story about itself: about its role in the region, its national interests, the balance between security and development.

The absence of such a narrative results in dependence on the perceptions of others. Countries in the region offer contrasting models: Poland asserts itself as a regional leader through massive defense investments; Hungary cultivates its sovereign and mediator profile; Turkey plays the role of pivot between geopolitical blocs. Romania, by contrast, defines itself through strategic silence — it reacts, often belatedly, but rarely acts.

The Military Dimension – Between Presence and Relevance

From a military perspective, the partial withdrawal of U.S. troops does not signify abandonment, but rather a resilience test for Romania’s Armed Forces and national defense system. For years, Romania has relied on allied presence as a security guarantee. Yet external guarantees cannot substitute internal responsibility.

Without a realistic national defense strategy, grounded in its own priorities, Romania risks becoming merely a logistical territory, not a strategic actor. The military infrastructure developed with allied support (the Mihail Kogălniceanu base, the facilities at Câmpia Turzii or Deveselu) must be matched by a competitive national defense industry capable of ensuring minimal autonomy in times of crisis.

At present, Romania continues to lean on the symbolism of the “NATO umbrella” without building its own shield. In a multipolar world where alliances are increasingly flexible, real security is measured in internal capability, not in the number of joint declarations.

The current state of the Romanian Armed Forces unfortunately reflects a growing gap between political rhetoric and operational reality.

In terms of personnel, the army faces a chronic shortage of active troops and reservists. The average age exceeds 40, and voluntary recruitment fails to offset retirements and professional migration. Military education has been partially modernized, but tactical training and adaptation to new forms of warfare (hybrid, cyber, informational) remain insufficient, especially at unit level.

Regarding equipment, Romania has made specific advances (Patriot systems, HIMARS, Piranha armored vehicles, F-16 modernization), but without national industrial and logistical coherence. The absence of an integrated strategy leaves acquisitions largely dependent on imports and allied initiatives, with limited contribution to the domestic defense economy.

As for the national defense industry, it survives more through inertia than vision[4]. Many capacities are unused or technologically outdated, and the production chain no longer covers even basic needs in ammunition, maintenance, and individual equipment. Recent attempts at revitalization (such as reopening powder production in Făgăraș[5]) are welcome, but cannot replace the lack of a coherent defense industrial policy coordinated between the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of National Defense.

Overall, Romania’s military system operates under a structural imbalance: insufficient and partially unprepared personnel, modern equipment but poorly integrated, an inert defense industry, and growing reliance on allied infrastructure. Without a long-term national program reconnecting training, procurement, and domestic production, Romania risks remaining a military transit corridor, not a source of strategic regional resilience.

Romania Between Globalism and Strategic Sovereignty

The absence of a national strategic narrative is visible in Romania’s relation to major global trends. In the context of the confrontation between globalism and sovereignty, Romania has failed to define its own position. The country oscillates between full attachment to Western structures and a latent, content-less sovereigntism.

A state that does not know its priorities cannot claim a regional leadership role. A strategic narrative is not merely a communication exercise, but a national thinking framework: it links foreign policy objectives to economic, energy, defense, and cultural goals.

Without such a framework, Romania risks becoming a transit gate for the interests of others — a buffer zone between spheres of influence, but without true decision-making power. In the absence of a coherent strategy, even the best partnerships become dependencies, and allied presence risks being perceived more as a substitute for internal vision than as the result of conscious planning.

The Need for a Strategic Compass

The partial withdrawal of American troops from Romania is a test of geopolitical clarity. It is not a loss of protection, but an opportunity for reflection. It shows that Romania needs, more than ever, its own strategic compass — an integrated vision of defense, economy, and diplomacy.

A state that aspires to stability and respect must speak through initiative, not reflex. Romania has the resources, geographic position, and historical experience to become a pillar of regional balance, but this cannot be achieved without a coherent internal vision. Yet, the politicians who have led the country for the past 35 years are preoccupied with petty interests, eager to please one side or another to preserve their privileges, and lack strategic vision.

A national strategic research center, a politically educated elite in geopolitics, and an informed society are the minimum conditions for formulating a credible national narrative.

Without it, Romania risks remaining what it has gradually become: a gate open to storms, but without a lighthouse to foresee them. Yet Romania is not condemned to be a gate to storms — it can become the lighthouse that signals them. The choice lies entirely with us.

Brașov, 29 October 2025

[1] An expression inspired by the title of Eusebiu Camilar’s book “Poarta furtunilor” (The Gate of Storms), published by Editura Militară in 1955, which recounts episodes from medieval history, when Romania stood at the crossroads of three empires: Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg.

[2] The decision to suspend the rotation of a U.S. brigade — which was to be deployed across several allied countries, including Romania — was communicated by Romania’s Ministry of National Defense on 29 October 2025. It was specified that approximately 1,000 U.S. troops will remain on Romanian territory, and that the modification concerns primarily the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base (the only location where the rotation of the brigade will no longer take place).

[3] Immediately after 1989, Romania missed the opportunity to unite with the Republic of Moldova, and even concluded a treaty with the USSR, which was already on the verge of collapse. Romania’s integration into the European Union and NATO was achieved with a delay of 5–6 years, after other Eastern European states had already been accepted. This was due to internal reasons: the absence of a consistent political elite, economic fragmentation, and delayed reforms.

