“When politicians play with the pencil on the map, the drums of war begin to beat.”

Otto von Bismarck

By Corneliu Pivariu

I Brief History

Syria, under French mandate after World War I, gained independence in 1945, subsequently experiencing a highly turbulent political and social period marked by numerous military coups until 1970, when General Hafez Al-Assad seized power through a coup. A referendum in the spring of 1971 legitimized his leadership, establishing an autocratic rule based on the military and secret services, widely supported by his Alawite coreligionists (a minority), who held the most important positions in the power structures.

The natural passing of Hafez Al-Assad in 2000, one of the longest-serving heads of state in the Middle East, was linked by many analysts to the beginning of Syria’s decline in regional influence. His successor, his son Bashar, assumed power instead of his elder brother Basel, who had been groomed for leadership but died in a tragic car accident in Lebanon. Retaining his father’s loyal supporters, Bashar managed to stay in power for nearly 24 years, until December 8, 2024, when he fled to Moscow.

Ultimately, the London-trained ophthalmologist failed to effectively manage the external and internal challenges he faced, exacerbated by severe mistakes made by his close circle and the shifting geopolitical landscape. The phrase popular in Damascus in the 2010s—”The West needs Bashar al-Assad more than Bashar needs the West”—gradually lost its validity due to the regime’s serious errors and changing international attitudes toward Damascus.

II. Syria and the Arab Spring

In Syria, the Arab Spring (or rather, the Arab Winter) emerged later than in North Africa, where protests and political upheavals began in 2010. The onset of Syrian unrest, which gradually escalated into a long and bloody civil war[1], is traced to March 15, 2011, following earlier protests in Dara, a southern Syrian city near the Jordanian border. The Assad regime mishandled these protests, employing heavy-handed repression, particularly through the Republican Guard led by Bashar’s brother, Maher Al-Assad. Popular discontent was further fueled by the presence of several hundred infiltrators from abroad, carrying passports from a neighboring country, between January and March 2011. This signaled an external decision to remove Assad, reinforced by substantial financial and material support from Arab states such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Despite the regime’s powerful secret services, which recruited followers from an early age, protests became violent across nearly the entire country. Armed intervention against demonstrators led to the radicalization of the movement. Due to Syria’s unique social situation and the government’s intelligence operations, opposition groups fragmented into various factions, including armed groups like the Free Syrian Army, which failed to unify into a single force. Extremist organizations such as Daesh (ISIS) exploited the ensuing chaos to seize control of different regions.

The situation was further complicated by the involvement of international actors such as Russia (from 2015), Iran (from the beginning, both militarily and through Hezbollah), Turkey, and the U.S.-led coalition, each pursuing distinct geopolitical interests.

Mass desertions weakened the Syrian army, which, except for its elite commando units and the Republican Guard, was generally poorly trained. Alongside foreign military presences—Russia and Iran being crucial in securing strategic areas—the regime also established local paramilitary formations such as the Shabiha (“ghosts”), primarily composed of Alawite minorities who maintained control, especially along the coast, where their population was significant.

To survive, the regime employed all available means, from airstrikes using fragmentation bombs to chemical weapons. Prisons became overcrowded with opposition members detained for the slightest act of defiance.

From a demographic perspective, the war was catastrophic, causing over 500,000 deaths, more than 6 million external refugees, and around 4 million internally displaced persons. Material destruction is difficult to estimate, with figures reaching approximately $300 billion.

Between 2011 and 2023, the Syrian economy shrank by 85%. The regime survived largely due to Iranian support, estimated at $2-6 billion annually. Another financial lifeline was the production of Captagon, an illicit drug known as the “jihad drug,” generating over $10 billion for the Assad regime.

In late November 2024, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham[2] (HTS) – Organization for the Liberation of the Levant, which controlled Syria’s northwestern Idlib region, launched an offensive against key strategic points, capturing Aleppo within days, followed by Hama, Homs, and finally Damascus.

The Syrian Civil War formally ended on December 7, 2024, following a meeting in Doha involving Arab foreign ministers and the Astana Process for Syria. They signed a Joint Declaration[3] endorsing a ceasefire based on UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

On December 8, 2024, Bashar al-Assad fled from Damascus to Latakia and was evacuated to Moscow from Russia’s Hmeimim military airbase.

