Romania in this context. Projections for 2050

By General (Rtd) Corneliu Pivariu

This work provides an in-depth geopolitical analysis of the global transformations that have occurred in the first quarter of the 21st century, alongside an assessment of Romania’s strategic position and prospects within the context of these changes. Starting from the premise that the current international order is facing multiple systemic crises — political, economic, ideological, and security-related — the study offers a structured overview of the main global, regional, and national dynamics, with well-argued projections extending to the horizon of 2050.

The first section identifies and examines the major trends in global geopolitical evolution, including the decline of the unipolar order, the rise of new centers of power, the intensification of economic and technological competition, and the legitimacy crisis of international institutions. It highlights the growing polarization between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes, the return to the logic of spheres of influence, and the increasing role of non-state actors and hybrid warfare.

The second chapter reviews the main military conflicts at the beginning of the century — from the Middle East to Eastern Europe — and provides a strategic analysis of the causes, actors involved, and the impact of these confrontations on the global security architecture. Possible scenarios for military developments up to 2050 are also presented, in the context of accelerated armament and the redefinition of international alliances.

The third part of the study focuses on the geopolitics of natural resources — energy, food, water, and rare materials — emphasizing how control over these resources is once again becoming a central factor in international rivalries. Topics such as energy security, dependence on global supply chains, and strategic agricultural potential are addressed, with particular focus on Romania’s vulnerabilities and opportunities in this context.

The fourth chapter explores the ideological and structural conflict between globalism and sovereigntism, highlighting how this tension shapes not only foreign policy choices but also the internal cohesion of states. It offers an in-depth analysis of the relationship between plutocracy and meritocracy, the influence of global informal power networks, and the impact of dominant ideologies on values, identities, and political legitimacy.

The work concludes with a final chapter of general conclusions, in which the main trends are synthesized, development perspectives through 2050 are outlined, and recommendations are formulated for strengthening Romania’s position in a multipolar, unstable, and highly competitive international environment. The study argues that Romania must become an active and self-aware player in defining its own geopolitical path, aiming for a balance between international cooperation and the defense of national interest.

GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL EVOLUTIONS IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE XXI CENTURY. ROMANIA IN THIS CONTEXT. FORECASTS FOR 2050

 “Geopolitical forecasts are often an exercise in anticipating the future, a balancing act between reality and possibility. But do not forget that the future is also shaped by the choices we make today.” – Anonymous

The period 2000–2025 and the second half of the 20th century reflect significant yet rather different geopolitical developments.

In the second half of the 20th century, the world was largely divided between the Eastern bloc, led by the Soviet Union, and the Western bloc, led by the United States, under the Cold War paradigm. It was a time of military and political tensions, the nuclear arms race and space race, but also of decolonization and the growth of independence in many Asian, African, and Caribbean nations.

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world entered a new geopolitical era. Between 2000 and 2025, global powers diversified and reconfigured. The United States remained a superpower, but other major powers emerged, including China and the European Union.

Globalization accelerated, facilitated by technology and the internet, and global challenges such as climate change and terrorism became more pronounced. At the same time, nationalism and populism intensified in many countries.

Another key trend was the reconfiguration of power in the Middle East, through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, and the rise of terrorist organizations like ISIS.

The second half of the 20th century was marked by the formation and consolidation of major international legal structures and principles.

The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 provided a global framework for cooperation and the resolution of international disputes.

This era also saw the adoption of major international treaties such as the Geneva Conventions (1949) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), which laid down international norms in areas such as human rights, humanitarian law, and arms control.

It was also a period of decolonization and the affirmation of the right to self-determination, as enshrined in the UN Charter.

By contrast, the 2000–2025 period was marked by challenges to the rule-based international order established in the 20th century. The first quarter of the 21st century redefined the global order, shifting from unipolar hegemony to multipolar competition, driven by technology, resources, and new forms of conflict.

Despite the existence of an international legal framework, there have been numerous violations of international law—such as illegal invasions, the use of torture, and human rights abuses.

Globalization also introduced new challenges for international law, including the regulation of the internet and digital technologies, and the need for global climate governance.

Additionally, the international order has been challenged by the rise of non-Western powers like China, which promote their own interpretations of international law.

In conclusion, while the second half of the 20th century was a time of international legal formation and consolidation—shaped by geopolitical polarization and decolonization—the 2000–2025 period was marked by tensions surrounding its application, globalization, shifting power balances, and the emergence of global issues.

I. HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT OF GEOPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

“The map of the world is not drawn by geographers, but by the forces of history, economy, and conflict.” – Halford Mackinder

1. Historical Premises: Lessons of the 20th Century

The 20th century was marked by two major world wars that redrew borders, altered power balances, and gave rise to new geopolitical paradigms. After the fall of colonial empires (British, French, Ottoman, Russian), the world entered a bipolar era, dominated by the Cold War between the US and the USSR. Ideological, economic, and military confrontation played out through proxy wars in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, accompanied by an unprecedented arms race.

The collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989–1991 led to a major geopolitical reconfiguration: the United States remained the global hegemon, championing neoliberal globalization, NATO expansion, and a new unipolar international order. The European Union expanded politically and economically, but also became increasingly interdependent, while Russia entered a phase of strategic decline.

Simultaneously, China embarked on a path of economic and technological ascent, integrating into the global economic system while maintaining an authoritarian structure and a clear geopolitical ambition—to offer a systemic alternative to Western hegemony.

2. Emerging Multipolarity: The End of the Unipolar Era

Starting in the 2010s, the post–Cold War unipolar order began to fragment. Economic crises (2008–2010), protracted wars (Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan), the rise of illiberal regimes, and the contestation of Western norms contributed to the emergence of a multipolar, yet unstable, system.

Today we are witnessing a return to classical geopolitics: rivalries among major powers, arms races, ideological confrontations, and battles for influence in strategic areas. Instead of a coherent global leadership, we face a fractured geopolitical mechanism, where various centers of power compete for hegemony or autonomy:

• The United States strives to maintain its role as global arbiter but is undermined by internal polarization, strategic costs, and rising competitors.

• China is not an emerging power in the classical sense but a civilizational great power with a long history of dominance in Asia. Humiliated in the 19th century by European empires and Japan, marginalized in the post-1945 world order, China now seeks to return to the center of global power—not just as an economic leader but as a superpower with global influence. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, Beijing has pursued a gradual development strategy: economic modernization, centralized political control, global expansion through strategic projects (like the Belt and Road Initiative), and massive investments in technology, infrastructure, military, and space. It is no longer just a regional power, but an actor offering a systemic alternative to Western hegemony.

• Russia employs asymmetric tools (hybrid warfare, energy, disinformation) to maintain its influence in the former Soviet space and to undermine Western unity.

• India, Brazil, Iran, Turkey, and entities like BRICS are asserting themselves as regional poles with global ambitions.

• A special mention goes to plutocracy, which especially in the second half of the 20th century began to play an increasingly important role. The Marshall Plan and IMF/World Bank had not only geopolitical components but also served to consolidate Western capitalism under the umbrella of U.S. financial interests. The creation of a controlled global financial system (dollar, Wall Street, Federal Reserve, City of London) enabled the mobility of private capital and control over global money flows. Beyond the Cold War period, when plutocracy developed significantly, the neoliberal globalization era (1979–2008), dominated by free market ideology, privatization, and deregulation, was a golden age for plutocracy. Major corporations gained more power than many states, and strategic decisions were dictated by investment banks, hedge funds, and conglomerates. The 2008 crisis demonstrated the failure of self-regulation and the institutional capture by financial elites: losses were socialized while profits were privatized.

Plutocracy is not a mere side effect of global capitalism but an informal transnational power structure that has influenced—and continues to influence—the foreign policy of major powers, the composition of international alliances, resource wars, and the shaping of emerging economies. In the absence of real mechanisms for transparency, regulation, and democratic control, plutocracy continues to shape the world order—sometimes even more effectively than military alliances or international institutions—always with the same goal: maximizing private gain.

3. Current Trends: Fractures and Realignments

1. The return of bloc confrontation – the war in Ukraine has reignited the East–West bipolar logic, with a consolidated Euro-Atlantic West (NATO, EU, G7) and an informal Sino-Russian front acting as a counterbalance, including through BRICS.

2. Redefining borders – frozen conflicts (Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria) could reactivate, putting pressure on the post-1945 order. As of 2025, frozen conflicts in Europe are concentrated around the post-Soviet space and the Western Balkans. While some remain stable (Transnistria, Abkhazia), others may reignite quickly depending on geopolitical context.

3. Resource geopolitics – energy, water, food, and rare technologies (rare earths, chips, AI) have become key elements of strategic competition.

4. Digitalization as a weapon – digital sovereignty, control over networks, artificial intelligence, and disinformation are the new battlefield of the 21st century.

5. Instability in the Global South – Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia remain arenas of rivalry between great powers and epicenters of economic and humanitarian crises.

4. Romania and the Regional Context

Romania, located at the intersection of Euro-Atlantic, Russian, and Turkish interests, plays a key role in the Black Sea region. It is a member of NATO and the EU but remains vulnerable to:

• External energy and economic pressures;

• Technological and logistical dependencies;

• Instabilities in the eastern neighborhood (Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Western Balkans).

Our country must define its own geopolitical strategy, based on strengthening economic sovereignty, smart reindustrialization, resource valorization, and pragmatic alliances.

II. MAJOR MILITARY CONFLICTS 2000–2025. FORECASTS FOR 2050

“Tomorrow’s conflicts are born from today’s injustices and yesterday’s silences.”

The period from 2000 to 2025 was marked by a series of armed conflicts that profoundly reshaped the global geopolitical landscape. While the 1990s seemed to signal a dissipation of tensions with the end of the Cold War, the new millennium ushered in a reconfiguration of conflict paradigms: from classic state-versus-state wars to asymmetric, hybrid, proxy wars, and ideological or religious confrontations. Against the backdrop of rising populism, the fragmentation of the international order, and competition for resources, organized violence took on new forms, involving both major powers and non-state actors.

1. Major Conflicts 2000–2025

Afghanistan (2001–2021)

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States[1], supported by an international coalition and NATO, launched Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban regime. The initial goal—destroying Al-Qaeda’s network—gradually shifted to state-building efforts plagued by endemic corruption and tribal resistance. After 20 years of military presence, the complete withdrawal of Western forces in August 2021 led to the rapid return of the Taliban to power and the collapse of Afghan institutions. 

A final strategic assessment reveals: militarily, the war was partially effective (weakening Al-Qaeda, though the Taliban, ousted in 2001, regained power); politically, it was a failure, with the established regime collapsing in 11 days; financially, it was a costly endeavor with no lasting results; humanly, it carried an immense cost, including civilian lives (over 170,000 deaths); and reputationally, the chaotic withdrawal damaged the U.S.’s image. 