Although the political leadership in the United States changed, Romania remained attached to the political orientation of the Obama and Biden administrations, without adapting to the strong conservative shift that occurred in 2024–2025. This is also illustrated by the presence in the Bucharest government, in positions of primary importance, of personalities well-known for their political preferences and public statements openly opposed to the current administration in Washington, including recently through the nomination of a new Deputy Prime Minister and the continued posting in Washington of an underperforming ambassador.

[4] According to data available from September–October 2025, a significant number of enterprises within the National Company Romarm S.A. and its network of military-profile subsidiaries (Uzina Mecanică Cugir, Plopeni, Dragomirești, Sadu, Mija, Carfil, Moreni, Metrom, etc.) do not have their revenue and expenditure budgets approved for the current year.

[5] In December 2005, powder production at the Făgăraș Powder Plant was largely halted. It was only on 27 August 2025 that the Romanian state signed a contract with Rheinmetall — Germany for the construction of a new strategic powder production facility for ammunition, more than three years after the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine.

The Middle East and North Africa: Strategic Competition, Energy and Security Reconfiguring the Global Balance

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The Middle East and North Africa: Strategic Competition, Energy and Security Reconfiguring the Global Balance

“True power in the 21st century no longer lies solely in the strength of arms, but in the ability to connect resources, routes and people.” “In the Middle East, reality changes faster than perceptions, and perceptions often shape reality.”
By Lieutenant General Corneliu Pivariu (ret)

MENA as a Key Space of Global Rebalancing

The Middle East and North Africa – known under the acronym MENA – represent, more than ever, a crossroads of history, religion, energy, and geopolitics.
Here, millennial civilizations, contemporary ideologies, and global economic interests collide and reshape themselves in a continuous process.

We live in an era where transformations unfold at the pace of a historical revolution, and developments in this region have repercussions that reverberate worldwide.
After more than seven decades of almost uninterrupted conflict, MENA now stands at the centre of a new strategic competition where energy, technology, and political influence intertwine within a transforming architecture of power.

The region has become the symbol of the emerging multipolar world – one without a single hegemon, but with a complex network of regional and global powers that cooperate, compete, and condition one another.
This multipolarity does not signify fragmentation, but rather a redistribution of decision-making centres and their adaptation to a logic of strategic interdependence.

Energy and Strategic Interdependence

Energy remains the keystone of power in the Middle East.
The Gulf States – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – still hold a dominant share of the world’s oil and gas reserves.
However, they no longer play the passive role of resource suppliers. Over the past two decades, these countries have evolved into strategic decision centres, diversifying their economies and investments in technology, infrastructure, defence, and green energy.

A new form of power is thus emerging: not the one that merely extracts the resource, but the one that transforms it, directs it, and connects it.
Green hydrogen, solar energy from the Maghreb, trans-Saharan interconnections, maritime corridors, and port infrastructures now form the circulatory system of the global economy. Energy has become not only the source but also the language of contemporary geopolitics.

As shown in my previous analyses on BRICS and “Globalisation 2.0”, the redistribution of energy and technological flows is shifting the global centre of gravity from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, with MENA serving as the critical interface between the Global South and the industrialised North.
Energy corridors – from Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb to Suez and the Eastern Mediterranean – are the arteries through which not only energy, but global stability itself, flows.

Europe, faced with its own energy vulnerability since 2022, is rediscovering MENA’s strategic role – not merely as an alternative source, but as an indispensable partner for energy transition and global security.

Strategic Competition among Major Powers

Nowhere is the new global contest for influence more visible than in MENA.
The United States, China, Russia, the European Union, and regional actors – India, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, and others – simultaneously compete for space, resources, and narrative control.

The United States seeks a balance between partial disengagement and sustained influence, relying on selective partnerships and the consolidation of the Abraham Accords.
China promotes a subtle strategy: through the Belt and Road Initiative and its mediation role (e.g., between Iran and Saudi Arabia), it asserts itself as a major economic and diplomatic actor – without direct military presence.
Russia, though weakened by the war in Ukraine, maintains strategic anchors in Syria, Iran, and Algeria, cultivating asymmetric networks of influence.
The European Union remains the main trade partner, yet still lacks a coherent security strategy for the region.

Meanwhile, India discreetly expands its economic and technological footprint in the Gulf and East Africa, while BRICS+ increasingly emerges as an attractive platform for Arab states seeking to diversify their financial and energy partnerships.

Regional actors are also asserting greater autonomy:
– Iran capitalises on the “axis of resistance” (Hezbollah, the Houthis, Shiite militias);
– Saudi Arabia diversifies its partnerships and aspires to a global role within BRICS+;
– Turkey adopts a flexible stance between NATO, Russia, and the Muslim world;
– Israel, as I have shown in the study “Super Sparta”, strengthens its technological and intelligence superiority, but faces a serious erosion of image and growing diplomatic isolation amid the Gaza crisis.

In the logic of the new realpolitik, competition is no longer purely military but also narrative: each actor strives to define the meaning of world order, to impose its own framework of legitimacy and its own version of international normality.

Security and Instability – Fragile Equilibria

The Gaza crisis remains the epicentre of tensions.
After a year of open conflict, the human and political toll is tragic: tens of thousands of victims, massive destruction, a paralysed peace process, and a climate of hatred fuelling new generations of radicalism.
The elimination of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders has not brought stability – only a pause between two phases of the same confrontation.

