Cheo Hurtado, the Soul of Venezuela, Performs at the Permanent Mission in The Hague

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Cheo Hurtado, the Soul of Venezuela, Performs at the Permanent Mission in The Hague


United by Music

As part of a series of cultural activities highlighting Latin American talent in Europe, the Permanent Mission of Venezuela in The Hague distinguished itself by presenting the renowned maestro Cheo Hurtado, in what became an unforgettable evening for diplomats, artists, and lovers of traditional Venezuelan music.

Held on Thursday, October 9, at the Venezuelan diplomatic headquarters, the event transformed the Mission into a space of cultural dialogue through music. With his inseparable cuatro, the traditional Venezuelan string instrument, Hurtado captivated the audience, demonstrating that culture is a source of pride and a powerful tool of diplomacy.

Cheo Hurtado, Venezuela.

Recognized as one of the most emblematic performers of the cuatro, Cheo Hurtado offered a recital lasting over an hour before Ambassador Héctor Constant-Rosales, Venezuela’s Permanent Representative to international organizations, and an audience of distinguished guests, including fellow ambassadors and friends of Venezuela.

Many guests attended Cheo Hurtado’s concert at Venezuela Representation.

Among the attendees were the ambassadors of Kazakhstan, Costa Rica, Tanzania, Colombia, Belarus, Uruguay, Bolivia, Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, who joined in celebrating Venezuela’s rich cultural heritage. Hurtado’s repertoire covered the most representative genres of Venezuelan folklore — from joropo to calypso, as well as waltzes and aguinaldos — each piece performed with mastery and deep emotion. The concert reached its peak with Pajarito, one of the most iconic pieces in the llanero repertoire, performed with the expressive intensity that characterizes Hurtado’s art.

Cheo Hurtado, concert at the Venezuela Representation.

A living legend of Venezuelan music, Cheo Hurtado’s artistic career spans more than five decades. He has devoted his life to performance, research, teaching, and the dissemination of Venezuela’s traditional rhythms. His work has been instrumental in promoting the cuatro internationally and preserving indigenous genres such as joropo, guasa, waltz, calypso, and aguinaldo — earning him recognition as one of the great cultural ambassadors of Venezuela.

Following the concert, Ambassador Constant-Rosales hosted a warm reception where guests enjoyed typical Venezuelan delicacies, including arepas.

Saudi Cultural Fund Injects SAR 3 Billion to Boost Cultural Investments

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Saudi Cultural Fund Injects SAR 3 Billion to Boost Cultural Investments

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia, Oct. 15, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Cultural Development Fund (CDF), Saudi Arabia’s key financial enabler of the cultural sector, has announced a suite of new funds and financial products exceeding SAR 3 billion (USD 933 million), further advancing its mission to unlock private investment and build a sustainable cultural economy.

Through these efforts, CDF continues to enrich Saudi cultural production and create developmental economic opportunities—advancing the Kingdom’s cultural scene and deepening appreciation of national culture both locally and globally.

Commenting on the new funds, Majed Abdulmohsen Alhugail, CEO of the Cultural Development Fund said:

“As a Center of Excellence and Financial Enabler for the cultural sector, the Cultural Development Fund works to strengthen integration across the cultural ecosystem and deepen strategic partnerships with the private sector, driving the sector’s sustainability and long-term growth. The agreements we recently signed during the Cultural Investment Conference reflect our commitment to advancing public–private partnerships through risk-sharing mechanisms and co-financing models that channel new capital flows into the cultural economy. These commitments mark a pivotal step toward building a thriving cultural sector that is globally competitive, generates investment and employment opportunities, and contributes to sustainable development. These efforts align with the National Culture Strategy and Vision 2030, which aim to raise the cultural sector’s contribution to GDP to 3%, while increasing the private sector’s share to 65% and diversifying the Kingdom’s economy.”

CDF’s announcements span both investment and financing solutions, including agreements to establish three new investment funds, with CDF acting as an anchor investor for two of them. The first fund is the SAR 375 million (USD 100 million) film investment fund, where CDF is an anchor investor in partnership with BSF Capital. The second is the SAR 300 million (USD 80 million) Fashion Investment Fund, also with CDF as anchor investor in partnership with Merak Capital. The third fund, valued at SAR 850 million (USD 227 million), is launched by the Cultural Assets Group and financed with SAR 200 million (USD 53 million) CDF as part of its role in enabling the cultural sector.

The Cultural Assets Group’s Fund will make investments across visual arts, fashion, digital content, experience design, and emerging technologies. This fund integrates public and private capital to localize IP, attract international companies, and sustain long-term growth of the cultural economy.

The new film investment fund, managed by BSF Capital, targets investment in high-quality film projects and studio facilities in and beyond Saudi Arabia. This includes film production and distribution. Its goal is to develop the Saudi film sector’s infrastructure and expand its global reach, in collaboration with one of the world’s leading film production companies.

The Fashion Investment Fund, managed by Merak Capital, is the Kingdom’s first dedicated fashion investment fund. It will support local and regional fashion companies and supply chains, aiming to grow Saudi brands with international expansion potential while enhancing sector sustainability.

On the financing side, CDF has launched the Co-Lending Product – the first of its kind in the cultural sector – in partnership with five leading financial institutions. At the same time, CDF introduced five new financing products under “Cultural Finance”. These are receivable financing, revolving loans, bridge loans, medium- and long-term loans, and micro-lending. The Fund also signed cooperation agreements with three local banks to broaden the reach of CDF’s “Cultural Finance.” Through these announcements, CDF aims to provide cultural MSMEs with flexible financing options tailored to their needs, enabling their growth and expansion across the cultural value chain.

Beyond investment funds and financing products, CDF announced the release of its inaugural investment report, “Saudi Arabia Cultural Market Outlook 2025: Vision, Impact, and Opportunities”, which maps the Saudi cultural economy landscape, featuring 36 promising, ready-to-invest opportunities introduced by the Ministry of Investment, Invest in Saudi, and CDF. The Fund also launched a digital investment platform to empower local and foreign entrepreneurs to explore opportunities in the Saudi cultural economy.

These announcements were underpinned by strategic partnerships with both the public and private sectors. CDF signed Memoranda of Understanding with the Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Investment, Sparklabs, and Asyad Holdings to develop and enable the growth of the cultural sector. In addition, it signed cooperation agreements with the Royal Commission for AlUla, MBC Group, Rotana Studios, and the Saudi Coffee Company to drive the sector’s sustainable growth and amplify its economic and social impact.

Europe – In Search of its Moral Triumph

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Europe – In Search of its Moral Triumph

Lessons from Iceland, Bhutan, and New Zealand

Caught by two Guernicas, which we frivolously call conflicts – one Semitic and the other inter-Slavic – of uncertain ends and its beginnings, and trapped in a cycle of confrontational multispatial despair, the European continent finds itself demoralized and disoriented, deindustrialised and disenfranchised. Hot rhetoric does not warm up a steep, cold recession. As it witnesses loss of its geopolitical centrality, the unravelling of global cooperation – to say; slowbalisation, internal depopulation, collapsing social cohesion and fracturing cross-generational contract, Europe desperately searches not just for stability, but for its moral triumph.