In conclusion, the war in Afghanistan began with clear military objectives but transformed into a poorly strategized nation-building mission. While it yielded some short-term benefits, it failed to achieve a lasting strategic victory. Many analysts, including retired U.S. generals, now consider the cost unjustified relative to the outcomes.

Iraq (2003–2011 and its aftermath)

The U.S. invasion[2] in March 2003, justified by the alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction, led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The absence of a coherent post-war reconstruction plan triggered chaos, sectarian conflict, and the collapse of governance structures. The emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014 was a direct consequence of this power vacuum, prompting a new international military intervention. Instability persists today, despite limited progress. 

Currently, the United States maintains approximately 2,500 troops in Iraq under the mandate of the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve to advise, assist, and support Iraqi and Kurdish forces in the fight against ISIS. The current Iraqi government, led by al-Sudani, adopts a moderate and pragmatic centrist approach, balancing diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran while pursuing internal structural reforms to strengthen the state, combat corruption, integrate militias, and promote internal stability. It also seeks to enhance international cooperation through agreements with the United Kingdom, the U.S., and the UN, aiming to position Iraq as a regional mediator.

Syria (2011–2024)

The 2011 popular uprising rapidly escalated into a devastating civil war[3], part of the broader Middle East and North Africa “Arab Spring” events. However, the Syrian conflict is characterized by unique features: over 14 years of conflict with distinct phases (protests, conventional war, global jihad, external interventions, fragmented rebellion[4], betrayals[5]); it has become a prolonged “low-intensity conflict” with no clear victory for over a decade. 

The humanitarian toll is unprecedented in modern times: over 500,000 deaths (mostly civilians), over 13 million displaced (including 6 million external refugees)—half the pre-war population; tens of thousands of children killed, chronic famine, lack of medicine, and destroyed healthcare infrastructure; and the destruction of historical heritage (e.g., Palmyra, Aleppo). In the early years of the conflict, the Syrian army saw 80,000–100,000 deserters. 

There has been no coherent or lasting peace process, with international efforts (Geneva, Astana, UN) failing to achieve a genuine political transition. The post-2024 normalization process remains fragile, lacking broad international consensus and under the control of HTS[6]. 

In summary, the Syrian civil war stands out for its unprecedented complexity (in terms of actors, territorial, and sectarian-religious dynamics), significant international implications, extreme humanitarian costs (the largest refugee crisis in modern history, nearly half a million deaths), and the absence of a coherent political solution. 

Total damages are estimated by the UN and World Bank at $490 billion, including $220 billion in civilian infrastructure, $100 billion in social services, $120 billion in productive industries, and $50 billion in strategic assets. Reconstruction costs are projected at $500–600 billion over 15–25 years, with key actors including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the EU, the UN, and possibly China. However, this requires essential conditions: political stability, regional stability, constitutional reform, and anti-corruption measures. 

Syria’s external debt stands at approximately $23 billion (mainly for arms and military equipment from Russia and Iran, oil, and other military expenditures, plus other private creditors). An additional $15.5 million owed to the World Bank was equally settled by Qatar and Saudi Arabia on May 12, 2025. 

Syrian territory remains partially controlled by external forces and local armed groups, with reconstruction delayed or blocked by the lack of internal and regional/international political consensus. Turkey currently holds a favored position in Syria, while Israel has achieved one of its strategic goals—ensuring Syria poses no military threat in an Israel–Arab world conflict for at least the next 10–15 years. 

The Syrian war serves as a case study for analyzing hybrid wars, state collapse, and the destructive geopolitics of external interventions.

Ukraine (2014–2025)

The conflict in Ukraine is the largest and most complex conventional war in Europe since 1945. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 marked the start of a new era of confrontations in Europe. The Donbas conflict escalated in February 2022 into a full-scale Russian invasion. The war has prompted unprecedented NATO and EU support for Ukraine through military, economic, and humanitarian aid. 

More than three years into the conflict, it is necessary to move beyond the emotional clichés of its early days, some still used today, and recognize that the war in Ukraine stems from the cumulative effects of the following main causes: the poorly managed post-Cold War geopolitical process; Ukraine’s strategic ambivalence, used as a pretext by Moscow; Russian revanchism and its desire to rebuild a sphere of influence; and the weakening of the international security architecture amid the erosion of international legal principles. 

By 2025, the conflict continues with fluctuating frontlines, significant human losses, and a persistent risk of regional or global escalation. Promises made by U.S. President Donald Trump before and after the U.S. presidential election have proven more aspirational than tangible. In mid-July, he set a new 50-day deadline for Russia (until mid-September 2025) to accept a ceasefire agreement, threatening 100% tariffs on Russian imports and secondary sanctions on countries continuing to buy Russian oil. Additionally, Trump announced an agreement with NATO for European allies to fund and supply advanced equipment (including Patriot systems) to Ukraine, while the U.S. remains the primary supplier but avoids bearing the costs alone.

Distinct Features of the Conflict 

Phases: 

  – 2014–2021: Hybrid and low-intensity conflict in Donbas and Crimea’s annexation. 

  – 2022–2023: Large-scale conventional Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

  – 2024–2025: Partial frontline stabilization, transitioning to a war of attrition. 

Territorial and Strategic Dimensions: 

  – A front stretching over 1,000 km. 

  – Intense urban combat (Mariupol, Bakhmut, Avdiivka). 

  – Long-range strikes and massive air attacks (drones, hypersonic missiles, artillery). 

Indirect NATO Involvement

  – Military, economic, and intelligence support for Ukraine (including HIMARS, F-16s, ATACMS, STARLINK satellite network[7]). 

  – Participation through “technological proxies” (e.g., Western drones operated by Ukrainians). 

  – Training of over 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers in Europe and the U.S. 

Informational and Cyber Warfare: 

  – Intense propaganda on both sides; 

  – Massive disinformation campaigns, including deepfakes, targeting international public opinion; 

  – Cyber warfare (disrupting energy and communication infrastructures);

Possible Short-Term Developments (2025–2027) 

Scenario 1 – Extended Status Quo: The front stabilizes along the Dnieper–Donetsk–Crimea line; a prolonged positional war with stalled negotiations and cyclical resumptions of hostilities. 

Scenario 2 – Forced Armistice and Frozen Conflict: An implicit international agreement (Korean model); Ukraine remains supported by NATO without formal membership but with bilateral security guarantees. 

Scenario 3 – Conflict Expansion (Low but Existing Risk): A major incident in the Black Sea, Transnistria, or Belarus; unintentional escalation between Russia and NATO border states. 

The Ukraine conflict reflects the transition from a post-bipolar world to an evolving multipolar order. It combines classic interstate confrontation with modern hybrid, informational, and economic warfare methods. Its outcome will not only be military but will redefine Europe’s security balance and the West’s influence on its eastern borders[8]. 

Romania, as a NATO border state, remains deeply strategically involved and must adapt its military doctrine and capabilities to new realities, prioritizing national interests while aligning with its EU and NATO membership.

Possible Developments by 2050

Scenario 1 – Ukraine Prevails (Most Optimistic): By 2030, Ukraine recovers most occupied territories and secures Western security guarantees. Over the next decade, it becomes an EU member and a strategic NATO ally, contributing to regional stability. By 2050, Ukraine is fully rebuilt and consolidated as a pillar of the Euro-Atlantic order, while Russia’s global influence significantly erodes, though it retains Crimea. 

Scenario 2 – Russia Prevails (Possible)

 By 2030, Russia maintains control over Crimea and southeastern Ukraine, forcing Kyiv to accept neutrality due to a regime change to a more Russia-compliant government. Ukraine remains divided and under constant pressure, while Moscow seeks to expand its influence in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. By 2050, a new power balance dominated by Russia and China reshapes the Black Sea to Central Asia region, with NATO in a defensive posture. 

Scenario 3 – Frozen Conflict, No Clear Winner (Most Likely)

 The war stabilizes within 2–3 years without a clear political solution. Frontlines become permanent, with an unofficial armistice and sporadic clashes. Ukraine remains partially occupied but strengthens ties with the West. By 2050, the conflict becomes “Europe’s new Korea,” with regional stability depending on NATO and EU support for a partially integrated but perpetually pressured Ukraine. 

General Conclusion 2025–2050 

The Ukraine conflict is more than a military confrontation—it represents the fault line between two geopolitical models: Russian neo-imperial authoritarianism and the Euro-Atlantic model. It is also a platform for global polarization and, while not formally a “world war,” the direct and indirect involvement of major global powers makes it a systemic conflict with profound effects on the international order. Its outcome will decisively shape Europe’s security architecture for decades to come. 

Romania, in close proximity, must take an active role in projecting regional stability, strengthening its defense capabilities, attracting reconstruction investments, and bolstering informational and digital defense.

Yemen (2015–Present)

The Yemen conflict has become a textbook example of a proxy war. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates intervened to support the internationally recognized government, while Houthi rebels are logistically and militarily backed by Iran. Airstrikes, maritime blockades, and the resulting humanitarian crisis have caused one of the worst humanitarian tragedies of the 21st century.

Israel–Iran (2022–2025) 

The latent conflict between Israel and Iran escalated into a regional war with global implications between 2022 and 2025. After years of tensions and covert actions, 2025 marked a turning point. Israel launched massive strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, followed by ballistic missile and drone retaliations from Iran. The U.S. supported Israel, including through direct strikes on key Iranian nuclear program targets, escalating the conflict into a high-intensity conflagration. Although a fragile U.S.-mediated armistice was achieved in June 2025, tensions persist, and a new wave of hostilities remains possible.

Distinct Features of the Conflict

The Israel–Iran conflict is not a conventional direct war but a prolonged strategic confrontation with regional and global ramifications, unfolding across nuclear[9], military, informational, cyber, and religious-ideological domains. 

Key Characteristics: 

  Asymmetric and Indirect Conflict: Iran avoids direct confrontation with Israel, acting through proxies: Hezbollah (Lebanon), Islamic Jihad and Hamas (Gaza), Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, and Houthi rebels (Yemen). 

Ideological Dimension[10]: Iran’s theocratic regime views Israel as an “illegitimate state” and “enemy of Islam,” while Israel sees Iran’s regime as an existential threat. 

Supra-Regional Impact: The conflict affects the entire Middle East, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, and global power relations. 

Conclusions for 2025

The Israel–Iran confrontation entered an open military phase in 2025, surpassing the traditional threshold of clandestine operations and proxy warfare. The direct exchange of strikes—drones, ballistic missiles, and airstrikes—between the two states marked a strategic turning point in the Middle East. This escalation resulted from the acceleration of Iran’s nuclear program and Israel’s decision to implement an extended preemptive strike doctrine in coordination with the U.S. 

The combined U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025[11] marked a historic shift in their deterrence dynamics. The operation—unprecedented in scale since 1981—targeted underground uranium enrichment facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, as well as military infrastructure linked to the Revolutionary Guards. While it caused significant damage to Iran’s nuclear program, it did not eliminate it entirely. Iran’s response—coordinated across multiple fronts, including attacks on U.S. bases in the Gulf and ballistic missile strikes on Israeli territory—demonstrated its ability to wage a simultaneous regional war with integrated conventional and asymmetric components. 

