Unmasking War Propaganda against Russian Aggression: An Investigative Approach

Diplomat Magazine
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Unmasking War Propaganda against Russian Aggression: An Investigative Approach

By Prof. Dr. Masahiro Matsumura

Since its unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine, Russia has inundated the world with misinformation and disinformation in efforts to justify its military operations and to claim its strict observance of the rules of warfare. Unsurprisingly, many of these efforts have often been penetrated due to the poor and blatant construction exposed by the mainstream Western mass media that perhaps interact closely with the intelligence circles. 

But this hardly means that Western governments and the mass media are bona fide disseminators of war information that are free from distortion and manipulation. This is because, in the modern and contemporary history of war, government propaganda is a commonplace. It is instrumental to mobilize, sustain and strengthen domestic and international support for war efforts, particularly when magnified by mass media. An underdog country can use such propaganda to enhance international support, especially through provision of weapons, ammunition, logistics and, if feasible, reinforcements, to complement its inferior war capability, as well as economic sanction against the top dog country. On the other hand, the latter can employ such a propaganda to enhance popular morale and supplement resource mobilization capacity. 

In fact, Western government war propaganda and the mainstream mass media reports have established a predominant international opinion that sides sympathetically with Ukraine as the innocent underdog[2]. This is particularly because numerous video footage has lively covered massive exoduses of Ukrainian women and children to neighbouring countries, missile bombardment and other forms of shelling against urban residential areas, and vivid images of killed and injured non-combatants as well as combatants, among others. Unfortunately, timely open-source information on evolving operational and tactical realities is limited, partial, unbalanced and/or, biased, possibly with intentional distortions and manipulations. Yet, the reports seem to prove atrocities committed by the Russian invasion forces, demonizing these forces and President Vladimir Putin at the levels of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.

Yet, war propaganda becomes unplausible and ineffective, especially when detached from evolving battlefield realities. Until then, war propaganda surely hampers coolheaded analysis and appropriate policy prescription on how to end a war, while unnecessarily protracting warfare involving a significantly higher death toll and further destruction.

In this light, this study will cast some different light on the tenability of the predominant factual recognition and discourse in mainstream Western mass media. The first jus in bello cases is about Western allegation of atrocities committed by the Russian side against Ukrainian non-combatants, particularly under the condition of extremely fierce urban warfare in the cities of Mariupol and Bucha. The second jus ad bellum case is about Russian allegation of U.S.-assisted biological weapon R&D in Ukraine. These cases are particularly important because most of Western news and reports have flatly turned down Russian counterparts as misinformation and disinformation, without any serious examination. Certainly, the current author of this piece does not enjoy any privileged access to classified information but only to open sources. Yet, careful examination of open-source materials, including Russian and alternative media sources, may make it possible to identify blind assumptions and invalid judgements in the current dominant Western discourse, if not to present correct facts and cogent judgements.

1-The Mariupol Case


The Context

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in his on-line speech of March 23 to the Japanese Diet that several thousand Ukrainian civilians, including 121 children, had been killed, together with nine million refugees and internally displaced civilians[3]. This unexpectedly low level of death toll may indicate that Russian invasion forces exercised certain self-restraint in attacking civilians, except collateral damage.

In fact, Douglas Macgregor[4], a retired U.S. Army Colonel and a Senior Advisor to Acting Secretary of Defence Christopher Miller, stated that, despite the strong impression generated by the repeated exposure to video footage, President Vladimir Putin strictly ordered from the outset of the war to avoid killing civilians and destroying urban areas as much as possible[5]. This is consistent with his historical outlook on the triune Russian national identity – White, Little and Great Russians (respectively, Belarussians, Ukrainians and Russians), characterized by strong historical unity and brotherhood[6]. Naturally, it begs the question of why the Russian forces killed many Ukrainian civilians and severely destroyed urban residential areas in Ukraine, involving an inscrutable disjunction between Putin’s own creed and practice.

Extremely fierce urban warfare, especially in the City of Mariupol, is a natural consequence of the stark disparity of Russian and Ukrainian military power, to which both sides have even introduced foreign volunteer fighters and mercenaries[7]. With its overwhelming superiority, the Russian invasion forces neutralized a significant portion of main high-end platforms, assets and on-ground facilities of the Ukrainian armed forces at the initial stage of the current war, including air superiority fighters, major battle tanks and the command & control systems[8]. This is consistent with numerous video footage available in public domain that primarily captures Ukrainian infantry operations with portable anti-tank missiles for close combat and low-altitude anti-air missiles, while few high-end platforms are visible. In fact, the Russian Defence Ministry said that, soon after the start of the war, the Russian forces totally destroyed Ukrainian Air Force combat aircraft while some of them escaped to Poland and Romania[9]. Reportedly, the Russia forces destroyed 974 Ukrainian tanks and other armoured vehicles just for the first three weeks[10]. No wonder, MacGregor judged that the Ukrainian units still active “(were) completely surrounded, cut off and isolated in various town and cities”, with supplies likely running out soon[11]. Ukrainian infantry and special operation forces in Mariupol were cornered at bay without reinforcement nor air cover. An Azov Battalion commander there vainly urged the U.S.-led NATO to make armed intervention against Russia, especially to set an effective no-fly zone over Ukraine, while attributing a grave humanitarian crisis in the making to Russia[12]。 

Who attacked the maternity hospital and the drama theatre?

The Ukrainian government strongly condemned Russia for its military attack against a maternity hospital in Mariupol on March 17[13], which injured 17 people including women, children and doctors, with at least five of them dead thereafter[14]. But Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov justified the attack because an Azov Battalion unit turned the hospital to a combat base[15], claiming the victims as unavoidable and lawful collateral damage. Surprisingly, the pregnant woman on spotlight in the reports later disclosed that Ukrainian soldiers used the hospital as base while holding these civilians as human shield against Russian forces, suggesting that the incident was an act of self-destruct and a false flag operation by the Ukraine’s side[16]. This is compatible with other fragmentary video footage that capture how Ukrainian civilians in Mariupol have been used as human shield[17] and prevented from leaving the city[18]. 

Also, the Ukrainian government alleged, echoed aloud by major Western mass media, that, on March 16, a Russian airstrike dropped a powerful bomb on the Mariupol Drama Theatre sheltering some 1,300 local residents, including women and children, and despite large signs of “children” that were clearly visible from aircraft. Reportedly, the death toll reached at least to 300[19]. The Russian government flatly denied the allegation and instead accused the Azov Battalion, a far-right Ukrainian militia, of blowing up the theatre building. This is compatible with the interview of a 17- year-old female survivor of the incident with the Abkhazian Network News Agency, who eye-witnessed Azov soldiers hiding themselves behind civilian hostages in the building[20].

More specifically, a Russian military spokesman stated that Azov Battalion units held civilian hostages in the theatre building as human shield, using the upper floor as firing points. This means that the Russian attack aimed at these units, involving significant civilian casualties as collateral damage during the engagement[21]. This is a plausible account on what happened, particularly given the very similar circumstances of the above hospital case.

It is now crucially important to inquire what the Azov Battalion is all about and if the troop has the established notoriety of committing such atrocities.

The Azov Battalion[22] 

The Azov Battalion is now a part of the Ukrainian National Guard, which is the country’s gendarmerie under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its name originates from the fact that it has been based in Mariupol in the Azov Sea costal region since 2014, first as a volunteer militia that fought against Russian separatist forces in the Donbas War and later in the same year incorporated into the National Guard while expanded in scale into a regiment. As Russia labels it as neo-Nazis, it in fact uses controversial symbols resembling the Nazis SS Wolfsangel, though it denies any connection with Nazism[23]. Yet, in 2015, an Azov spokesman disclosed 10-20% of units consisted of neo-Nazis members[24]. The concern over the Azov is serious enough to the extent that the U.S. Congress enacted a legislative measure, Consolidated Appropriation Bill of 2018, to ban military aids to the paramilitary due to its white supremacist ideology and neo-Nazism[25].

The Azov has faced serious allegations of committing torture and war crimes, including the grossly under investigated case of the 2014 Odessa Clashes in which some 50 pro-Russia separatists were killed[26]. In fact, the U.N. Human Rights Office of High Commissioner published reports that connect the Azov Battalion to war crimes such as mass looting, unlawful detention, and torture[27]. Clearly. Russia’s counter-allegations on the above atrocities in Mariupol are at least compatible with an established understanding on Azov’s behavioural pattern connected to war crimes.

Actually, Russia’s emphasis and Western de-emphasis on the Azov Battalion is obscurely central to their intensified exchanges of war propaganda and counter-propaganda, on the ground that the paramilitary has constituted a major U.S instrument of covert military intervention in Russia-Ukraine armed conflict. More specifically, the CIA had a secret advisory and training program for Ukrainian paramilitaries and militias, most probably including the Azov, for eight years until shortly before the start of the current war, despite the aforementioned legislative ban. The CIA has had training centres in the U.S. and eastern Ukraine for sniper techniques[28], anti-tank missile handling, covert communications, and other tactics necessary for insurgency and counter-insurgency[29]. Thus, the issue of the Azov Battalion cannot simply be reduced to the question of war crimes, but can only be fully comprehended in the context of a U.S.-Russia proxy war over the Donbas region that is central to NATO expansion to Ukraine and determination of their spheres of interest.

2. The Bucha Case 

A similar suspicion of war propaganda is not easily excludable, with a focus on the atrocities allegedly committed by the Russian armed forces against local Ukrainian civilians in the city of Bucha. Major Western governments and the mainstream mass media are condemning, with strongest terms, the unspeakable atrocities against local Ukrainian civilians on the way of retreat after hard battles to vainly capture Kiev. However, on March 31 when the Russian forces left the city, its mayor did not at all mention of the atrocities in an interview with a Ukrainian on-line news site[30] which is compatible with his bright expression in a selfie video taken on the same day[31]. On April 2, when Ukrainian army forces entered the city to make sure of a complete retreat of the Russian forces, the video footage by a local news media captured no corpse on roads and no sign of emotional distress among the local population. On April 1, Azov Battalion troops entered the city[32], and on April 3, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence released video footage as evidence of the atrocities committed by the Russian forces, which neither the New York Times nor the Pentagon are independently able to verify the assertion of the Ministry[33]. In addition, in the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. and the U.K. blocked Russia’s proposal to send an independent fact-finding mission to Ukraine[34]. 