III. The Fall of the Assad Regime, Current Developments, and Perspectives

The fall of the Assad regime was driven by a combination of internal and external factors that reached a critical point towards the end of 2024. Nevertheless, the regime demonstrated remarkable resilience, though the worsening economic and social crisis heightened the risks of regime change. Key external factors included Israel’s desire to capitalize on developments in Gaza and Lebanon to minimize Iran’s influence in Syria, as well as the situation of the Russian Federation, which, being engaged in the conflict in Ukraine, was unwilling to intensify its military support for Bashar al-Assad, thereby accepting his departure within a broader geopolitical context.

The Assad family was not entirely caught off guard[4], having taken precautions from the early years of the civil war to secure a comfortable life in Russia. Bashar shared his plans to flee Syria with almost no one, misleading his advisors, officials, and even relatives about his real intentions. His brother, Maher—commander of the Republican Guard—departed by helicopter to Iraq and then flew to Moscow.

On December 8, the armed opposition announced the fall of the regime, and the acting Prime Minister, Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, declared his willingness to hand over power to a transitional government.

On December 10, Ahmed al-Sharaa[5], the emir of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), who became the de facto head of state, appointed Mohammed al-Bashir as Prime Minister of the Salvation Government. Initially consisting of 12 members from the previously established government in Idlib, the cabinet was expanded by six members on December 21, and the first female minister was appointed a day later. On December 30, Maysaa Sabreen was appointed as the first female governor of the Central Bank of Syria, having previously served as the first deputy governor of the bank during the latter part of the Assad regime.

On January 29, 2025, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) held the “Victory Conference” in Damascus, officially naming Ahmed al-Sharaa as interim president. He was tasked with forming an interim legislative council to draft a new constitution.

In a five-minute speech, Sharaa outlined his five priorities: resolving the power vacuum; maintaining civil peace and preventing acts of revenge[6]; rebuilding state institutions, particularly the military, security, and police forces, to ensure public safety; revitalizing the economy by rebuilding human resources, agriculture, industry, and the service sector; and regaining Syria’s regional position by establishing foreign relations based on sovereignty, respect, and mutual interests. Aware of the difficulties ahead, al-Sharaa remarked, “The first moment of victory can be the first moment of defeat.”

In defense, initial steps were taken as 18 larger and around 50 smaller armed factions agreed to dissolve and integrate into the new army. However, two armed factions in the south, from Suwayda and Daraa, as well as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which control a significant area in northeastern Syria, have not yet accepted integration. The SDF, of Kurdish origin and allied with the U.S., maintains ties with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and is considered a terrorist organization by Turkey, which seeks to eliminate it.

Economic reconstruction is estimated to take at least ten years for Syria’s GDP to return to its 2010 level ($80 billion), compared to just $10 billion in 2023. In 2019, reconstruction costs were estimated at approximately $400 billion, likely exceeding $500-600 billion today.

The new Minister of Economy has promised a transition to a free, competitive economy, abandoning the centralized control model.

Although the U.S. and the EU are expected to lift most, if not all, economic sanctions, massive investments will be required for reconstruction, making it a fundamentally political issue. Countries financing reconstruction will play a crucial political role in Syria’s future.

Despite expressing interest, Iran and Russia are unlikely to play a dominant role due to their internal and geopolitical circumstances. Given Syria’s new power dynamics, Turkey is in the most advantageous position. Turkish exports to Damascus were worth $2 billion in 2023, and given Ankara’s support for HTS, Turkey is likely to become the primary investor in reconstruction. The Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Damascus on December 22, 2024, signaled not only political-military but also economic intentions. By late January 2025, President Erdogan stated that Turkey alone could eradicate terrorist groups in Syria, implying its desire for a leading role in the country.

In this context, the revival of the Turkey-Qatar gas pipeline project, first proposed in 2009 and abandoned due to political difficulties, including the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, is worth noting.

The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani’s visit to Damascus on January 30, 2025—the first by an Arab head of state since Assad’s fall—further underscores Qatar’s interest in Syria’s future. Apart from general discussions on post-war collaboration, Qatar provided 200 MW of electricity, with plans for gradual expansion.