What could mark such a turning point? Is the strategic decoupling and geo-economic binarization a way out? Is there, on the horizon of an attainable future, a model of renewal—one grounded not in abstract geopolitical ambition, but in the tangible, lived well-being of its people? In seeking an answer, Europe might look not to its (selectively interpreted) past or (deceiving) power, but to its priorities.

Iceland, Bhutan, New Zealand: Three Roads to Rethinking Prosperity

In a world often driven by economic growth metrics such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), some nations have dared to redefine what it means to thrive. Rather than chasing purely financial gains, countries like Iceland, Bhutan, and New Zealand have taken bold steps to prioritize the holistic well-being of their citizens. Iceland’s recent shift to a nationwide four-day workweek, Bhutan’s long-standing focus on Gross National Happiness (GNH), and New Zealand’s reimagined budgeting framework centered on well-being illustrate three distinct, yet deeply aligned, approaches to redefining progress in the 21st century.

Iceland: A Work-Life Revolution

Since 2019, Iceland has been at the forefront of an innovative experiment in workplace reform. Through a series of trials led by Reykjavík City Council and the national government, the country tested reduced working hours for thousands of workers without a drop in pay (Haraldsson & Kellam, 2021). The results were overwhelmingly positive: improved work-life balance, lower stress levels, and in many cases, even higher productivity.

The Icelandic model challenges the assumption that more hours equal more output. It also generated ripple effects in gender equality. Men and women reported greater sharing of domestic duties and child-rearing responsibilities, making the shorter workweek not only a labor reform but also a cultural shift.

Unlike most current narratives that link the introduction of new technologies (such as AI) with massive joblessness, Icelandic case is a strikingly bright. This transformation reflects a broader national commitment to well-being, mental health, and equity. Iceland’s success reveals that redefining the workweek can improve both quality of life and economic performance. Simply, the new technologies can bring the self-realisation for many, not just a profit for the few.

Bhutan: Happiness Over GDP, Development over Growth

Bhutan stands as a global benchmark in its official rejection of GDP as the sole measure of progress. Since the 1970s, the country has embraced Gross National Happiness (GNH), a development philosophy structured around nine domains, including psychological well-being, health, education, good governance, and ecological diversity (Ura et al., 2012). This multidimensional model is designed to ensure that material growth does not come at the expense of spiritual and environmental integrity.

Bhutan’s policies reflect this philosophy. The country is not only carbon-negative—absorbing more carbon than it emits—but also constitutionally mandated to preserve at least 60% forest cover (Royal Government of Bhutan, 2008). Tourism is limited to minimize cultural and ecological disruption, and all national planning must pass through a GNH policy screening tool. Personal happiness in Bhutan is a constitutionally guaranteed category.

The Club of Rome warned in its landmark 1972 report Limits to Growth that unchecked economic and population growth would inevitably collide with the planet’s finite resources (Meadows et al., 1972). Bhutan’s development philosophy can be seen as a rare real-world embodiment of this insight: a country designing its policies around planetary boundaries before surpassing them. Bhutan is not against economic growth but it prioritises social development, following the 3M matrix: maximum good for the maximum species over the maximum time.

New Zealand: The Wellbeing Budget

In 2019, New Zealand launched the world’s first “Wellbeing Budget,” a fiscal framework prioritizing citizen well-being over short-term economic growth. Spearheaded by then Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and its Finance Minister Grant Robertson, the initiative aimed to address systemic issues like mental health, child poverty, and indigenous inequality (New Zealand Treasury, 2019).

Instead of merely focusing on GDP or deficit targets, policies were evaluated based on how they improved life satisfaction, social cohesion, and long-term health outcomes. For example, major investments were funnelled into mental health services and the support of marginalized communities, such as the Māori and Pasifika populations.

As economist Thomas Piketty notes in Capital and Ideology, “Every human society must justify its inequalities: unless reasons for them are found, the whole political and social edifice stands to collapse” (Piketty, 2020, p. 6). Iceland, Bhutan, and New Zealand (as well as sporadically the Latin American examples, such as those of Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico) implicitly answer this challenge by reducing structural inequities and embedding well-being into their policy frameworks.

A Global Movement Toward Well-Being

While the specifics differ, Iceland, Bhutan, and New Zealand all embody a significant shift in national priorities. They challenge the dominant global narrative that defines success in purely economic terms. Their experiences show that it is possible to elevate health, equality, sustainability, and happiness without sacrificing prosperity.

This trend is timely. The world today faces an epidemic of burnout, climate emergencies, collapsing social cohesions, rising inequality and over-militarisation instead of good neighbourly collective security. The traditional growth-at-all-costs model is no longer adequate. Neither more products lead to prosperity, nor do increased security expenditures translate into greater stability and safety. The Limits to Growth report predicted systemic collapse unless societies transitioned away from the pursuit of endless material expansion (Meadows et al., 1972). That warning, echoed decades later by doctors, sociologists, and economists alike, is more urgent than ever.

As Piketty (2014) writes, “The history of inequality is shaped by the way economic, social, and political systems interact” (p. 20). These three countries, along with the numerous earlier examples, offer a model of interaction that fosters dignity, justice, inclusion and cohesion over mere expansion.

 

The Right to an Analog Life and Mental Balance in the Age of Overdigitalised, Contactless Society

In parallel with structural economic reforms, any meaningful shift toward well-being in Europe must also acknowledge the psychological and social toll of constant digital exposure. The latest acceleration of digital platforms into nearly all aspects of life—work, education, governance, and even leisure—has created what many now call an always-on culture. This has not only blurred the boundaries between public and private life, real or simulated, but also contributed to rising levels of anxiety, burnout, and digital fatigue, especially among younger – increasingly contactless – generations.

A recovery plan rooted in well-being must defend what could be termed basic liberty -the right to an analogue life—the right to meaningful offline time, unmediated by screens, algorithms, or notifications. Public institutions, workplaces, and schools should actively promote “analogue weekends,” nature immersion programs, and screen-free zones to restore attention, mental balance, and human connection.

As Erich Fromm foresightedly observed, modern individuals risk becoming “having” rather than “being”, caught in a mode of existence dominated by possession and consumption rather than authentic experience and presence (Fromm, 1976, p. 41). Protecting analogue space and slowness is not a nostalgic act but a strategic investment in mental resilience and civic cohesion in an overstimulated age, especially for the younger cohorts of our societies. (Analogue retreat modalities, as e.g. these offered by the Global Academy for Future Governance, are valuable models for reflection, reloading, and adjustment.)

A Recovery Plan for the Union and its Candidate Countries

In contrast, much of the European Union—and particularly its candidate countries—grapples with structural stagnation. Regional inequalities, youth unemployment, demographic decline, and democratic erosion (voters’ apathy) reflect a broader crisis of legitimacy and purpose. While the EU’s brief recovery (through quantitative easing) offered a short-term lift, deeper structural problems remain unresolved.