Thus, there is a good possibility that the Azov Battalion might have fabricated or purposefully committed at least some parts of the “atrocities” by itself[35]. (More specifically, to differentiate which camp they belong, pro-Ukraine and pro-Russian civilians wear blue or white armbands respectively. Many corpses in Bucha wore white armbands as in video footage available. The Azov and/or other ultra-right militia units may have committed the atrocities out of emotional impulse, while the mass media and propaganda section of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs may have made up the scene to impute responsibilities of war crime to the Russian invasion forces[36]. It should be reminded that the current war has the dimension of ethnic conflict as well as that of inter-state war.)

Given the leading role of BBC reports on this matter with the analysis of a satellite image, this begs the question of if the U.K. intelligence circles are engaged in elaborate war propaganda against Russia to mislead and manipulate other major Western governments and mass media[37].

3. The Case of Biological Weapon R&D

Possession of weapon of mass destruction by a revisionist power may constitute a casus bello of a status quo power, particularly when the latter sees the former’s move as its existential threat or serious threat against its vital national interests. Yet, legitimatizing a war has to satisfy some procedural requirements according to international law with presentation of solid evidence to the international society. 

In this light, Russia’s allegation on Ukraine’s nuclear weapon programs is not tenable at all, at least at this point, due to its abrupt aggression against Ukraine without presenting any substantial evidence[38]. Also, there are little significant related information in public domain, though Ukraine has active nuclear power plants with some substantial potential to develop nuclear weapons as the country was part of the Soviet Union.

But Russia’s accusation of U.S.-assisted biological weapon R&D in Ukraine, as articulated with a trove of original documentation by Lieutenant-General Igor Kirillov, Commander of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troop of the Russian Army[39], is not totally deniable but seems plausible with open-source information[40]. Most remarkably, Victoria Nuland, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, admitted the existence of biolaboratories in Ukraine under the bilateral cooperative programs of the U.S. Defence Threat Reduction Agency during a hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations[41], while the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department unequivocally denied U.S.-funded biological weapon laboratories in Ukraine[42]. In addition, an official letter from an official in charge at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence to a project manager of Black & Veatch, a DTRA contractor, attests to their significant collaborative research relationship, while another official letter from an official in charge at the DTRA office in Kiev to an official in charge at the Ukraine Ministry Defence indicates their clear awareness of the potential usefulness of their research collaboration for biological weapon development[43]. 

Certainly, the Agency’s Biological Threat Reduction Programs may serve bona fide statutory purposes, not designed to contribute to virus and other biological weapon R&D. Yet, suspicion remains, given that the offense and defence of biological warfare is generally the head and tail of similar biological weapon technologies while there is no clear demarcation line between military and civil research in most advanced virus and other biological R&D that involves genetic manipulation. The lack of confidence in the sectoral culture has recently become worse because Anthony Fauci, Chief Medical Advisor to the President Joseph Biden, hid the fact before a Senate hearing that the EcoHealth Alliance, New York City-based non-profit organization, funnelled U.S. public funds to gain-of-function research on bat coronaviruses at China’s Wuhan lab, making it feasible to bypass stringent domestic regulations and strict public eyes. The experiment is suspected potentially useful for biological weapon R&D, and a virus leak from the lab might have been a primary cause of the current COVIT-19 pandemic[44].

4. Reflection

Hitherto, this investigative inquiry has cast significant doubt and suspicion on the established Western discourse that sided uncritically with Ukraine in its war against hyper-demonized Russia, almost exclusively on the basis of Western government war information and mass media reports, and without carefully checking Russian reports. 

Of course, Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine is utterly indisputable, and a great number of innocent Ukrainian civilians have been killed in the current war, either in atrocity or collateral damage. But who killed how many civilians and in what ways is not self-evident as reported in the Western media, especially in the context of ethnic conflict and urban warfare as the world learnt from gross information manipulation in the former Yugoslavia ethnic conflict[45]. It is increasingly necessary to check Western reports carefully against Russian ones, while verifying the authenticity of allegedly “original” U.S. documents presented by the Russian government and mass media. The U.S. government will be accountable, if verified.

Inundated with propaganda and counter-propaganda both by the West and Russia day after day, both political leaders and the public in the West will suffer self-poisoning effect of the hyper-demonized image of Russia on making coolheaded policy analysis. It is high time that the Western governments and mainstream mass media recalibrate war propaganda and counter-propaganda, in view of the need to think of how to end the current war and to keep diplomatic channels open with Russia that would most unlikely capitulate, given that it is a nuclear power coequal to the United States

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Footnotes:
[1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has Special Consultative status at ECOSOC/UN, New York, since 2018.
[2] Despite the current image of an innocent victim, Ukraine has continually played a disturbing role to Asian and international security, particularly because it sold an ex-Soviet aircraft career, Varyag, as scrap to China, that has been already repaired and commissioned as the country’s first aircraft career, Liaoning; and because Ukraine has not effectively banned outflows of ballistic missile technologies to North Korea that has significantly contributed to the development of its nuclear weapon programs. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “North Korea’s Missile Success Is Linked to Ukrainian Plant, Investigators Say”, New York Times, August 14, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/world/asia/north-korea-missiles-ukraine-factory.html.
[3] Ukrainian President Zelensky ‘s speech to the Japanese Diet, Japan Forward, March 24, 2022, https://japan-forward.com/read-the-full-speech-by-president-of-ukraine-volodymyr- zelenskyy-to-japans-national-diet/. 
[4] Steve Benen, “Why a former Trump appointee’s pro-Russia rhetoric matters”, MSNBC, March 1, 2022, https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/maddowblog/former-trump-appointees-russia-rhetoric-matters-rcna17957.
[5] Tyler Stone, “Macgregor: Washington Wants War To Continue As Long As Possible In Hopes To Overthrow Putin”, Real Clear Politics, March 16, 2022, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2022/03/16/macgregor_washington_wants_war_to_continue_as_long_as_possible_in_hopes_to_overthrown_putin.html. “Former top Pentagon advisor Doug Macgregor on Russia-Ukraine war”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NFngc_8RiVc. His statement is faithfully recorded in: “American military expert explains ‘slow’ Russian advance in Ukraine”, RT, March 16, 2022, https://www.rt.com/russia/552098-ukraine-speed-operations-civilians/.
[6] Vladimir Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, July 12,2021, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181.
[7] Will Fyfe , “Ukraine: Private militias recruiting former soldiers”, BBC News, March 10, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-60676720; “Russia claims to kill ‘180 foreign mercenaries’ in strike on western Ukraine”, Time of Israel, March 13, 2022, https://www.timesofisrael.com/russia-claims-missile-strike-in-western-ukraine-killed-180-foreign-mercenaries/; Mari Saito and Elaine Lies, “Dozens volunteer to fight for Ukraine in pacifist Japan”, Japan Times, March 2, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/03/02/national/japan-volunteers-ukraine/; and, Jack Losh, “Putin Resorts to Syrian Mercenaries in Ukraine. It’s Not the First Time.”, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/25/russia-war-syrian-mercenaries-car-ukraine/
[8] Luke MacGee, “How long can Ukraine hold out in the war for the skies?”, CNN, March 18, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/17/europe/air-superiority-ukraine-russia-intl-cmd/index.html.
[9] Joseph P Chacko, “Ukrainian Airforce combat aircraft totally destroyed, some escaped to Poland and Romania, says Russia,” Frontier India, March 7, 2022, https://frontierindia.com/ukrainian-airforce-combat-aircraft-totally-destroyed-some-escaped-to-poland-and-romania-says-russia/.
[10] “Russia says it destroyed 974 Ukrainian tanks and armoured vehicles -TASS”, Reuters, March 9, 2022, https://jp.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-russia-tanks/russia-says-it-destroyed-974-ukrainian-tanks-and-armoured-vehicles-tass-idUSP4N2HB01U.
[11] “Former top Pentagon advisor Doug Macgregor on Russia-Ukraine war”, op.cit.
[12] “Official appeal of Azov commander, the major Denis Prokopenko, to the world community”, March 7, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dZ8KFqQWRbY.
[13] “Mariupol hospital attack: Pregnant woman hurt in bombing gives birth “, BBC, March 11, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60715492.
[14] Katie Polglase, Gianluca Mezzofiore and Livvy Doherty, “Anatomy of the Mariupol hospital attack”, CNN Special Report, March 17, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2022/03/europe/mariupol-maternity-hospital-attack/index.html.
[15] Ibid.
[16] An interview with Marianna Vyshemirskaya, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AWn6I8cCAug.
[17] https://mobile.twitter.com/j_sato/status/1507201492326838273.
[18] https://twitter.com/stillgray/status/1504758870635597831.
[19] “Historic Theater Sheltering Mariupol Civilians Hit By Air Strike, Number Of Casualties Unknown”, Radio Free Europe, March 16, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-mariupol-thearer-destroyed-strike/31756641.html. Tim Stelloh, “Satellite images show apparent devastation, hunger in Mariupol”, NBC News, March 30, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/satellite-images-show-apparent-devastation-hunger-mariupol-rcna22119.
[20] Max Blumenthal, “Was bombing of Mariupol theater staged by Ukrainian Azov extremists to trigger NATO intervention?”, Monthly Review Online, March 22, 2022, https://mronline.org/2022/03/22/was-bombing-of-mariupol-theater-staged-by-ukrainian-azov-extremists-to-trigger-nato-intervention.
[21] “Ukraine backtracks on Mariupol theater claims”, RT, March 18, 2022, https://www.rt.com/russia/552266-mariupol-theater-civilians-survived/.
[22] There are at least several major pro-Ukraine and pro-Russian militias, including those similar to the Azov Battalion. This study focuses primarily on the Azov as atypical example due the limited analytical purpose. Mitch Ruhl, “Paramilitary Forces in Ukraine: Matches to a Powder Keg”, Small Wars Journal, February 21, 2022, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/paramilitary-forces-ukraine-matches-powder-keg.
[23] “Azov Battalion”, Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, https://stanford.app.box.com/s/7ocm1tlvp2uydbki04qiuph4oa5j8tg9.
[24] Oren Dorell, “Volunteer Ukrainian unit includes Nazis”, USA Today, March 01, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/10/ukraine-azov-brigade-nazis-abuses-separatists/24664937/.
[25] Rebecca Kheel, “Congress bans arms to Ukraine militia linked to neo-Nazism”, Hill, March 27, 2018, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/380483-congress-bans-arms-to-controversial-ukrainian-militia-linked-to-neo-nazis/.
[26] Roman Goncharenko, “The Odessa file: What happened on May 2, 2014?”, Deutsche Welle, May 2, 2015, https://www.dw.com/en/the-odessa-file-what-happened-on-may-2-2014/a-18425200.
[27] “Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016″, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, February 2016, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_13th_HRMMU_Report_3March2016.pdf; and, “Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 February to 15 May 2016″, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, May 2016, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_14th_HRMMU_Report.pdf.
[28] Ben Tobias, “War in Ukraine: Fourth Russian general killed – Zelensky”, BBC News, March 16, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60767664.
[29] Zach Dorfman, “CIA-trained Ukrainian paramilitaries may take central role if Russia invade”, Yahoo News, January 14, 2022, https://www.yahoo.com/news/cia-trained-ukrainian-paramilitaries-may-take-central-role-if-russia-invades-185258008.html.
[30] “Bucha liberated from Russian invaders – mayor”, UKRINFORM, April 1, 2022, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3445989-bucha-liberated-from-russian-invaders-mayor.html.
[31] https://twitter.com/j_sato/status/1510943234129682432.
[32] “Scenes of desperation and death as the Russians retreat from suburbs outside Kyiv”, New York Times, April 2, 2022, 10:27 p.m. ET,  https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/04/03/world/ukraine-russia-war.
[33] Anushka Patil, April 3, 2022, 7:03 pm ET, Ibid. “Pentagon can’t independently confirm atrocities in Ukraine’s Bucha, official say”, Reuters, April 5, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/pentagon-cant-independently-confirm-atrocities-ukraines-bucha-official-says-2022-04-04/?fbclid=IwAR1rCp3Z1FlmsyaJhHP3L8roWIyS8OrFiOoDW2pVIwVzqoNPMblxw7THUDg.
[34] “Russia calls Security Council meeting over Bacha”, RT, April 3, 2022, https://www.rt.com/russia/553242-bucha-un-security-council/.
[35] “Russia and Ukraine trade accusations over Bucha civilian deaths (TIMELINE)”, RT, April 4, 2022, https://www.rt.com/russia/553274-bucha-war-crimes-allegations/.
[36] “If you are living in Bucha, please use blue arm band. don’t use white arm band like Russian”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFZar6DXD1Y. Nick Griffin, “MSM’s Bucha Tall Tale”, Sputnik International, April 5, 2022, https://sputniknews.com/20220405/msms-bucha-tall-tale-1094504500.html.
[37] “Bucha killings: Satellite image of bodies site contradicts Russian claims”, BBC News, April 6, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/60981238.
[38] “Russia, without evidence, says Ukraine making nuclear ‘dirty bomb’”, Reuters, March 6, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-without-evidence-says-ukraine-making-nuclear-dirty-bomb-2022-03-06/.
[39] “US biological facilities in #ukraine #russia #war”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IYzmIIYfx4g.
[40] More than a dozen of DTRA documents on biolabs in Ukraine are archived though they had been removed from the official website of the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine. For the hyperlinks to them, see, Silviu Costinescu, “US ran gruesome bioweapon research in over 25 countries. Wuhan, tip of an iceberg”, June 3, 2021, https://silview.media/2021/06/03/us-ran-grewsome-bioweapon-research-in-over-25-countries-wuhan-tip-of-an-iceberg-ecohealth-alliance-implicated-again/.
[41] “What Victoria Nuland really said about biolaboratories in Ukraine”, EURORADIO, March 13, 2022, https://euroradio.fm/en/what-victoria-nuland-really-said-about-biolaboratories-ukraine.
[42] Ling Qiu “Theory about U.S.-funded bioweapons labs in Ukraine is unfounded”, New York Time, March 12, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/03/12/world/ukraine-biolabs-media-claims/.
[43] Ilya Tsukanov, “Russian MoD Names Curator of Pentagon-Funded Biolabs in Ukraine, Releases Original Docs”, Sputnik International, March 17, 2022, https://sputniknews.com/20220317/russia-believes-components-of-biological-weapons-were-created-in-ukraine—mod-1093960475.html.
[44] Emily Crane, “NIH admits US funded gain-of-function in Wuhan — despite Fauci’s denials”, New York Post, October 21, 2021, https://nypost.com/2021/10/21/nih-admits-us-funded-gain-of-function-in-wuhan-despite-faucis-repeated-denials/#.
[45] Shinya Watanabe, “The Influence of the Nation-State on Art : The Case of the Former Yugoslavian Countries”,2004, http://www.shinyawatanabe.net/nationstate/thesis3.htm.

