Nicaragua c. Colombie : décision de la CIJ en faveur de la Colombie

Par Nicolas Boeglin

Le 13 juillet, la Cour internationale de justice (CIJ) a annoncé sa décision portant sur les prétentions du Nicaragua face a la Colombie dans la mer des Caraïbes, qui lui  demandait d’étendre ses droits sur son plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles nautiques (voir le texte de l’arrêt en français et en anglais). 

Il s’agit de la réponse du juge international à la demande formulée par le Nicaragua en septembre 2013 (voir texte intégral de sa requête). Les 10 ans qui séparent les deux textes s’expliquent en grande partie par les exceptions préliminaires soulevées par la Colombie en 2014, afin de soustraire la discussion sur le fond à la compétence de la CIJ (voir la décision de la CIJ sur les exceptions préliminaires de mars 2016, rejetant les allégations d’incompétence de la Colombie).

Un long différend soumis en partie à la CIJ depuis 2001

Cette décision de 2016 sur les exceptions préliminaires rappelle aussi celle de 2007 dans laquelle, lors de la première affaire, la CIJ avait égalemente rejeté en partie les griefs d´incompétence soulevés par la Colombie (voir décision). 

Il convient de noter que, par une étrange coïncidence, quelques jours avant cette décision de mars 2016, la Colombie avait demandé à la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme un avis consultatif concernant les dommages environnementaux marins transfrontaliers, et ce sans jamais mentionner le Nicaragua : cette demande (voir texte en espagnol et en francais) a donné lieu à l’avis consultatif OC-23 publié par la Cour de San José en 2018 (voir le texte intégral en espagnol).

Lorsqu´un Etat ne soulève pas d´exceptions préliminaires, une affaire est résolue en quatre ou cinq ans par le juge international. C´est le cas, par exemple, des affaires a répétition opposant le Costa Rica et le Nicaragua entre 2005 et 2018 :

– Costa Rica c. Nicaragua : décision de juillet 2009 de la CIJ (voir texte) sur les droits de navigation du Costa Rica sur le fleuve San Juan;  

– Costa Rica  c. Nicaragua et Nicaragua c. Costa Rica: décision de décembre 2015 de la CIJ (voir texte) concernant le dragage du fleuve San Juan par le Nicaragua ainsi que la construction de la “trocha fronteriza” par le Costa Rica le long d´une partie du San Juan; 

– Costa Rica c. Nicaragua: décision de février 2018 (voir texte)  concernant la délimitation martime dans le Pacifique et dans les Caraïbes (Note 1); 

– Costa Rica c. Nicaragua: décision de février 2018 (voir texte) concernant l´emplacement exact du point de départ de la frontiere terrestre.

Il faudrait ajouter également (deux ans et deux mois de procédure) la décision de la CIJ de février 2018 (voir texte) concernant le montant de l´indemnisation pour dommages environnementaux causés par le Nicaragua dans la région d´Isla Portillos (Note 2).

Le contenu de l’arrêt du 13 juillet 2023 en bref

Dans le dispositif (point 104) de l’arrêt entendu le 13 juillet 2023 entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie, la Cour indique que :

1) Par treize voix contre quatre, 

Rejette la demande par laquelle la République du Nicaragua la prie de dire et juger que sa frontière maritime avec la République de Colombie, dans les zones du plateau continental qui, selon la République du Nicaragua, reviennent à chacune au-delà de la frontière fixée par la Cour dans son arrêt du 19 novembre 2012, suit des lignes géodésiques reliant les points 1 à 8 dont les coordonnées figurent au paragraphe 19 ci-dessus ; /…/

2) Par treize voix contre quatre, 

Rejette la demande par laquelle la République du Nicaragua la prie de dire et juger que les îles de San Andrés et Providencia ont droit à un plateau continental jusqu’à une ligne constituée d’arcs de 200 milles marins partant des lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de sa mer territoriale et reliant les points A, C et B dont les coordonnées figurent au paragraphe 19 ci-dessus ; /…/

3) Par douze voix contre cinq, 

Rejette la demande de la République du Nicaragua portant sur les droits à des espaces maritimes générés par Serranilla et Bajo Nuevo. /…/

(1) By thirteen votes to four, 

Rejects the request made by the Republic of Nicaragua that the Court adjudge and declare that the maritime boundary between the Republic of Nicaragua and the Republic of Colombia in the areas of the continental shelf which, according to the Republic of Nicaragua, appertain to each of them beyond the boundary determined by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012 follows geodetic lines connecting the points 1 to 8, the co-ordinates of which are referred to in paragraph 19 above; /…/

(2) By thirteen votes to four, 

Rejects the request made by the Republic of Nicaragua that the Court adjudge and declare that the islands of San Andrés and Providencia are entitled to a continental shelf up to a line consisting of 200-nautical-mile arcs from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured connecting the points A, C and B, the co-ordinates of which are referred to in paragraph 19 above; /…/

(3) By twelve votes to five, 

Rejects the request made by the Republic of Nicaragua with respect to the maritime entitlements of Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo” /…/

Deux questions auxquelles il est répondu par la négative

Comme nous avons eu l’occasion de le souligner (voir notre précédente note en espagnol), la CIJ avait ordonné en octobre 2022 aux deux États de consacrer leurs plaidoiries à répondre à deux questions très précises relatives à une prétendue coutume internationale invoquée par le Nicaragua pour revendiquer ses droits sur son plateau continental au-delà des 200 milles marins. 

Les audiences finales ont eu lieu en décembre 2022 et les deux États ont concentré leurs plaidoiries sur ces deux questions. 

Dans sa décision du 13 juillet 2023, la CIJ répond par la négative à la première question en indiquant au paragraphe 79 que : 

79. Au vu de ce qui précède, la Cour conclut que, en droit international coutumier, le droit d’un État à un plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de sa mer territoriale ne peut pas s’étendre à des espaces maritimes en deçà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base d’un autre État.”

79. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that, under customary international law, a State’s entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured may not extend within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of another State“. 

D’autre part, en ce qui concerne la deuxième question, au paragraphe 82, nous lisons ce qui suit :

“82. Il résulte de la réponse donnée par la Cour à la première question que, quels que soient les critères selon lesquels est établie la limite extérieure du plateau continental étendu auquel un État a droit, ce plateau continental étendu ne peut pas chevaucher la zone du plateau continental qui est située en deçà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base d’un autre État. En l’absence de droits concurrents sur les mêmes espaces maritimes, la Cour ne peut procéder à une délimitation maritime (voir le paragraphe 42 ci-dessus). Dès lors, point n’est besoin pour elle de se prononcer sur la seconde question.

82. It follows from the Court’s answer to the first question that, regardless of the criteria that determine the outer limit of the extended continental shelf to which a State is entitled, its extended continental shelf cannot overlap with the area of continental shelf within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of another State. In the absence of overlapping entitlements over the same maritime areas, the Court cannot proceed to a maritime delimitation (see paragraph 42 above). Consequently, there is no need for the Court to address the second question”.

Il convient de noter que cet arrêt est accompagné de plusieurs opinions individuelles distinctes (trois au total), d’opinions dissidentes (quatre) et d’une déclaration, ce qui témoigne de l’intense débat intra muros qui a eu lieu entre les membres de la CIJ. Compte tenu du fait que l’arrêt de la CIJ en tant que tel ne dépasse pas les 35 pages, il est intéressant de lire l’opinion dissidente fort détaillée du juge slovaque (voir texte) et celle de la juge australienne (disponible ici), ainsi que l’opinion séparée rédigée par la juge chinoise (voir texte).