Former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis argues that Europe’s economic framework is often driven by technocratic logic that isolates fiscal policy from democratic control (Varoufakis, 2017). In his works, he advocates for radical democratization of economic life, public investment in green technology, and replacing extractive capitalism with participatory models (Varoufakis, 2020) – similar to the Yugoslav socially (not, a state owned) self-management models, the so-called self-managing interest communities of labour (so-called SIZ and OUR). These ideas, previously implemented in Yugoslavia, Spain (Mondragon), Parecon (Albert-Hahnel initiative), Worker-Owned Cooperatives (e.g., USA, Argentina, Italy), and Israeli Kibbutzim, align strongly with the well-being-centred governance models recently implemented in Iceland, Bhutan, and New Zealand.[1]

A European recovery plan inspired by these examples would involve six strategic actions:

  1. Institutionalizing Well-Being, Inequality reductions, Equitable socity: The EU should formally integrate well-being metrics—such as the OECD Better Life Index—into funding and evaluation frameworks, particularly within cohesion and pre-accession policy. It should be coupled with the quality education and healthcare, progressive taxation and social safety nets, supporting vulnerable populations, affordable housing, combating generational discrimination, and fostering similar socio-economic and demographic opportunities for the population at large; self-realisation and self-enhancement;
  2. Reforming Labour Structures: As Iceland has done, Europe should pilot shorter workweeks, flexible work hours, and universal care programs. These changes would directly target burnout and improve work-life balance across generations. In short, technology should work for people, not against them – coupling human development and the overall advancement of working age populations with growth, driven by innovative technologies;
  3. Generational Transition and Youth Employment: Europe must address the growing crisis of long-term youth unemployment and underemployment. Lasting cross-generational contract as well as the generational renewal requires major investment in training, green and digital skills, apprenticeships, and pathways into meaningful work. A “New Deal for Youth” could prevent the economic disillusionment and migration that threaten demographic balance in many parts of Europe;
  4. Demographic Renewal, Orderly migrations: Low birth rates and an aging population, especially in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, pose structural risks to social compact and sustainability. Policies that combine work-life balance (such as childcare access and parental leave), housing affordability, maternity assistance, and youth retention strategies are crucial. Without generational renewal, Europe’s welfare systems and democratic institutions risk stagnation. Europe must address root causes of forced migrations, and support repatriation of economic migrants’ and welfare nomads by linking it to economic development of the migrants’ regions of origin;
  5. Oversecuritisation and Environmental Limits, Green Investment: Echoing the Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972), Europe must refrain from warmongering and declarative overmilitarisation, while urgently redefining its neighbourhood policies (Arctic policy, Eastern policy, EURO-Med Barcelona Process reinvigoration, trans-Atlantic policy balanced for inclusion of Central and Latina America). Green (demilitarised) investments primarily should secure clean and reliable sources of energy but also modes of transportation across continental Europe – such as high-speed rail networks. Over-excessive computing power build up goes in the same, unnecessary consumption of resources, direction.[2] Simply, the digital world pollutes the analogue — and it must be restrained. Such a transition – towards sustainable infrastructure, local resilience, and ecological regeneration – should not be viewed as a cost but as a generational obligation. Not a burden but an opportunity;
  6. Democratizing Policy-Making: Inspired by Varoufakis’ calls for economic democratization and the previous Yugoslav self-management model including SDK (the fee-less monetary/finance infrastructure system),[3] the EU should expand participatory governance through citizen assemblies, regional councils, social and cross-generational dialogue. These mechanisms would help reverse trust and democracy deficits and ensure that younger generations feel heard in decision-making processes.

Towards Europe’s renewal

Iceland, Bhutan, and New Zealand each represent a distinct but converging trend in governance: the prioritization of well-being over traditional economic performance. Whether through a shortened workweek, happiness-based development, or a well-being-oriented budget, these countries are forging paths toward a more humane and sustainable future.

Thomas Piketty’s work reinforces the need for such rethinking. As he argues, the persistence of inequality cannot be understood apart from the systems that produce and justify it. The Club of Rome warned decades ago that the planet itself cannot sustain the dominant economic models we inherited. Yanis Varoufakis adds that democracy must return to the heart of economic design, of already successfully tested Yugoslav model of social ownership, self-management.[4]

For the EFTA, the EU and its candidate countries, this is not just a moment for economic repair—but one for generational renewal. With a bold shift toward well-being, inclusion, youth empowerment, and the urgent need to tackle overfinancialization, overdigitalisation, oversecuritasation and overconsumption along with the ecological limits, Europe can build a new foundation for prosperity—one that serves both its people, planetary raw-model for many generations to come.

Moral triumph attainable?

Finally, will Europe be able to triumph morally ever again? The main obstacles to such a mastery, especially considering the Continent’s loss of initiative on the international arena, can be outlined as follows:

  • Internal fragmentation (disagreements and inconsistences);
  • External dependences diluting Europe’s autonomy (on the US for security, Chine for trade, Russia for energy, and southern and eastern peripheries for demographic compensation);
  • Moral inconsistences (dubious arms sales, selective observance of human rights, rule of law, democracy and humanitarian law within and beyond the Continent);
  • Post-colonial lapses and Historical amnesia (imperial past burden, patronisation of Global south, subtle jingoism in education media and culture);
  • Economic prioritisation over principles (profits driven deals over moral imperatives, historical obligations and legal commitments);
  • Loss of soft powers and cultural leadership as the main power of Europe on the global stage (for a long while, Europe held monopoly of historical vertical, beacon of humanism and moral reservoir).  

In brief, the Continent’s main obstacle to moral triumph is not a lack of values, but a lack of coherent, principled, and decisive action to defend and promote them in a fragmented, interest-driven global system. Without genuine leadership, unity, collective (not selective) security as stipulated by the Helsinki accords and the Charter, strategic independence and coherence, as well as the courage to accept economic and political costs for moral leadership, Europe risks further irrelevance on the world stage.

Bhutan or Nepal, simply choice.[5]

Anis H. Bajrektarevic            

Vienna, 16 SEP 2025

anis@corpsdiplomatique.cd    Author is chairperson and professor in international law and global political studies, Vienna, Austria. He authored ten books. His latest title: Justice and Ho

[1] It is worth noting the real attempts to respect labour autonomy and the self-realisation of society as a whole (that leaned on the Antonio Gramsci and, Herbert Marcuse’ as well as on the works of Erik Olin Wright, Murray Bookchin, Michael Polanyi and the Pareconese; Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel). Still, considering its global recognition and the contemporary context, the thinker closest to it is Hayek: And well, it is the Yugoslav Self-management system that is the most thorough and elaborate realisation of the basic Hayek’s (socio-)economic theory. Both –his theory as well as the Yugoslav practice– regar-ded the following as central to the very success of a society: (i) Decentralisation; (ii) Optimisation of the market mechanisms; (iii) Limits to the central planning; (iv) Freedom and Autonomy enhancement. Surely, while Hayek was primarily attuned to the pure economic needs, the Yugoslav system demonstrated great attention to overall societal well-being (eliminating many of the hidden costs).

[2] Human brain has an effective computing power of about ten to 100 petaflops (quadrillions of operations per second). The most powerful computes that we have today in general use in the world are also rated at about ten to 100 petaflops. The only problem is that each such a device is the size of living room, cost some €200 million, untold heat and related primary and secondary pollutions, annually producing an electricity bill of some €3 million.    