This article has been originally published by International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies Ljubljana/Osaka, April 20, 2022

About the author: 

Prof. Dr. Masahiro Matsumura


Prof. Dr. Masahiro Matsumura is Professor of International Politics and National Security, Faculty of Law, St. Andrew’s University (Momoyama Gakuin Daigaku). He is Member of IFIMES Council.

The views expressed in this explanatory note are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.

Putin and International Law : Revisited

Diplomat Magazine
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Putin and International Law : Revisited

By Steven van Hoogstraten

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an Order on 16 March 2022, indicating that “the Russian Federation should immediately suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February in the territory of Ukraine”. This Order was made up under the Genocide Convention of 1948 [1], invoked by Ukraine to support its case. Ukraine stated that there simply was no genocide by Ukraine against the Russian speaking population in the Donbas region which could be used as a pretext for military action by Russia against Ukraine. The Genocide Convention has a compulsory system for disputes between states, involving the establishment of jurisdiction of the ICJ for settling such disputes. .

We are a full month later, and no practical steps have followed this judgment by the ICJ. More precisely, the Russian Federation continues and intensifies the military operation notably in the East of Ukraine (the Donbas region). Heavy losses of life are being reported amongst the civilian population, which seems to be targeted by the Russian forces in order to create disorder and terror. Terrible examples of military misbehaviour are shown on our TV’s, leading to claims of war crimes and even of genocide by the Russian forces. Commentators of international justice are suggesting ways and means how to prosecute such crimes, and how to hold Putin to account, without however identifying a track that would work without the cooperation of Russia itself. 

For the moment, it is still highly unclear (at best) what the effect of the Order of the ICJ will be. Rather likely, it will go down as an unintended failure of the international legal system to be effective in restoring peaceful relations between states. Bringing this case to the table of the Security Council, according to the procedure set out in the Charter of the UN, does not offer much hope as the Russian Federation holds a power of veto over any decision-making in that Council.

Against this gloomy background, it is interesting to look back to the time that the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, brought a visit to the Peace Palace. This was in November 2005[2]. He was received with full honours by the ICJ, and delivered a speech to the 15 judges of the Court, at the time under the presidency of judge Shi from China.  I remember it very well, as I was in charge at that time in the Peace Palace. There also was a distinct Russian interest to learn more about the history of this institution in which the Russian czar Nicolas II played a pioneering role.

President Putin stated first that he was trained in the Russian school of law, and that he took great pride in addressing the principal judicial organ of the UN[3]. He dwelt some time on the important Russian contributions to the first Peace Conference in the Hague in 1899, and noted that not only had this conference given rise to the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration – the first permanent universal mechanism for the settlement of inter-state disputes – but equally significant, it had led to the concept of international justice itself.

The Russian President told the judges of the ICJ  â€œthat Russia had confirmed (in 2005) its commitment to the primacy of international law”. Russia, he said “is in favour of strengthening the Courts’ role”. President Putin stressed  that the “judgements and advisory opinions of the ICJ play an extremely important role in strengthening and developing international legal principles and norms;  because they provide a clear understanding of States’ rights and obligations”.

The Court , he added,  influences in a positive way  the process of universalization of international law and serves to bolster the stability and legitimacy of the United Nations.

If one reads this, the conclusion can be no other than that the words and good intentions of President Putin were there, back in 2005. Words of respect for the ICJ, and words of involvement in the shaping of international law. Would someone in the close vicinity of the Russian President have the courage to remind him of this positive attitude towards international law, and explain that the military invasion of another country simply tramps under foot the rights of that other country under the United Nations Charter ?

And that an Order by the International Court of Justiceshould be given a follow up, even if the Order did not go your preferred way ?

The Order of the ICJ in the case brought by Ukraine should not go down in history as just a piece of paper, or as an email attachment which is easy to delete. The world must not allow the international legal order to be brushed to the side , as is being done now.

[1] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

[2] The visit took place on 2 November 2005

[3] All references to the speech by V. Putin are taken from his orginal Russian text, translated by the ICJ staff in English and French.

Key to Ukraine

Diplomat Magazine
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Key to Ukraine

Re-calibration, contextualization, de-escalation

By Alexander G. Savelyev, Olga M. Alexandria

The strategic stability concept was created in the United States after it had become absolutely clear that a nuclear war between the USSR and the U.S. would inevitably lead to their complete destruction. This concept is based on the nuclear deterrence policy, which was also devised in the United States at the dawn of the nuclear era and designed to show the U.S. ability to deliver a crushing nuclear strike in the event of a possible adversary’s aggression against America or its allies. But as the strategic arsenals of the two sides equalized, it became absolutely clear that each of them was capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on each other even after absorbing a counter-force attack. Therefore, nuclear war becomes senseless as it will inevitably end in complete destruction of the warring parties.