The war in Gaza has become a symbol of a world increasingly unable to negotiate lasting peace – the latest agreement concluded in Egypt being a telling example.
Behind the military confrontation lies a battle for narrative control: who is the aggressor, who is the victim, and who defines the legitimacy of action?
This is the purest expression of the strategic narrative – a concept that redefines the relationship between power and perception in the 21st century.

The expansion of the conflict through attacks from Yemen and the pressure on Red Sea maritime routes shows that regionalised warfare has already become a reality.
Against this backdrop, Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia attempt cautious mediation efforts, but the lack of consensus among major powers keeps peace as a more declarative than substantive objective.

Security in MENA today is a fragile mosaic in which local stability depends on global balances, and each conflict represents a link in a broader geopolitical chain.
In a deeper historical sense, we are witnessing a reactivation of post-Ottoman fragmentations, where symbolic frontiers have returned stronger than geographic ones.

Romania and MENA – Between Experience and Opportunity

Romania has a solid and long-standing tradition of dialogue and balance in the Middle East, dating back to the Cold War era.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Romanian diplomacy was respected in Cairo, Damascus, Tehran, and Tel Aviv – as well as in Washington, Beijing, and other capitals – for its capacity to maintain open channels between antagonistic camps.

After 1990, this vocation gradually faded.
Foreign policy focused almost exclusively on the Euro-Atlantic vector, while regional expertise diminished.
Nevertheless, the current context provides a genuine opportunity for strategic re-engagement – even if the present diplomatic leadership seems little, if at all, concerned with seizing it.

Romania could act along three main directions:

  1. Energy and infrastructure – through the Port of Constanța and the Rail2Sea and Danube2Sea projects, which could logistically connect Eastern Europe with the Mediterranean and MENA, strengthening its position within the Three Seas Initiative.
  2. Education and cultural diplomacy – by expanding university cooperation with Arab states and creating a framework for training regional specialists, continuing the former tradition of expertise and balance.
  3. Mediation diplomacy – by reviving a foreign policy based on credibility, continuity, and active balance.

A major advantage for Romania is that it is a European state without a colonial past in the region, a trait that offers it genuine potential for credible partnership with the Global South.

As highlighted in Global Geopolitical Evolutions up to 2050, Romania has the vocation of a bridge between North and South, between Europe and the Orient, provided it assumes a pragmatic, not merely declarative, role within the global architecture.

MENA as the Laboratory of the New World Order

The Middle East and North Africa have become the testing ground of the multipolar order.
Here intersect the new forms of power: economic, energetic, technological, and informational.
Here, too, the parameters of European security are indirectly being shaped.

The region is no longer merely an object of great power competition, but an autonomous actor capable of influencing global trends.
For Romania, the challenge is clear: not to observe these transformations from the sidelines, but to take part in them – through dialogue, expertise, and vision.

In a world where the “force of arms” is increasingly replaced by the power of connections, true influence will be measured by the ability to understand, anticipate, and connect.
The future will not belong solely to the greatest powers, but also to those who can build bridges between them – and Romania has the chance to be among these, if it ceases to act merely as a docile executor of directives from Brussels or elsewhere, and instead acts with professionalism and strategic vision.

Presentation delivered at the 11th MEPEI Forum “Middle East from Chaos to the New (Dis)Order”, Bucharest, 30 October 2025.

Selective Bibliography

  1. International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2025, Paris, 2025.
  2. Chatham House, Middle East Energy Transition: Opportunities and Risks, London, 2024.
  3. Brookings Institution, The New Middle East Order: Power and Partnership in the Post-Oil Era, Washington DC, 2024.
  4. RAND Corporation, US Strategic Posture in the Middle East 2023–2030, Santa Monica, 2023.
  5. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025, London, 2025.
  6. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), BRICS+ and the Global South: Implications for Energy and Security, Washington, 2024.
  7. Miskimmon, A., O’Loughlin, B., Roselle, L., Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, Routledge, 2013.
  8. United Nations ESCWA, Arab Regional Outlook 2025: Connectivity, Energy, and Climate Transition, Beirut, 2025.
  9. Corneliu Pivariu, Global Geopolitical Evolutions up to 2050, Financial Intelligence, Bucharest, 2025.

Building bridges between strategic cultures

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Building bridges between strategic cultures

By Captain Edouard Jonnet, French Defence Attaché in the Netherlands

France and the Netherlands are both NATO and EU founding members, but have inherited sometimes differing strategic cultures. The war in Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East and the Caribbean, among others, lead us to rethink how to defend our shared interests. As a defense attaché, one of my duties is to cultivate a shared strategic thinking and foster our “intellectual re-armament”.

Beyond the percentages of GDP allocated to defense, this intellectual re-armament should allow us to shape our military capabilities in a way that will enable us to prevail in the event of a high-intensity conflict. In this spirit, the participation of the Netherlands as guests of honour in the Paris Defense and Strategy Forum last March and the Franco-Dutch Defense Talks in September are examples of how to build bridges between our strategic cultures.

In the past months, several developments had a positive impact on the build-up of a common strategic culture.

Lessons learned from WWII encourage us to develop a common strategic culture. The 2024 twining between the municipalities of Kapelle and Orry La Ville supports this way forward.

At the beginning of the Second World War, France was the only country to deploy large units to support Dutch Armed forces in Brabant and Zeeland in May 1940. Most remarkably, after the capitulation, Dutch troops in Zeeland kept fighting for a few more days under French command. Nowadays, French soldiers who died in the Netherlands during WWII are buried in the town of Kapelle. To a certain extent, the poor coordination between French and Dutch forces back in 1940 had been nurtured by the lack of a shared strategic culture. This lesson learned from history should not be forgotten now.