Another crucial issue is securing Syria’s oil supply, which was 90% dependent on Iran before deliveries ceased following Assad’s fall. Additionally, Hezbollah’s oil trafficking routes from Lebanon were bombed by Israel, forcing Syria to seek alternative sources. Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and even Iraq are being considered for this purpose.

Iran evacuated its personnel from Syria shortly before the regime’s fall but remains open to cooperation with the new authorities. Iran still has significant influence through its supporters in Syria, which it can leverage to advance its interests.

Although initially stating its intention to maintain good relations with Moscow, the new Syrian government has annulled Russia’s 49-year lease of the Tartus naval base. A visit by Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister to Damascus in late January failed to resolve the issue, and Russian military equipment has begun to be evacuated by sea. However, Syria will need to maintain some level of normal relations with Russia, considering their historical ties and future dependencies. Syria’s external debt to Russia exceeds $15 billion, primarily for military procurement, and its armed forces rely on Russian technology, making a shift to alternative suppliers a long-term process. Moreover, Russia’s long-standing advisory presence in Syria’s security and defense sectors remains a strategic advantage for Moscow.

The U.S. has shown interest in Syria’s developments, evidenced by a State Department delegation’s visit to Damascus shortly after Assad’s fall. The U.S. maintains around 2,000 troops in northeastern Syria, supporting the SDF, a stance opposed by Turkey. After December 8, 2024, the U.S. reportedly expanded Ain al-Assad airbase in western Iraq to serve as a logistics hub for American bases in the region. Additionally, it allegedly secured agreements for three new bases in Damascus, Daraa, and Quneitra, while expanding the Hasakah base.

I personally believe that the regime change in Syria was linked to the changes underway in the Washington Administration, in order to align with the new intentions of the Trump administration in the Middle East, with Syria potentially playing an important role in the security architecture envisioned by the new American administration for the region.

Israel was an active participant in the evolution of the situation in Syria and took advantage of the circumstances that emerged after December 8, 2024, to carry out over 400 air strikes against Iranian targets, Hezbollah, and the Syrian military—destroying missile and ammunition depots, striking the most important points of Syria’s anti-aircraft defenses and radar installations, and sinking a large part of the Syrian military fleet. Israel justified its actions as preventive, to ensure that the respective weaponry and military equipment would not be captured by terrorists. Furthermore, immediately after December 8, it proceeded to completely occupy the heights of the Golan as well as Mount Hermon (2,814 m), the highest in the area, overlooking Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. “It is extremely important from a strategic point of view. There is no substitute for mountains,” explained Efraim Inbar, Director of the Institute for Strategy and Security in Jerusalem (JISS). Although Israel officially declared that it would not retain these territories, I doubt that it will not, in the not-too-distant future, proclaim the annexation of the entire Golan plateau and maintain control over Mount Hermon, where it could install specialized equipment for military electronic reconnaissance (if such equipment has not already begun to be installed).

At present, I do not believe that Israel has established a long-term policy towards the new regime in Syria, given the multiple possible political scenarios regarding the developments in that country. Potentially, a normalization of relations between Syria and Israel could open new economic prospects, particularly in the energy sector for Israel.

Ahmad al-Sharaa and the interim government established in Damascus face particularly heavy and complex challenges both domestically and internationally. The transition period is estimated to last around three years, after which a new constitution must be approved by referendum, followed by elections in the fourth year. The issues that the new government will confront are very different from the administration of a region such as Idlib, where errors were also made.

Regarding the medium- and long-term evolution of the situation in Syria, I believe it can be grouped into two main scenarios, each with several variants: either Syria remains within its current territory—with some modifications in the Golan area that will be entirely annexed by Israel—or Syria is partially or completely divided (the latter being the least likely variant), depending on the evolution of the internal situation and the negotiations between various regional powers and global actors.

In the event of a division, Turkey is best positioned, as it would like to bring under its control the area in the north, from immediately north of Latakia, through Aleppo and along the Euphrates to the border with Iraq. The coastal area, where the Alawite minority is predominant, could declare independence and come under the umbrella of Moscow, thereby saving its maritime bases in the Mediterranean. Jordan, as a maximalist plan, might lay claim to expand its territory even as far as Damascus, taking into account the historical traditions of the Hashemite dynasty, or only as far as Daraa and Suwayda. This, too, will depend on developments in Gaza.