[3] It is absolutelyfascinating and insightful to compare theblockchainand Yugoslavia’s SDK (Social Bookkeeping Service/ Služba društvenog knjigovodstva). Hence, the author of this text is inviting researchers and practicioners to study SDK system for the futher betterments of the banking/finance systems. Though very different in terms of technology and historical context, the two do share conceptual similarities in how they manageaccountability, fees, decentralization, and transparency. Yugoslavia’s SDK was, in many ways, a proto-blockchain idea in a centralized socially owned form: (i) It functioned like a clearing house or state ledger, charging NO fees for its services. Hence, it was apublic service, not a profit-seeking institution; (ii) It embedded trust and compliance into the decentralised financial infrastructure; (iii) It offered transparency and control, by centralized social oversight and public recordkeeping; (iv) It pursued systemic accountability, much like blockchain aims to do today; (v) It enjoyed full support and trust from the entire community, as it was genuine and rooted in its own society.

[4] One of the most influential figures in literature, politics and culture of the modern age, Jean-Paul Sartre famously claimed: “Yugoslavia is the realization of my philosophy.” In the same tone, Britain’s King Charles III (then Prince), speaking to the media in early 1970s — as Director Zbanic beautifully reminds us in her latest work, nominated for an 2026 Oscar — says, “The Yugoslav self-management model deserves a closer look, as it might be indispensable for the stability and prosperity of Europe.”

[5] It refers to the recent massive popular revolt against all three major political parties – both ruling and opposition – driven by unbearable social and economic disparities in Nepalese society. The discontent, that turned violent and resulted in the deaths, injuries and hasty flight abroad of government officials and their family members, was fuelled by chronic, unsolved issues such as youth unemployment, corruption, lack of access to quality education and healthcare, and the ever widening gap between the rich and the poor.

References (APA Style)

Haraldsson, G. D., & Kellam, J. (2021). Going public: Lessons from Iceland’s journey to a shorter working week. Alda – Association for Sustainability and Democracy. https://autonomy.work/portfolio/icelandsww/

Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L., Randers, J., & Behrens, W. W. (1972). The limits to growth. Club of Rome. Universe Books.

New Zealand Treasury. (2019). The Wellbeing Budget 2019. Government of New Zealand. https://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/wellbeing-budget/wellbeing-budget-2019

Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century (A. Goldhammer, Trans.). Belknap Press.

Piketty, T. (2020). Capital and ideology (A. Goldhammer, Trans.). Harvard University Press.

Royal Government of Bhutan. (2008). The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan. http://www.nationalcouncil.bt/assets/uploads/docs/acts/2014/The_Constitution_of_Bhutan_2008.pdf

Ura, K., Alkire, S., Zangmo, T., & Wangdi, K. (2012). A short guide to Gross National Happiness Index. Centre for Bhutan Studies. https://ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Bhutan-GNH-Index-short-guide.pdf

Fromm, E. (1976). To Have or To Be? Continuum.

Bajrektarevic, A. (2005). OSCE EF 13th Ministerial, Closing Session ( EF.NGO/9/05 ) www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/7/14857.pdf 

Hayek, F. A. (1982). Law, legislation and liberty: A new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy (Vols. 1–3). University of Chicago Press.

Baković, J. (1979). Služba društvenog knjigovodstva u sistemu socijalističkog samoupravljanja, Narodne Novine, Zagreb-Sarajevo

Sartre, J-P. (1985). Critique de la raison dialectique, Éditions Gallimard

Varoufakis, Y. (2017). Adults in the room: My battle with Europe’s deep establishment.

Bajrektarević, A. H. (2013). Geopolitics of Peter Pan, Europe of the West: Imperialism of Imagination. Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, 5(2), 136–150.

Žbanić, J. (2024). Blum: Masters of Their Own Destiny, (Oscar Nominated documentary (2026)) – movie script.

First Latin American Food Festival with Chef Luis Rojas

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First Latin American Food Festival with Chef Luis Rojas

The tastes of Latin America are coming together for the very first edition of the Latin American Food Festival, led by renowned Peruvian Chef de Cuisine, Luis Rojas.

The real secret behind Hilton The Hague’s celebrated restaurant, Blue Blood, is its chef. Hilton The Hague succeeded in luring Chef Rojas away from Abu Dhabi, where he wore the toque at the Hilton restaurant on Yas Island. Trained in Lima and at the prestigious Cordon Bleu School—an epicenter of great cuisine in Latin America—Chef Rojas has honed his craft across the globe. Yet it is his roots and passion for Latin flavors that truly define his cooking.

Chef Rojas, a big, amiable, teddy bear of a man, exudes enthusiasm for the upcoming festival, which he has designed to be served in waves of dishes rather than courses. Each wave is both a feast for the eye and a sensation for the palate. Meeting him is a pleasure in itself—he speaks of his creations with vivid clarity, charming guests with his pride and passion.

H.E. Ms. Franca Deza Ferreccio, Ambassador of Peru to the Netherlands, expressed her congratulations to Blue Blood restaurant and, in particular, to Peruvian Chef Luis Rojas for organizing the Latin Food Festival, which will take place on Friday, October 17, 2025.

“We are confident that, as in previous editions of the Peruvian Food Festival, Chef Rojas will once again shine at this celebration dedicated to Latin American cuisine, demonstrating his talent, creativity, and commitment to promoting the rich flavors of our region.

The Embassy of Peru extends its best wishes to Blue Blood restaurant and its talented Peruvian chef, Luis Rojas, for the greatest success in this new culinary initiative.”

This festival will celebrate the rich culinary traditions of Latin America, offering an extensive buffet filled with authentic dishes that showcase the diversity, color, and flavor of the region. “For me, food is more than taste; it is memory, tradition, and celebration. Through this festival, I want to share the warmth and spirit of Latin America with every guest,” says Chef Rojas.

Dining at Blue Blood during the Latin American Food Festival is something you truly must not miss. Expect a festive atmosphere, exceptional food, and an unforgettable culinary journey guided by one of Latin America’s most passionate chefs. Reservations are highly recommended.

Abir Ali — Lebanon’s New Envoy to Germany

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Abir Ali — Lebanon’s New Envoy to Germany

On 13 October 2025, H.E. Ms. Abir Ali presented her credentials as Ambassador of Lebanon to Germany to H.E. Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal President of Germany. Following the ceremony at Bellevue Palace, Ambassador Ali remarked:

“Today I had the honor to present my letters of credence to H.E. Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier accrediting me as Ambassador of Lebanon to Germany.”

According to the official schedule of the Federal President’s Office, Ambassador Ali’s accreditation took place at 10:00 a.m. on that day.

Ambassador Ali previously served as Chargé d’Affaires of the Lebanese Embassy in The Hague, Netherlands (2013–2017), where she earned great respect across the diplomatic community. Known for her professionalism, intellect, and warm presence, she left behind a legacy of accomplishments and lasting friendships.

Presentation of Credentials to Germany H.E. Ms. Abir Ali, Ambassador of Lebanon.