It is also worth noting that, in similar fashion, Dutch forces fought on French soil. The Princess Irene brigade took part in the battle of Normandy in 1944, and Dutch soldiers are buried in the cemetery of Orry La Ville. In 2024, Orry La Ville and Kapelle have officialized their twinning programme, during a moving ceremony in Orry[1].

Training with similar equipment is a catalyst for a common strategic culture build up

In terms of capabilities, the acquisition by the Netherlands of four Orka-class submarines from Naval Group and its Dutch partners marks a turning point[2]. Beyond the industrial links that will emerge from this cooperation, it is also an opportunity to build up a shared strategic thinking on submarine warfare and therefore contribute together to the security of Europe in the coming decades. As a defense attaché, but more importantly as a submariner, I am of course very enthusiastic about this perspective. Several other projects regarding helicopters, mine warfare, radars and smaller equipment are also great opportunities to build bridges between our strategic cultures, just like radars or other.

Organizations’ rapprochement eases a common strategic culture

The creation of a Joint Force command[3] in the Dutch ministry of defense is a very interesting move. The Dutch organization will be more joint and closer to the French organigram. This kind of rapprochement should not be underestimated. Officers will definitely be more eager to exchange information if they don’t struggle to grasp someone else’s organization.

In a way, evolutions towards similar organigrams and decision-making processes are key topics for bringing strategic cultures closer.

Even if there is still room for improvement in order to bring our strategic cultures ever closer, the evolutions of the last few years have been significant and encourage us to move forward with greater energy and will.

Finally, strategic culture is about learning who we are, and understanding each other. It may be the most decisive step of the much-needed intellectual rearmament of Europe.

[1] https://www.kapelle.nl/orry-la-ville-et-kapelle

[2] https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2024/06/12/politieke-steun-voor-bouw-onderzeeboten-door-naval-group

[3] https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/09/04/met-joint-force-command-beter-voorbereid-op-grootschalig-conflict

General Elections in the Netherlands 29 October 2025

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General Elections in the Netherlands 29 October 2025

By Roy Lie Atjam

Early general elections took place in the Netherlands on Wednesday, October 29, 2025, to elect members of the House of Representatives. Initially scheduled for 2028, they were accelerated due to the collapse of the Schoof cabinet after the Party for Freedom (PVV) withdrew from the coalition.

Voter turnout reached 76%. The House of Representatives comprises 150 seats, with 76 needed for a majority. Since 1894, no party has achieved a majority due to the country’s proportional representation system, making coalition formation necessary after extensive negotiations.

Electoral System – Elections occur every four years in March unless a snap election is called. The 150 members are elected through semi-open lists in a single nationwide constituency, requiring a minimum of 0.67% of votes to qualify for seat distribution. Voters can cast preferential votes, with seats allocated first to candidates who meet a threshold of 25% of the Hare quota. Any remaining seats are filled based on candidates’ positions on the list.Unlike the Westminster model, the Dutch make use of a proportional representation system, making it highly unlikely for any one party to obtain a majority. Instead, it is expected that a coalition of political parties will be formed after a period of extensive negotiations.

Election Day – Polling stations operated from 7:30 AM to 9:00 PM, with a few  in Arnhem, Zwolle, opening shortly after midnight. Train station booths opened early for convenience.

Voting from Abroad  – Dutch citizens abroad could vote if they registered with the Municipality of The Hague by September 17, 2025. Transfer of voting passes and proxy voting were permitted.

Electoral Council  – The Electoral Council oversees elections and acts as an advisory body on voting laws and procedures.

Possible coalitions

D66 leader Rob Jetten experienced a triumphant night, while left-wing leader Frans Timmermans faced significant setbacks. The spotlight also turned to the far-right figure Geert Wilders, raising intriguing questions about potential coalitions.

Several parties, including GroenLinks/PvdA, VVD, and CDA, have made it clear they do not want to ally with the PVV.

Mr. Jetten has expressed a preference for a coalition that includes the CDA, GroenLinks-PvdA, and VVD. A centre-left coalition could secure 86 seats, whereas a centre-right alliance with D66 would only reach 75 seats—insufficient for a governing majority.

The results with 98% of the votes counted
D66 26
PVV 26
VVD 22
GL-PvdA 20
CDA 18
JA21 9
FvD 7
BBB 4
SP 3
Denk 3
PvdD 3
SGP 3
CU 2
Volt 0
50+ 2

Election results will be validated on November 7, 2025, with the new House of Representatives convening on November 12, 2025.

H.E. Mr Joseph Popolo, Ambassador of the United States of America

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H.E. Mr Joseph Popolo, Ambassador of the United States of America

Ambassador Popolo Presents Credentials to His Majesty King Willem-Alexander

Joseph Popolo, the new Ambassador of the United States to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, presented his credentials to His Majesty King Willem-Alexander at Paleis Noordeinde on Wednesday, October 29.

As the President’s representative in the Netherlands, Ambassador Popolo brings a strong personal commitment to advancing the United States’ long-standing partnership with the Netherlands. His mandate includes deepening cooperation across key areas of the bilateral relationship—defense and security, law enforcement, trade, and cutting-edge technologies. His arrival underscores the United States’ enduring dedication to one of its oldest and closest allies.