On notera aussi qu’après la publication de l’ordonnance de la CIJ du 4 octobre 2022 (voir le texte en français et en anglais), la Colombie a procédé au changement d’une partie de son équipe  (voir cette note de presse de Semana du 25/10/2022). Au sein de l’équipe juridique du Nicaragua, depuis mars 2022, et après plus de trois decennies en tant que conseiller juridique du Nicaragua à La Haye, l’un de ses juristes les plus expérimentés, le nord-américain Paul Reichler, a démissionné (Note 3).

En ce qui concerne les coûts exacts pour chaque Etat du recours à une instance telle que La Haye pendant plusieurs longues années de procédure, la zone grise demeure: nous avions eu l´occasion de l´évoquer lors de notre analyse (en espagnol) de l’arrêt d’avril 2022 entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie (avec quelques montants officiels divulgués dans la note 4 de l´analyse précitée). Nonobstant, les pays andins semblent plus transparents sur le sujet: dans le cas du Chili, le Pouvoir Exécutif a dû reconnaître en 2015 (et ce, contre son gré) avoir dépensé 20,3 millions de dollars pour faire face à la seule requête déposée par le Pérou en janvier 2008 devant la CIJ (voir note de presse) et résolue en janvier 2014 par le juge de La Haye; la Bolivie pour sa part a reconnu en 2018 avoir dépensé plus de 14 millions de dollars dans l´affaire l´opposant au Chili devant le juge de La Haye (voir note de presse), pendant que le Chili a reconnu avoir dépensé plus de 24 millions de dollars (voir note de presse).

En guise de conclusion

Les prétentions du Nicaragua sur son plateau continental ayant été freinées, les deux États vont maintenant devoir trouver un moyen de négocier conjointement les divers aspects relevant de leur frontière maritime, sur la base de ce qui est indiqué dans l’arrêt de novembre 2012 (voir le texte intégral de l’arrêt).

Une négociation que, ni le ton provocateur de la Colombie à partir de novembre 2012, avec la dénonciation du Pacte de Bogota (Note 4) et la déclaration d’ ” inapplicabilité “de l’arrêt de 2012 en 2013 (Note 5), ni les deux nouvelles requêtes présentées contre elle par le Nicaragua devant le juge international en 2013, n´avaient permis.  Concernant la déclaration présidentielle d´”inapplicabilité” de la décision de 2012, nous avions indiqué que:

Les spécialistes du langage corporel s´intéresseront sûrement aux deux poings présidentiels pointés vers la caméra lorsque le Président Santos prononce le mot « indignados » au début de son intervention filmée du 10 septembre 2013.Ce geste, l´attitude du Président et celle des autorités de la Colombie depuis le 19 novembre 2012 semblent en effet correspondre davantage à un acte politique face à une opinion publique colombienne en plein désarroi depuis cette date” (Note 6).

Nous avons eu l ‘occasion d’analyser l´arrêt  d´avril 2022 par lequel la CIJ a condamné la Colombie (voir communiqué officiel de l’ONU) : nous renvoyons nos lecteurs à notre article sur cet arrêt (en espagnol), précédé dans les jours précédents l’arrêt 2022, d’un article un peu plus complet publié sur le site juridique spécialisé – en espagnol – de Ius360 mettant en garde nos lecteurs face au déséquilibre apparent (mais seulement apparent…)  entre les deux délégations présentes lors des audiences orales (Note 7).

Carte extraite de la note de presse intitulé “Nicaragua pierde disputa marítima contra Colombia ante Corte de La Haya”, émission de radio Amelia Rueda (Costa Rica), édition du 13/07/2023.

Il faut espérer que les appareils diplomatiques de ces deux Etats parviendront, à partir du 13 juillet 2023, à créer un climat propice au rapprochement, au dialogue et à l’entente. Pour ce faire, les déclarations officielles des prochains jours seront d’une grande importance, tout comme la retenue et la modération qu’elles contiendront. En effet, depuis 1980, le différend entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie a affecté de manière significative plusieurs États appartenant à la mer des Caraïbes : une mer semi-fermée avec un grand nombre de zones maritimes qui se chevauchent et qui doivent faire l’objet de négociations entre les États voisins (Note 8). Pour exemple, le traité entre la Colombie et le Costa Rica de 1977 dans les Caraïbes (non ratifié par le Costa Rica) – voir texte et carte aux pages 154-156 de ce recueil de traités de délimitation maritime des Nations Unies – aurait dû faire l´objet d´une renégociation dès 2012, sans que pour l´heure le Costa Rica ait déclaré officiellement ce texte comme nul et non avenu (Note 9).

L’incertitude générée par ce long contentieux, porté devant la justice internationale en 2001, devrait être considérée comme surmontée, et ce, afin de parvenir progressivement à une gestion commune plus harmonieuse de ces espaces maritimes.

L’auteurNicolas Boeglin est Professeur de Droit International Public, Faculté de Droit, Université du Costa Rica (UCR) / Contact : nboeglin@gmail.com

 – Notes – 

Note 1 : Cf. RASPAIL H., “La fonction juridictionnelle à l’épreuve de la délimitation territoriale : l’arrêt du 2 février 2018 dans les affaires Délimitation maritime dans la mer des Caraïbes et l’océan Pacifique et Frontière terrestre dans la partie septentrionale d’Isla Portillos (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua)”, Annuaire Français de Droit International (AFDI) 2018, Volume  64, pp. 241-276. Texte complet disponible ici

Note 2 :  Cf. HAJJAMI N., “CIJ, Certaines activités menées par le Nicaragua dans la région frontalière (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua) – Arrêt du 2 février 2018 (Indemnisation)“,  Annuaire Français de Droit International  (AFDI), 2017, Vol. 63 pp. 163-176. Texte dipsonible ici.

Note 3 : Cf.  BOEGLIN N., “A propósito de la renuncia de uno de los artífices de los logros de Nicaragua ante la justicia internacional“, publiée dans Confidencial (Nicaragua), édition du 6/04/2022. Texte disponible ici. Pour une analyse de la décision de la CIJ de 2012, cf. DELABIE L., “Le fragile équilibre entre prévisibilité juridique et opportunité judiciaire en matière de délimitation maritime : l’arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice du 19 novembre 2012 dans l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie)“, Annuaire Français de Droit International (AFDI), 2012, Vol. 58,  pp. 223-252. Texte diponible ici.

Note 4 :  Cf.  BOEGLIN N. « Le retrait du Pacte de Bogota par la Colombie », publié sur le site Le Monde du Droit (France), édition du 7/12/2012. Texte disponible ici. Cf. aussi (en espagnol)  BOEGLIN N., “La denuncia por Colombia del Pacto de Bogotá“, La Nación (Costa Rica), édition du 8/12/2012, disponible pour les souscripteurs ici

Note 5 : Cf. BOEGLIN N., “La décision de la Colombie de déclarer l´arrêt de la CIJ “non applicable”: breves refléxions” Bulletin de Sentinelle (Société Francaise pour le Droit International – SFDI /France), édition du 23/09/2013. Texte disponible ici. Cf. aussi (en espagnol) BOEGLIN N., “El anuncio de Colombia de no aplicar el fallo de la CIJ“, Alainet, édition du 23/09/2013, article disponible ici

Note 6 : Cf. BOEGLIN N., “La décision de la Colombie de déclarer l´arrêt de la CIJ “non applicable”: breves refléxions” Bulletin de Sentinelle (Société Francaise pour le Droit International – SFDI /France), édition du 23/09/2013. Texte disponible ici.

Note 7 : Cf. BOEGLIN N., “Nicaragua/Colombia: a propósito de la lectura de la sentenca de la CIJ“, Ius360 (Pérou), édition du 20/04/2022. Texte disponible ici.