At first, the Soviet Union and the United States (and then Russia and the U.S.) agreed, informally and later in official nuclear arms control agreements, to maintain the situation of “mutual destruction,” which essentially served as a basis for the strategic stability concept. In June 1990, the sides reached a common understanding of this term. They defined strategic stability as the balance of strategic nuclear forces that rules out incentives for any party to launch a nuclear first strike. The parties did not specify what exactly they meant by such incentives. Nevertheless, based on the overall context of the nuclear deterrence concept, most experts concluded that it could be the acquisition by one side of the ability to launch a disarming first strike.

The set of factors that could influence strategic stability in its initial interpretation was quite limited: it implied only those of them that affect the ability to deliver a first strike and a retaliatory strike. Apart from quantitative and qualitative characteristics of strategic offensive weapons, such factors also include missile defense, antisubmarine defense, and air defense. The Soviet Union and the United States officially recognized the special influence of missile defense on strategic stability and in 1972 concluded an open-ended ABM Treaty, thereby sharply limiting the negative impact of this factor.

As new weapons appeared, including more effective non-nuclear ones, many experts began to say that the new systems could have a serious impact on strategic stability as well. They include strategic non-nuclear systems, precision weapons, primarily non-nuclear global strike weapons, space weapons (if any), and others.

Simultaneously, the term ‘strategic stability’ itself began to be interpreted more broadly. As a result, in many cases, strategic stability became almost synonymous with security, and the range of factors that can affect strategic stability in this interpretation has expanded dramatically. This process is characteristic not only of Russia, but also of the United States and other Western countries. As for China, the term ‘strategic stability’ is not used at all, at least in official rhetoric.

Such a “broad” approach did not negate the original interpretation of the term ‘strategic stability’ based on the nuclear deterrence concept. As before, this term is used by the professional community when negotiating and evaluating agreements on strategic nuclear weapons, with its almost identical understanding by all parties involved, primarily Russia and the United States.

From our point of view, the “broad” understanding of strategic stability should mean the “sustainability of political-military relations” between both states and their associations. It is difficult to say why the term ‘strategic stability’ came into use instead. Apparently, it turned out to be so handy and attractive that its use in relation to the political and military situation in various areas and regions of the world was considered quite justified not only by Russian, but also by many Western politicians and experts.

Our survey did not seek to find out what interpretation of strategic stability prevails in the Russian expert community, and what point of view each of the interviewed experts holds. We consider that it is much more important to identify the factors that affect strategic stability at present and will affect it in the foreseeable future, as well as ways to strengthen security and stability in any of the above interpretations.

Methods and Composition of the Expert Group

Expert surveys use various, often unique, methods. Some of them are created exclusively for a specific case study. Nevertheless, there are some universal guiding principles. This particular survey used an integrated approach, which, in our opinion, proved most effective.

A special questionnaire was drawn up for this survey and sent to each expert individually. The experts did not know who else was participating in the survey or how many people were to be polled. The questionnaire contained questions that each expert had to answer in consecutive order. It also provided sample tables. The survey mainly took place in absentia, but some of the experts were interviewed in person. Their questionnaires were filled in during the interview which was conducted using the standard method. The multi-stage (Delphic) method was not used.

Experts were selected individually on the basis of open information about their qualifications and authority. The group included leading Russian specialists, with many years’ professional experience in the international security field. The initial plan was that twenty-four experts would take part in the survey, but four of them could not participate for various reasons. The survey was conducted on condition of anonymity, and no names of the experts will appear in this article. However, we must say that the majority of the experts involved have academic degrees (five hold doctoral and thirteen candidate degrees). At least a third of the twenty experts have practical experience in conducting official arms control negotiations, and have worked in various Soviet and Russian military and civilian bodies (Foreign or Defense Ministry). In particular, four of them have the military rank of general. During the survey, the experts gave detailed answers to the questions asked, which allows the authors to make a number of generalizations and conclusions that sufficiently reflect the views of a significant part of the Russian military-political elite on one of the most pressing security issues, that is, the need to strengthen strategic stability.

It should be emphasized that Russian experts were invited to participate in the survey regardless of their political views. The selection was based on their professional experience, authority in academic, military, and political circles in Russia and abroad, and a high level of their expertise. With this regard we believe that the conclusions and recommendations presented in this work generally reflect the opinion of the Russian professional expert community on important security and strategic stability issues.

Factors Affecting Strategic Stability

According to the results of the survey, experts identified twenty different factors which they believe affect strategic stability at present or will affect it in the future. In fact, more such factors were named, but we combined answers that looked similar in order to systematize the data. For example, the “High-precision weapons group” also included “rapid global strike weapons” and “hypersonic weapons,” and the Ukraine factor was incorporated into the “Growing conflict intensity between leading world powers” group.

During the survey, each of the experts (with only one exception) named three to ten factors that, to his opinion, affect strategic stability. At the same time, the majority cited from six to seven such factors. In total, nineteen out of twenty experts named 127 factors, which in most cases were identical in different answers. Only one respondent believes that there will be no threats to strategic stability in the foreseeable future, and there are no factors that can motivate countries to use nuclear weapons. At the same time, he thinks that the risk of the use of nuclear weapons remains, but solely due to a combination of accidental events and technical failures.

Most often the factor of space weapons was mentioned (90% of experts). Precision weapons (including rapid global strike and hypersonic weapons) rank second with 85%. They are followed by missile defense (ABM) and cyber weapons (both factors were mentioned by 80% of respondents), third-country nuclear weapons (75%), and non-strategic nuclear weapons (75%). The remaining factors were named by less than half of the experts polled. According to 40% of the survey respondents, the most significant of them are various interpretations of growing conflict intensity between leading countries, primarily Russia and the U.S. and NATO, the U.S. and China, and the West and the East (see Fig. 1).

https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/2022-04-12_21-42-23.png

The above picture will be incomplete unless we consider the experts’ responses in terms of the importance of each factor. Space weapons top the list. Nine out of eighteen experts who included this factor in the list named their major impact on strategic stability. Two experts put space weapons in second place, three in fourth place, one in fifth place, and three in sixth place.

Only one expert named precision weapons as the main factor affecting strategic stability. Three experts put this factor in second place, seven in fourth place, four in fifth place, and two in eighth place. None of the experts considered missile defense to be the main factor influencing strategic stability. Only one respondent put missile defense in second place, three in third place, eight in fifth place, three in sixth place, and one in ninth place. Only one expert mentioned antisubmarine defense (third place), and no one named air defense.

Two experts ranked cyber weapons third―the highest position in this group. Three experts put this factor in fourth place, one in fifth, eight in sixth, and two in seventh place. Only one expert named third-country nuclear weapons as the main factor affecting strategic stability. Nine respondents ranked them second, one put them in third place, one in fourth place, one in fifth place, and as many put them in seventh and eighth places. Non-strategic nuclear weapons received two first places, one second place, seven third places, four fourth places, and one seventh place.

Growing conflict intensity between leading world powers was noted as the main factor affecting strategic stability by four experts. One expert put this factor in second place, and one gave it third place. The Ukraine conflict received one first place and one third place.

Our preliminary conclusion is that, in terms of quantitative indicators, space weapons are the most important factor that, according to leading Russian experts, affects strategic stability. This factor ranks first both in terms of the total number of references and the number of answers that put it at the top of the list. The quantitative distribution of the other positions does not clearly indicate the importance of the other factors mentioned by the experts. In this case, everything depends on the chosen evaluation methods.

For example, judging by the total number of references (as mentioned above), high-precision weapons should be followed by space weapons, then missile defense and cyber weapons, third-country nuclear weapons and non-strategic nuclear weapons. But if the list of factors is drawn up according to the ranking by the degree of importance (the number of first places), then the picture will change quite dramatically (Fig. 2). Space weapons will remain in first place (nine first places), but the second position will be occupied by growing conflict intensity between leading world powers (five first places). They are followed by non-strategic nuclear weapons (two first places), and four other factors, each holding one first place (third-country nuclear weapons, precision weapons, agreements on strategic offensive weapons, the crisis of the system of international institutions). At the same time, missile defense and cyber weapons, which were never put at the top, fall out of the first part of the list.

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We considered that further specification in determining key factors among those that have the greatest impact on strategic stability, for example, by ranking them according to the average position assigned to them by the experts, would be redundant and even misleading. This would distort the overall picture, since the least often mentioned factors but holding top positions would have an advantage. Therefore, in this case more informative will be analyzing the received results qualitatively by examining these factors in terms of their impact on strategic stability as assessed by Russian experts.

The Impact of Individual Factors on Strategic Stability

As mentioned above, the experts assessed how the factors they named will impact strategic stability in 2022, 2026, and 2036. The summary data based on their responses are given in Table 1 and Graphs showing the dynamics of each factor’s impact on strategic stability.

Table 1. Impact of individual factors on strategic stability in 2022, 2026, and 2036, %

Factor/Year 202220262036
Space weapons 52060
Precision weapons, including rapid global strike and hypersonic weapons 153555
Missile defense 0520
Cyber weapons 52055
Third-country nuclear weapons 103560
Non-strategic nuclear weapons 202035
Growing conflict intensity between leading countries (Russia-NATO and U.S., U.S.-China) 403020

Let us consider each year separately.

2022. The results of the survey show that the growing conflict intensity between leading world powers has the greatest impact on strategic stability at present. This impact was assessed as “significant” by all six experts who included it in their lists, regardless of its place in them. If we add up the factor of Ukraine (mentioned by two experts who marked it as “significant influence”), we will see that almost half of the experts name these factors as having the main impact on strategic stability.

Against this background, the factors that topped the lists in the quantitative analysis have noticeably lost their positions. For example, second place is held by non-strategic nuclear weapons, whose impact on strategic stability was assessed as “significant” by four experts.

Three experts assessed the influence of precision weapons as significant. These are followed by third-country nuclear weapons (two), space weapons (one), cyber weapons (one), and missile defense, the impact of which on strategic stability was not regarded as significant by any of the experts polled.

The impact of strategic offensive weapons, including START treaties, on strategic stability was assessed as significant by all three experts who mentioned this factor.