Despite the severity of the U.S.-Israeli attack and Iran’s retaliation, the conflict did not escalate into a broader regional war but remained geographically and operationally limited. Strikes occurred in short, intense waves targeting Iran’s strategic infrastructure, proxy bases, and select symbolic targets in Israel. 

– Hezbollah launched limited rocket salvos from southern Lebanon without triggering a major offensive. 

– Houthis attacked commercial vessels in the Red Sea within a known framework, without large-scale expansion. 

– Iran employed cyberattacks and drones against Israeli targets but refrained from ground forces or strategic ballistic missile strikes. 

This mutual restraint indicates both sides aim to avoid total war, preferring a “demonstrative conflict” with limited objectives: destroying nuclear capabilities (Israel) and reaffirming deterrence (Iran). 

In the medium term (2025–2035), the conflict risks becoming a regional war of attrition with periodic escalations and brief armistices. A ceasefire mediated by the UN, Russia, China, or Turkey is possible but will not address the root cause: Iran’s nuclear program and the lack of mutual recognition. 

For NATO and Romania, the open Israel–Iran conflict has multiple implications: 

– Increased risks to energy security and oil and gas supplies from the Gulf. 

– Potential escalation in the broader Mediterranean and Black Sea theater, given Russia’s presence in Syria and the Iran–Russia strategic connection. 

– The need to recalibrate strategic posture in the Middle East, including intelligence efforts to counter proxy networks and arms/technology flows. 

Final Conclusion

The Iran–Israel conflict will not be resolved militarily, diplomatically, or ideologically by 2050 but will become manageable and partially predictable within a mutual deterrence framework. It will decisively influence: 

– The regional power balance, 

– Global energy security, 

– The configuration of alliances in the broader Middle East. 

The conflict between Israel and Iran has not been resolved militarily and does not appear to be diplomatically solvable by 2050[12]. It remains a structural confrontation, unfolding on multiple fronts – nuclear, cyber, ideological, and regional – with a constant risk of escalation. In the absence of a new security framework in the Middle East, the Israel–Iran relationship will continue to represent the most unstable strategic point of the post-bipolar world.

Gaza Conflict (2022–July 2025) 

Introduction: Between Stagnation and Implosion – Gaza Before the Major Shock 

Between 2022 and 2023, the Gaza Strip[13] remained one of the Middle East’s most volatile flashpoints, caught in an unstable balance between a de facto armistice and latent tensions. Governed by Hamas since 2007, Gaza faced an air, sea, and land blockade by Israel and Egypt, leading to severe humanitarian and economic crises. Despite successive mediations by Egypt and Qatar, the structural conflict between Israel and Hamas was not resolved, only postponed. 

Internally, Hamas consolidated its quasi-state role, managing local administration and an underground military infrastructure—tunnels, weapons factories, and command centers—while discreetly building military capabilities. Meanwhile, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other radical groups grew in influence, pressuring Hamas for more aggressive actions. 

In Israel, internal political tensions, the rise of right-wing governments, and religious provocations in Jerusalem (particularly at the Al-Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount) fueled polarization. Israeli police interventions at Al-Aqsa, access restrictions, and settlement expansion in the West Bank were perceived in Gaza and the Muslim world as provocative and desecrating acts. 

Regionally, Iran and Hezbollah intensified support for Palestinian factions, while Arab states that signed the Abraham Accords (e.g., UAE, Bahrain) refrained from direct criticism but faced domestic pressure. 

In this context, Gaza became a powder keg[14]: an enclave gripped by extreme poverty, ideological radicalization, and geostrategic tensions. Without a negotiated solution and with a young generation growing up in despair, violence seemed inevitable. A false stability in 2022 and early 2023, sustained by Qatari financial transfers and limited Israeli operations, collapsed with the October 7, 2023 attack.

2. The October 7, 2023 Attack and Israel’s Offensive in Gaza

Triggering an Unprecedented Conflict 

2.1. Hamas’s Attack – Strategic Surprise, Psychological Shock 

On October 7, 2023, during the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah, Hamas launched a massive[15], well-coordinated, and unprecedented attack on southern Israel, combining: 

– Intense rocket barrages (over 3,000 launched in the first hours). 

– Ground incursions by hundreds of fighters breaching the security fence. 

– Drone attacks disabling Israeli surveillance and communication systems. 

– Assaults on military outposts and civilian communities (Sderot, Be’eri, Nir Oz, Kfar Aza, etc.). 

Immediate Results: 

– Over 1,200 Israelis killed, mostly civilians. 

– Approximately 250 people abducted and taken to Gaza. 

– Initial paralysis of Israel’s response system (IDF and intelligence services). 

This was the deadliest attack on Israeli soil in the state’s history, comparable in psychological impact to 9/11 in the U.S. Israeli society was deeply shocked, and the government declared a state of war.

2.2. Israel’s Response – Massive Retaliation and Total Offensive 

In the first phase, the IDF launched thousands of airstrikes on Gaza, destroying parts of Hamas’s infrastructure and imposing a total blockade, cutting off electricity, water, and fuel supplies. In the second phase, by the end of 2023, Israel initiated a ground offensive, gaining control over significant parts of northern and central Gaza. The third phase involved prolonged clearing and occupation operations with a permanent military presence in several sectors. Clashes decreased in intensity in the first half of 2025 but have not ended. Currently, Gaza is de facto divided into three zones: the North, under Israeli military control; the Center, an unstable buffer zone with limited IDF presence; and the South (Rafah–Khan Younis), semi-autonomous, dominated by dispersed Hamas cells.

2.3. Socio-Economic Impact 

According to Gaza’s Ministry of Health, 56,000–58,000 Palestinians were killed (including 17,000 children and 9,000 women), with over 132,000 injured. The cost of destroyed critical infrastructure is estimated at $18.5 billion. Debris from destroyed infrastructure is estimated at 40–50 million tons, with waste collection costing $500–600 million. 

Unemployment stands at 45–50% overall, exceeding 70% among those under 30. Eighty percent of the population depends on external humanitarian aid from UNRWA, the UN, Qatar, Egypt, and the EU. 

The total estimated reconstruction cost over the next 10 years is approximately $53 billion, with $20 billion needed in the first three years.

Interim Conclusion: Regional Isolation and International Division

– The Gaza conflict has solidified an anti-Israel regional alignment (Iran, Turkey, Qatar) but lacks military cohesion. 

– Israel retains support from the U.S., UK, and Germany but at significant diplomatic costs. 

– The lack of global consensus and failed mediation efforts indicate that Gaza has become not only a humanitarian crisis but also a global geopolitical fault line.

General Conclusion 

The Gaza conflict from 2022 to July 2025 represents one of the most severe military, humanitarian, and political crises in the Middle East in recent decades. It transcended a classic confrontation, evolving into an asymmetric conflict with regional and global implications. 

While Israel achieved significant tactical successes—destroying Hamas’s infrastructure, eliminating leaders, and regaining military control over parts of Gaza—it failed to meet its stated strategic objective: the complete elimination of Hamas and the establishment of lasting security. Instead, it faced significant human, diplomatic, and moral costs, leading to some international isolation and increased domestic pressures. 

Hamas, though severely weakened militarily, has not been defeated ideologically. It has mobilized sympathy among parts of the Palestinian population and the Muslim world, despite catastrophic losses. The group has been weakened as a governing force but survives as an insurgent actor and symbol of resistance. 

In July 2025, Gaza remains a devastated region without functional governance, reconstruction, or a clear political horizon. Relevant international actors (U.S., Egypt, Qatar, UN) have failed to impose a transitional solution. The situation leans toward a frozen conflict with chronic instability and the risk of renewed major clashes in the near future. 

In essence, this conflict has highlighted: 

– The limits of military superiority in a war with strong ideological and social dimensions. 

– The crisis of representation in the Palestinian camp, where neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority offers a credible alternative. 

– The international community’s inability to manage recurring conflicts in a region under systemic tensions. 

The Gaza war (2023–2025) marks a new stage of dangerous uncertainty, with reconstruction, reconciliation, and a political solution further away than ever.

Sahel and Horn of Africa Conflicts

The Sahel and Horn of Africa have become epicenters of instability due to weak states, demographic pressures, religious extremism, and climate change. Terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and Boko Haram exploit the security vacuum. France and other Western states have intervened militarily, but with limited success. Mass migration and humanitarian crises have direct consequences for Europe.

Asia-Pacific – Persistent Tensions 

This region has seen: the India–Pakistan rivalry in Kashmir, North Korea’s nuclear threats, and escalating tensions between China and Taiwan. The militarization of the region, strengthening of alliances, and naval competition in the South China Sea indicate a potential escalation in the coming decades.

2. Typologies of Contemporary Conflicts 

The conflicts from 2000 to 2025 have highlighted new patterns: 

– Hybrid Conflicts: Combining conventional, subversive, economic, and informational means (Russia–Ukraine, China–Taiwan). 

– Proxy Wars: Syria, Yemen, Libya, reflecting global geopolitical rivalries. 

– Cyber Warfare: Attacks on critical infrastructure (electricity, hospitals, defense systems). 

– Informational Warfare: Manipulating public opinion, destabilizing through fake news, social media, and propaganda.

3. Predictions for 2050 – Potential Conflict Hotspots 

 a. High-Risk Zones: 

– Taiwan and the South China Sea: Risk of direct China–U.S. confrontation. 

– Iran–Israel: Potential resumption of hostilities. 

– Gaza Strip and West Bank: Possible new conflicts between Israel and Palestinian groups. 

– Western Balkans: Kosovo–Serbia tensions could reignite. 

– North Africa and Extended Sahel: State collapses, migration, extremism. 

– Arctic: Competition for resources among Russia, U.S., Canada, Norway. 

b. Drivers of Future Conflicts: 

– Resource crises: Water, energy, food. 

– Climate change: Natural disasters, mass migrations, desertification. 

– Radicalization and extremist ideologies. 

– Emerging technologies: Military AI, autonomous drones, hypersonic weapons.

4. Conclusions on Major Military Conflicts 2000–2025. Predictions for 2050 

The period from 2000 to 2025 marked a profound redefinition of global conflict dynamics. The world transitioned from a post-bipolar system marked by hopes of stability and international cooperation to an uncertain multipolar era characterized by chronic instability, strategic competition, and a resurgence of armed confrontations.

a. Shifting Conflict Paradigms 

Classic military conflict (state vs. state) has been replaced or complemented by more complex forms: 

– Hybrid conflicts blurring the line between peace and war (e.g., Ukraine). 

– Proxy wars as expressions of global great-power competition (e.g., Syria, Yemen). 

– Informational and cyber warfare playing a major role in shaping perceptions and destabilizing regimes. 