During her farewell from The Hague, H.E. Abdelouahab Bellouki, Ambassador of Morocco, paid her a sincere tribute:

“Abir is the personification of class and grace, of elegance and style and even glamour. Educated, wise, and full of charm — she is the person you hope to be seated next to at a dinner party. A distinguished representative of her country, the beautiful Lebanon. Abir is known for her dedication to her job and her engagement for positive endeavors. Her sterling qualities command respect and consideration. Even though she was a one-person embassy, she succeeded in making the voice of Lebanon heard in the Netherlands on many fronts.”

Diplomat Magazine warmly congratulates Ambassador Abir Ali and wishes her a fruitful, inspiring, and successful posting in Germany.

Intermarium between NATO, Russia and the Great Powers

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Intermarium between NATO, Russia and the Great Powers

Romania’s Role in the Security Architecture from the Baltic to the Black, Caspian and Adriatic Seas

By Lieutenant (ret) General Corneliu Pivariu

The concept of Intermarium—originally conceived by Józef Piłsudski[1] during the interwar period—envisioned the creation of a confederation of states between the Baltic, the Black and the Adriatic Seas, capable of counterbalancing both Germany and Russia. Although the historical project never materialised, it periodically resurfaces in geopolitical analyses, especially in the context of the fragile security architecture of Central and Eastern Europe.

Today, through the Three Seas Initiative (3SI)[2], the Bucharest Nine (B9)[3], and under the pressure of the war in Ukraine, the idea of Intermarium gains renewed relevance, extending as far as the Caspian area, where energy and transport corridors link Europe to the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Although the Intermarium concept continues to be invoked in contemporary strategic analyses, in its historical form it remains more of a theoretical exercise; nevertheless, the idea of strengthened cooperation among the states between the Baltic, the Black and the Adriatic Seas continues to inspire regional initiatives with evolutionary potential.

Regional Strategic Context

The Baltic–Black–Caspian–Adriatic region forms a geopolitical arc of contact between NATO/the EU and the Russian sphere of influence. It includes:

  • The eastern flank of NATO – from the Baltic States to Romania and Bulgaria;
  • Energy and transport corridors – including Caspian routes, gas pipelines, and maritime and land interconnections;
  • The Western Balkans and the Adriatic – where the competition for influence between the West and Russia overlaps with China’s interests in infrastructure.

This area concentrates both vulnerabilities and opportunities:

  • vulnerability to Russian pressure (military, hybrid, and energy-related);
  • the importance of east–west and north–south transport corridors;
  • the position as a bridge towards the Middle East and Central Asia.

The Economic Dimension of Cooperation within the Intermarium Space

Although the Intermarium project was originally conceived as a political–military framework for balancing great powers, the realities of the 21st century require an expansion of the concept to include economic, energy, and logistical dimensions.

In this sense, the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) represents the most practical expression of the Intermarium logic, offering an institutional framework for cooperation among the states of Central and Eastern Europe in infrastructure, energy, and digitalisation[4].

Along this north–south axis—between the Baltic, the Black and the Adriatic Seas—a range of concrete projects is taking shape, capable of turning the region into an economic and energy corridor of strategic importance:

  • *Rail-2-Sea – the proposed railway connection between the ports of Gdańsk and Constanța;
  • *Via Carpatia – a transregional motorway linking Lithuania to Greece;
  • *The BRUA Corridor – a gas transport infrastructure connecting Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria;
  • *LNG terminals in Poland and Croatia supporting energy diversification in the region;
  • *Amber Rail Freight Corridor, later integrated into the Baltic–Adriatic Corridor, designed to streamline freight transport along the north–south axis.

Although these initiatives are in various stages of implementation, they express a clear trend towards functional regional integration, beyond military and political convergences. Their purpose is to reduce dependence on the traditional west–east infrastructure historically dominated by Germany and Russia, offering an economic alternative aligned with Euro-Atlantic strategic interests.

The NATO Dimension

For NATO, the Intermarium is synonymous with the Eastern Flank[5]. From the Baltic States—exposed to Russian military pressure—to the Black Sea, where the Alliance’s interests directly clash with Moscow’s, the region represents the contact line between two antagonistic geopolitical worlds.

Initiatives such as the Bucharest Nine (B9) or the strengthening of NATO’s forward presence in Poland and Romania demonstrate that the security of this region is a priority. However, the diversity of national interests means that the unity of the eastern flank remains more a declarative than a real objective.

The Russian Dimension

For Russia, the Intermarium represents a Western-imposed “sanitary cordon” meant to restrict its access to Central Europe and the Balkans. The Kremlin perceives any strengthening of cooperation among the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas as a direct threat.

In this sense, the war in Ukraine is also a battle to prevent Ukraine from becoming a pillar of a new Intermarium. Moscow seeks to counteract it through a strategy of destabilisation: maintaining frozen conflicts (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia), using propaganda, and exploiting energy dependencies. Moreover, the Kaliningrad[6] enclave plays an important role in this regard.

The Great Powers and the Intermarium

The United States supports the consolidation of the eastern flank and the Three Seas Initiative, seeing in the Intermarium a means to anchor regional allies and reduce energy dependence on Russia. Washington encourages investments in infrastructure, energy, and defence, treating the region as a vital bastion of the transatlantic order.

Germany and France regard the Intermarium idea with reserve, fearing that it could compete with the EU. However, in order not to let the US gain exclusive influence, they have accepted the Three Seas Initiative. France focuses on the Mediterranean and Africa, while Germany seeks control over critical European infrastructure.

Russia views the Intermarium as a structure of isolation, which fuels its anti-Western discourse.

China does not involve itself directly in regional security, but expresses interest through the Belt and Road Initiative, investing in ports, railways, and energy to strengthen its economic presence.

Thus, the great powers project their own interests onto the Intermarium, turning the region into an arena of emerging multipolarity.

Romania – A Geostrategic Pivot

Romania’s position is essential for any Intermarium project:

  • The Black Sea[7]: Romania is NATO’s main littoral state, responsible for securing this strategic area. The Bosporus and the energy routes from the Caucasus increase Romania’s strategic relevance.
  • The Carpathians and the Balkans[8]: Romania links the northern flank (Poland and the Baltic States) with the southern one (the Balkans and the Adriatic). North–south corridors and trans-Carpathian infrastructures are of vital importance.
  • Resources and Infrastructure[9]: Romania is an active participant in the Three Seas Initiative and can capitalise on energy projects (Black Sea gas, interconnections with Azerbaijan and Georgia) as well as infrastructural ones (motorways, railways, digital networks).

The opportunities for Romania lie in strategic visibility, attracting investments, and consolidating energy security. Yet the risks are equally significant: Russian pressure, internal vulnerabilities (corruption, political fragmentation), and the danger of being caught between divergent interests (the US, Germany, France).

Challenges and Perspectives

The Intermarium space is marked by:

  • lack of regional cohesion due to historical rivalries (Poland–Hungary, Croatia–Serbia, Romania–Hungary);
  • the risk of being instrumentalised by the great powers, in the absence of an autonomous regional integration project;
  • internal vulnerabilities such as political instability and governance issues, which limit Romania’s ability to act as a regional leader.
  •  

Conclusions

The Intermarium is not an alternative to NATO or the EU, but a complementary component that can strengthen the eastern flank and reduce structural dependencies. For Romania, it represents a dual challenge: managing geopolitical pressures while turning geographic vulnerability into strategic advantage.