Note 8 : Cf. par exemple TAGLIONI F., “Les revendications frontalieres maritimes dans le bassin Caraïbe : état des lieux et perspectives“, Norios, 1998, Tome 45, Núm. 180, pp.  617-630. Texte complet disponible ici. La Colombie a signé des traités de délimitation dans les Caraïbes avec le Costa Rica en 1977 (voir texte disponible – dans la collection Limits in the Seas publié par le Dértament d´Etat nord-américain – ici),  avec le Panama en 1978 (texte disponible ici) et avec la Jamaïque en 1993 (texte aux pages 12-15 de ce número de Limits in th Seas). 

Note 9 : Lors d´une demande d´intervention présentée par le Costa Rica en 2010 (et rejettée par la CIJ en 2011 – voir texte de l´arrêt), l´un des conseillers juridiques du Nicaragua, l´espagnol Antonio Remiro Brotons, a indiqué aux juges de la CIJ que: 

” 14. Le Costa Rica prétend avoir un intérêt juridique à ce que soient respectées les limites acceptées par son gouvernement, dans un traité signé, mais non ratifié, comme celui de 1977 avec la Colombie ; mais, en même temps, il situe ces intérêts au-delà de cette limite conventionnelle. Bref, on dirait que son désir est de tuer ce traité sans tirer un seul coup, ce qui serait d’ailleurs conforme à sa tradition pacifiste

(cf. verbatim disponible ici, audience du 13 octobre 2010, page 22).

Lawfare and Foreign Influence on Politicians – NATO and Portuguese Internal Intelligence Service Insights

By Jorge Marinho and Júlio Ventura

Politicians from a given country can be the targets of influence operations directly or indirectly conducted by adversary states, by turning to various instruments such as the media and lobbying firms, for instance. This article highlights the influence on lawmakers, within the context of lawfare. Since all this could entail repercussion in the sphere of security, this piece includes exclusive interviews with Andres Munoz Mosquera, Director of Allied Command Operations (ACO) Office of Legal Affairs – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) / NATO, and with Adélio Neiva da Cruz, Director of the Portuguese Internal Intelligence Service.

Foreign influence on political affairs can be regarded as normal and legitimate in the area of international relations (Jones January 2023, p. 21). This is often observed when a government, in the pursuit of its interests, seeks to influence the affairs and decisions of (an)other government(s) (Jones January 2023, p. 21). Foreign influence activities comprise public communications, lobbying and diplomacy (Jones January 2023, p. 21). Illegitimate interference from one government in the politics of another State can be called foreign interference (Jones January 2023, p. 7). Unlike foreign influence, this is deceptive / covert, including, for example, corruption and espionage (Jones January 2023, p. 21). In this context, there are hostile activities (Public Safety Canada August 20, 2021).

In this piece, given that differences fade away (Mansted February 2021, p. 1), it is considered that the terms foreign influence and foreign interference can also be used as synonyms (Foreign Interference and You, p. 2 / Homeland Security Advisory Council Interim Report of the Countering Foreign Influence Subcommittee May 21, 2019, p. 11). 


Media influence

Currently, various state and non-state actors take part in influence operations, in which multiple instruments are used, most notably, in this article, traditional and social media. To this end, we need to pay attention to communication not only from abroad, but also from domestic and local media that can serve foreign interests (McFarland, Somerville October 29, 2020 / Milosevich February 1, 2021). We should point out the possibility of infiltration in the latter two media. Proxies and accomplices can also take part in wielding foreign influence (2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, p. 75 / Kalniete February 8, 2022 / Tenove January 17, 2018).
 

A number of studies carried out in countries such as Australia, Bulgaria and Canada emphasize that, in the sphere of foreign interferences, the political system is targeted via various types of media (Enhancing Foreign Influence Transparency: Exploring Measures to Strengthen Canada’s Approach March 10, 2023 / Foreign Interference through Social Media March 13, 2020 / Vladimirov, Velcheva 2021). This problem can actually be countered by means of laws, as addressed, for instance, by Douek (July 11, 2018) in Lawfare. However, within the context of lobbying, the media could be used to pressure politicians, leaders and lawmakers (Mykkanen 2023 / Oleshchuk 2020, pp. 49-50). This, latu sensu, is also lawfare (Pinus, Hau 2023), in the sphere of a domestic confrontation, with foreign influences / interferences, between those wishing legal conditions favorable to certain interests, such as few, if any, constraints to the free circulation of information, including that which is broadcast by international media, and those pushing for the contrary. 

When referring to Europe, according to Karaskova and Simalcik (June 2020, p. 3), public discourse can be effectively changed by hostile foreign influence, since this is something that, to a large extent, is overlooked by European governments and society in general. To offset said influence, Karaskova and Simalcik (June 2020, p. 3) propose the following aspects, among others: restrictions to foreign ownership of the media; limits to support given by the government to media owners; prohibiting cross ownership of the media; enforcing regulations for tracking investments; and depoliticizing broadcasting councils that oversee the media. On March 10, 2023, after several days of public protests in Tbilisi, Georgia’s Parliament rejected a foreign agent registration bill that would be enforced on all media outlets, civil society organizations and individuals receiving over 20% of their funding from abroad, which would have subjected them to monitoring and to possible sanctions (Treisman March 10, 2023s.). 

Lawmakers and other politicians

Lawmakers can be the targets of various types of foreign influences, as is the case with covert operations (Schaffer May 23, 2022 / Tromblay July 13, 2017). To the foreign influencer, among a variety of aspects, it is vital to get to know the climate in which decision-making takes place and to come up with ways of introducing information that underpins their objectives (Tromblay July 13, 2017). In international relations, the use of lawfare tends to increase in the short / medium term; this is why we need to stress the importance of legal intelligence, whose purpose is to identify vulnerabilities, hazards, opportunities and hostile activities in the legal sphere (Férey April 2022, p. 7 / 32). Lawfare comprises aspects of an offensive and defensive nature (Férey April 2022, pp. 34-35).

The Government of New Zealand warns members of Parliament of the possibility of being the targets of espionage and influence / interference operations conducted by organizations from other countries (Espionage and Foreign Interference Threats June 2020, p. 3). All this can be orchestrated and carried out by foreign intelligence services with contributions from other actors, such as: academics; business people; community organizations; diplomats; media organizations; military personnel; online actors; proxies (Espionage and Foreign Interference Threats June 2020, p. 3).

Foreign interferences are also present in various central and local governments, weakening national sovereignty and favoring other countries’ interests (Consultation on a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry March 3, 2023 / Countering Foreign Interference February 16, 2023 / Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process July 2021, p.3). These interferences concern not only leaders, but also administrative personnel of government institutions (Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process July 2021, p. 9). For instance, in 2017, an agent-of-influence of a foreign country was identified and subsequently expelled from Singapore, on the grounds that he was collaborating with foreign intelligence agents, in order to influence senior decision makers of the Singapore government (Hostile Information Campaigns and Foreign Interference).

Elections are moments in a country’s political life that other governments take advantage of to pursue their goals (Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process July 2021, p. 6). A foreign power can recruit a certain politician and, over time, develop a relationship, seeking to benefit from that person’s possible election, to the extent that person will take part in government debates and decisions (Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process July 2021, p. 9). For example, in 2022, Mike Burgess, Director-General of Australia’s Intelligence Services (ASIO), revealed that a person directly linked to a foreign government and its intelligence agencies planned to make donations and promote some politicians in the media, in the context of elections (Fildes February 10, 2022). Foreign interference in political parties warrants particular attention (Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections March 10, 2021 / Jones January 2023 / Kalniete February 8, 2022). In reality, the previously referred aspects are somehow part of political warfare (Pronk / Rahman September 3, 2019 / Robinson, et alii 2018, p. 7). 