– Urbanized and mediatized conflicts targeting population morale, international image, and critical infrastructure. 

– The revival of ideological and religious conflicts fought in the name of identity, not territory.

b. Major Trends Identified (2000–2025) 

– The decline of unilateral U.S. hegemony: From post-9/11 dominance to the chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal. 

– The rise of strategic revisionism: Russia in Ukraine, Iran in the Middle East, China in the Asia-Pacific. 

– The failure of Western state-building interventions: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya. 

– The fragmentation of the international order, with a weakened UN, lack of global consensus on security norms, and frequent violations of international law. 

– The growing power of non-state actors (Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, Daesh, local militias, and private military companies like Wagner, Blackwater, or other entities contracted by states or corporations for combat, protection, or strategic influence) and the consolidation of transnational networks.

c. Consequences for Global Security Architecture

– A disconnect between international law and strategic reality. 

– Erosion of non-proliferation and arms control regimes (nuclear, ballistic, AI). 

– Vulnerability of critical infrastructure as a new battlefront (cyber, energy, communications). 

– Politicization of humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction, hindering sustainable recovery. 

– The generalization of “no-winner” conflicts with massive human and reputational losses.

d. Romania – In an Increasingly Unpredictable Security Environment

– Romania’s position as a NATO and EU border state places it near at least two major flashpoints: Ukraine and the broader Middle East. 

– Adapting its defense doctrine to hybrid and non-conventional operations is necessary. 

– Romania must become a regional security exporter through enhanced capabilities, interoperability, digitalization, and improved civil protection. 

– Strengthening national resilience against propaganda, cyberattacks, and uncontrolled migration is imperative. 

– Consolidating strategic partnerships, particularly with the U.S., Poland, France, and Turkey, is essential in a multipolar environment.

5. Looking Toward 2050 – An Uncertain but Manageable Future

Future conflicts will not only be military but also eco-geopolitical, technological, and ideological. Control over resources, identity protection, and the technological race will define the nature of confrontations. 

In this context: 

– Prevention, adaptation, and deterrence capabilities will outweigh brute military superiority, though the latter will remain critical for achieving political objectives; 

– Flexible alliances and multilateral strategies will replace rigid Cold War-style blocs; 

– Romania, to safeguard its sovereignty and prosperity, must become an active, anticipatory, and coherent actor regionally and internationally.

III. GEOPOLITICS OF RESOURCES AND GLOBAL RIVALRIES IN THE FIELD

In today’s global economy, natural resources are a double-edged sword: they offer the potential for prosperity, but also create chains of dependency that can be exploited geopolitically. From Middle Eastern oil to rare earths in Asia and Africa, and gas reserves in Eurasia, nations no longer fight only to possess resources, but also to avoid becoming prisoners of others.

The 21st century reaffirms a fundamental historical reality: natural resources are not merely economic factors, but also major geopolitical instruments. From energy and water to rare raw materials and arable land, the global competition for access, control, and use has become increasingly intense, sophisticated, and conflict-prone.

The dynamics of resource control reflect and amplify the redistribution of power on a global scale. Nations no longer compete solely for markets and alliances, but also for what lies beneath their soil, in their river basins, or offshore in contested maritime zones. Resources are increasingly used as tools of pressure, levers of influence, and even triggers for military or commercial conflicts.

In the context of accelerating climate change, global population growth, and the depletion of traditional resources, we are witnessing a redefinition of the resource paradigm: it is no longer only about quantity, but also about accessibility, supply chain security, technological control, and legal regimes.

Behind major international tensions — whether through open conflict or economic “cold wars” — lie often unseen but decisive stakes: oil fields, lithium deposits, strategic maritime routes, or underground aquifers.

Thus, the geopolitics of resources can no longer be separated from the geopolitics of power. Global actors — be they states, alliances, or transnational consortia — are recalibrating their strategies based on their ability to ensure secure, stable, and sustainable access to key resources. This new form of competition is shaping alliances, redefining priorities, and outlining new centers of influence.

1. Energy – Geopolitical Dimensions and Emerging Rivalries

Energy remains a key driver in current and future geopolitical rivalries, shaping the relationships between major global and regional actors. In the context of the war in Ukraine, Europe’s dependency on Russian gas has prompted the European Union to accelerate the diversification of supply sources and the development of LNG[16] (liquefied natural gas) infrastructure.

This transformation has significant geopolitical implications:

• The United States and Qatar are becoming the main LNG suppliers for Europe, reinforcing the transatlantic link and increasing American strategic influence over the continent;

• Russia is seeking new markets, particularly in China and India, as part of a strategic reorientation toward Asia;

• The Middle East, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, is diversifying its energy portfolio, aiming for a controlled transition to renewable energy and future exports of green hydrogen.

Recent crises — such as the conflict in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Iran and Venezuela — have demonstrated that energy can be wielded as a political weapon, a bargaining chip, or a means of coercion.

Organizations like OPEC+ (where Russia cooperates with Gulf states) have regained strategic importance, influencing global prices through coordinated decisions, while the United States has leveraged its position as the leading LNG exporter to counterbalance Russian influence in Europe.

This geopolitical fragmentation of the energy market signals a shift toward a “regionalization” of supply and the dismantling of the old integrated global order, in favor of distinct strategic energy ecosystems — each with its own rules, currencies, and security infrastructure.

Geopolitical Rivalries in the Field of Resources

Access to rare[17] and strategic energy resources — not only traditional ones like oil and gas — is generating new lines of tension:

• The United States and China are competing for control over supply chains of critical materials essential to the global energy transition.
• Africa is emerging as a key battleground among major powers seeking access to vital mineral resources, alongside competition over energy infrastructure (dam projects, offshore gas exploitation).
• The deep seas — including the Arctic, the South China Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean — are attracting increased interest from global actors due to their potential hydrocarbon reserves.

Outlook

• Over the next two decades, the global energy mix will be characterized by the coexistence of hydrocarbons with the accelerated development of renewable sources and nuclear energy.
• Hydrogen[18] (both green and blue) is increasingly viewed as a strategic resource, with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Japan leading pilot initiatives.
• Romania could capitalize on its geographic position and available resources to become a regional energy hub, provided it accelerates investment in modern energy infrastructure and technologies.

Romania’s Energy Potential: From Strategic Position to Regional Hub

Romania holds a set of geographic, natural, and infrastructural advantages that, if properly leveraged, could transform the country into a regional energy hub in Central and Southeastern Europe. However, this potential remains contingent on accelerating investments in energy infrastructure and the adoption of advanced technologies.

From a geographical standpoint, Romania is positioned at the crossroads of major energy transit routes:

• It has direct access to the Black Sea, a gateway for offshore resources and international LNG supply routes;
• It lies at the intersection of EU energy corridors (notably BRUA – Bulgaria–Romania–Hungary–Austria pipeline);
• It borders both the Balkans and Ukraine, making it a natural interface between Eastern supply and Western demand.

In terms of resources, Romania benefits from:

• Significant gas reserves, both onshore and offshore (notably in the Neptun Deep project), with the potential to reduce regional dependence on Russian imports;
• Nuclear energy capacity, already operational (Cernavodă), with future expansion plans that could ensure low-carbon baseload supply;
• Favorable conditions for renewable energy (wind in Dobrogea, solar in the south, hydropower[19]), offering a diversified and sustainable energy mix.

Despite these strengths, Romania must overcome several structural obstacles to consolidate its regional role:

• Modernization of energy infrastructure, including interconnectors, storage facilities, and smart grid integration;
• Streamlining regulatory frameworks to attract foreign and domestic investment in energy projects;
• Encouraging innovation and industrial capacity in hydrogen, battery storage, and digitalization of the energy system.

If these priorities are addressed in a coherent strategy, Romania could:

• Export energy and technological expertise to neighboring states;
• Attract investment and play a decisive role in European energy security;
• Assert itself as a pillar of regional stability and sustainability in a fragmented geopolitical environment.

Geopolitical rivalries in the energy sector in Romania’s region, horizon 2025–2050

Between 2025 and 2050, the broader region surrounding Romania is expected to become a hotspot of intensifying geopolitical rivalries in the energy sector, driven by the reconfiguration of European energy flows and the progressive decoupling from Russian resources. The Black Sea will gain increased strategic importance, both as a source of offshore energy resources and as a transit corridor for natural gas originating from the Caspian region and the Middle East. Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey will compete — yet also cooperate — to become regional energy hubs, within a complex framework where the interests of the EU, the United States, Russia, and China will intersect.

At the same time, regional initiatives such as the Three Seas Initiative and cross-border interconnection projects will create new opportunities, but also potential risks of fragmentation, depending on the divergent interests of the actors involved. Access to EU funding for green energy will generate indirect competition among the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe, while dependency on non-European technologies (particularly Chinese and American) in areas such as hydrogen, battery systems, and smart grids will open new fronts in the ongoing geopolitical competition.

Austria’s Control Over Romania’s Oil and Gas Reserves

Over the past two decades, Austria, through the company OMV, has gained significant control over Romania’s oil and natural gas resources, particularly through the acquisition of the national company Petrom in 2004. This move effectively transferred strategic decision-making regarding exploitation, investment, and exports in the energy sector to an external actor, whose corporate agenda is aligned with Austria’s national interests and those of its international shareholders.

The main consequences include:

• Reduced control by the Romanian state over a strategic sector, with direct implications for national energy security;
• Externalization of profits and the loss of a significant share of the added value[20] generated within the domestic energy sector;
• Indirect political influence exerted by Vienna over decisions related to energy infrastructure and the orientation of regional energy flows (e.g. delays in strategic projects or opposition to the eastward expansion of European energy networks).

Although OMV Petrom has made substantial investments in modernization and exploration — including in the offshore sector — the strategic dependence on an external actor raises essential questions about Romania’s energy sovereignty and its ability to defend its long-term interests in an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment.

2. Water Resources – The Strategic Resource of the Future

In a world under the pressure of climate change, population growth, and accelerated urbanization, freshwater is becoming one of the most critical and contested resources of the 21st century. Although it does not receive the same media attention as oil or gas, lack of access to clean water is already a major cause of instability in numerous regions around the globe.

Hydropolitics – The New Face of Regional Conflicts

An increasing number of states are shaping their foreign and security strategies around access to and control over freshwater sources, particularly transboundary surface waters. Rivers such as the Nile, Tigris–Euphrates, Mekong, Indus, and Jordan have become axes of rivalry among riparian states, while the construction of dams and water diversions generates diplomatic tensions and latent threats of armed conflict.

In East Africa, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt are competing for control over the Blue Nile and the completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. In South Asia, India and Pakistan struggle to manage the hydrological regime of the Indus basin, with direct implications for agriculture and energy.

Groundwater and Aquifers – The Invisible Conflict

Beyond surface waters, underground aquifers—many of them transboundary and difficult to replenish—are becoming an unseen but vital strategic resource. The absence of clear international regulations in this domain enables unilateral and often unregulated exploitation, which may lead to the depletion of reserves and the degradation of water quality.