The success of this project depends on:

  • tangible support from the US and the EU for the Three Seas Initiative;
  • Romania’s ability to modernise its infrastructure and armed forces;
  • the resilience of regional states in the face of Russian pressure and the geopolitical temptations offered by China.

As mentioned at the beginning of this study, although the Intermarium concept continues to be invoked in contemporary strategic analyses, in its historical form it remains largely a theoretical exercise; nevertheless, the idea of strengthened cooperation among the states situated between the Baltic, the Black and the Adriatic Seas continues to inspire regional initiatives with genuine potential for evolution.

If Romania intelligently capitalises on its position as a pivot between the Black Sea, the Carpathians and the Balkans, it can move from the status of a vulnerable frontier to that of an indispensable actor within Europe’s security architecture.

Selective Bibliography
Historical and Foundational Sources
  • Piłsudski, Józef. Political Writings. Documents on the Intermarium Project. Warsaw: Translated and Annotated Editions, 2005.
  • Mackinder, Halford J. Democratic Ideals and Reality. Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1995.
  • Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic, 2000.
General and Contemporary Geopolitical Analyses
  • Kaplan, Robert D. The Revenge of Geography. Bucharest: Litera, 2013.
  • Friedman, George. The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century. Bucharest: Litera, 2011.
  • Motyl, Alexander J. “Intermarium: Conceptualising a Geopolitical Space between the Baltic and the Black Seas.” East European Studies Journal, no. 2/2017.
  • Chatham House. Russia, Ukraine and the Future of European Security. Reports 2022–2025.
  • Council on Foreign Relations. Eastern Europe and NATO’s Frontier Security. Washington, 2023.
Institutional Documents and Initiatives
  • NATO. Strategic Concept 2022. Brussels, 2022.
  • European Union. Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Brussels, 2016.
  • Three Seas Initiative. Summit Declarations (2016–2024). Warsaw, Bucharest, Tallinn, Sofia.
Romanian and Regional Contributions
  • Pivariu, Corneliu. Geopolitical and Military Lessons from the Russia–Ukraine Conflict. Bucharest: Financial Intelligence, 2025.
  • Pivariu, Corneliu. Global Geopolitical Developments in the First Quarter of the 21st Century. Romania in this Context. Forecasts for 2050. Bucharest: Financial Intelligence, 2025.
  • Ioniță, Sorin. “The Three Seas Initiative and its Relevance for Romania.” Revista 22, no. 10/2019.
  • Dungaciu, Dan; Rusu, Petrișor. The Black Sea: NATO and the EU on the Eastern Frontier. Bucharest: Tritonic, 2016.
  • Chifu, Iulian. Geopolitics in the Extended Black Sea Region. Bucharest: Curtea Veche, 2018.
  • European Institute of Romania. Studies on Strategy and Regional Security. Bucharest, 2020–2023.
Complementary Works and Reports
  • International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The Military Balance (Editions 2022–2025). London.
  • RAND Corporation. Deterring Russia in the Baltics. Santa Monica, 2022.
  • Atlantic Council. Three Seas Initiative: A Strategy for Transatlantic Unity. Washington, 2023.

[1] Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935), Polish statesman and military leader, promoted after the First World War the idea of a federation of states between the Baltic and the Black Seas (“Intermarium”), intended to balance the influence of Germany and Russia.

[2] The Three Seas Initiative (TSI) was launched in 2015 at the joint proposal of Poland (President Andrzej Duda) and Croatia (President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović). It brings together 13 European Union member states located between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas, aiming to develop infrastructure, enhance energy and digital connectivity, and strengthen regional cohesion and security.

[3] The Bucharest Nine (B9) group was established in 2015 at the initiative of Romania (President Klaus Iohannis) and Poland (President Andrzej Duda). Comprising nine Eastern European NATO member states — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary — the group aims to coordinate regional positions on Euro-Atlantic security and to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank. The initiative enjoys consistent support from the United States and NATO and is regarded as a complementary instrument for enhancing allied unity and resilience.

[4] Although numerous projects have been proposed and several have already been implemented, critics point out that only a relatively small number have been completed so far — some reports note that only 14 of the 143 priority projects have been finalized (or have reached an advanced stage of implementation). Major obstacles include high levels of bureaucracy, difficult cross-border coordination, divergent national priorities, the lack of a strong central implementation mechanism, and dependence on EU or external funding. Although the 3SI was conceived as a framework for coordination among states on regional projects, it lacks strong executive mechanisms in itself — its success lies rather in the fact that governments have begun to design major projects from a regional perspective.

[5] The term “eastern flank” is the established NATO formulation which, from a military standpoint—as I have noted on other occasions and as other prominent military analysts have also stated—is a political definition rather than a militarily accurate one. In fact, it should be referred to as the “eastern front,” a formulation that could gradually gain acceptance if Russia continues its aggression in Ukraine.

[6] Kaliningrad is an enclave of the Russian Federation located on the Baltic Sea coast, between Poland and Lithuania. A former German territory (Königsberg) annexed by the Soviet Union in 1945, the region holds exceptional strategic importance as Russia’s westernmost military base. It hosts the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet and a dense complex of A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) capabilities, including Iskander-M ballistic and anti-ship missile systems, S-400 and Bastion systems, as well as aviation and electronic warfare units.
Its position enables control over maritime and air routes across northern Poland and the Baltic states, serving as a major leverage point against NATO. Since 2022, Moscow has strengthened its military presence in Kaliningrad, expanding ammunition storage infrastructure and intensifying joint exercises with the Baltic Fleet, accompanied by rhetoric about the potential deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.

[7] Romania holds a geostrategically vital position on the Black Sea, located at the intersection of economic, energy, and military corridors linking Central Europe, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. The Port of Constanța, the largest port on the Black Sea and one of the most important in Europe, functions as the main logistical hub of the European Union’s and NATO’s eastern flank.
Through its rail and river connections (via the Danube–Black Sea Canal), the port provides direct access to the European transport network (TEN-T), serving as the natural terminus of the Rail-2-Sea project and as a key link in the north–south interconnection axis promoted by the Three Seas Initiative. At the same time, the port serves as critical infrastructure for allied mobility within NATO, holding strategic value comparable to that of the ports of Gdańsk and Koper.

[8] Romania occupies a unique geographical and strategic position at the confluence of the Carpathian arc and the Balkan sphere of influence, forming a natural link between Central and South-Eastern Europe. The Carpathian mountain chain, which crosses its territory for more than 900 km, provides a distinctive defensive terrain while granting control over the main access routes from Pannonia, Ukraine, and the Black Sea.
Situated north of the Balkans, Romania serves as a bridge between the Danubian–Carpathian area and the Balkan Peninsula, playing a role of regional stability and strategic continuity within the European security architecture.
Its geographic position enables Romania to become the connecting element between the northern and southern segments of the Intermarium axis, thereby strengthening the geopolitical relevance of the region within the broader Euro-Atlantic framework.