Several measures can be taken to counteract foreign influence. These are currently being adopted and debated by various organizations and governments. By way of example, since 2022, in Singapore, provisions have gone into effect for the purpose of tackling foreign interference by hostile information operations and, thus, protecting the following Politically Significant Persons (organizations and individuals with direct participation in political processes): central executive committee members of political parties; election candidates and their election agents; leader of the House; leader of the Opposition; members of Parliament; political office holders; political parties [Introduction to Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA)]. A competent body appointed by Singapore’s Minister of Home Affairs can determine that other Politically Significant Persons be protected [Introduction to Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA)]. In relation to Politically Significant Persons, the Government of Singapore enforces countermeasures on other aspects of foreign influence: affiliations; donations; leadership and membership; volunteers [Introduction to Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA)].
 

Siman (February 2022) points out the weakness of the European Union (EU) and of its member-states concerning countermeasures intended to offset influence operations. However, institutionally speaking, in the EU, there are reflections as to how foreign interferences affect the EU’s political system, including members of the European Parliament (Jones January 2023 / Kalniete February 8, 2022). As part of the EU, the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on a Mandatory Transparency Register, in accordance with article 3, applies to activities conducted by interest representatives with the purpose of influencing the formulating or implementing of policy / legislation and decision-making processes of EU institutions. Even though registration is not mandatory for individuals and organizations whose objective comprises the aforementioned influence, it is encouraged, to the extent it is requested for certain activities such as invitations to speak at hearings or public events, meetings with politicians, senior officials, as well as entry in certain premises (Jones January 2023, p. 25). The Transparency Register could be improved in relation to foreign influence (Jones January 2023, p. 25).

In the U.S., certain agents should periodically disclose their relations with their foreign principals, their activities, revenues and expenditures linked to supporting those activities (Foreign Agents Registration Act). These aspects fall within the remit of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) Unit of the Counterintelligence and Export Control Section in the National Security Division (Foreign Agents Registration Act). The FARA encompasses, for instance, lobbyists who, while working for foreign governments, aim to influence Congress, U.S. branches of foreign parties and state-owned media (Schaffer May 23, 2022). As per Brandon Van Grack, FARA needs to be updated, considering the Internet and social media (Schaffer May 23, 2022).

According to Linvill and Warren (October 23, 2020), it is preferable to focus too much on problems related to foreign influence than to be negligent.

NATO

In an exclusive interview, Andres Munoz Mosquera, as a NATO expert, elaborates on various reflections surrounding the central topic of this article. In relation to the field of Security / Defense, Munoz Mosquera considers that, without legal cohesion among member-states, NATO would have disintegrated long ago. This interviewee points out that the Preamble and articles 3, 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and article 51 of the United Nations Charter have greatly contributed to such cohesion. 

NATO symbol

Regarding influence on members of the Parliaments of NATO member-states, Munoz Mosquera acknowledges that the adversaries of said organization can try to sway decisions, by turning to lobbying firms. This expert feels that it is up to each government, and not to NATO, to determine whether legislation needs to be created in order to control lobbying firms’ activities. 
 

Munoz Mosquera considers that most people don’t have the faintest idea of the influence that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly wields over both current members and those wishing to become part of said Alliance. This interviewee stresses that this Assembly enables characterizing NATO as a democratic political organization, comprising an intergovernmental nature, and with security and defense matters at its center of attention.

Counterintelligence

As concerns counterintelligence measures that NATO member-states’ governments could take to prevent their Parliament members to be the subject of foreign influence operations by NATO’s adversary states, Munoz Mosquera believes there are advantages in revealing to operators what is going on in the legal battlefield both in peacetime and in times of crisis. According to Andres Munoz Mosquera, this will broaden operators’ horizons regarding the impact of legal matters in the current strategic competition.

Munoz Mosquera clarifies that the only NATO body with legal operations capacity (the designation given to lawfare at this organization) is SHAPE. This expert explains that, as part of SHAPE, said operations include the following aspects: 

-legal vigilance or legal intelligence, that is, monitoring and assessing adversaries’ legal moves

-obtaining open-source information from adversaries

-creating awareness and providing training in relation to legal, intelligence, hybrid and strategic communications staff.

Munoz Mosquera underlines that all this seeks to back NATO leadership with information aimed at decision-making. This interviewee adds that adversaries have seriously undertaken actions that break the Rule-of-Law under the guise of false legality and legitimacy.

Portuguese Internal Intelligence Service (PIIS)

According to PIIS Director Adélio Neiva da Cruz, this body’s mission includes understanding and examining the phenomena matching various types of threats, such as foreign interference, with negative effects on economic sovereignty and national security. The PIIS Director maintains that, in fulfilling its missions, the organization that he heads cooperates with NATO and the EU in a variety of areas, namely interference from hostile States. Portugal is a member-state of both organizations.

Neiva da Cruz asserts that there is a relationship between Portugal’s domestic security and European domestic security, as part of a common space comprising freedom, security and justice. In this regard, the PIIS Director makes reference to a document which was recently approved with an outlook for the EU’s next decade: A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. Nevertheless, this interviewee stresses that, as part of the EU, article 4(2) of the Treaty of Lisbon (May 9, 2008) sets forth that each member-state is solely responsible for its own national security. 

Portuguese Internal Intelligence Service symbol

Neiva da Cruz adds that the PIIS comprises activities that raise various private and public bodies’ awareness to counterespionage, warning them of issues related to influence and interference in Portugal, so as to protect classified and / or sensitive information. In terms of counterintelligence, Neiva da Cruz exposes that, within the current context of war economy and changes in world geopolitics, one of PIIS’ main objectives includes developing operational cooperation and exchanging information among the various authorities in outlining a common legal basis, using more effective methodologies, by turning to new tech tools and applications.

Adélio Neiva da Cruz considers that PIIS remains attentive to diverse situations where national security is called into question, inter alia:
 

  • covert operations aimed at recruiting Portuguese nationals with access to relevant information, chiefly information that is protected with security measures, in the political, economic, diplomatic and military spheres;
  • electronic access to communication networks and databases where valuable information is found.

Conclusion

This article addresses hostile foreign influence / interference activities in relation to political affairs of a given country. Said activities can be conducted through a variety of means, with this piece highlighting lobbying firms and the media. Targets include politicians and political organizations. Private or public bodies from another Government, including intelligence services, could be behind hostile foreign influence / interference exerted over a certain country. From the outset, this can be politically countered by creating laws, when this becomes necessary. Several countries have been regulating influence activities geared to politicians and political organizations.

Lawfare and legal intelligence

This way, lawmakers are particularly important, thereby making them the targets of hostile foreign influence / interference. This falls under lawfare and legal intelligence, both of which are increasingly relevant in the sphere of international relations. In this regard, a number of issues are raised regarding sovereignty, security and national defense. 
 

The previously referred matters concern diverse national and international organizations, as seen with PIIS and NATO, respectively. The latter undertakes several activities as part of legal operations, such as legal vigilance or legal intelligence in relation to adversaries. 

Concerning Portugal, PIIS remains attentive to possible covert operations in the political, economic, diplomatic and military spheres. PIIS cooperates with NATO and the EU, since Portugal is a member-state of both international organizations. However, the missions conducted by PIIS as a domestic body are vital to Portugal’s security.

About the authors:

Jorge Marinho

Jorge Marinho PhD in Communication Sciences, BA in International Journalism.

Júlio Ventura

Júlio Ventura BA in Law, MA student in Political Science and International Relations at the Portuguese. Catholic University (Lisbon, Portugal), member of the European Parliament trainee (Brussels, Belgium).

References

Interviews

*This interview was conducted, via email, on July 1, 2023.