Privatization and Geopoliticization of Water

Access to drinking water is defined by the UN as a fundamental human right, but in practice, many water sources and distribution networks are owned or controlled by multinational corporations. In some regions, the protection of corporate interests has led to the exclusion of local communities from their own water resources, triggering protests and social unrest.

Thus, water becomes not only a physical resource but also a vector of economic and geopolitical power, with potential implications comparable to those of energy resources.

Romania and Water Resources – An Underutilized Strategic Potential

Romania benefits from a dense hydrographic network, an extensive river system, and significant aquifers, placing it among the European countries with a relatively high level of water availability. The Danube, inland rivers, natural and man-made lakes, as well as underground waters offer a strategic potential for population supply, agriculture, industry, and energy (hydropower).

Nevertheless, poor resource management, distribution network losses, pollution of watercourses, and lack of investment in storage and treatment infrastructure limit the efficient use of this advantage. In the context of future regional tensions over water, Romania has the opportunity to become a pole of stability and cooperation, but only if it strengthens its policies for the protection and sustainable use of water resources.In conclusion, water remains a strategic resource for Romania[21], of major importance for food, energy, and economic security. Sustainable water resource management and the modernization of irrigation and hydropower infrastructure are essential for transforming this resource into a geopolitical asset, in a global context marked by rising water deficits and intensified competition for this vital resource.

 3. Food and Food Security in a Geopolitical Context

In the first half of the 21st century, food security has become a key dimension of international stability, positioned at the intersection of agriculture, global trade, climate change, and strategic interests. Access to food, control over supply chains, and dominance of agri-food markets are increasingly used as tools of geopolitical pressure.

From Famine to Geopolitical Weapon

Recent crises — the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and prolonged droughts — have shown that food is no longer just a commodity, but a critical and manipulable resource. The blocking of grain exports, embargoes on fertilizers, or financial speculation on agricultural products can trigger instability, migration, and regional conflict.

Powers such as Russia, China, and the United States use their agricultural capacities as instruments of influence — either through targeted exports or by conditioning access to essential inputs (e.g., fertilizers, seeds, technologies).

Concentrations and Dependencies in the Global Food System

Only a handful of countries — the U.S., Brazil, Russia, China, India, and Argentina — dominate the global production and export of grains, oilseeds, and meat. At the same time, multinational corporations such as Cargill, ADM, Bayer, Syngenta, and John Deere control a large share of the production, processing, and distribution chains in agri-food.

This concentration of control creates structural vulnerabilities for importing countries and weakens the ability of smaller states to maintain food sovereignty.

Food as a Vector of Regional Stability or Destabilization

Lack of access to food or a sudden spike in food prices can lead to social unrest, economic collapse, and political conflict. The so-called “food riots” have preceded numerous episodes of instability (e.g., the Arab Spring). In Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, food security remains a critical factor in governance and national survival.

Romania – Strategic Agricultural Potential[22], Yet Underutilized

Romania possesses one of the largest agricultural potentials in the European Union: fertile land, a relatively favorable climate, water resources, and a strong tradition in crop and livestock production. However, a large part of the arable land is owned by foreign investors[23], and production is highly dependent on external inputs (seeds, fertilizers, mechanization).

Romania remains largely an exporter of raw agricultural products and an importer of processed goods, losing added value and food autonomy. Furthermore, the lack of storage, irrigation, and processing infrastructure, combined with fragmented agricultural policies, limits the state’s ability to respond effectively to major food crises.

Outlook 2025–2050

Amid climate change, intensifying competition for fertile land, and recurring geopolitical crises, food security will become a major criterion of national sovereignty. Countries that can produce, process, and distribute food at both national and regional levels will gain a significant strategic advantage. Romania could play a key role in Southeastern Europe, but only under the condition of adopting an integrated, visionary, and sovereign agricultural policy.

Conclusion – Natural Resources as Instruments of Power in the 21st Century

In the first half of the 21st century, the geopolitics of resources has emerged as one of the most dynamic and conflict-prone dimensions of the international landscape. Energy, water, and food—vital resources for any nation—are no longer merely economic goods, but strategic levers of influence, pressure, or domination. In a global context marked by instability, technological transitions, and accelerated climate change, control over these resources increasingly equates to a decisive geopolitical advantage.

Transformations in the energy sector, driven by the shift toward cleaner sources and the need to reduce dependency on unstable actors, have profoundly reshaped international relations. At the same time, freshwater—though less visible in public discourse—has become a contested and increasingly politicized resource, with direct impacts on regional security in many parts of the world. Food, closely intertwined with both energy and water, has turned into a geopolitical vector, affecting social stability and political cohesion in numerous states.

Romania holds a rare position in this equation: it possesses significant resources in all three domains—energy, water, and agriculture—as well as a favorable geostrategic location. However, this position is currently more potential than actualized. External dependencies, insufficient investments, foreign control over strategic assets, and the lack of an integrated vision significantly limit the Romanian state’s capacity to turn these advantages into regional influence and lasting national security.

For Romania to become a relevant geopolitical actor in the region, it is essential to adopt coherent policies for the protection and strategic use of its own resources, supported by smart investments, balanced strategic partnerships, and competent governance. Without such efforts, even the richest resources risk becoming sources of vulnerability rather than power.

IV. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN GLOBALISM AND SOVEREIGNISM

“What some call globalization, others experience as a loss of identity. Between openness to the world and the preservation of sovereignty, balance becomes the central struggle of the 21st century.”
— adapted from ideas by Samuel Huntington

In the early decades of the 21st century, the world is witnessing a deep ideological and political confrontation between two paradigms: globalism and sovereignism. This tension transcends doctrinal boundaries and takes on a major geopolitical dimension, affecting the international balance of power, the cohesion of states, and the legitimacy of global institutions.

Globalism, initially promoted as an extension of economic and political liberalism, advocates for the integration of states into an international order based on economic interdependence, multilateral rules, and the reduction of national barriers in favor of global cooperation. It has been the driving force behind trade liberalization, the expansion of transnational organizations (such as the EU, UN, IMF, WTO), and the assertion of universal norms concerning human rights, free markets, and global governance. In reality, however, this project has often been monopolized by major financial centers and transnational corporations, which have imposed an agenda favorable to globalized capital, to the detriment of the national states’ decision-making autonomy.

On the other hand, sovereignism revives the idea of the nation-state as the legitimate space for political decision-making, for protecting citizens’ interests, and for defending collective identity. It is a reaction to the perception that globalism has created an elite disconnected from real societies—an elite that decides the fate of millions without being democratically accountable to them. Sovereignist movements claim the right of peoples to control their borders, economic policies, natural resources, culture, and national security.

This conflict is not merely theoretical; it shapes strategic decisions, international alliances, and even geopolitical configurations. It influences the policies of major powers, redefines popular movements, fuels internal polarization in democracies, and questions the legitimacy of the post-1990 world order.

In many countries, including Romania, this conflict translates into practical dilemmas: How much autonomy can a state retain as a member of complex international structures? How much real sovereignty remains in a system dominated by global markets and borderless corporations? Can the need for international cooperation be reconciled with the defense of national interest?

1. Globalism – Concept, Stages, Dominant Interests

Globalism is a complex and often controversial concept, designating the progressive integration of economies, societies, institutions, and cultures into a global network of interdependence. Unlike globalization—a process with technical, economic, and social implications—globalism can be understood as the ideology that supports and promotes the extension of these processes beyond national borders, with the goal of achieving a unified world order.

The origins of modern globalism can be traced back to the post-war period, when, after World War II, there arose the need for economic reconstruction as well as the prevention of future large-scale conflicts. The Bretton Woods Agreements (1944), the creation of the IMF and the World Bank, and the establishment of the United Nations marked the beginning of an early stage of globalism, dominated by a Western core interested in maintaining peace through economic integration and institutionalized cooperation.

The second stage, between the 1970s and 1990s, was characterized by the liberalization of financial markets, the development of global trade networks, and the rise of major transnational corporations. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, globalism entered a phase of accelerated expansion, driven by what came to be known as the triumph of neoliberal ideologies—namely, the affirmation of the free market as the central organizing mechanism of society, the reduction of the national state’s role, large-scale privatizations, and deregulation in favor of internationally mobile capital. However, in parallel with this economic orientation, an ideologically different trend began to emerge—rooted in post-Marxist currents—which gradually gained influence in universities, media institutions, and international organizations.

This ideological component—often described as cultural neo-Marxism[24]—promoted a radical reevaluation of the traditional values of Western civilization. Under the pretext of equality and inclusion, emphasis shifted from the rights of majorities to an almost exclusive focus on protecting ethnic, sexual, religious, or ideological minorities. This resulted in an overlap between economic globalism and an ideological discourse that seeks to challenge the pillars of classical civilization—family, nation, religion, merit—and replace them with new precepts, such as fluid identity, relativistic multiculturalism, deconstruction of authority, and the redefinition of morality outside collective norms.

The contemporary phase of globalism, beginning after 2000, is marked by sharp polarization. On the one hand, we see the consolidation of technological, financial, and informational interdependencies—symbolized by Big Tech, global payment systems, and cross-border labor markets. On the other hand, increasingly visible tensions and nationalist reactions are emerging, driven by the perception of lost sovereignty and the unfair distribution of globalization’s benefits.

The dominant interests behind globalism vary but converge around a central objective: maintaining and extending control over economic, informational, and cultural flows. The global elite—composed of multinational corporations, international financial institutions, Western political elites, and media conglomerates—pursues a regulatory framework that is flexible and favorable to transnational capital, as well as a standardization of norms that facilitates the expansion of the global market.

At the same time, globalism features a pronounced ideological component: the promotion of values considered universal—such as human rights, liberal democracy, environmental protection, and multiculturalism—which, in some cases, are instrumentalized to justify political or economic interventions in sovereign states. This tension between the promoted universalism and the cultural or political particularities of individual nations has become a focal point of contestation.

In conclusion, globalism is both an ideological construction and an architecture of interests that has profoundly shaped the world order in recent decades. Despite recent crises—pandemics, regional conflicts, geopolitical fragmentation—it continues to decisively influence the global economic and political architecture. However, it increasingly faces challenges from the rise of sovereignism and the strategic repositioning of major powers.

2. Sovereignism: Forms, Justifications, and Recent Dynamics

Sovereignism is a fundamental political doctrine of modernity, emerging well before globalist processes and rooted deeply in the conception of the nation-state as a legitimate form of political organization. Enshrined in the Westphalian tradition of sovereignty, it affirms the right of peoples to govern their own destiny without external interference, based on a social contract between citizens and national institutions.

Unlike extreme nationalism, sovereignism does not imply isolationism or hostility toward international cooperation; rather, it asserts that such cooperation must be voluntary, balanced, and compatible with democratic sovereignty. In this sense, sovereignism was not born as a reaction to globalism, but has been a constant in the modern political order—rediscovered and revalued in the face of new geopolitical and ideological challenges.