2026. By 2026, several factors can significantly increase their influence on strategic stability, thus moving up to the top of the list and pushing growing conflict intensity to third place. This is, first of all, precision weapons, the influence of which this year was considered significant by seven experts. The same can be said of third-country nuclear weapons (assessed as significant by seven experts).

Russian experts expect the impact of growing conflict intensity between leading world powers on strategic stability to slightly decrease. And yet it will most likely remain a major factor. Five experts assessed its impact as significant. One expert expects the Ukraine factor to continue to have a significant impact on stability.

Experts noted that the influence of other factors on strategic stability will increase by 2026. These include non-strategic nuclear weapons, space weapons, cyber weapons (four experts considered the effect of each factor significant). The impact of missile defense will also slightly increase (one expert).

2036. Russian experts expect the list of the most significant factors in terms of strategic stability to change considerably by 2036. For example, space weapons and third-country nuclear weapons are expected to move up to the top of the list (twelve respondents identified it as significant). Precision weapons, which will somewhat lose their leading position since 2026, and cyber weapons will come close to them (eleven answers each).

This is followed by non-strategic nuclear weapons (seven responses). Least of all, strategic stability will be affected by missile defense and growing conflict intensity between leading world powers (four responses each). It should be noted that the fact that growing conflict intensity moves down does not mean that its impact will decrease substantially. This relocation is solely due to the fact that this factor was named by a smaller number of experts than the others. The impact of growing conflict intensity is assessed mainly as significant throughout the projected period (with the exception of the Ukraine factor, which may lose its significance or even disappear from the list of these factors in 2026).[1]

Fig. 3 shows the change expected by experts in the share of individual factors in the stated years in terms of their “significant” impact on strategic stability.

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As can be seen from Fig. 3, Russian experts believe that by 2036, the main factors affecting strategic stability (except for growing conflict intensity between leading world powers) can become much more significant. All this raises the question of how these factors can be taken into account in order to neutralize their negative impact on security.

Necessary Measures to Address Factors Affecting Strategic Stability

All Russian experts noted that the factors they named as affecting strategic stability should be addressed one way or another by 2036 (see Fig. 4). As for 2026, some experts believe that by that time some factors may be ignored due to their small influence on stability. Space weapons (70% of respondents say they need to be factored in) and precision weapons (also supported by 70% of experts) top this list. They are followed by non-strategic nuclear weapons and cyber weapons (65% of the experts insisted that both factors will have to be taken into account). Finally, missile defense and third-country nuclear weapons come third (55% of respondents believe that these factors must be taken into consideration in 2026).

The experts offered their views on how and in what form the above factors affecting strategic stability should be dealt with in the future. These proposals include a wide range of measures and initiatives for each of the factors named. At the same time, only one of 113 recommendations implies a military-technical response to the actions of other countries, which, in the opinion of this expert, can weaken or even undermine strategic stability.

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Third-Country Nuclear Weapons

Summing up the experts’ proposals, we can note the following. It is important to achieve mutual understanding, primarily between Russia and the United States, on the nuclear arsenals of third countries. The key to solving this problem may be a trilateral dialogue between Russia, the United States, and China, with possible engagement of the other nuclear powers. It should be preceded by increased informal contacts between representatives of these countries, including through international seminars, discussions, other forums, joint projects, etc. To this end, the experts suggest using existing platforms and mechanisms for such contacts, in particular those that have been established and operate within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Ultimately, all efforts should be directed if not towards drafting a multilateral treaty between the five nuclear powers (although some experts suggest such an option), then definitely towards ensuring transparency and predictability in this area. Some experts consider it important to develop a “code of conduct” in the field of nuclear weapons, and persuade individual countries to assume unilateral obligations not to increase their nuclear arsenals.

Missile Defense

None of the experts insisted on the restoration of severe ABM restrictions provided for in the 1972 Treaty. In rare cases, a “light” version of this treaty was proposed, with partial restrictions on certain ABM parameters. Some experts believe that the missile defense issue can be addressed through a trilateral U.S.-Russian-Chinese dialogue as the sides move forward in discussing their nuclear arsenals. Some experts insist on linking strategic offensive arms cuts to defensive systems. Others suggest fixing such interdependence in a future START treaty (START-4), as was done in START-3.

Many experts believe it is important to develop confidence-building and predictability measures in the area of strategic defense, as well as voluntary unilateral measures of restraint in implementing relevant programs. Among direct prohibitions, experts named the advisability of reaching an agreement on the non-deployment of missile defense systems and their components in space.

In general, according to leading Russian experts, missile defense is not among major factors that affect strategic stability. Nevertheless, they believe that it should be addressed, but not under agreements imposing harsh restrictions, but rather on the basis of better mutual understanding, greater predictability, and self-restraint.

Precision Weapons, Rapid Global Strike Systems, Hypersonic Weapons

As mentioned above, in order to systematize the information received from the experts polled, three categories of weapons were combined into one group. In fact, only one out of twenty experts put non-nuclear rapid global strike systems and hypersonic weapons in separate categories. Therefore, the recommendations below will apply to all three arms groups combined under the name “precision weapons.”

A large part of the experts interviewed proposed to conclude agreements on certain categories of these weapons. Some believe that it would be possible to draw up a treaty covering certain categories of precision weapons. Another solution is to incorporate precision weapons capable of carrying nuclear weapons into a new START-4.

Some experts think that coordinating separate protocols, declarations and joint understandings without drafting a special treaty would be enough. This should be accompanied by increased confidence-building and transparency measures, as well as unilateral steps to address concerns about specific aspects of the introduction, deployment, and operation of precision weapons.

Only one expert suggested expanding the strategic partnership between Russia and China in this area, meaning particularly joint creation of the latest weapons for asymmetric deterrence of the United States and its NATO partners.

Space Weapons

Since space weapons as such do not exist yet and their control will be quite difficult (most likely, these will be dual purpose weapons), many experts did not insist on harsh restrictions in this area. The majority of experts believe that the most effective way to ensure security in this area would be agreeing on a “code of conduct” in space. Unilateral actions and commitments by states actively exploring outer space could also play a positive role.

Some of the experts insisted that the countries concerned should consider working out a legally binding agreement that would drastically restrict (prohibit) both the deployment of weapons in space and their use against space systems. This implies, first of all, a complete ban on anti-satellite weapons.

Experts believe that the development of a mechanism for implementing the proposed measures should begin with a series of consultations between Russia and the United States, to be joined later on by other space powers, primarily China. Some experts suggest starting such consultations immediately in a tripartite or even multilateral format.

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

As is well known, the United States has proposed to address the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons in future agreements. Some of the experts shared this view, suggesting that not only strategic offensive weapons but also all nuclear systems should be put under control by a single agreement (START-4). Some experts believe that intermediate-range nuclear weapons should be taken out of such a general agreement and addressed in a separate document, similar to the INF Treaty. Some proposed holding relevant negotiations among Russia, the U.S. and China.

Some experts draw attention to the difficulty of non-strategic nuclear arms verification. Detailed negotiations on this issue should be preceded by consultations with the United States on monitoring and transparency in this area. The conclusion of separate monitoring agreements, both with the United States and with other nuclear powers, is not excluded. The view expressed by experts is that such agreements will be enough to neutralize the negative impact of non-strategic nuclear weapons on strategic stability in the foreseeable future.

Some experts suggested addressing this issue step by step, specifying that the focus should be on nuclear warheads, not on weapons in general. Some experts believe that the resolution of the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be linked to further progress in limiting and reducing strategic offensive weapons. Others proposed to develop separate agreements on the two categories of nuclear weapons regardless of each other.

Cyber Weapons

As with space weapons, some experts suggested working out a code of conduct in cyberspace. Most experts believe that the impact of cyber weapons on strategic stability should be discussed and resolved through dialogue. At the same time, almost no one mentioned the idea of a legally binding agreement in this area, except maybe on certain issues, particularly the inadmissibility of cyberattacks on military command and control systems and critical infrastructure. They also suggested developing international cooperation to investigate such cases.

Russia, the U.S., and NATO were named as “priority” participants in such a dialogue. Some experts believe that the initial dialogue could be limited just to Russia and the United States. None of the experts polled named China explicitly.

Only one expert expressed the opinion that the problem of cyber weapons does not have a solution at all. The majority believes that unilateral obligations can help strengthen strategic stability. In particular, the parties concerned should pledge to refrain from intervening and targeting key systems that ensure strategic stability, including space-based elements of communications and command and control systems of the strategic nuclear forces and theearly warning systems.

Other Factors Affecting Strategic Stability

As noted above, growing conflict intensity between leading world powers stands first among the factors that received less than half of the votes from the experts surveyed. Experts suggested solving this problem by restoring dialogue between Russia and the United States, and between Russia and NATO. They believe that such a dialogue should lead to the conclusion of bilateral and/or multilateral legal agreements on security assurances, especially in Europe. Active work of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, the development of confidence-building measures, and arms control can play a role in this process.

Some experts pointed to the “strategic ‘infantilism’ of political elites and their lack of understanding of the importance of strategic stability.” To solve this problem, experts proposed to initiate an international campaign with the active participation of natural scientists to explain the real consequences of nuclear irresponsibility, including all aspects of the use of nuclear weapons.

Many of the interviewed experts believe that arms control can also play a positive role in solving the problem of new strategic weapons, and other problems directly related to nuclear and conventional arms. In the latter case, these concern the imbalance in conventional weapons and, in general, conventional triggers of nuclear escalation.

*  *  *

The above analysis of the results of the survey among leading Russian experts concerning factors that affect strategic stability showed that the expert community is both united and divided over a number of critical security issues.

In our view, there is no unity on the substance of the very concept of strategic stability. Although no such question was asked, the results of the survey clearly indicate that its participants have different approaches to the issue.

The lack of unity among the Russian experts on this issue was vividly expressed by the fact that they named more than twenty factors affecting strategic stability. We believe this clearly indicates the urgent need to intensify the discussion on the specific content of the notion of strategic stability, which is already actively used by Russian and Western politicians and experts, even though it is understood differently.