** This interview was conducted, via email, on June 27, 2023.

Figures

1. Photo by: Jorge Marinho

2. Retrieved 7.7.2023 from https://www.sis.pt/quem-somos/organograma-e-estrutura

Published by Marinho Media Analysis / July 10, 2023

http://www.marinho-mediaanalysis.org/articles/lawfare-and-foreign-influence-on-politicians-nato-and-portuguese-internal-intelligence-service-insights

Africa Day and the African Union’s 60th Anniversary

“Our Africa, Our Future.”

By Roy Lie Atjam

Africa Day 2023 came and went. H.E. Mr. Momar Gueye, Ambassador of the Republic of Senegal and Dean of the African Diplomatic Corps in the Netherlands, and his colleagues and Ambassadors welcomed the guests in style. A total of well over 250 persons attended the function. The date was 23 June 2023.

The commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the OAU-AU is a milestone that vividly portrays the continent’s commitment to solidarity, peace, security, and economic integration.

Africa Day is annually celebrated to commemorate the founding of the Organization of African Unity in 1963. This day is extraordinary and significant in many aspects, as it marks the solidarity, unity in diversity, and a common strategy for developing the African continent and the prosperity of its people. This year’s celebration theme is “Our Africa, Our Future.” Africa’s future.

The Ambassador of Angola, H.E. Ms. Maria Isabel Gomes de Resende Encoge.

AGENDA 2063 – Africa’s Aspirations for the Future

AGENDA 2063: The Africa we want, is Africa’s blueprint and master plan for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future. It is the continent’s strategic framework that aims to deliver on its goal for inclusive and sustainable development and is a concrete manifestation of the Pan-African drive for unity, self-determination, 

Agenda 2063 encapsulates Africa’s Aspirations for the Future and identifies key Flagship Programmes which can boost Africa’s economic growth and development and lead to the rapid transformation of the continent.

The Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali, underlined that the continent, with its 55 African Union members, is very strong and is fast becoming a critical voice in the global arena, “we have come a long way in promoting and defending an African common position on issues of interest to our continent and our people, yet much remains to be done, in realizing the aspirations of our forefathers as stipulated in the founding charter and that of our Agenda 2063” he added.

Mr. Paul Huijts, Permanent Secretary of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Guests turned out in their numbers to celebrate this momentous occasion. Ambassadors, Diplomats, African businesspeople included, and guests from other continents were on hand to enjoy the festivities. Of course, the diaspora showed up in all its colours and resplendent beauty.

The Deputy Dean of the Africa Diplomatic Corps in the Netherlands, H.E. Ms. Maria Isabel Gomes de Resende Encoge, Ambassador of Angola, delivered the welcome remarks. She mentioned, among other points: the commitment of Africa to promote unity, cooperation, peace, and stability amid uncertainties at the international level. Climate change is not to be forgotten.

As H.E. President William Ruto of Kenya recently stated in his interview with Diplomat Magazine, “The conversation in September 2023 (Africa Climate Action Summit, prelude to COP 28) will have depth and detail. We want to bring an African perspective to climate action, put our ideas on the table, and formulate innovative solutions that will help tackle this monster that is threatening humanity”.

President Ruto further declared, “the current architecture of the African Union is not effective. We, African Leaders, are having a very frank, intense, and honest conversation about what we need to do differently because we certainly must change. We need to give the AU the power and resources to engage with the European Union, America, China, and all of our other partners so that we can be able to get what we need to transform our countries. Look at what the Asian countries are doing (ASEAN).”

Ambassador H.E. Mr. Maria Isabel Gomes de Resende Encoge was adamant in her statement, Africa has to move forward!

Mr. Paul Huijts, the Permanent Secretary of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, delivered a keynote speech at the Africa Day event. He shared the government’s renewed approach towards Africa and touched upon the official visits to the continent.

Showcasing Africa’s progress

An upcoming event showcasing Africa’s progress is OPCW CHEMEX Africa 2023 Capacity Building through the South-South Cooperation, which will be held in Algeria. The Algiers event is scheduled from September 23 to October 04, 2023. This landmark event is a Pan-African multi-component emergency response exercise and demonstration. It aims to develop counter-chemical capability in Africa to mitigate, investigate, respond, and recover from chemical incidents or attacks involving chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals. It also intends to foster ‘South-South’ cooperation by encouraging broad participation of African instructors and to check and improve the preparedness of African countries to respond to chemical-related incidents.

Africa Day 2023 Ghana food corner.

Acceleration of AfCFTA implementation

The AfCFTA (African Continental Free Trade Area) is an ambitious trade pact to create a single market for goods and services for almost 1.3 bn people across Africa and deepen the continent’s economic integration.

The League of African Ambassadors will be coordinating African-centric positions and activities.

The Africa Day program further offered cultural performances by drummers and dancers from Angola, Morocco, and Rwanda, contributing to the celebrative ambiance of the momentous Africa Day event. The food outlet provided a selection of savoury dishes and drinks from different African nations.

The success of the 2023 Africa Day celebrations left all the participants enthusiastic and anticipating the next edition scheduled for 2024.

Georgia National Day Celebration 2023

By Roy Lie Atjam

On 20th of June 2023 on behalf of the Embassy of Georgia, H.E. Ambassador David Solomonia and Mrs Olena Terentieva hosted the reception on the occasion of 105th anniversary of Georgia’s State Independence.

In his opening speech, Ambassador welcomed the guests among which were representatives of Dutch public service, civil society organizations, diplomatic corps and the Georgian diaspora. He thanked everyone involved in the preparations of the event and acknowledged the dedications by the Honorary Consuls of Georgia in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

Georgia’s National Day is, by all means, a joyous occasion. 26th of May marks the day when the people of Georgia restored its statehood in the form of the first democratic republic. With their unique culture and language and the centuries of statecraft traditions Georgians once again asserted itself in the mosaic of interstate realm.

According to Ambassador Solomonia: “Independence Day holds significant place in our hearts. It symbolizes the triumph of liberty and the pursuit of a better future. It represents the collective aspirations of our society to break free from the irons of oppression and determine our own destiny.

SAKARTVELO choir

Today, we pay tribute to the visionaries who paved the way for an Independent Georgia and to all those who continue to preserve and uphold those values.”

Several months ago, on 14th of April, Georgia celebrated another significant historical event –

“Georgian Language Day” in cooperation with Leiden University. It marked the events that occurred in 1978 when the Soviet Authorities unsuccessfully attempted to remove the official status of Georgian throughout the country. “Georgia cherishes the bravery and efforts of those people who stood up against the oppressive regime and protected their language – a core of our cultural identity.” – stressed the Ambassador.

In his speech, Ambassador emphasized the importance of current affairs as well. He stressed that as the world is facing great crises, including the worst possible one – the terrible war, Russia’s brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine, which had started in Georgia back in 2008: “No nation can feel safe until Russia is held accountable for violating the fundamental principles agreed by all”.

Georgia National Day 2023.

At this point, Georgian-Dutch cooperation, friendship and long-standing ties are of great value for both countries. While the Dutch Embassy is representing the Netherlands in Tbilisi, the Embassy of Georgia maintains close cooperation in bilateral and multilateral level, and as the Ambassador put it “all time high like-mindedness on all major topics, including in The Hague based institutions, be it ICC, ICJ or OPCW”. Not least to mention that according to first quarter statistics of the year of 2023, the Netherlands is the biggest investor in Georgia.

The reception was adorned by stunning performances of Amersfoort based ChoirSAKARTVELOwho are specialized in famous Georgian polyphony – another cultural asset which has international recognition and is inscribed in the UNESCO list for intangible cultural heritage.

The celebratory evening concluded with a degustation of Georgian cuisine and beverages. Most notably, the notorious Georgian wine boasts its oldest wine-making traditions and increasing popularity in Dutch markets.