In recent decades, against the backdrop of expanding supranational institutions, transnational ideological and economic pressures, and the weakening of real democratic control, sovereignism has reemerged at the forefront of public debate as a form of resistance and reaffirmation of national rights. It advocates for the protection of decision-making autonomy, national resources, cultural identity, and social cohesion in the face of global homogenization trends.

The forms of sovereignism vary depending on geopolitical context and national historical experience. In Central and Eastern Europe, sovereignism expresses the need to defend post-communist national identity in the face of a Western model perceived as imposed and disconnected from local realities. In France and Italy, it manifests through movements that denounce the loss of monetary, economic, and cultural sovereignty within the European Union. In the United States, sovereignist currents take the form of strategic conservatism, focusing on border protection, reindustrialization, and reducing foreign dependence.

The justifications for sovereignism are multiple and coherent:

• Political: it reaffirms the principle of representativeness and challenges the transfer of authority to unelected or weakly accountable structures (such as the European Commission, IMF, or other international bodies);
• Economic: it advocates for maintaining control over strategic sectors, rejecting the dominance of transnational capital that dilutes national interest;
• Cultural: it defends national identity, language, religion, and civilizational continuity against relativism and destructuring globalist ideologies;
• Social: it calls for the protection of the social contract in the face of uncontrolled migration, pressure on public systems, and forced community transformations.

The recent dynamics of sovereignism have been accelerated by successive crises that exposed the vulnerabilities of global dependence: the 2008 financial crisis, the 2015 migration waves, the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis, and associated security risks. These moments have brought back to the center of debate the concept of strategic autonomy—not merely as an economic objective, but as an existential necessity for states seeking to survive in an unstable and multipolar international environment.

Today, sovereignism is asserting itself both at the governmental level (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and at certain times in Italy or Israel) and through political opposition, popular movements, or civic initiatives in an increasing number of countries.

In Romania, although still fragmented and often politicized, sovereignism expresses a deep current of discontent toward certain externally driven decisions perceived as imposed: market liberalization without real protections, the concession of natural resources, and social or cultural regulations lacking roots in local values.

In essence, sovereignism does not oppose the international order, but rather rejects an order constructed outside democratic consensus and in disregard of national specificity. It thus becomes a pillar of a new geopolitical vision—one that demands a rebalancing of the relationship between cooperation and autonomy, between openness and rootedness, between abstract universalism and concrete sovereignty.

Globalism and Sovereignism: Paradigms in Tension

Although seemingly complementary in certain respects, globalism and sovereignism have come to exist in a relationship of structural tension, generated by fundamentally different visions regarding international order, political legitimacy, and the role of the nation-state. While globalism advocates a fluid architecture of multilateral governance—in which borders become porous and decision-making is externalized to supranational institutions or transnational networks of influence—sovereignism reasserts the centrality of the people as the bearer of power and of the nation-state as the guarantor of the collective will.

The conflict between these two paradigms is not merely theoretical but also deeply practical, generating divergent views on key issues of the contemporary world: Who has the right to decide on behalf of a community? What is the legitimate relationship between the universal and the local? Is equity an abstract ideal or a cultural construct? The answers offered by the two doctrines are often incompatible, which helps explain the growing polarization within modern societies and the systemic deadlocks of international cooperation.

This paradigmatic rupture also explains why, over the past two decades, the global landscape has shifted from optimistic interdependence to normative rivalry[25]. Sovereignism is reemerging as a response to a globalization perceived not only as economic, but also as ideological and cultural—its affirmation taking place not only at the national level, but also through the reconfiguration of geopolitical alliances.

4. Plutocracy and Meritocracy – The Clash Between the Power of Wealth and the Legitimacy of Competence

Within the broader tension between globalism and sovereignism lies a profound fracture in the mechanisms of power selection and exercise: the confrontation between plutocracy—the domination of public decision-making by a capital elite—and meritocracy—the modern ideal that competence, effort, and performance should determine access to leadership and influence.

Plutocracy designates a system in which wealth—either directly or indirectly—becomes the main criterion for accessing power. Unlike classical oligarchy, modern global plutocracy does not limit itself to controlling the economy, but actively interferes in the decision-making processes of governments, international institutions, and public opinion through subtle mechanisms: campaign financing, media and digital platform control, and the shaping of global agendas through think tanks, foundations, and lobbying networks.

This transnational elite is often anonymous, opaque, and self-replicating, operating beyond the reach of the citizen and often in disregard of principles of transparency and democratic accountability. Multinational corporations, investment funds, global digital platforms, and even some philanthropic actors have become pillars of a new informal governance, in which strategic decisions no longer belong to elected institutions but to boards of directors and interest groups with their own agendas.

Corporate Plutocracy: Power Without Mandate

In recent decades, major transnational corporations have become de facto geopolitical actors, surpassing many national governments in both economic and symbolic influence. The market value of the ten largest companies in tech, energy, and finance is equivalent to the combined GDP of dozens of countries. These entities control informational flows (Big Tech), global supply chains, energy and resource markets, as well as financial and investment mechanisms.

This “corporate plutocracy” exerts an informal yet highly effective form of global governance without holding any democratic mandate. Through lobbying, campaign financing, public-private partnerships, and participation in international bodies (including advisory boards to the UN, OECD, or European Commission), corporations influence legislation, health, education, environmental, and digital policies—often to their own benefit.

In parallel, they frequently support progressive ideological agendas—such as forced energy transitions, speech regulation, or gender ideologies—which provide them with a moral and media shield against public scrutiny. Thus, corporate plutocracy presents itself as a “responsible actor” of the modern world, while promoting a logic of profit without accountability and a global value uniformity often at odds with the cultural or democratic realities of sovereign states.

In the absence of real political oversight and transparency mechanisms, this form of power risks becoming a transnational neo-aristocracy—deciding without being elected, influencing without being held accountable, and ideologically shielding itself while undermining the social contract.

In contrast, meritocracy is the principle that underpins democratic modernity. In administrative theory, education, science, and public service, merit has been conceived as the foundation of fair selection, institutional performance, and social equity. A meritocratic society is not elitist in the negative sense, but one that promotes excellence based on genuine competence and concrete contribution to the common good.

The fundamental problem that emerges today is that globalism tends to favor plutocracy: the transnational economy weakens the authority of states over their own social, fiscal, and educational policies, thereby undermining national merit-based selection systems. At the same time, globalist rhetoric about “equality,” “inclusion,” or “diversity” is often used to justify the redistribution of positions of power not in favor of the most competent, but of those ideologically aligned. Thus, meritocracy is devalued from two directions: from above, by plutocratic dominance; and from below, by the pressure of a forced egalitarianism that denies the value of performance-based differentiation.

In this context, access to strategic positions—in education, culture, administration, and media—is increasingly determined not by professional merit or demonstrable ability, but by affiliation with economic influence networks or dominant ideological currents. This reality creates a growing rift between rulers and the ruled, between elites and society, between decision and legitimacy.

The result is a crisis of trust: ordinary citizens no longer see themselves reflected in their leaders, perceived as the privileged few of a closed, inaccessible, and self-protecting system. In place of the authority of merit comes suspicion toward competence; in place of the aspiration to perform, resignation or revolt. This representational void is one of the key factors fueling the rise of sovereignist and populist movements—a reaction to an order perceived as illegitimate and unjust.

Thus, the conflict between plutocracy and meritocracy is not merely technical or social, but profoundly geopolitical: it determines who controls resources, who shapes public policy, and who sets the acceptable values of a society. If plutocracy succeeds in asserting itself without meritocratic or democratic counterbalances, the world risks drifting toward rule by a globalized financial aristocracy—detached from the needs and aspirations of the majority.

In the long run, restoring balance between these two models is essential for the survival of a functional and legitimate international order. Meritocracy is not a technocratic luxury, but a condition for social cohesion and political sustainability. Sovereignism, in its deeper sense, does not reject merit—it seeks to re-anchor it within a national, responsible, transparent, and equitable framework.

Conclusion

The conflict between globalism and sovereignism reflects not merely an ideological rupture, but a deeper dispute over the very architecture of the international order. Beyond political labels, it reveals a crisis of legitimacy: who decides, on whose behalf, and by what moral standard?

Neither technocratic globalism nor defensive sovereignism, in their current forms, offer a sustainable long-term model. The former has abdicated democratic accountability; the latter risks isolation if it fails to articulate constructive alternatives.

The challenge of our time is not to choose radically between the two, but to rebuild a functional equilibrium—where openness to the world does not exclude rooted identity, and where international cooperation does not negate national responsibility.

The future will belong to a new balance—between openness and autonomy, between interdependence and national responsibility, between cooperation and diversity—within a framework that recognizes pluralism as a geopolitical value, not an obstacle to be overcome.

General Conclusions

In a world marked by systemic instability, geopolitical fragmentation, and the acceleration of major economic and cultural transformations, this analysis offers a structured reading of the main global trends of the first quarter of the 21st century, with well-argued projections through to 2050. The complexity of contemporary realities demands moving beyond simplistic approaches and understanding international relations as the expression of a multipolar game in which resources, ideologies, technology, and informal power structures converge and compete simultaneously.

The first major conclusion is that the great geopolitical ruptures of the 21st century are not circumstantial, but structural. From the crisis of the liberal international order to the challenge of Western supremacy, from the return of conventional wars to the explosion of hybrid conflicts, all point to the end of the unipolar American-led era and the shift toward a more fluid but unpredictable global architecture. The emergence of alternative poles of power – China, Russia, India, the expanded BRICS – does not automatically bring balance, but rather intensifies a new competition for norms, influence, and legitimacy.

Secondly, natural resources and control over them are once again becoming central vectors of global confrontation. The post-pandemic and post-conflict world is not one of energy cooperation, but of resource nationalism, climate protectionism, and strategic investments in critical areas such as agriculture, water, and rare technologies. In this context, Romania has both the opportunity and the responsibility to capitalize on its geostrategic position, agricultural potential, and underground resources within a smart framework of balance between sovereignty and partnerships.

A third conclusion emerges from the increasingly visible conflict between globalism and sovereigntism – a confrontation that transcends mere ideology and reflects a struggle over the legitimacy of power in today’s world. While globalism has promoted accelerated integration under the banner of transnational capital and universalist norms, sovereigntism re-emerges as an identity-based and geopolitical reaction to the loss of national control. Romania, situated at the crossroads of these tensions, must define its own model of balance between multilateral affiliation and the defense of core national interests.

In parallel, the latent conflict between plutocracy and meritocracy outlines a fourth global fault line. A world dominated by corporations without democratic mandate, informal influence networks, and destabilizing global ideologies undermines the idea of selection based on competence, responsibility, and transparency. This reality creates a representation crisis and fuels populist, nationalist, or conservative movements that contest the established order “from above.”