“I am incredibly honored to have been selected by President Trump to serve the United States as our new Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, one of our most important and enduring allies. Working with Secretary Rubio, we will strengthen the vital partnership between our two countries, building our past success into future results,” Ambassador Popolo stated.

Joseph “Joe” Popolo is the founder of Charles & Potomac Capital, LLC, a private investment firm focusing on technology, healthcare, media, energy, and real estate. Before his appointment, he served as its CEO. His extensive leadership experience—building teams, scaling businesses across continents, and contributing actively to educational, philanthropic, and charitable organizations—has prepared him well for his diplomatic role.

Prior to founding Charles & Potomac Capital, Ambassador Popolo played a key role in transforming the Freeman Company into the world’s leading live-event brand experience enterprise, tripling its size to $3 billion in revenue. He oversaw 7,500 employees in 25 cities across four continents, including the company’s European audio-visual division based in the Netherlands. Over the course of his career, he has overseen more than $1.5 billion in mergers and acquisitions. In 2018, he led the team that marketed and sold Freeman’s Encore Event Technology subsidiary to Blackstone, creating the world’s largest venue-based audio-visual company. He has served on several corporate boards, including Ondas Holdings ($ONDS), Encore, JEGI CLARITY, and Advisory Research, and held roles on the Board of Trustees at Boston College and the Executive Board of SMU’s Cox School of Business.

A proud Boston College alumnus, Ambassador Popolo holds a BS in Finance and an MBA in Finance and Economics from the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, where he later received a Dean’s Award of Distinction. He and his wife are the parents of three children.

Explores the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on International Arbitration

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Explores the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on International Arbitration

New Book by Dr. Fernando Messias Published by Springer Nature

Lisbon, 28 November 2025 — Portuguese lawyer and researcher Dr. Fernando Messias has released his new book, “The Practice of Law and International Arbitration in the Age of Artificial Intelligence”, published by Springer Nature. The publication offers an in-depth analysis of how artificial intelligence is transforming legal practice and international dispute resolution.

Springer Nature, one of the world’s leading academic publishers, is renowned for its rigorous peer-review process and scientific excellence. It publishes thousands of peer-reviewed journals and books annually, serving as a global benchmark for research quality and trusted scholarship.

Dr. Messias’s book examines the ethical, organisational, and procedural implications of integrating artificial intelligence into law and arbitration. Drawing on interdisciplinary research spanning law, ethics, and organisational psychology, it proposes a forward-looking framework for the responsible incorporation of AI in international arbitration.

Impact of Artificial Intelligence on International Arbitration

The official book launch will take place during the international seminar “AI and International Arbitration – Ethical and Practical Challenges in Light of the New CIArb Guidelines”, to be held on 28 November 2025 in Lisbon. The event is supported by the Fundação Lusíada, the CIArb Iberian Chapter, and Springer Nature.

Confirmed speakers include Professor Dr. Diogo Leite de Campos, Dr. Abel Lacerda Botelho, Prof. Nazareth Romero, Dr. João Valadas Coriel, Dr. Claire Morel de Westgaver, Dr. Eduardo Gómez, Dra. Silvana Marcotulli, among others.

The seminar will also feature the attendance of the President of the Portuguese Bar Association, underscoring the institutional importance of this discussion on the evolving role of artificial intelligence in legal practice and international arbitration.

For more information on the book, visit:
Springer Nature – The Practice of Law and International Arbitration in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Czech Republic Reiterates Commitment to Victims of Rome Statute Crimes

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Czech Republic Reiterates Commitment to Victims of Rome Statute Crimes

The Czech Republic, a State Party to the International Criminal Court (ICC) since 2009, has made an unrestricted voluntary contribution of EUR 20,000 to the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV), reaffirming its steadfast commitment to international justice and the rights of victims of crimes under the Rome Statute.

Mr. Andres Parmas, Chair of the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for Victims at the ICC, stated:

“This continued support highlights the Czech Republic’s dedication to addressing the harm endured by victims of Rome Statute crimes. Through this contribution, the Czech Republic demonstrates its commitment to justice and to ensuring that victims of the most horrendous crimes regain their hope, dignity, and ability to rebuild their lives.”

H.E. René Miko, Ambassador of the Czech Republic to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, remarked:

“I am pleased to announce the Czech Republic’s contribution to the Trust Fund for Victims at the ICC. Its mandate to support those who have suffered harm constitutes an inherent component of international law. Reparations and assistance provided by the Trust Fund are vital parts of restorative justice and reconciliation, complementing the role of the International Criminal Court.”

Since 2011, the Czech Republic has consistently supported TFV programmes benefiting victims through sustained and progressively increasing voluntary contributions.

For more information about the Trust Fund for Victims at the ICC, please contact trustfundforvictims@icc-cpi.int or visit www.trustfundforvictims.org

Negotiating Peace in a Fragmented World: The Case for Preventative Diplomacy

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Negotiating Peace in a Fragmented World: The Case for Preventative Diplomacy

By Mr. Rabbih El-Haddad, Director of the Division for Multilateral Diplomacy at UNITAR

Across the world, fractures appear to be widening faster than old wounds can heal. Conflicts that were once local now reverberate globally while new crises – pandemics, climate change, and mass displacement – place unprecedented strain upon our established systems of cooperation. In such a landscape, it might seem as though the time for preventative diplomacy has passed. However, the commitment to negotiate before disputes spiral out of control has never been more important.  