Congratulations Georgia!

Taste of Kosovo- Exclusive Wine Tasting at Kosovo Embassy    

 

 By Roy Lie Atjam

On 30 June 2023, H.E. Dr. Dren Doli, Ambassador of Kosovo in the Netherlands, hosted a wine tasting soirée.

Guests were invited to come and delight themself in a splendid evening with wine tasting. There were three white wines: Elephant Chardonnay, Stone Castle Chardonnay and Kalaveshi Sauvignon Blanc. Two red wines: Besa and Elephant Cabernet Sauvignon.

Kosovo wine testing – Deputy ministers mingle with guests.

The event was part of the continuous efforts to promote Kosovo produce and allow the international community to try and enjoy high-quality Kosovo wines. 

Simultaneously the Embassy’s Art Gallery of 13 art pieces by Kosovarian artists was inaugurated. The exposition is part of the project “Moving Art Exhibition Abroad”.

Also on the program was the launching of the three-day activity at the Embassy with the Kosovo-Albanian scientific diaspora aiming at coordination among main stakeholders on how to advance Kosovo abroad, specifically within European academic circles.

Noteworthy were the Kosovo Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora, Ms. Liza Gashi, and the Deputy Minister of Education, Ms. Edona Maloku, who graced the event with their presence. Both dignitaries briefly address the guests.

Visitors were pleased with the fabulous evening, featuring excellent wines from Kosovo.

The Ambassador of Kosovo address the guests.










































Ceremonial opening for Arkadag, Central Asia’s smart city

Thursday, 29 June 2023, Ahal Province, Turkmenistan: The opening ceremony of the city of Arkadag took place. The relevant decree was signed by President Serdar Berdimuhamedov during an expanded offsite meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers held in this city. 

The document was adopted “in order to organize the opening of the city of Arkadag at a high level, built on the initiative of the National Leader of the Turkmen people, Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov based on the concept of “smart city” using advanced technologies of the new generation.”

The ruling prescribes:

  • The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the hyakimlik of the city of Arkadag, the Ministry of Trade and Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Culture and the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs jointly ensure the opening ceremony of the city of Arkadag on June 29, 2023 at a high organizational level;
  • To provide the relevant ministries and departments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the hyakimlik of the city of Arkadag, the Ministry of Trade and Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Culture and the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs with all possible assistance in preparing and holding the opening ceremony at a high organizational level;
  • To the Ministry of Culture, the State Committee for Television, Radio Broadcasting and Cinematography, the State News Agency to provide high-level media coverage of the opening ceremony and measures taken in Turkmenistan in the field of the smart city concept.

According to President Berdimuhamedov, the construction of the city of Arkadag was planned to be carried out in two stages.

“Currently, the first phase of its construction has been completed. In the near future, the grand opening ceremony and commissioning of the new city, built on the basis of the smart city concept, will take place. As part of the first stage of development, 336 modern buildings were erected, including two and multi-storey comfortable residential buildings, public, educational, medical and cultural facilities, sports facilities and engineering systems,” Serdar Berdimuhamedov said.

According to him, all the high-quality work carried out in the new city meets international standards. A digital system has been introduced in educational institutions, and a “smart” house system has been introduced in residential buildings, the head of state emphasized. A set of necessary measures has been taken to ensure the environmental cleanliness of the new city. In particular, for its harmonious coexistence with the surrounding nature, a lot of trees and flowers have been planted along the streets and in the adjacent territory, and a road transport infrastructure that meets environmental requirements has been formed.

“In general, the new city of Arkadag has become one of the most perfect cities, with the most favorable conditions for living, working and recreation,” said President Serdar Berdimuhamedov”

At the same time, the emphasis was placed on its important political, economic and social significance for our state and people. In this context, the head of state stressed that the work aimed at the prosperity of the mighty Motherland would be continued together with specialists well versed in modern technologies.

The city of Arkadag, which will house approximately 70 000 people, is being built on an area of 950 hectares, 30 kilometers southwest of the Turkmen capital. “Smart” residential buildings controlled via a smartphone, a square with a flagpole, buildings of the hyakimlik and other institutions have been built here.

The construction of this mega-project was started in 2019.

On March 24, 2023, a new Law of Turkmenistan came into force, according to which a special legal status is assigned to the city of Arkadag – a city of state importance.

________________________

Source: https://turkmenportal.com/en/blog/63413

Images courtesy of the Turkmen Government 

A Nikkei feast

Text and pictures by John Dunkelgrün

A great dining experience requires a careful balance between flavours, quality of the ingredients, presentation, ambiance, and a welcoming service. Blue Blood at the Hilton has managed to get it all just right.

Hilton’s bar, The Hague.

Entering through a huge hippodrome-shaped bar that wouldn’t be out of place in New York or Hong Kong, you come into a low-key dining area where, if you are lucky, you get a table with a view of the canal.

While the bar is big, bright, and lofty, the restaurant proper is intimate and restful. You can hear your footsteps, you can hear your companions talk.

John and Anne Dunkelgrün with friends at Blue Blood, HIlton The Hague.

The staff is proficient and warmly welcoming. Being guided to our table, we passed a sushi-bar that made our mouths water. We lucked out with a table at the window. It was a balmy evening and we saw the Ooievaart boat slide by and watched people canoeing and paddle boarding. We were totally relaxed, even before the drinks arrived.

The real secret behind this restaurant is its chef. Hilton The Hague has managed to lure Chef Luis Rojas away from Abu Dhabi, where he wore the Toque at the Hilton restaurant on Yas Island in Abu Dhabi. Chef Rojas has worked all over the world, but was trained in Lima, which has become the epicenter of great cuisine in Latin America.

Chef Luis Rojas, from Blue Blood.

Blessed with a long coast teeming with fish and seafood, its cuisine was inspired by a large Japanese immigrant population that has thrived in the country for well over a century. The fusion of Japanese and Peruvian cuisine became known as Nikkei Cuisine blending the many varieties of corn, potato, and chillies with local herbs, fish and seafood.

The development of Nikkei was helped by Le Cordon Bleu School of Cooking in Lima, which has produced hundreds of top chefs for restaurants all over the Americas.

Chef Rojas, a big amiable teddybear of a man, exuded enthusiasm about the Nikkei tradition. We had ordered the tasting menu, which was organized in waves of dishes rather than in courses. Each ‘wave’ was a feast to the eye and its individual dishes were a true taste sensation.

I am not a restaurant critic and will not give a dish-by-dish description. You must really try for yourself the spectacular presentation and WOW-delicious flavors of each successive wave.

I have been lucky to dine in in top restaurants all over the world, but this evening just blew our party of four completely away. The experience was so special, that I just had to share it with you.

Meeting Chef Rojas is a pleasure in itself. He is very good at describing his creations vividly and clearly, while charming you with obvious pride in his creations.

The Hague has really gained a dining experience of international standard. Chapeau (or perhaps ‘toque’) to the chef, his kitchen brigade, and the wonderful restaurant staff.

Dining at Blue Blood with Chef Rojas’ Nikkei cuisine, is something you really must not miss.

Chef Luis Rojas, John and Anne Dunkelgrün and friends.

Celebrating the Peruvian National Day with top delicacies

On July 28th, the Embassy of Peru to the Netherlands together with Hilton’s BlueBlood Restaurant in The Hague, celebrate Peru and its culinary tradition through a delicious food marathon, under the direct supervision of Chef Luis Rojas.

As Diplomat Magazine is supporting the event, we talked to Chef Rojas about his passion for food, vast experience and love for Peruvian traditions.

As he recalls, some of his warmest childhood memories in Peru are related to food, to going to the market with his mother and choosing fresh ingredients for their family.