Of course, Israel will take the entire Golan as well as Mount Hermon.
Will Ahmad al-Sharaa, at the age of 43, be able to successfully lead Syria through the transition period and subsequent reconstruction? Determination alone is not enough; the way in which internal and external factors will interweave, as well as how he will seize emerging opportunities, will determine the final outcome of Syria’s evolution in the first half of the 21st century.

IV. Brief Conclusions

The fall of the Assad regime in less than a month after nearly 14 years of civil war is a clear indication that regional and global geopolitical shifts in the second quarter of the 21st century will be more significant than before. The possibility of border modifications worldwide is no longer far-fetched.

In the Middle East, Israel and Turkey emerge as the main winners, though each faces internal and external challenges.

Syria’s situation remains highly complex and open to various possibilities. The new government must tackle a deepening economic and social crisis while preventing a descent into factional conflict, reminiscent of Lebanon’s historical turmoil.

Syria’s developments will shape new regional and global power balances, potentially becoming the new litmus test for Middle Eastern and even global geopolitics.

Brașov, Romania, February 3, 2025

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[1] For details on the evolution of the Syrian civil war, see also Corneliu Pivariu – Current Geopolitics, Unveiled in 200 Episodes, pp. 259-267; Current Geopolitics. Significant Episodes 2011-2014, pp. 236-253; Major Moves on the Geopolitical Chessboard 2014-2017, pp. 355-390; Geopolitics Before and After Covid-19, pp. 243-246.

[2] Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a Sunni Islamist politico-military organization that emerged in January 2017 through the merger of several Syrian Sunni opposition military factions. Previously, in 2011, HTS was known as Jabhat al-Nusra and was affiliated with Al-Qaeda. It also had ties with the Islamic State, but these affiliations were severed with the formation of HTS. The organization has been designated a terrorist group by the UN, the US, Turkey, the EU, and other states. HTS controlled the northwestern region of Syria, known as the Idlib region, as well as parts of the Aleppo area, including the Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey. It established a Salvation Government composed of 10 ministers. The organization has received increased support from Turkey over the past year, including drones, military instructors, and weaponry. Additionally, it benefits from support from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, other Arab and non-Arab countries, and wealthy opponents of the Assad regime who have taken refuge abroad.

[3] The foreign ministers of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, as well as the Russian representative, participated in the Astana Process.

[4] According to the Financial Times, as early as 2019, the extended Assad family purchased 19 apartments in Moscow’s modern commercial center, valued at $40 million. The US State Department estimated in 2022 that the Assad family’s wealth was approximately $2 billion, spread across numerous accounts, shell companies, real estate portfolios, and tax havens. A Syrian intelligence officer told a Turkish publication that, before his departure from Syria, Bashar al-Assad had transferred $135 billion out of the country. His eldest son, Hafez, now 22 years old, is currently preparing for his doctorate in Moscow

[5] Ahmed al-Sharaa, known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani (born October 29, 1982), was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to a Syrian Sunni family from the Golan region. At the age of six, he returned with his family to Damascus. Shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, he joined Al-Qaeda in Iraq, where he fought for three years before being captured by American forces and imprisoned in various locations from 2006 to 2011. His release coincided with the start of the Syrian civil war, during which he established the Al-Nusra Front to support Al-Qaeda’s fight against Bashar al-Assad’s Ba’athist regime. In 2013, he was placed on the US State Department’s terrorist list, and four years later, a $10 million reward was set for information leading to his capture. In December 2024, the reward was canceled following his meeting with a US State Department delegation visiting Damascus.

On July 28, 2016, al-Sharaa announced that Al-Nusra was severing ties with Al-Qaeda and renamed the organization Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS). In January 2017, he formed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) by merging with other groups. He prioritized combating Al-Qaeda and Daesh to improve relations with the West, particularly with Turkey, and succeeded in controlling most of the Idlib region, which he governs through the Syrian Salvation Government.

[6] Reports have already surfaced of summary executions of approximately 35 people in central Homs and another 10 people in the Alawite area, from which the Assad family originates.