Preventative diplomacy has always been one of the most vital, yet most understated tools of the United Nations. It tends to operate outside of the spotlight, seeking to de-escalate tensions through dialogue and mediation rather than force. Though its successes may rarely make headlines, its absence is unmistakable in the devastation left by war. The conflicts that dominate our headlines today illustrate the immense cost of waiting too long to negotiate and remind us that prevention is not only more humane, but far less costly than response and reconstruction. As the United Nations commemorates its 80th anniversary, this is a moment to reaffirm the founding vision of the Charter: that lasting peace is built not only on agreements, but on the constant practice of dialogue, cooperation, and trust. 

Preventive diplomacy begins with that trust, both between parties in a conflict and in the multilateral institutions that make dialogue possible. The erosion of this trust has made prevention harder to sustain than ever. Rebuilding it therefore calls for a renewed culture of engagement across divisions, where listening and inclusion form the foundation of collective action. 

In this spirit, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research is proud to announce the second edition of World Negotiation Day, which will be taking place on the 8th of December 2025 in Doha, Qatar. Hosted by UNITAR in collaboration with the Doha Forum and QatarDebate, this year’s event is structured around the theme “Negotiating Peace in a Fragmented World: The Case for Preventative Diplomacy.” Qatar has emerged as a key mediator in some of the world’s most complex and protracted conflicts, and its sustained commitment to dialogue makes Doha a particularly meaningful host for this initiative.

The forum will convene leading voices from international organizations, governments, and civil society to examine how negotiation can, and must, be revitalized as the first line of defense against conflict. Its agenda features an opening ceremony, a high-level panel, and the presentation of the “Doha Best Negotiator of the Year” award, which honors an individual whose skills, integrity, and impact in negotiation have contributed meaningfully to international peace and cooperation. 

As fragmentation threatens the foundation of multilateralism, we must resist the temptation to believe that dialogue is no longer sufficient or effective. Negotiation is not a relic of a more optimistic age, but the pathway to a more sustainable one. 

For more information or to submit nominations for the Doha Best Negotiator of the Year Award, please contact dwnd@unitar.org. Registration for in-person and online participation is open through UNITAR’s website. 

About the author:

Mr. Rabbih El-Haddad is the Director of the Division for Multilateral Diplomacy of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), his work focuses on supporting governments, decision-makers, multilateral negotiators and the numerous negotiating groups that use diplomacy and negotiation as tools to defend their national interests in a complex context.

China Defined – Propositions on the meaning of “developing country” in the World Trade Organization

Diplomat Magazine
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China Defined – Propositions on the meaning of “developing country” in the World Trade Organization

By Isa Jeziah Dookie

 “CHEATING,” is how President Donald Trump described China’s self-designation as a developing country in the World Trade Organization (WTO). One might be forgiven for dismissing President Trump’s tweet as just another bombastic Trumpism were it not for the fact that the subsequent U.S. administration and the U.S. Congress made it clear this, albeit in more diplomatic but no less strong words, was U.S. policy. Under the Biden administration, the (unpretentiously named) “PRC Is Not a Developing Country Act” cleared the House in a 415-0 vote and was approved by a Senate committee, though it has not yet been enacted into law. The U.S. remains firm in its stance that China should not receive developing-country treatment at the WTO.

China, for its part, labelled President Trump’s cheating allegation as the absurd trickery of a global hegemon and has staunchly defended its position before the WTO, maintaining that it is merely the world’s largest developing economy. However, in September 2025, China announced that while it continues to regard itself as a developing country, it will no longer seek Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) in current and future WTO negotiations, a significant policy shift aimed at defusing the long-running U.S.–China dispute. Even so, Beijing’s declaration does not affect its existing WTO commitments or its broader developing-country narrative, leaving the debate over how “development” should be defined very much alive.

The WTO should adopt objective but non-deterministic criteria for deciding which countries are “developing countries” for the purpose of WTO trade agreements and which are not. The decision on whether a country is developing should be placed before the Dispute Settlement Body as a strategy to break the deadlock on the WTO Appellate Body.

The Dispute: Redefining “Developing” in the WTO Order

In the aftermath of World War II, the United States and its allies rebuilt global institutions on principles of fairness, justice, and non-discrimination, establishing the United Nations to safeguard peace and human rights and creating a new economic order, embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and later the WTO, to promote equal access to trade, economic collaboration, and shared prosperity.

The WTO trade order rests on five core principles: non-discrimination, freer trade, predictability, fair competition, and support for development. Non-discrimination, through Most-Favoured Nation and national treatment rules, ensures equal trading conditions among members. Together with tariff reduction, transparent commitments, competitive fairness, and flexibility for developing nations, these principles aim to create a stable and equitable global trading system.

Concessions for developing countries in the WTO

The WTO’s founding promise was clear: give developing nations, especially the poorest, a fair share of global trade, but in practice, those lofty words often clash with limited capacity and uneven benefits. In line with the stated principle to encourage development and economic reform, the WTO agreements contain special provisions to the benefit of developing countries by offering special rights or extra leniency. This is referred to as “special and differential treatment” (SDT).

Developing countries are facilitated by being allowed extra time to fulfil their commitments, given greater market access to increasing trading opportunities, having their interests safeguarded, and being helped. Developing countries enjoy limited trade advantages under WTO rules.For instance, the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement exempts those with a per capita GNP under $1,000 from subsidy bans and grants all developing members a grace period to phase out export subsidies. They also benefit from the Generalized System of Preferences, which lowers tariffs on their exports to developed nations, and from preferential trade arrangements among developing countries themselves.