He says: ‘I started cooking when I was only 14 year old and I remember being especially inspired by how my mother managed to make the most savory and delicious dishes with the simplest ingredients’.

After he completed his studies in culinary school in Peru, he started working as a professional cook in different countries, and the list is quite impressive: Chile, Brazil, Qatar, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and now, The Netherlands. He has fond memories from everywhere, he worked in a Michelin-Star restaurant in Brazil, worked for Marriott in Dubai and Abu Dhabi and he is now the Head Chef at the BlueBlood Restaurant at the prestigious Hilton The Hague.

He traveled the world looking for inspiration, always learning new techniques and discovering ‘secrets’ about fine cuisine. He also experienced cooking fusion Indian-Peruvian foods, as both usually use lots of spices.

‘Coming to Europe offered me additional opportunities to learn new cooking techniques and experience high quality local ingredients’, he mentions.

At Hilton he is managing a professional team where, he says, ‘good atmosphere is everything. I need to feel comfortable in the kitchen, I am not the boss; I am part of my team. We cook together, make authentic food together and always add a little bit of magic to it’.

He says his favorite dish is Peruvian Ceviche, a spicy food which he prepared even for royal guests at Blueblood restaurant. When talking about his local guests, he says that ‘Dutch people like to go out to eat a lot, and they like doing it in style. They like good food and quality wines and they are always eager to try new foods, they also like spices’.

He is proud of his national heritage. He says:  ‘one of my main goals is to present Peruvian food to the world because it has a lot of history and it is so rich in ingredients. Peru has more than 2000 different kinds of chilly, 200 different types of potatoes, there is a lot to discover and experiment’.  

Chef Luis Rojas at Hilton’s Blueblood Restaurant, The Hague.

Because of that, he had the idea of a Peruvian Food Festival at Hilton. He has done similar projects in Abu Dhabi, in cooperation with the Peruvian Consulate.

‘In The Hague, I presented the idea to the Peruvian Ambassador, H. E. Marisol Flavia Aguero Colunga, who was very receptive and immediately agreed to participate to it. We are planning the event together’.

The event, with more than 20 different traditional Peruvian and Nikkei inspired dishes on the menu, is expected to be attended by around 100 guests, hosted by Hilton’s exquisite BlueBlood Restaurant.

Chef Rojas hopes that this will become an established annual event which will attract many people and will bring Peruvian food to everyone’s attention.

It surely deserves that!

25th Anniversary of the Rome Statute Interview with President Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi

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This year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the adoption of the Rome Statute which established the International Criminal Court. Different commemoration events will be organized with a view to celebrate this extraordinary achievement of the international community. This  includes an exhibit entitled “Common bonds” in The Hague, which opens on 12 July, a commemoration event at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on 17 July, the day when the Rome Statute was adopted, and an event in Rome on 12 and 13 October.

Looking back at the Rome Diplomatic conference in July 1998, what were the hopes then when deciding on the creation of the world’s first permanent International Criminal Court? How much has been achieved, and how much is yet to be fulfilled?

At the end of the diplomatic conference, on 17 July 1998, an enthusiastic crowd of representatives of States and civil society hailed the adoption of the treaty – the “Rome Statute” – creating the first international permanent criminal court to investigate and try perpetrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Rome Statute also covered the crime of aggression, but only in a programmatic way pending an agreement on its definition and other requirements, which could only be attained some years later.

Expectations were high. The creation of the Court was based on the belief that prosecuting those responsible for the worst atrocities would not only bring remedy for past crimes but also prevent others in the future, thus contributing to international peace and security.

In the 25 years that followed, the Court demonstrated its capacity to investigate and prosecute in situations in Africa, Asia, America and Europe. It also showed that it was possible to involve the victims and survivors of the crimes in its proceedings and to repair the harm suffered by thousands of them, with the assistance of the Trust Fund for Victims.

Notwithstanding these achievements, the Court has not been able to meet the expectation that all atrocities, wherever committed, would be addressed. This is because the Court can, in principle, only intervene in those situations where States directly concerned are parties to its founding treaty.  This leaves entire situations beyond its reach and is the reason why achieving universality is so important. 

The Assembly of States Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened at the World Forum Convention Center in The Hague, The Netherlands.

As President of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, and former President of the International Criminal Court, what are the challenges that you foresee for this institution in the future?

The main challenge is to ensure that the Court can indeed address all atrocity crimes equally. Today, the Rome Statute has 123 States Parties, a significant number that comprises two thirds of the international community, but still insufficient to achieve the Court’s global aspirations. Increasing this number to attain universal participation is thus of crucial importance. Another important challenge is to ensure sufficient political support and resources for the Court as well as concrete cooperation for its investigations and prosecutions. The Court has no intelligence service, police, or army of its own. It relies entirely on the cooperation of States, organizations, and civil society to collect evidence, protect witnesses, arrest suspects, and provide victims access to justice and reparations.

In a world that is becoming more polarized than in the 1990s, and in the midst of violent conflicts, how do you think the Assembly and the Court should proceed to be able to meet the expectations of the victims around the globe?

In our turbulent world, justice is more necessary than ever. It is thus crucial that the Court can deliver justice to its full potential. Currently, the Assembly is undertaking, together with the Court and civil society, a holistic review that aims at strengthening the Rome Statute system by accelerating proceedings and improving the performance, governance, and work culture of the Court. Among other initiatives, the Assembly has already implemented measures and practices to improve the selection of judges and other high officials, in recognition that the Court can only be as good as the individuals that are trusted with its important functions.

However, to meet the expectations of all victims of the world, it is necessary not only to deliver high quality justice at the Court but also to contribute to justice efforts undertaken by others. Fighting impunity for massive crimes cannot be and was never intended to be the work of the Court alone. On the contrary, the Court was created as a complementary institution of last resort.

It is a welcomed development that nowadays, despite adverse current circumstances, the international community has redoubled its demand for justice and initiatives to that effect have multiplied. In addition to proceedings by the Court and other international tribunals, more States are willing to exercise jurisdiction over international crimes at the national level, and international mechanisms are set up to assist in the collection and preservation of evidence.  Furthermore, a new treaty was adopted in Slovenia, a few weeks ago, to facilitate inter-State cooperation for the investigation and prosecution of these crimes, which will be opened for signature in The Hague early next year.  We witness the gradual emergence of a global justice system, or a justice “eco-system”, within which international and national courts have a role to play. In this context, the Court and the Assembly must join forces with all those involved in justice efforts to help to consolidate this system.

Many major powers have not ratified the Rome Statute, some of them were or are openly hostile to the ICC. Does this affect the cohesion of the Assembly of States Parties and its commitment to defend its Court?

The lack of universal participation in the Rome Statute affects the effectiveness of the system. We need more States to join, big or small. Open hostility against the Court, when it translates into threats and attacks, seeks to frustrate its core mandate by undermining its independence and integrity.

These attempts are extremely grave and need to be countered effectively. These are not just hypothetical dangers. We have already witnessed economic sanctions being imposed against the former Prosecutor and one of her directors, which were lifted by the new US administration in April 2021. When these sanctions were imposed, States and civil society mobilized against them, demonstrating their commitment to the Court. I trust the same resolve will be shown to counter the reprisals by the Russian Federation against the Prosecutor and judges involved in the Ukraine situation.

The Assembly has recently adopted a mechanism to be followed in case of threats and attacks against the Court, its officials and staff, and any other person cooperating with it. This mechanism intended to improve coordination within the Assembly and to contribute to a robust collective response is without prejudice to any other initiative that may be taken by individual States or civil society.

The twenty-first session of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened today at the World Forum Convention Center in The Hague, The Netherlands.

Finally, as we commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Rome Statute, what message you would like to leave our readers, here in the Netherlands, with?