[9] Romania possesses significant potential in natural and energy resources, including substantial reserves of natural gas (both onshore and offshore in the Black Sea), crude oil, coal, non-ferrous ores, as well as considerable hydroelectric and agricultural resources. The development of gas exploitation projects in the Neptun Deep and Midia Gas Development perimeters strengthens its role as a regional energy producer.
From an infrastructural standpoint, Romania is crossed by the main European transport corridors (TEN-T), connecting the Black Sea with Central and Western Europe through railway, road, and river networks (including the Danube–Black Sea Canal).
This combination of resources and infrastructure makes Romania an essential energy and logistical pillar of the European Union’s and NATO’s eastern flank, while also providing economic and strategic support for the regional projects of the Three Seas Initiative and the broader Intermarium concept.
Nevertheless, the national infrastructure remains affected by structural and investment gaps, an insufficiently modernized transport network, and partial dependence on energy imports—factors that currently limit the full exploitation of its strategic potential.

“Between empires and alliances, the lands between the Baltic and the Black Seas have always been less the masters of their own destiny and more the arena where destinies are decided.”
— (attributed to George F. Kennan, paraphrased from American Diplomacy)

Day of Cuban Culture

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Day of Cuban Culture

The Cuban Embassy and the Hispanic Association of The Hague will celebrate the Cuban Culture Day with a salsa class. Diplomats and their couples are invited to join.

Sudan’s War is not Between Equals:  It’s a Nation Defending itself Against a Militia

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Sudan’s War is not Between Equals:  It’s a Nation Defending itself Against a Militia

By Ambassador Mohamed Osman Akasha, PhD, Charge’ d’Affaires a.i, Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan in Nairobi 

Why calling Sudan’s war a conflict between “two equal parties” is a moral and factual distortion

A dangerous myth persists in international discourse that Sudan’s devastating conflict is a war between “two equal parties.” This framing, repeated in some international and regional circles and a few media reports, is not only false but deeply unjust. It blurs the moral and legal line between a national army defending its state and people, and a militia waging terror against them.

To understand Sudan’s war, one must look beyond slogans and into logic, evidence, and the lived experience of millions of Sudanese civilians.

Legitimacy Cannot Be Shared Between a State and a Militia

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is a constitutionally established institution, recognised by international law and tasked with safeguarding Sudan’s sovereignty and unity.

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, by contrast, is not a legitimate national force. It is the rebranded face of the Janjaweed militia, a group of supremacists responsible for genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass atrocities in Darfur since 2003.

According to the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005), the Janjaweed were responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against non-Arab communities.[¹] These militias,  were reorganised and renamed as the RSF under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”), keeping their same command structures and violent practices and also their genocidal nature.[²][³]

For years, the international community condemned the Janjaweed for mass killings, rape, village burnings, and forced displacement. Yet today, many of those same international actors risk moral amnesia by equating this genocidal militia with Sudan’s national army.

The RSF militia seized Sudan’s political instability, as in April 2023, it turned its guns on the state, attacking government institutions, airports, and residential areas in an endeavour to consolidate power through a well-planned coup d’état.

To describe both as “equal sides” is like calling a nation’s police and an armed gang “two parties in conflict.” One defends the rule of law; the other destroys it. Legitimacy is not a matter of opinion, it is a matter of law.

Civilians Know Who Protects Them

The truest test of legitimacy is found in the movement of civilians. Across Sudan, millions have fled RSF militia-controlled areas, streaming toward army-held zones or neighbouring countries in search of safety.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than nine million people have been displaced since the war began, most fleeing violence, looting, and sexual abuse committed by RSF militias in Darfur, Al-Gezira, Sinnar, and Khartoum.[⁴]

If both sides were equal, the population would be divided. They are not. Sudanese civilians are voting with their feet, escaping the RSF militias seeking refuge under the army’s protection.

The RSF’s Documented Crimes

The RSF’s record is one of systematic brutality, not political legitimacy. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has documented mass killings, torture, and sexual violence by RSF militia fighters in Darfur, warning that the crimes amount to crimes against humanity.[⁵]

Human Rights Watch recorded ethnic massacres in El Geneina, where RSF militia forces and allied militias slaughtered non-Arab civilians and burned entire neighbourhoods to the ground.[⁶]

Amnesty International confirmed widespread rape, abductions, and forced disappearances used as weapons of war by the RSF militia.[⁷]

Meanwhile, the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan traced foreign arms supplies and illicit financial flows that sustain the militia’s operations, violating international sanctions and prolonging Sudan’s agony.[⁸]

These are not the actions of a movement seeking justice or reform, they are the crimes of a mercenary militia, driven by greed, tribal domination, and foreign sponsorship.

The National Army’s Role Is Defensive, Not Aggressive

The war did not begin with the Sudanese Armed Forces. It began when the RSF militia launched a coordinated assault on state institutions, looting public assets, seizing airports, and occupying homes in Khartoum. According to the UN Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council (S/2023/700), the RSF militia initiated the fighting on 15 April 2023, attacking both military installations and civilian neighbourhoods.[⁹]

Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, every sovereign state has the right and the duty to defend itself from internal rebellion. Sudan is no exception. To condemn the national army for defending the nation is to deny Sudan’s right to exist as a state.

The Danger of False Neutrality

In the name of “balance,” some international voices continue to speak of “both sides.” But false neutrality is not fairness, it is complicity. Equating the Sudanese Armed Forces with a militia accused of genocide and crimes against humanity is morally untenable and strategically reckless.

This misguided parity rewards the perpetrators and punishes the victims. Peace cannot be built on deception, it requires acknowledging who defends the nation and who destroys it.

Truth Before Peace

Sudan’s war is not a clash between equals. It is a nation under attack by a rebranded genocidal militia. The Sudanese Armed Forces represent the continuity of the state, the flag, and the people’s collective will to defend their homeland. The RSF militia represents anarchy, foreign interference, and mass suffering. To call them “equal parties” is not diplomacy, it is denial. Truth must come before peace, because peace without truth sanctifies injustice. Sudan is not at war with itself. It is fighting for its survival.

References

  • *United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the Secretary-General, 25 January 2005.
  • *Human Rights Watch, “Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Janjaweed Militias,” May 2004.
  • *Amnesty International, “Too Many People Killed for No Reason: Darfur, 2003–2004,” 2004.
  • *UNHCR, Sudan Situation Update, August 2025.
  • *OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Violations in Sudan (April–December 2023), Geneva, 2024.
  • *Human Rights Watch, “Darfur: RSF Massacres Civilians, Ethnic Targeting in El Geneina,” July 2023.
  • *Amnesty International, “Sudan: Sexual Violence and Killings by RSF in Darfur,” November 2023.
  • *UN Panel of Experts on Sudan, Final Report Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2676 (2023), February 2024.
  • *United Nations Secretary-General, Situation in the Sudan, Report to the Security Council (S/2023/700), October 2023.

Building Bridges, Dams and Locks through the Practice of International Law

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Building Bridges, Dams and Locks through the Practice of International Law

Reflections from The Ambassador Lecture Series at Maastricht University

On 22 September 2025, H.E. Ms. Carolina Olarte Bácares, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, delivered a captivating lecture at Maastricht University’s Faculty of Law titled “Building bridges, dams and locks through the practice of international law.”