Such differences would have been expected to affect the experts’ approaches to ways and methods of strengthening strategic stability, including the weakening or neutralization of factors that adversely affect stability. But it is precisely this area where the experts were quite unanimous.

They were unanimous in saying that problems associated with the negative influence of various factors on strategic stability can be resolved through negotiations. There were practically no proposals concerning “retaliatory,” “asymmetric” or other unilateral military-technical measures. The Russian experts suggested strengthening existing and creating new channels of official and unofficial contacts with the United States and other Western countries in order to jointly find solutions to vital security problems and avoid an arms race in “traditional” and new areas of military activity. In their opinion, efforts to increase mutual understanding, and ensure openness, transparency, and predictability in the military field should facilitate this process.

In conclusion, we should note that the proposals put forth by the Russian experts cannot be implemented without reciprocity from the West. Contacts between Russia and Western countries, both official (diplomats, the military) and unofficial (scientists, experts), have shrunk significantly in recent years. This can hardly contribute to better understanding between countries and progress in strengthening security and strategic stability, which all international actors are presumably interested in.

About the authors:

Alexander G. Savelyev

Alexander G. Savelyev

Doctor of Political Science
Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, Russia
Chief Research Fellow;
National Research University–Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
Institute for Advanced Strategic Studies
Chief Expert

E-mail: al.g.savelyev@gmail.com

Olga M. Alexandria

Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia
Department of International Security of Faculty of World Politics
Senior Lecturer;
National Research University–Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
Institute for Advanced Strategic Studies
Expert

E-mail: olga.alexandria@gmail.com

Note from the Editors: This article had been written and accepted for publication before the start of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine. Naturally, the research does not include expert assessments of the latest developments; however, its major conclusions remain remarkably valid.

Cultural and Art Diplomacy – The Example of Portugal’s Consulate-General in Newark

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Cultural and Art Diplomacy – The Example of Portugal’s Consulate-General in Newark

By Jorge Marinho, JĂșlio Ventura, Guilherme GuimarĂŁes


Cultural Diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy is currently a dynamic sphere of academic research (What is Cultural Diplomacy? What is Soft Power?). Even though the term cultural diplomacy is relatively recent, this reality has been in place for several centuries (What is Cultural Diplomacy? What is Soft Power?). Throughout history, interaction among peoples has amounted to an exchange of languages, religions and arts, for instance, thus enabling improved relations among differing groups (What is Cultural Diplomacy? What is Soft Power?). 

Maria Regina de Mongiardim (February 2021, pp. 39-40) states that cultural diplomacy currently comprises a priority strategic importance, with political, economic and even security  implications. This author points out the relevance of cultural diplomacy, as concerns countries’ international prestige and projection (Mongiardim February 2021, p. 38). Using a multiplicity of means, said diplomacy includes formal and informal aspects related to initiatives undertaken by national governments and by several parties involved (Moita, et alii May 2019, p. 58 / Mongiardim February 2021, pp. 38-39).  

The European Union, which includes Portugal as a member-state, has created a Cultural Diplomacy Platform (RelaçÔes Culturais Internacionais). In 2020, after four years, this served as the basis for creating a global cultural relations platform, comprising participants such as the Goethe Institute, the University of Siena, the European Foundation for Culture and the international contemporary performing arts network (RelaçÔes Culturais Internacionais). 

For Portugal, language diplomacy (that is, lusophony) is a complement to cultural diplomacy, within a context that goes beyond the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries and the Portuguese Diaspora worldwide (Mongiardim February 2021, p.41). Under this diplomatic domain, Portugal relies on the CamĂ”es Institute, which is linked to the Foreign and Culture Ministries (Mongiardim February 2021, p. 41). This institute also engages in artistic activities (Mongiardim February 2021, p. 41). The Portuguese Budget for 2021 contains various sections pertaining to streamlining cultural diplomacy and internationalizing Portuguese Culture (OE 2021, pp. 13 / 24). This document highlights visual and performing arts in order to ensure Portugal’s international projection (OE 2021, p. 14). In 2022, then-Portuguese Foreign Minister Augusto Santos Silva stressed Portugal’s ability to disseminate its heritage, arts and artists in 70 to 80 countries on every continent, while then-Culture Minister Graça Fonseca felt that Cultural Diplomacy is of strategic importance projecting the nation (Portugal Projecta a Sua Cultura em Mais de 70 PaĂ­ses February 8, 2022) . 


Art Diplomacy

While Art Diplomacy is certainly one of the oldest forms of diplomacy and international relations, only recently has it been studied at academic level (Cohen July 12, 2019). Experts acknowledge that Art makes cultural diplomacy easier and more effective, creating empathy and overcoming obstacles such as language (Nazarian September 5, 2019). We should point out Art’s ability to humanize (McCulloch-Lovell September 4, 2005). The Academy for Cultural Diplomacy considers that Art can serve as an instrument for influencing the atmosphere of intercultural relations (Art as Cultural Diplomacy. About the Program). Art diplomacy contributes to mutual understanding and toward respect for foreign beliefs and cultural values (Grincheva 2010). On the international stage, Art can be linked to soft power, while being used for determining attitudes toward other countries (Nazarian September 5, 2019). Shoqiran (September 14, 2016) states that Art can lie at the basis for joint political projects. This author considers that Diplomacy, together with culture and Art, permeates society (Shoqiran September 14, 2016).

Art can serve to both disseminate cultural heritage and identity while constituting a neutral meeting point for artists, audiences and people involved in cultural management (Art as Cultural Diplomacy. About the Program). Natalia Grincheva (2010) feels that Art, to the extent it has always represented national culture and tradition, is notably featured in cultural diplomacy practices. According to Marta Ryniejska-KieƂdanowicz (2009), Art and culture correspond to the forefront of many countries’ promotional initiatives. This way, such countries construct a positive image aimed at achieving political goals (Ryniejska-KieƂdanowicz 2009). 

Artists engage their audiences emotionally (Canales), which is of interest to foreign governments seeking to influence hearts and minds through music, cinema and the media in general (Doeser, Nisbett 2017, p. 9). It should be stressed that the success of cultural diplomacy initiatives somehow involves artists who are familiar with certain aspects that go beyond their customary performances (Renewing Canada’s Cultural Diplomacy). For example, on an institutional site of Brazil’s Federal Government, Cultural Diplomacy is linked to Visual Arts, Music and Literature (Cultural Diplomacy Themes). 

The U.S. Administration’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs seeks to create lasting relations between that nation and other countries: this allows Americans to gain access to international artists, while sharing the culture of U.S. visual and performing arts with international audiences (Cultural Diplomacy).

Consulate-General of Portugal in Newark, U.S.

Throughout its history since its founding in 1143, Portugal has forged relations with peoples on every continent (HistĂłria). According to Portuguese Ambassador JĂșlio Vilela (February 2021, p. 85), in the case of Portugal, we cannot separate consular activity from immigrants, given that, historically, this is a country of outward migration. According to data provided by local authorities and, in the absence of such data, based on consular registrations, on December 31st, 2018, the Portuguese community living abroad was estimated at around 5.4 million Portuguese nationals and descendents, distributed as follows:

  • 56.7% in the Americas
  • 30.1% in Europe
  • 7.5% in Africa
  • 4.9% in Asia
  • under 1% in Oceania (Vilela February 2021, p. 93).

Over time, consular activity has evolved to support integrating Portuguese nationals living in host countries; as such, this fosters their civic and political prominence (Vilela February 2021, p. 82).

It is wise to envision the long-term goals of Foreign Policy (Lopes 2017, p. 33). An analysis of the programs of Portugal’s 16 governments, from 1974 to 2019, reveals a few topics that have constituted foreign policy priorities, such as the following:

– fostering Portuguese language and culture

– transatlantic relations

– Portuguese communities scattered all over the world and modernizing consular services (Vilela February 2021, p. 89).

Consular activity is a gateway to presenting Portugal as a modern, innovative country, attracting tourists and enhancing ties linking Portuguese immigrants and their descendents to the nation (Vilela February 2021, p. 96). Technological development should benefit services provided by consulates, in an automated and simplified manner, without compromising the country’s security (Vilela February 2021, p. 99).

Given the considerable size of the Portuguese community in the Americas, there is an extensive consular network (Americas). At the Portuguese Government’s Diplomatic Portal, the American community of Portuguese descent (some 1.3 million people) is presented as being well integrated in the U.S. (Americas). The New York Times has published several pieces where Newark is characterized by a notable Portuguese presence, in demographic and cultural terms (Levy October 6, 1995 / Shepard October 18, 1979). This is indicative of Newark’s importance, as part of the History of Portuguese immigration to the U.S., mainly in the 20th century, which is still being felt in the 21st century. In September 2021, Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa was in Newark, having symbolically visited the Sport Club PortuguĂȘs (Mano September 21, 2021).
 

The importance of Cultural Diplomacy in relations between Portugal and the U.S. is certainly recognized by diplomats of both countries. For instance, the U.S. Ambassador to Lisbon is depicted as a cultural diplomat (Levine, Randi Charno – Portuguese Republic – November 2021), while Portugal’s Consulate-General in Newark shows interest in organizing cultural events (Monteiro). This consular post wants to be more than a document-generating instrument. For such purpose, it needs to be close to the Portuguese community and its recreational clubs, while joining in artistic events, for example, as revealed by Consul-General Pedro Monteiro in an exclusive interview. This diplomat feels that the opening, at Newark’s Consulate-General, of JosĂ© Rodrigues MiguĂ©is Hall, named after a writer from the Portuguese Diaspora who lived in the New York area, serves to create an official, neutral venue for hosting a variety of events within the Portuguese community.