The Court has its seat in the city of The Hague, which has now become the symbol of justice against the worst crimes and a beacon of hope for victims of all over the world. I encourage all those in the Netherlands that have not yet done so to visit its beautiful premises, to see the Court in action and get to know more about its goals and achievements. This year is a particularly good occasion to do this as we commemorate the twenty fifth anniversary of its historic creation. In 1998, the Court was an idea seeking to be realized. Now that we confront an increasingly fragmented world, it is the time to join our efforts again to preserve the bonds that united us at the time of its creation.

Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi is the President of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute. She was President of the International Criminal Court (2015 – 2018) and served as a judge (2010 – 2018). She played a leading role in multilateral efforts to create the International Criminal Court (ICC), by presiding over the entire negotiating process of the ICC criminal procedure provisions in the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (1995 – 2000); as Vice President of the Ad Hoc Committee and the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the ICC, which led to the Rome Conference (1995 – 1998); as Vice President of the Committee of the Whole (the negotiating forum) and President of the Working Group on criminal procedures in 1998; and as part of the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court (2001 – 2002).

“Together We Prosper” Rwanda Liberation and Independence Day Celebration 2023 

The Hague, the 29th anniversary of Rwanda’s liberation, was celebrated on the 4th of July 2023 under the theme “Together we prosper”. The Embassy of the Republic of Rwanda hosted the Kwibohora29 celebration with an elegant reception at the Marriott Hotel The Hague.

H.E. Ambassador Olivier J.P. Nduhungirehe, his spouse and the Embassy team welcomed more than 150 guests including members of the diplomatic community, hight-ranking representatives of the Dutch government, representatives of international organizations, leaders of the Rwandan community and friends of Rwanda. 

The breakdown of the program.
Dutch National Anthem, Rwandan National Anthem, immediately followed by a
Kwibohora29 video.

Ms. Martine Van Hoogstraten, Deputy Director for Sub-Saharan Africa’s desk of the Ministry of Foreign The Hague, delivered her remarks at the Liberation Day festivities, she made the following statement:

I am honoured to stand here in commemoration of the 29th Liberation Day and the celebration of the 61st Independence Day of the Republic of Rwanda. While we celebrate this memorable moment, let us also reflect on the many obstacles Rwanda had to overcome. The decades that followed on independence were characterized by turbulence and trials. Ethnic tensions and political conflicts often intertwined, leading to acts of violence against innocent civilians.

Ms. Martine Van Hoogstraten, Deputy Director for Sub-Saharan Africa’s desk of the Ministry of Foreign The Hague.

Tragically, these events reached a devastating climax with the Genocide against the Tutsi in 1994. The genocide destroyed the lives of countless Rwandans, including those of moderate Hutu and others who opposed the atrocities. To honour the victims, our Director General, Mr. Marcel de Vink, participated in a Kwibuka ceremony held in Amsterdam on the 19th of April this year. During the event, he assisted in the unveiling of a commemorative statue in the Beatrixpark.

Exemplifying our longstanding collaboration in the field of justice, a high level delegation from the Rwandan justice sector recently visited the Netherlands. During this visit, the delegation members met with esteemed institutions such as our Supreme Court and the International Criminal Court (ICC). These fruitful exchanges of perspectives benefitted both sides involved.”

Hoogstraten further stated, in line with the new Africa strategy of the Netherlands “I would like to emphasise the importance of reciprocity. The relationship between our countries is now characterised by enhanced bilateral trade rather than development aid. This new focus marks a significant milestone in our bilateral relations. It is fitting to highlight this today, during this celebration of independence and emancipation.

By working as equal partners, we can jointly find solutions for global threats to peace and security, such as Russia’s war against Ukraine. The vicinity of both our countries to armed conflict shows that peace is never self-evident. In light of the escalating tensions in Eastern DRC, I encourage Rwanda to maintain open lines of communication with its neighbouring countries and actively pursue the de-escalation of tensions in the Great Lakes Region. “

The Keynote address was delivered by H.E. Olivier J.P. Nduhungirehe, Ambassador of the Republic of Rwanda.

The Ambassador commenced his keynote address as follows. Some extracts.

“ My wife Virginie, the whole staff of the Embassy of Rwanda and I wish to thank you all for finding time on your busy schedule to be with us today. I will only take a few minutes of your time to tell you why you were invited and what we are celebrating. This evening, we are not celebrating a national day only. We are celebrating values and principles – actually three sets of values: (1) togetherness and prosperity, (2) friendship and cooperation, and (3) multilateralism and international law.

Rwanda Independence and Liberation Day, 4 July 2023.

We are celebrating togetherness and prosperity on the occasion of the National Day of Rwanda, which is a two-in-one event. Today 4th July 2023 is first and foremost the 29th anniversary of Rwanda’s Liberation Day, which marks the day on which the forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF-Inkotanyi) overthrew the ethnic regime that was committing the genocide against the Tutsi for the previous hundred days.

The official theme of this Liberation Day is “Together We Prosper”. Those two words “together” and “prosper” are equally important. Indeed, unity, reconciliation and togetherness were critical in July 1994 to rebuild today’s Rwanda, because it’s the destruction of the social fabric of our country over several decades, through a divisive ideology that was entertained by the colonial administration and two successive regimes, which led to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. As for prosperity, it was the blueprint of the government of Rwanda since the end of the genocide, which led to a significant socio-economic transformation that we all witnessed over the past 29 years.

Today’s national day is a two-in-one event as I said earlier, because we also mark the 61st anniversary of the Independence of Rwanda, which was recovered on July 1st, 1962, after more than six decades of colonisation.

Some of the ambassadors attending Rwanda Independence and Liberation Day 4 July 2023.

This evening, we are also celebrating friendship and cooperation. Friendship of Rwanda with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, but also with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, to which I am also accredited as non-resident Ambassador. Those three Baltic States have become solid economies since their independence and reliable partners of Rwanda, to which they serve as development models, especially in e-governance, FinTech, manufacturing industry and technology. 

The Netherlands is also a shareholder of our “prosperity”, to which they contributed by their significant and growing trade and investments with Rwanda, as well as cooperation in critical sectors such as agriculture and water resources management. As the two countries have now transitioned from aid to trade, we hope that our friendship and cooperation will continue to flourish. 

Finally, we are today celebrating multilateralism and international law. This celebration is sometimes necessary in this troubled world; and there was no better city on this planet where we can do that other than The Hague, the international city of peace and justice. Rwanda, as a small country on the map but great in ideas, firmly believes in multilateralism, which is a kind of “international togetherness”. We all know our divergent geostrategic interests and the tensions and conflicts in our respective regions, but we believe that institutions such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are playing a critical role in bridging the gaps between nations and building a better world free of chemical weapons. As we cannot all of us be “like-minded”, I hope that we will at least remain “open-minded” and continue supporting this organization and its work.

Rwanda also appreciates the contribution of The Hague-based international courts to peace, justice and international law. Beyond the internationally-renowned jurisdictions, I would take this opportunity to congratulate and highlight the work done by three institutions in the promotion of international law. Those are (1) The Hague Academy of International Law, which celebrated its centenary this year; (2) the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), which will celebrate its 125th anniversary next year; and (3) The Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), which Rwanda has just decided to join.

H.E. Olivier J.P. Nduhungirehe, Ambassador of Rwanda together with Ms. Martine Van Hoogstraten, Deputy Director for Sub-Saharan Africa of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Let me conclude my remarks by making an obvious toast, together with Mrs Van Hoogstraten, whom I invite to join me: “To our togetherness and prosperity, to our friendship and cooperation; and to multilateralism and international law”.

Traditional Rwandan dance performers animated the reception.

Rwanda Liberation Day.