China’s WTO Accession and the “Developing Country” Status

In the WTO’s world, countries decide for themselves whether they’re ‘developing’; a self-declared status that lets China and others claim benefits meant for the world’s poorest nations.

When China joined the WTO in 2001, it claimed developing-country status but was pressed by the U.S. and EU to accept stricter “WTO-plus” terms eliminating subsidies without a transition period and waiving rights under Article 27 of the Subsidies Agreement. Two decades later, Beijing highlighted its over-compliance, cutting tariffs on manufactured goods to 2.8% below required levels and opening 20 more service sectors than pledged, yet critics argue it still lags on subsidy disclosure and reform of its vast state-owned enterprises.

The USA’ led complaints

From the start, developed nations bristled at China’s ‘developing country’ label, a dispute that has since snowballed into a global backlash against self-designation even stalling the Doha talks.

In February 2019, the U.S. escalated its challenge to the WTO’s self-declared “developing country” system, warning in a 45-page paper that the practice was outdated, stifled liberalization, and risked making the WTO irrelevant; it also tabled a draft decision urging that wealthier members forgo special treatment in future trade talks.

U.S. lawmakers have taken a united stand against China’s “developing country” label. After the protectionist Inflation Reduction Act, Congress introduced Mitt Romney’s Ending China’s Developing Nation Status Act, and the PRC Is Not a Developing Country Act, which orders the State Department to identify all treaties granting China leniency based on development status within 180 days, a clear signal that Washington’s patience has run out.

Self Designation – Is It Really the Issue?

Analysts argue that China’s “developing country” status offers little real benefit, since it cut industrial tariffs to 9.5% from the usual 31.4% and agricultural tariffs to 15.1% from 37.9%, showing that even as a self-declared developing nation, it received almost no preferential treatment.

While accession concessions dilute the strength of SDT, they remain a key bargaining tool for developing nations. Developed members negotiate on the assumption that such countries need incentives to join the free trade system, calibrating SDT reductions to their economic limitations. Today’s backlash arises from the view that China’s remaining SDT benefits, once justified by its developmental status, now grant it an unfair competitive edge it no longer needs.

India made a different case that the label does not matter. India argued that most SDT provisions in the WTO covered agreements are imprecise, unenforceable and in the form of ‘best endeavour clauses, noting that though Members can declare themselves as developing, their specific rights and obligations are still subject to negotiations.

India’s stance carries weight. Developing-country status under the WTO is less a fixed label than a flexible negotiating tool that depends on each nation’s economic capacity and trade needs. The law merely requires developed members to avoid demanding reciprocal concessions that exceed those capacities. From this perspective, debates over who “is” a developing country miss the point, the real question is how development needs should be assessed case by case in future negotiations.

The EU’s proposal for a targeted, evidence-based approach to SDT reflects a shift toward practicality, moving away from broad, open-ended exemptions. This approach assumes that SDT was a mechanism designed by developed countries to help or control developing nations within a global trade framework. Yet the balance of advantage has shifted: rather than a gateway to economic liberalization, SDT has become a strategic shield for emerging powers like China, which have used it to expand global market access while limiting exposure to intrusive trade rules. In this light, debates over original intent are secondary to present realities; if China truly gained no advantage from its developing status, it would have little reason to resist mounting pressure to give it up.

Alternatives to Self-Designation

If the era of self-designation is to end, what is to replace it? In its draft decision, the United States proposed that WTO members falling into any of four categories should no longer qualify for SDT: those belonging to or seeking accession to the OECD, members of the G20, countries classified by the World Bank as “high income,” or those accounting for at least 0.5% of global merchandise trade. These are independent disqualifiers; meeting even one would exclude a member from SDT, and the proposal also reserves the right to deny SDT to other developing countries in specific sectors.

The U.S. justified this approach to modernize WTO rules, yet each criterion raises questions. OECD membership is treated as proof of “developed” status, even though this effectively substitutes one form of self-declaration for another. G20 membership is offered with no clear rationale, despite including entities like the EU and the African Union that are not countries. The World Bank’s income classification provides a more objective measure, though its thresholds are arguably arbitrary. The trade volume test, set at 0.5% of global merchandise trade, is equally problematic, as it ignores the nature of exports and unfairly penalizes populous economies such as China.

Critics argue that these criteria are designed to target China, which meets several of them, and to curtail SDT for emerging economies more broadly. China denounced the proposal as relying on “flawed” indicators that exaggerate development levels, while India condemned it as “arbitrary” and “divisive,” suspecting it to be a strategy to phase out SDT altogether.

Two weeks after the U.S. unveiled its proposal, China, India, and several developing nations fired back with a joint statement invoking Thomas Jefferson’s warning that “nothing is more unequal than the equal treatment of unequal people.” They defended self-declaration as the fairest way to define developing-country status, acknowledging economic progress but stressing that indicators like per capita GDP, poverty, undernourishment, agricultural dependence, and energy disparities still justify differential treatment.

What criteria then?

While agreeing with the U.S. that self-declaration should be replaced by objective measures, the U.S. criteria, based largely on membership and size, fall short of true objectivity. A fairer approach would combine measurable indicators like GDP per capita, poverty and undernourishment rates, life expectancy, and the share of high-value trade and services, reflecting real quality of life and economic capacity. Such a multi-factor model would prevent any single metric from being decisive, with disputes over classification settled by the WTO’s dispute resolution system, once, that is, the U.S. agrees to restore the Appellate Body it helped disable.