According to Pedro Monteiro, while cultural events organized by Portugal’s Consulate-General  in Newark are chiefly geared to the Portuguese community, they can also reach out to Americans. To Pedro Monteiro, artistic initiatives undertaken by the Consulate-General contribute toward maintaining emotional ties between its audiences and Portugal. This diplomat acknowledges that, in the U.S., people of Portuguese descent feel a very strong sentimental affinity to Portugal, despite the geographic distance and generational aspects (second and third generation). These highly positive sentiments regarding Portugal surprise Pedro Monteiro, when thinking of immigrants who left their country of origin due to lack of conditions that would have otherwise enabled them to stay. According to Pedro Monteiro, this is why the emphasis given by Portuguese nationals living in the U.S. to positive things describing Portugal (while putting negative aspects on the back burner) is a more emotional attitude than a rational one. This Consul-General’s work experience leads him to conclude that esthetics and emotions are important in the diplomatic context, particularly notable when involving Art.
 

Pedro Monteiro appreciates the works that endure over time, which leave their mark, as can be seen on a Newark street, with an azulejo glazed tile panel depicting AmĂĄlia, a renowned singer of fado (typically Portuguese music). This diplomat highlights a fado festival that took place in the last few years, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, in collaboration with Portugal’s Consulate-General in Newark. As Pedro Monteiro states, this consulate has also collaborated with the New Jersey Performing Arts Center (NJPAC) in promoting events that include fado, making Mariza known to the American public. 

In assessing his work as Consul-General in Newark from September 2018 to March 2022, with regard to organizing artistic activities, Pedro Monteiro underscores the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, to the extent that, for instance, events could not be attended in person. This diplomat feels that the Portuguese community, chiefly older folks, hardly buy into virtual initiatives, that is, online. Pedro Monteiro acknowledges that there needs to be improvement in linking the Consulate-General in Newark to a certain audience comprising young people of Portuguese descent, by disseminating messages via communication channels which are actually used more often by the target audience. This diplomat already has cultural / artistic programming ideas to be put in place by the Consulate-General, in the latter half of 2022, including, for instance, documentaries made by Portuguese nationals.

The CamĂ”es Institute, in the Newark area, as stated by its local representative in an exclusive interview, aims to make cultural resources and activities available to Portuguese and American communities. This representative, JosĂ© Carlos AdĂŁo, makes particular reference to cooperation protocols between the CamĂ”es Institute and Rutgers University (Newark), which look to conduct research into Portuguese Literature. In the view of JosĂ© Carlos AdĂŁo, events related to said literature seek not only to strengthen the ties that join the community of Portuguese people and those of Portuguese descent to its culture, but also to disseminate Portuguese authors to Americans. Within this context, according to JosĂ© Carlos AdĂŁo, events are organized in partnership with local basic, secondary schools and universities enabling direct contact with authors and their works. 


Conclusion

Throughout History, Art has been significantly present in relations among peoples, even contributing toward overcoming differences, through activities organized by public or private organizations. Art can serve to manifest a certain identity of countries and to project these on the international stage. In order to bring all this about, artists are vital, of course.

Art Diplomacy, within the broadest sphere of Cultural Diplomacy, is characterized, among other aspects, by being able to emotionally engage its audiences. This type of engaging can prove to be particularly effective in pursuing certain objectives, in the short and, mainly, in the medium to long term, by way of influencing people’s hearts and minds. Art runs deep and, at times, in a subtle manner, in various spheres of society. 

Portugal’s Foreign Ministry currently stresses the strategic importance of the nation’s artistic heritage. For example, Pedro Monteiro, Portugal’s Consul-General in Newark, and JosĂ© Carlos AdĂŁo, representative of the CamĂ”es Institute in that same U.S. city, aim to organize artistic initiatives, including Literature, reaching not only Portuguese immigrants and people of Portuguese descent, but also to Americans. Pedro Monteiro acknowledges that the highly positive view that Newark’s Portuguese community has of Portugal, a country which they left for lack of conditions enabling them to stay, is due to emotional factors more than to rational ones.

According to Pedro Monteiro, the COVID-19 pandemic made it difficult and, in some cases, impossible to organize live events. This diplomat concedes that, on the one hand, Newark’s Portuguese community, chiefly among older folks, does not easily buy into online events, and that, on the other hand, the Consulate-General has to improve communication with young people of Portuguese descent; to this end, the most appropriate communication channels need to be used. Pedro Monteiro would like for the consular post not to be viewed merely as a document-generating instrument.

About the authors:

Jorge Marinho, Research supervisor. PhD in Communication Sciences, BA in International Journalism.

JĂșlio Ventura, BA in Law, MA student in Political Science and International Relations at the Portuguese Catholic University (Lisbon, Portugal), intern at the Consulate-General of Portugal in Newark, New Jersey (United States of America).

Guilherme GuimarĂŁes, BA in Law, MA student in International Law at the Portuguese Catholic University (Porto, Portugal), intern at the Consulate-General of Portugal in Newark, New Jersey (United States of America).

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This article has been originally published in the online magazine Marinho Media Analysis on April 7, 2022: http://www.marinho-mediaanalysis.org/articles/cultural-and-art-diplomacy-the-example-of-portugals-consulate-general-in-newark-new-jersey-united-states

Gender Equality for a Better Tomorrow: Lessons from Rwanda

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Gender Equality for a Better Tomorrow: Lessons from Rwanda

By Prof. Jeannette Bayisenge, Minister of Gender and Family Promotion of the Republic of Rwanda

Through lobbying and the passage of legislation, the Netherlands is ahead of many countries around the world in terms of women’s rights.

As the Minister of Gender and Family Promotion in Rwanda, I applaud this. Rwanda has also strived to promote opportunities for all women and girls. Our experience as a nation proves that the link between gender equality and sustainable development can never be over-emphasized.

Following the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi, the entire nation was left to reflect on how to rebuild our country. Very early in this process, our government recognised that emphasising equality throughout the country, particularly with respect to gender equality, would be a key pillar on which progress could be built.

This was underscored by two realities. Firstly, that pre-genocide Rwanda had been a primarily paternalistic society – with little opportunity for women to take part in leadership in government or in wider society. Secondly, due to the genocide and outflows of refugees during and after it –women were the majority and the recovery would only be possible if both women and men play a central role. In addition, realising that equality was a fundamental human right – not a favour – and that women’s leadership would be vital in times where forgiveness, reconciliation, and peacebuilding would be priorities – the government took a strong stance on women’s representation.

This cannot simply be achieved by lip service, however. Undoing historic patriarchal tendencies takes action. Therefore, Rwanda devised several innovative mechanisms to promote women’s representation and inclusion. Lawmakers introduced some of the most women-friendly policies in the world and women were heavily involved in the drafting of a new constitution, between 1994 and its publication in 2003 and other gender sensitive laws as well as policies and strategies. For instance, girls and boys are allowed to inherit equally ; women and men can assume the leadership within the family and have the same rights on family property and this has enabled women to use their land as collateral to obtain loans, encouraging financial independence; girls’ education is priority and incentives are created for girls to study traditionally male-dominated subjects – for example, almost 44.7% of STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) students are women. In the same context, a girl’s room is a requirement for primary and secondary schools to increase’ girls’ privacy during their periods. To fight against gender-based violence, women in parliament lobbied for laws against gender-based violence that criminalized marital rape and provide punishment for Gender-Based Violence in all its forms.

The results speak for themselves.

Currently, Rwanda is leading globally in terms of women representation in Parliament (61.3%); 2nd African Country to close gender gaps and 7th globally (World Economic forum, 2021). Women are also represented in other leadership positions along with their counterparts’ men with 55% of female in Cabinet, 51% female judges, 46.1% of women in District councils (NEC report,2021). Women, throughout the country and at all levels, are at the forefront of leadership and decision-making. The progress we see in Rwanda today is not only the result of this commitment to inclusivity, but also the fruits of women’s efforts. As President Kagame once said: “We did not give dignity to women. It was always theirs. All we did was bring it to light”

Economically, Rwanda has the world’s highest rate of female labor force participation at 86 –as highlighted by the World Economic Forum in 2018. Women contribute 30% of the GDP, while female entrepreneurship accounts for 42% of enterprises countrywide and 58% of informal businesses, according to International Finance Corporation. In addition, women are given special access to finance from both public and private financing institutions. For example, with respect to financial inclusion, the 2020 FinScope survey revealed that 92% of women are financially included compared to 93% men. Business Development Fund (BDF) also facilitates women to access capital for their business ventures by providing a 75% coverage on due collateral.

An all-of-government and indeed all-of-society approach to ensuring gender equality has been at the heart of these achievements, and at the heart of Rwanda’s rebirth as a prosperous and peaceful nation.

 I also recognise, as so many do, that further action needs to be taken, not just here but around our continent, and indeed around the world. By elaborating on our experience as a nation, I hope to spread this message more widely.

As His Excellency President Paul Kagame remarked earlier this year: “Equality is a right not a favour. We must do even more and better to ensure that the next generations of our daughters and granddaughters inherit a nation where their aspirations have no limits.” This is a spirit that every country, and every society, can take on board – we can always do more.  

La Vita Diplomatica

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La Vita Diplomatica

By Alexandra Paucescu

An old saying goes :’you have the life that you make for yourself’.

Milena Padula, a beautiful Italian born in Naples, certainly knows that. Despite the many changes she went through so far in life, she always knew how to make the best of every situation. She tells me that she was only eighteen when she first left home and went to study Economics and Banking in Tuscany, then, as one of the first Erasmus students, won a scholarship and spent one year at the University of Reading, in the UK. It was on the flight back to Italy where she met her future husband and from there, a life of diplomatic postings began.  Moscow, London, Bahrain, Montreal and Ho Chi Min City, where she recently moved, they all left strong and dear memories to her.

Milena Padula at McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

‘I always had the feeling that every posting was my country for the 4 years I spent there. I usually fall in love with the food, the people, the language, the culture and I even start to get goose bumps when the National Anthem of that country is played. If I had to choose nice memories from each of the cities I lived in, I would remember my wedding day in Moscow at the gorgeous Italian Embassy, the typical British lifestyle in London, with the Queen’s Garden Parties at Buckingham Palace, the races in Ascot, the tennis matches at Wimbledon and the Chelsea Flower Shows, the very welcoming people of Bahrain, with its interesting culture and strong traditions.’