In the long run, forecasts for 2050 point to a fragmented but interdependent world; multipolar, but unstable; technologically advanced, yet vulnerable to chaos and manipulation. Those states that will survive and remain relevant in the global equation will be the ones capable of consolidating strategic autonomy, investing in education and innovation, preserving social cohesion, and asserting identity without renouncing cooperation.

For Romania, this is not just an intellectual exercise, but a historic choice. In a reconfiguring world, Romania must become not only the object of geopolitics, but also a subject – an actor with vision, lucidity, and strategic will. And for that, clarity in analysis, honesty in diagnosis, and courage in decision-making are conditions for survival, not theoretical options.

Brasov, Romania, August 2025

Methodology

This study employs a multidisciplinary approach, integrating elements of geopolitics, international economics, international relations, security studies, and ideological analysis to provide a comprehensive perspective on global developments during the 2000–2025 period, along with projections extending to the year 2050.

The primary method used is qualitative analysis, based on:

• Documentary research: consulting a wide range of primary and secondary sources — strategic reports, academic analyses, government documents, specialized articles, and official statements from international actors.
• Correlation of geopolitical and economic data: interpreting global trends through the lens of interdependence between geostrategic and economic variables, particularly in the areas of natural resources, security, and ideological influence.
• Scenario analysis: developing potential scenarios for the evolution of the international order and Romania’s position by 2050, using both inductive logic and comparative observation of similar historical developments.
• Critical evaluation of concepts: nuanced examination of notions such as globalism, sovereigntism, plutocracy, and meritocracy, with the aim of clarifying their theoretical and practical implications in the current context.

The approach is structured both thematically and chronologically, aiming not only to describe developments but also to interpret their underlying causes and likely consequences. The study seeks not only to inform but also to contribute to the formation of a coherent strategic vision regarding Romania’s role in a continuously transforming world.

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[1] Total U.S. military expenditures in this war are estimated at approximately $2.3 trillion (excluding costs for veteran care and interest on war-related loans). Additionally, around 2,400 U.S. military personnel were killed, and over 20,000 were injured.

[2] Direct U.S. expenditures in this war are estimated at around $1.7 trillion, with over 4,500 military personnel killed and approximately 35,000 injured. In the initial years following the invasion, about $8.8 billion from the Development Fund for Iraq, managed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), could not be accounted for, being lost or misused. Of the roughly $60 billion allocated by the U.S. for reconstruction, at least $8 billion was lost due to fraud, uncompleted contracts, or inflated costs. In practice, billions of U.S. dollars were diverted through systemic fraud, overpriced contracts, redundant payments, and high-level bribery schemes. This undermined the mission’s overall effectiveness and eroded public trust.

[3] The trigger was popular protests in the city of Deraa, subtly exploited by infiltrated external forces, as well as the heavy-handed repression by the Republican Guard, commanded by the president’s brother.

[4] The Syrian opposition has remained consistently fragmented and failed to coalesce, with nearly 1,000 organizations and groups at its peak.

[5] General Manaf Tlass, a commander in the Republican Guard (son of former Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass, one of Hafez al-Assad’s most loyal allies), defected in July 2012. Unconfirmed reports suggest that on the night of Aleppo’s fall without fighting (November 30, 2024), some senior Syrian army officers betrayed their command, allowing 350 HTS fighters to seize the city while 30,000 Syrian troops withdrew. Additionally, an Iranian general was reportedly killed by a Syrian officer in Aleppo, undermining Iranian support. These betrayals reportedly continued and led to Bashar al-Assad’s loss of control over Syria in just 11 days, forcing him to seek assistance from Russian President Vladimir Putin for evacuation. The operation at the end of 2024 that led to Assad’s fall reportedly involved significant coordination by Western intelligence services, with a key role played by Turkey.

[6] Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (Organization for the Liberation of the Levant), founded in 2017 through the merger of several Sunni jihadist groups, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa and widely supported by Turkey and other foreign actors, managed to seize control of Syria at the end of 2024 in just 11 days. On January 29, 2025, Ahmed al-Sharaa was appointed interim president of Syria, and on March 29, a transitional government was formed. The group improved its foreign relations through visits to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. (including a proposal to President Trump to build a Trump Tower in Damascus). On July 7, 2025, the U.S. government removed HTS from its list of terrorist organizations.

[7] The Starlink network is a key element of Ukraine’s technological superiority in this conflict, providing real-time connectivity and strategic autonomy. Although costly (estimated at $300 million for equipment and services between 2022 and 2025), the investment is largely supported by the U.S. and allies (primarily the EU, especially Poland and Germany), and its functionality is already integrated into Ukraine’s combat doctrine. As of the writing of this document, over 42,000 terminals (military and civilian) ensure secure battlefield communication under enemy fire, coordination of mobile units and drones, real-time artillery fire correction, and internet access for civilian administrations and critical infrastructure.

[8] In this context, I align with the opinions of prominent military strategists and geopoliticians, expressed at least a decade earlier, who criticized the incorrect use of the term “eastern flank” of NATO when it should be referred to as the “eastern front.” I believe there is no longer any justification for this …diplomatic deference to Russia.

[9] Iran’s nuclear program began in 1957 through an agreement with the U.S. In 1974, the Shah of Iran announced ambitious nuclear plans to build over 20 nuclear reactors, involving France and Germany. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the program was suspended but discreetly resumed in the mid-1980s through technical collaborations with Pakistan, China, Russia, and North Korea. The Bushehr nuclear plant project, initially built with German assistance, was continued by Russia in the 1990s. The military program reportedly began in 1989 and continued until 2003 (AMAD Program). In 2003, Iranian leaders officially halted military research due to international pressure and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. CIA estimates from 2007 suggest Iran retained the option to resume its military nuclear program. Between 2011 and 2025, Iran oscillated between cooperation and escalation, maintaining a strategy of nuclear ambiguity. The JCPOA delayed the military program, but the U.S. withdrawal and loss of mutual trust brought Tehran close to the technological capability to build nuclear weapons without crossing the red line. Currently, the danger lies not only in weaponry but in Iran’s status as a “threshold nuclear state,” which significantly complicates regional and global security.

[10] The Iran–Israel conflict is not merely a geopolitical struggle for influence in the Middle East but is laden with religious symbolism and incompatible ideological missions. For Iran, Israel represents global injustice and the “Zionist sin”; for Israel, Iran is the ultimate threat, fueled by religious hatred and nuclear ambitions. This dimension makes the conflict extremely difficult to mediate or defuse in the long term, as each side legitimizes itself to its people through sacralized doctrines. However, public statements, often repeated even in international forums, claiming that Iran’s Constitution mandates the destruction of Israel are incorrect. Iran’s Constitution does not explicitly call for Israel’s destruction. This notion stems from repeated statements by Ruhollah Khomeini that “the Zionist regime must be eliminated,” as well as later reiterations by Khamenei and other Iranian officials claiming that “Israel is a cancerous tumor that must be removed” or “Israel will cease to exist in 25 years” (2015).

[11] Israel attacked on June 13 – Operation Rising Lion, while U.S. strikes occurred on June 22 – Operation Midnight Hammer.

[12] This statement excludes the possibility of a radical regime change in Iran, though such a scenario cannot be entirely ruled out. Regarding Israel, there are no significant factors suggesting a radical political shift in its Middle East policy.

[13] The Gaza Strip is a narrow Palestinian territory on the eastern Mediterranean coast, bordered by Israel and Egypt, with an area of approximately 365 km² (about 16 km long and 6–12 km wide) and an estimated population in July 2025 of around 1.9 million (down from approximately 2.2 million before the October 2023 attack).

[14] Additionally, natural gas reserves discovered in the Palestinian exclusive economic zone, approximately 30 km west of Gaza (1 trillion cubic feet), identified in 1999, represent a significant strategic factor often overlooked in public analysis but contributing significantly to the conflict’s dynamics. These reserves are part of the regional geopolitical calculations of Israel and international actors.

[15] This was also made possible by errors on the part of Israeli intelligence services and the military.

^[16] Relevant example: the development of LNG in Europe. The LNG terminal project in Świnoujście (Poland), operational and gradually expanded, has become a key element in reducing dependence on Russian gas in Central and Eastern Europe. Other projects in Germany, Croatia, Estonia, and Latvia reinforce this trend, creating a network of LNG import points connected to the European gas transmission system.

[17] Critical minerals for green energy and batteries (lithium, cobalt, graphite, nickel, manganese, copper, aluminum);Rare earth elements – 70–90% controlled by China (neodymium, praseodymium, terbium, europium, cerium);Materials for smart grids and energy infrastructure (indium, gallium, selenium).

[18] Green hydrogen, produced through electrolysis powered by renewable energy, is emerging as a top strategic resource for the future, with the potential to replace natural gas in heavy industry and transportation. Blue hydrogen, produced from natural gas with CO₂ capture, is viewed as a transitional alternative.

[19] To harness Romania’s hydroelectric potential, the following is necessary: the swift unblocking of the Răstolița project by clarifying environmental and legal aspects, in order to integrate it into national energy production; the priority launch of the Tarnița–Lăpuștești project, vital for energy storage, by attracting European funding and/or through public–private partnerships; the continuation and acceleration of modernization programs for existing hydropower plants, aimed at increasing efficiency and operational safety; the creation of a stable and predictable legislative framework for the completion of small hydropower plants, in compliance with environmental standards and their integration into local grids; the inclusion of hydroelectric projects in the national energy transition strategy, as a main pillar of grid flexibility and stability in the context of the growing share of green energy.

[20] Austria, through OMV Petrom, pays Romania royalties ranging between 3.5% and 13.5% of its oil and gas production, with an estimated average of around 8%. This level is significantly below the global average, where royalties typically range between 10% and 25%, depending on the type of resources and the fiscal regime. The direct consequences for Romania include reduced budget revenues from a strategic sector and a limited ability to capitalize on national resources in the public interest, compared to other producing countries.

[21] Water resources in Romania are public property of the state, according to the Constitution and the Water Law. The National Administration “Apele Române”, under the authority of the Ministry of Environment, manages their use by granting licenses and collecting exploitation fees.

Companies in the energy, agricultural, or water supply sectors (including private operators such as Apa Nova/Veolia) do not own the resources, but are granted limited-term usage rights.

Although the state maintains legal control over water resources, the influence of private operators over distribution networks and pricing poses risks in terms of equitable access, investment levels, and transparency in management.

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[22] Romania has one of the largest agricultural potentials in the European Union, with a total agricultural area of approximately 14.7 million hectares, of which 9.3 million hectares are arable land—ranking 6th in the EU in total agricultural land and 4th in arable surface. The Romanian Plain, the Western Plain, and the plateaus of Moldova and Transylvania, along with hilly and mountainous areas, offer a geographically diverse environment favorable for both crop cultivation (wheat, corn, sunflower, rapeseed, soybeans, potatoes) and livestock farming. In favorable agricultural years, Romania produces over 10 million tons of wheat and over 12 million tons of corn, consistently ranking among the top 5 grain exporters in the EU.