About the author:

Isa Jeziah Dookie is a multi-jurisdictional lawyer called to the Bars of England & Wales, Trinidad & Tobago, and Ontario, Canada. He carries qualifications in business law and middle-eastern law, and has appeared before various courts and panels in the Caribbean, Canada, and the UK, at the first-instance and appellate levels.

Bridging the Future: Strengthening Economic and Security Ties between Romania and the Kingdom of the Netherlands

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Bridging the Future: Strengthening Economic and Security Ties between Romania and the Kingdom of the Netherlands

By H.E. Mr. Nicolae Comanescu, Ambassador of Romania to the Kingdom of the Netherlands


In recent years, the diplomatic, economic, and security relationships between Romania and the Kingdom of the Netherlands have witnessed significant growth and development. Rooted in shared values and interests, the bilateral cooperation continues to evolve, reflecting both countries’ commitment to enhancing their partnership in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.

Diplomatic Engagements and NATO Cooperation

Building on this strong foundation, this year marks 145 years of diplomatic relations between Romania and the Netherlands, highlighting the enduring partnership between the two countries. Recent high-profile diplomatic engagements, including meetings between the Romanian and Dutch foreign ministers, have reaffirmed their shared commitment to deepening cooperation across political, security, economic, technological, and cultural domains. This interaction was further illustrated by Romania’s active involvement in the NATO Summit held in The Hague in June 2025, where discussions focused on bolstering defense capacities amid the ongoing geopolitical challenges in Eastern Europe. The ongoing war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine has galvanized both nations to reinforce their commitment to NATO and European security.

Both countries are united in supporting Ukraine against this aggression, firmly believing in the importance of European solidarity and the defense of common values. The NATO Summit in The Hague in June 2025 marked a critical point in enhancing strategic military cooperation, with Romania benefiting from the stationing of NATO battle groups on its territory, further integrating into the collective defense framework.

The bilateral military cooperation has been strengthened through visits and meetings attended by Dutch military officials and their Romanian counterparts. A pivotal agreement emerged during the NATO Summit, with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on the expansion of the F-16 Training Center in Romania – highlighting the countries’ joint commitment to improving their defense capabilities.

Economic Collaboration

Beyond security, the economic relationship between Romania and the Netherlands has been flourishing. The Netherlands is one of the largest foreign investors in Romania, accounting for approximately 20% of total foreign direct investments, with a social subscribed and paid-in registered capital of €9.9 billion and more than 25 billion euro total invested capital across various sectors. Over 6,200 Romanian-Dutch joint ventures and a bilateral trade turnover in goods amounted to 9 billion euro in 2024 and around to 10 billion euro expected in 2025, signify the robust economic ties between the two nations. Based on this, Netherlands occupies the 7th place in the ranking of the trade partners of Romania, both on export and import.

In the ever-evolving European landscape, the two countries are currently identifying cooperative projects between their defense industries, leveraging new frameworks supported by the European Commission, such as the Readiness 2030 Plan (ReArm Europe) and the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation. There is unexploited potential for collaboration within these sectors, and both nations are poised to maximize resources to achieve NATO’s capability targets.

A significant upcoming event, the NATO-Industry Forum set to be held in Bucharest in November 2025, serves to further enhance economic cooperation in the defense sector. This forum will create opportunities for increased engagement between transatlantic defense industries, allowing for extensive bilateral contacts.

Near-Shoring Initiatives

Further cooperation has erupted in the production industry, with Romanian and Dutch companies exploring joint ventures aimed at attracting new orders and relocating manufacturing from Asia. This “near-shoring” policy is particularly relevant in the current global and regional geopolitical and economic climate, and it promises to stimulate local economies while enhancing resilience in supply chains.

Supported by one of the largest pools of IT specialists in Central and Eastern Europe, Romania is emerging as a regional high-tech hub, with recent significant investments from the Netherlands in microchip and R&D projects underscoring the maturity of its tech ecosystem and the growing confidence of international investors.

The agri-food sector attracts strong interest from both sides, as numerous Dutch investors are already active in our country and Romania aiming to enhance the value of its high agricultural potential.

Cultural Ties as a Foundation for Cooperation

Cultural initiatives significantly complement the economic and security cooperation between Romania and the Netherlands. In September 2025, a major exhibition was inaugurated and open to the public at the H-Art Museum in Amsterdam. This exhibition features over 30 sculptures by the renowned Romanian artist Constantin Brâncuși, alongside photographs, drawings, and archival materials, all inspired by Brâncuși’s studio, a space he deemed sacred. The exhibition will remain open to the public until January 20, 2026.

The last retrospective of Brâncuși’s work in the Netherlands was held 50 years ago, and the exhibition is expected to attract over 100,000 visitors, marking a significant cultural milestone. Such cultural exchanges serve to reinforce the deep-rooted ties between the nations, showcasing shared heritage and enhancing mutual understanding.

Summarizing, the relationship between Romania and the Kingdom of the Netherlands is characterized by dynamic cooperation across economic, security, and cultural dimensions. Marking 145 years of diplomatic relations, both nations are committed to strengthening their partnership in addressing current challenges, promoting shared values, and exploring new avenues of growth. As they continue to navigate the complexities of the current geopolitical landscape, the future looks promising for the further deepening of their long-standing and flourishing ties.

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