Milena is a very active woman. This is how I met her and, besides her beauty and elegance, it is her actions which caught my attention. She tells me that she realized, from the very beginning of her diplomatic life, that she needed to be more than just a diplomatic spouse, she wanted to have something of her own, and I couldn’t resonate with this more!

She says; ‘I strongly believe that, as a diplomatic spouse, if you are not able to work, it is very important to keep up to date and to make the most of any training opportunity.  I always recommend it to other spouses that if, for any reason, they have to pause their career they should take the chance to go back to study. And it is what I did in Montreal, where, the only way to escape the harsh winters was to go back to my studies. I achieved a master’s degree in Public Relations and Fundraising at McGill University. Back in Rome after Canada, I took another course at the Sapienza University, on the role of women in the peace processes (UN Security Council Resolution 1325)’.

Milena Padula Spouse of the Italian Consul General in HCMC

Her experience abroad as the wife of a diplomat allows her to put this knowledge to good use. When in Rome, she usually collaborates with ACDMAE, the Italian Foreign Affairs Spouses Association, which carries out voluntary activities for the employees of the Ministry and their families.

Milena says: ‘within the association, I founded the Education & Career Group, which supports spouses to follow their professional path, despite their constant moving from one country to another. I helped to promote the “portable career” concept, teaching spouses to shift from one posting to another while keeping their career. I have been elected ACDMAE President in 2021 and was honored to give my contribution in organizing events for the members of our association and supporting the spouses during their relocation.

I have also been for many years, the Italian delegate to EUFASA (European Foreign Affairs Spouse and Families Association) with members from twenty European countries, meeting at annual conferences. The purpose of EUFASA is the exchange of ideas and information among its members, in order to improve the provisions related to spouses, partners and families of diplomats. It aims to identify best practices, to gain support for family-friendly policies within the EU MFAs. I will participate as the Italian delegate to the next conference, in Paris on May 2 & 3 2022 (www.eufasa.org)’.

During the pandemic, she yet started to be involved with another project. ‘Here We Are Italy’ (www.hereweareglobal.com/italy) is a network which aims to connect international professionals on the move, as accompanying partners. During lockdown she organized, together with partners in Modena and Milan, many workshops to help expats moving to Italy and around the world. I attended some of them and I remember the pleasure to be part of that community and to learn new things.

She confesses to me that, after more than 25 years as a diplomatic spouse, 5 countries, 2 children and a huge number of boxes, her most valuable advice would be that it is important to realize that we are not defined by our spouse’s job, we need to have an independent life.

Milena Padula at EUFASA conference London 2019.

‘We have to develop our own interests and we need to have what I call a double life’, she says.

Another important goal would be ‘to contradict the stereotype that the life of diplomats is a glittering life full of parties and never ending holidays. Nowadays, it is increasingly difficult to move from one country to another, considering how many postings are gradually becoming very dangerous’.

She had the opportunity to write about her own experience during the civil war in Bahrain in a book. “Nella buona e nella cattiva sorte. L’altra faccia del servizio all’estero” describes the ‘not so glamorous’ side of life as wife of a diplomat in a conflict zone.

But, despite the ups and downs of this diplomatic life and the difficulties related to changing countries every four years, leaving family and friends behind, she admits that she still thinks that this is the best life she could have ever asked for.

She remains optimistic and open to new experiences and opportunities to make her ‘vita diplomatica’ as beautiful as possible, no matter where she is.

After all, as her favorite quote says: ‘always see your glass half full’!


About the author:

Alexandra Paucescu

Alexandra Paucescu- Author of “Just a Diplomatic Spouse” Romanian, management graduate with a Master in business, cultural diplomacy and international relations studies.

She speaks Romanian, English, French, German and Italian,  gives lectures on intercultural communication and is an active NGO volunteer.

Career in Caribbean Science Workshop   

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Career in Caribbean Science Workshop   

By Roy Lie Atjam

The Hague, on 23 April 2022, Mr Carlson Manuel, Minister Plenipotentiary of Curacao in the Netherlands flungopen the doors of his Cabinet to host the first-ever Career In Caribbean Science Workshop. 

After welcoming his guests, the Minister focused on developing a career in science. Minister Manuel lauded the speakers for their willingness to share their experiences with their compatriots and interested ones. Manuel wished the gathering a successful afternoon.

The Career In Caribbean Science Workshop, organized in collaboration with Stichting We Connect and CARAF Science, attracted many students and professionals from Curacao, Aruba and the wider Caribbean. A growing number of these(PhD.) students and professionals are looking for mutual contact and sharing of experiences. MC for the event was the well-known Tanja Fraai manager of We Connect.

Featuring on the program were the following speakers.

 Cherelle Maduro, Universiteit Maastricht. PhD candidate in trauma surgery Cherelle Maduro recounts the many corners she had to take to arrive at her current PhD research. Cherelle holds a BA and two master’s degrees. She pointed out the passion, tenacity and patience one has to exercise. It’s heartening for Cherelle to see the results of her proper research implemented on patients.

Mandy Spaltman, Radboud University. Mandy talked about her career as a behavioural scientist at Philips, working in a commercial company as a researcher. Is interesting and multidisciplinary.

Mariëlle Osinga (researcher Universiteit Groningen) Marielle elaborated on her (comparative) research into father absence among Caribbean children in the Netherlands and Curaçao. About doing quantitative and qualitative research and finding the right interviewees. How do you go about that? Mariëlle has just become a mother so her contribution was by video conference. Congrats Mariëlle!

Durwin Lynch, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam/VU Amsterdam. Durwin gave a brief  overview of his many activities. He Lecturers, is a researcher and  coordinates  the master’s program. Durwin shuttles between his day-to-day activities and his  PhD research. An extremely busy lad I would say.

In conclusion Jan Bant, university  Groningen, Leiden. On behalf of NWO (Dutch Research Council), Jan Bant invited us to participate in the Dutch Caribbean Research Week that will take place in June. 2022. 

The workshop was, by all means beneficial it took place in a relaxed Caribbean ambience. Savoury snacks and beverages were served.

Thank you for your hospitality Minister Manuel.

Photography Weconnect

Israeli Iftar – a commitment to religious freedom

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Israeli Iftar – a commitment to religious freedom

On Tuesday evening, April 26, the ambassador of Israel in the Netherlands, H.E. Mr. Modi Ephraim organized an Iftar. Several ambassadors, religious representatives and politicians were present at this breaking of the fast during Ramadan.

A musical interlude was provided by Mohamed Ahaddaf on the oud.

“The interfaith Iftar underlines Israel’s commitment to religious freedom for all religions”, Ambassador Ephraim said.

Israeli Iftar at the residence.

ICC President meets with United Nations Secretary-General, concludes mission to New York

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ICC President meets with United Nations Secretary-General, concludes mission to New York

The President of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or  the “Court”), Judge Piotr HofmaƄski, concluded yesterday a three-day official mission to the seat of the United Nations (UN) in New York, during which he met with the UN Secretary-General, AntĂłnio Guterres, as well as with other UN officials and representatives of States and civil society. In his meetings, President HofmaƄski highlighted the Court’s unprecedented level of judicial activity and called for the widest possible support of the international community for the Court’s independent mandate and its activities taking place on several different continents.

During his meeting with Secretary-General Guterres on Tuesday 5 April 2022, President HofmaƄski conveyed to the Secretary-General the Court’s deep appreciation of the continued support and cooperation of the United Nations, which remains as important as ever as the Court copes with an unprecedented workload, including a record number of five trials taking place this year. Secretary-General Guterres renewed assurances of his and the United Nations’ firm commitment to supporting the Court in its efforts aimed at addressing the gravest crimes under international law.

Discussions during the meeting further underlined the paramount importance of respecting the Court’s independence as a judicial institution as well as the importance of continued efforts to encourage all States that have not yet done so to join the Court’s founding treaty, the Rome Statute, in order to strengthen the international criminal justice system, to enhance the deterrence of atrocities and to promote access to justice for victims everywhere. 

President HofmaƄski also met separately with Mr Achim Steiner, Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, and Ms Alice Wairimu Nderitu, Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, in the context of the collaborative relations between the ICC and the United Nations. 

While in New York, the ICC President also met with the Vice-President of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, Ambassador Bob Rae, and briefed the Assembly’s New York Working Group on the Court’s current judicial workload and other activities, notably including efforts to enhance the Court’s operations in the context of the ongoing Review process being conducted jointly by the Assembly and the Court. President HofmaƄski also held a number of meetings aimed at promoting universal ratification of the Rome Statute and met with representatives of non-governmental organizations based in New York. 

Eurojust supports searches in Germany, Italy and Hungary against use of faulty emission devices in Japanese cars

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Eurojust supports searches in Germany, Italy and Hungary against use of faulty emission devices in Japanese cars

Eurojust is assisting authorities in Germany, Italy and Hungary with a series of searches to counter the use of faulty emission devices in engines, used in cars of a Japanese producer. The devices were allegedly fitted in the Italian-built diesel engines of large numbers of cars, giving the impression that the vehicles’ nitrogen oxide emissions were in line with EU regulations. The engines were later assembled into various models of the car manufacturer at a Hungarian production plant.

The aim of the searches, which are taking place at the request of the Economic Crime Unit of the General Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) of Frankfurt am Main, is to secure various documents, data and correspondence. This information will later be examined further and analysed by the judicial authorities concerned.

The car producer, with its European headquarters based in Germany, is supposed to be aware that as of 2018 diesel engines have been fitted with the devices. These showed that the emission rates of nitrogen oxide were in compliance with the legal EU emission norms, whereas according to investigations so far, they seem to be above the set limits. The devices were obtained by the Italian engine producer from another Italian supplier.

Eurojust has organised a coordination meeting to prepare for the searches of business locations in Bensheim and Heidelberg in Germany, Corbetta in Italy and Esztergom in Hungary. Furthermore, the Agency is providing support to enable a swift cross-border judicial coordination between the authorities involved.

The operation was carried out on the ground by:

  • Germany: General PPO Frankfurt am Main, Hesse State Police
  • Italy: PPO Turin, Guardia di Finanza Turin and Milan
  • Hungary: Police Headquarters of County KomĂĄrom-Esztergom

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