More than 3.5 million hectares are operated by large or medium-sized farms, but approximately 45% of agricultural land is used by subsistence farms, which have low productivity. In addition, about 1 million hectares are owned by foreign investors (primarily from Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and the Middle East), raising concerns about food sovereignty and control over production.

The national irrigation system, which in the 1980s covered over 3 million hectares, currently operates on less than 500,000 hectares, due to infrastructure degradation and lack of investment. Moreover, storage and processing capacities remain insufficient, leading to significant post-harvest losses and the mass export of raw agricultural products instead of value-added finished goods.

With a coherent agricultural policy, investment in irrigation, digitalization, green energy, and short supply chains, Romania could become a key player in Southeastern Europe’s food security and a reliable supplier for global markets.

[23] In Romania, approximately 40% of the arable land is controlled by foreign investors, according to recent academic studies. Among the largest investors are Al Dahra Group (United Arab Emirates), which controls around 56,000 hectares in the Great Island of Brăila following the acquisition of Agricola Brăila; Maria Group (Lebanon), which operates over 35,000 hectares and owns its own storage and port infrastructure; and Bardeau Holding (Austria), owned by Andreas von Bardeau, which manages approximately 21,000 hectares in western Romania.

[24] Over the past two decades, cultural neo-Marxism has become an active ideological component of the globalist project, moving beyond the academic sphere and transforming into an instrument of influence over social, educational, and political norms on an international scale. Unlike classical Marxism, which sought to overthrow the economic order through class conflict, contemporary neo-Marxism aims to restructure the cultural and symbolic order by deconstructing traditional identities.

This ideology operates transversally—it undermines national cohesion in the name of “diversity,” erodes natural hierarchies through the dogma of “absolute equality,” and rewrites history in accusatory terms, polarizing societies. Under the guise of inclusion, anti-discrimination, and “emerging rights” discourse, it promotes a model of uprooted, cosmopolitan individuals lacking stable cultural references—ideal subjects for integration into a fluid and controllable global order.

Cultural neo-Marxism is no longer merely an intellectual current; it has become a geopolitical vector used to weaken states’ resistance to cultural and normative homogenization. It offers a silent yet effective ideological weapon in the confrontation between expansionist globalism and reactive sovereignism. This is precisely why its contestation increasingly takes on a geopolitical, rather than purely cultural, character.

[25] Optimistic Interdependence refers to the period (approximately 1990–2010) during which Western elites—and a part of the global community—believed that through economic globalization, institutional integration, and the free circulation of ideas, a stable, peaceful, and prosperous international order would emerge. It was assumed that economic interdependence would reduce the risk of military conflict and that Western democratic and economic standards would, over time, be universally adopted.

This vision was foundational for: the enlargement of the European Union and NATO; China’s integration into the WTO; the neoliberal reforms imposed in Eastern Europe and Latin America; and the promotion of “nation-building” policies in the Middle East.

The optimism of interdependence was based on the belief that cooperation fosters convergence, and that classical sovereignty would gradually become a relic of the past.

Normative Rivalry. Following a series of crises (2008, 2015, the pandemic, the war in Ukraine), it became increasingly clear that interdependence does not automatically lead to convergence, but can instead fuel new forms of conflict. What we now call normative rivalry emerged—namely, a competition between incompatible sets of norms, values, and models of society.

In this phase, it is not only economic interests that clash, but also conflicting visions of: sovereignty vs global governance; national identity vs multiculturalism; tradition and religion vs radical secularism; merit and responsibility vs equality of outcome.

Normative rivalry is visible in the tensions between: the EU and Poland/Hungary; the U.S. and China; Russia and the West; and between globalist elites and popular or conservative movements.

By Ms. Yi Wang

In 2025, China and the European Union mark the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. According to public information, the EU-China Summit is scheduled to take place in Beijing in late July. Whether the summit can yield substantive outcomes is a matter of great interest to the international community.

The relationship between the United States, the European Union, and China is one of the most important international relationships of the 21st century; any direct conflict among the three would severely disrupt global stability.

On June 6, 2024, former U.S. Ambassador to China R. Nicholas Burns stated clearly in a speech on “U.S.-China Relations” at the Asia Society that “the future of Europe is a core interest of the United States”. The security of Europe has always been closely linked to the dynamics of U.S.-China relations. On the issue of Ukraine, the U.S. government has consistently been dissatisfied with China’s stance, yet it still sees the need to strengthen dialogue and communication with China and adopt a flexible diplomatic approach. Last week, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Kuala Lumpur, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, after meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister, told the media: “we’re two big, powerful countries, and there are always going to be issues that we disagree on. I think there’s some areas of potential cooperation”.

On July 8, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen delivered a speech at the European Parliament on the future of EU-China relations, stating that the EU is seeking a “more balanced and a more stable” relationship with China. The EU has long expressed strong concerns over issues such as China’s industrial overcapacity, state subsidies to enterprises, bilateral trade frictions, and China’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, concerns that have been repeatedly emphasized in various forums in recent years. In light of the war in Ukraine, addressing vulnerabilities in supply chains has become an urgent priority for EU member states. However, EU leaders reaffirmed that while they are discussing strategies related to “de-risking”, they have no intention of decoupling or isolating themselves.

The EU-China Summit comes at a time when the United States has set August 1 as the deadline for negotiations on “reciprocal tariffs”, prompting all parties to safeguard their respective interests. In key areas such as electric vehicles, rare earths, and medical equipment procurement, significant differences remain between China and the EU, with limited progress in negotiations. Consequently, tensions between Brussels and Beijing appear to be rising.

Do both China and the EU have the will to improve relations? The answer is undoubtedly yes.

There are differences between Europe and the United States in their strategies toward China, and the independence of European diplomacy has become increasingly evident. Since 2023, both the EU and the UK have stepped up engagement and mutual visits with China, clearly expressing the possibility of strengthening cooperation, trade, and investment partnerships, while seeking to strike a balance between national security and economic interests.

In response to the tariff war initiated by the Trump administration, the EU has sought to enhance mutual understanding through high-level policy dialogues with China. As early as April 8, during a phone call between President Ursula von der Leyen and Premier Li Qiang, von der Leyen emphasized that China plays a key role in addressing potential trade diversion caused by U.S. tariff increases，especially in industries already affected by global overcapacity. Premier Li called for the EU and China to “strengthen communication and coordination, expand mutual openness, jointly uphold free and open trade and investment, and maintain the stability and smooth functioning of global industrial and supply chains, injecting greater stability and certainty into both sides and the global economy“. The two sides also discussed the establishment of a mechanism to monitor potential trade diversion and ensure that related issues are properly addressed.

In early May, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that, following mutual agreement, China and the European Parliament had decided to fully and simultaneously lift restrictions on mutual exchanges. The resumption of engagement between legislative bodies indicates that EU-China relations are moving toward a path of continued stability.

Cognitive Bias Behind the Differences

Europe’s greatest current dilemma is how to engage with China. On one hand, elections across European countries are reshaping political forces, leading to internal power struggles and diverging interests within the EU. Newly appointed policymakers in Germany, France, and other EU member states will need to clarify the ultimate goal of Europe’s China policy and the costs of adopting a tougher stance toward China. On the other hand, Europe has begun to recognize the complexity of China’s domestic realities. However, its perspective has not kept pace with China’s rapid development and transformation. Europe lacks sufficient expertise in understanding China’s development goals, industrial policies, new investment trends, changes in local government roles, and its growing participation in global affairs. There is also a shortage of a new generation of professionals who genuinely understand China. This knowledge gap weakens the effectiveness of Europe’s China policy and hampers the development of innovative solutions to real-world challenges.

Against this backdrop, it is necessary for China to strengthen its “strategic thinking” and take a more proactive approach in proposing feasible solutions to the EU. A deep understanding of the broader changes taking place in Europe is essential, and when addressing EU-China differences, it is important to avoid narrowly focusing on individual issues in isolation. For the EU, the key lies in looking toward the future: in which areas can China and Europe expand cooperation, and through what models can bilateral relations be deepened? Only with clarity on these questions can the next steps in policy-making be effectively formulated.

Options in the Relations

Achieving broader “reciprocal market openness” is at the core of advancing EU-China relations. In areas such as green industries, climate change, technological innovation, digital transformation, and standard-setting, both sides have opportunities to identify new, mutually beneficial pathways. The following are several specific recommendations.

1. China should focus on the core concerns of the EU and, aligned with its strategy of high-level opening-up, promote change across various sectors. By inviting European companies to invest in China, the Chinese side must clearly communicate its policies while also strengthening their implementation. Effective follow-through is essential to demonstrate that China’s vast market can continue to drive global economic growth.

• The core issue in current EU-China trade tensions centers on the electric vehicle (EV) sector. There is still room for negotiation in this area. The key lies in managing the competitive dynamics between Chinese and non-Chinese companies. Under fair conditions, both EU and Chinese enterprises can enhance their capabilities. For example, Chinese automotive companies are actively aligning with the EU’s supply chain traceability standards. On the EU side, starting with new energy batteries, cooperation with China on carbon footprint calculations and alignment of battery passport data standards is already underway. Both sides have been attempting to address these issues, and greater encouragement should be given to joint China-EU efforts in research and development, investment, and the co-development of relevant standards and regulations.

• The global surge in electronic waste (e-waste) has become a major challenge, and most countries currently lack effective solutions, making it an area where China and the EU could strengthen technical cooperation and share experiences. Since the 1990s, the rise of the internet has driven the growth of the digital economy, leading to an exponential increase in electronic devices. Now, the emergence of artificial intelligence is further accelerating large-scale equipment upgrades. The market potential for efficient e-waste recycling remains largely untapped. By jointly leading technological innovation in this field, Chinese and European companies can grow together.

• As the United States becomes less proactive on climate issues, the European Union and China have an opportunity to take on greater leadership in driving global carbon emissions reductions. For example, in the area of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), China and the EU can strengthen policy coordination. If the EU and China can reach a joint climate commitment ahead of the UN Climate Summit (COP30) in Belém, Brazil this November, it could inject a degree of optimism into an otherwise subdued global climate dialogue.

• In global trade and investment activities, cross-border data flows are crucial and present significant challenges to corporate management, especially in industries such as finance, insurance, pharmaceuticals, automotive, and information and communication technology (ICT). Chinese and EU institutions could collaborate to establish pilot zones for data cooperation, explore mechanisms for dialogue and collaboration on trusted data spaces, and jointly develop an EU-China mutual recognition framework for data compliance. Such efforts could contribute to overcoming trade barriers.

The advances and retreats in EU-China relations are not only a matter of balancing strength, but also of mastering strategic posture. As Aristotle noted in Nicomachean Ethics, “temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by the mean”. The significance of the EU-China Summit may lie in finding the right way to engage with one another, as both sides seek to be better understood, respected, and trusted.