Drawing inspiration from Dutch feats of engineering, Ambassador Olarte Bácares used dikes, bridges, and locks as metaphors to explore how international law can be taught, practised, and lived. Her reflections, imaginative yet deeply grounded in experience, invited the audience to see law as a dynamic instrument—one that shields, connects, and enables passage through turbulent times.

Dikes: Protecting through Understanding

The Afsluitdijk, the great Dutch barrier between the Zuiderzee and the Wadden Sea, became her metaphor for academia. For more than two decades, Olarte Bácares has taught and disseminated international law, including to Colombia’s army during the years of armed conflict. Just as a dike both separates and joins two bodies of water, she explained, international humanitarian law, human rights law, and international criminal law are not watertight compartments; they interact continuously. Teaching law to lawyers and non-lawyers alike, she argued, protects societies by making the law understandable and applicable.

Bridges: Building Connections

The Hovenring, a circular bridge in Eindhoven, symbolised her work on business and human rights. Law, she observed, must bridge states, companies, and civil society without collisions. Constructing such bridges requires awareness of diverse perspectives and a preventive mindset rooted in human-rights due diligence. Through such conscious connection, international law becomes an architecture of trust rather than confrontation.

Locks: Linking Legal Orders

Her final image, the Prinses Beatrixsluis (Princess Beatrix lock), reflected her diplomatic role as Colombia’s representative before international courts and tribunals. National and international jurisdictions, she noted, operate like two water levels communicating through a lock. The metaphor highlighted how diplomacy enables dialogue between legal orders, ensuring that one domain informs and elevates the other.

A Plural Discipline

Ambassador Olarte Bácares concluded that there is no single way to “do” international law. Whether as professor, consultant, or diplomat, each professional path enriches the discipline and makes it more human. She called for international law to step outside institutional walls—to be shared with soldiers, students, and citizens alike—so that it can serve as a living tool for protection, cooperation, and peace.

The lecture formed part of The Ambassador Lecture Series, a bi-monthly initiative convened by Professor Fabián Raimondo at Maastricht University’s Faculty of Law. Organised with the assistance of the European Law Students’ Association (ELSA) Maastricht and under the auspices of the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights, the series provides a forum for ambassadors to reflect on international law, international relations, and diplomacy from national perspectives. This inspiring lecture marked the opening of the 2025–2026 academic year.

Author: Gaia Ziliani, Vice President Seminars & Conferences, European Law Students’ Association with the invaluable support in the note taking of Polly Grünig, President of ELSA Maastricht and Emilia Cozariuc, Traineeships Director. 

For inquiries about The Ambassador Lecture Series, please contact Professor Raimondo at fabian.raimondo@maastrichtuniversity.nl.

Bolivia Celebrates its Bicentennial in The Hague

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Bolivia Celebrates its Bicentennial in The Hague

With Art, Culture, and Joy

In commemoration of the 200th Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, H.E. Ambassador Roberto Calzadilla Sarmiento hosted a remarkable National Day reception in August at the Embassy of Bolivia in The Hague. The celebration beautifully captured the essence of Bolivia’s rich cultural heritage and the pride of a nation marking two centuries of independence.

The embassy premises and garden were filled with diplomats, academics, members of the Bolivian diaspora, and friends of Bolivia from various sectors of Dutch society. The ambiance reflected a true spirit of joy, and hospitality—hallmarks of Bolivian culture.

Guests were greeted with a colorful program blending tradition, and art. The La Plata Ensemble opened the evening with an exquisite performance of Chiquitano baroque music, connecting Bolivia’s historical depth with its living artistic expression.

Guests attending the 200 Anniversary of Bolivia in The Hague.
Bolivia National Day 2025.

In his address, Ambassador Calzadilla Sarmiento delivered inspiring and warm remarks:

“We gather today in The Hague not only to commemorate two centuries since the signing of the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Bolivia on August 6, 1825, but also, in this Bicentennial year, to renew our firm commitment to continue building a truly free, sovereign, just, and united Bolivia.”

The Ambassador reflected on Bolivia’s journey—from its liberation struggles led by Simón Bolívar, Antonio José de Sucre, Juana Azurduy, and other heroes, to the nation’s transformation into a Plurinational State in 2009. He highlighted the importance of recognizing Bolivia’s 36 indigenous and peasant nations, their languages, and systems of self-government, as well as the nation’s advances in social inclusion, intercultural education, and environmental rights.

Bolivia, the La Plata Ensemble.

Ambassador Calzadilla Sarmiento also emphasized Bolivia’s foreign policy of peace and dialogue, anchored in “diplomacy of the peoples and diplomacy for Living Well,” which advocates harmony with nature, respect for human rights, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. He reaffirmed Bolivia’s support for multilateralism and climate justice, referencing the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on climate obligations.

“Our foreign policy, based on “diplomacy of the peoples and diplomacy for Living Well” and on a culture of peace, promotes dialogue, respect for human and environmental rights, harmony with nature, rejection of racism and oppression, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. At the global level, we have joined the BRICS and, in our region, MERCOSUR, amplifying our voice.

The climate crisis has brought historic droughts, frosts, floods, and forest fires that have devastated our Amazonian forests and productive communities. However, we remain steadfast in our support for productive recovery, knowing that the fight against climate change is inseparable from the fight for social justice.”

The Ambassador also underscored the importance of Bolivia’s relations with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, highlighting cooperation in sustainable trade, energy, forestry, and academia, as well as its engagement with Portugal and solidarity with the State of Palestine.

Ambassador Calzadilla Sarmiento and Cees van Casteren, leading international connoisseur of Bolivian wine culture.

Following his inspiring speech, the evening turned into a festive celebration of color and rhythm, as the Alma Latina dance group took the stage with dynamic performances of traditional Bolivian dances, including Tobas and Morenada. The dances, full of energy , rhythm and symbolism, brought the spirit of Bolivia to life, mesmerizing the audience.

Chef Rodrigo Arandia head of Iskay. Bolivia 200 Anniversary.

The culinary experience was another highlight of the evening. Bolivian venture Iskay and international chef Rodrigo Arandia curated a flavorful gastronomic journey through Bolivia’s diverse regions—featuring quinoa and anticuchos from the Andes, menudito from the valleys, and majadito from the tropical lowlands. Guests also enjoyed a tasting of Bolivian wines and singani, guided by renowned Dutch ethnologist and wine expert Cees van Casteren, whose work in Bolivia has made him one of the leading international connoisseurs of Bolivian wine culture.

Cees van Casteren, leading international connoisseur of Bolivian wine culture.

The evening concluded with awards presented to Bolivians and organizations that have significantly contributed to promoting Bolivia’s image and culture in the Netherlands.

Under the leadership of Ambassador Roberto Calzadilla Sarmiento, the Bicentennial celebration in The Hague stood as a meaningful symbol of Bolivia’s proud identity: a country of diversity, resilience, and profound cultural wealth, proudly sharing its vision of a just and united future.

Ambassador Calzadilla Sarmiento awarded Bolivians and organizations.

¡Jallalla Bolivia! Viva Bolivia.

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