Tuesday, 6 July 2021, Berlin, Germany: During a State Visit at the invitation of Federal President Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the Dutch royal couple, Their Majesties King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands and Queen Máxima, paid a visit to the Bundesrat (German Federal Council, or Chamber for the federal states), and addressed a plenary session attended by various state premiers as well as the plenipotentiaries accredited to the German Federation.
The visit to Berlin marks the end of a series of official trips that the Royal Couple undertook to the various German federal states since 2013. In the latter context, Bundesrat President pro tempore Dr. Reiner Haseloff -Premier of Saxony-Anhalt- also received the Dutch royal couple in the Bundesrat, where the King gave a speech in the plenary chamber to members of the Länder chamber.
On the picture from left to right – front row: Sawsan Chebli, State of Berlin Delegate to the Federation Permanent Secretary for Active Citizenship and International Relations; Manuela Schwesig, Premier of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania; Dr. Reiner Haseloff, President pro tempore of the Bundesrat, Premier of Saxony-Anhalt; Dutch Royal Couple; Bodo Ramelow, Premier of Thuringia; Malu Dreyer; Premier of Rhineland-Palatinate; Tobias Hans, Premier of The Saarland.
Second row from left to right: Dr. Antje Draheim, State of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Delate to the Federation; Lucia Puttrich, Minister of European and Federal Affairs and Representative of the State of Hesse at the Federal Government; Dr. Peter Tschentscher, First Mayor of Hamburg; Dr. Birgit Honé, Head of the Representation of the State of Lower Saxony, Minister of Federal, European Affairs and Regional Development; Sabine Sütterlin-Waack, State Minister of the Interior, Rural Areas, and Integration of Schleswig-Holstein.
President Jovenel Moise has been assassinated in his private residence located at Pelerin, Port au Prince. His wife Martine Moise was seriously injured in the attack, she is in hospital. The president’s residence was attacked by a commando around 1:00 in the morning Prime Minister Claude Joseph, informed.
The situation is calm and under the control of the Haitian National Army
Moise, 53, won the presidential elections of his country on November 27, 2016, which had the participation of 21% of the population at the time. Opposition groups have been demanding his removal from power for a year, claiming that the presidential term ended on February 7. Moise took possession of his presidential mandate on February 7, 2017, but opposition groups maintained that the period began on February 17, 2016. On the other hand, criminal groups had taken control of much of the Haitian territory constantly challenging his authority.
Queen Maxima and Indonesian Minister Retno Marsudi
By Roy Lie Atjam
The Hague 1st July 2021. Indonesia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs H.E. Retno Marsudi was on a working visit to The Hague. Noteworthy, Minister Retno Marssudi is a former Ambassador of Indonesia in the Netherlands but is now a prominent member of H.E. President Joko Widodo’s Government. It is Retno Marsudi’ second mandate as foreign minister. On 1st July 2021, Minister Retno Marsudi met with HR. Queen Maxima, Prime Minister Mark Rutte and Foreign Minister Sigrid Kaag.
Here is what the Embassy of Indonesia in The Hague reported on the visit:
Working Visit of Minister Retno Marsudi to the Netherlands
During her Working Visit to the Netherlands on July 1st 2021, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, H.E. Retno Marsudi held a meeting with:
Her Majesty Queen Máxima of the Netherlands in her capacity as the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Advocate for Inclusive Finance for Development (UNSGSA) and Honorary Patron of the Global Platform for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) of the G20; Prime Minister of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte; and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Sigrid Kaag.
Prime Minister Mark Rutte and Minister Retno Marsudi.
On her meeting with Queen Máxima, the meeting focussed on the issue of Financial Inclusion. In 2020, Indonesia has reached financial inclusivity index of 81 percent, compared with 76 percent in 2019. The role of women in economic development, especially in financial inclusion and digital economics.
On the separate meetings with PM Rutte and Minister Kaag, Minister Marsudi discussed the strengthening bilateral cooperation between the two countries.
In the discussion with Minister Kaag, the Netherlands agreed to give 3 million Covid-19 vaccines to Indonesia. Both with Minister Kaag and with PM Rutte, Minister Marsudi also discussed the possibilities of cooperation on therapeutic medicines.
Minister Kaag and Minister Marsudi.
Aside from vaccines and medicines, Minister Marsudi also discussed the extension of existing cooperation on sustainable palm oils to also address vegetable oils in general, in the context of its contribution to the achievement of UN SDGs 2030. Minister Marsudi explored the cooperation on study, research and seminar on sustainable vegetable oils and SDGs 2030.
Beside the bilateral relations, at the meeting with Minister Kaag, Minister Marsudi also discussed about the situation in the world, especially about the issue on women empowerment.
Wassenaar, 25 June 2021. The Ambassador of Bangladesh in the Netherlands H.E. Mr Riaz Hamidullah, hosted a reception at Bangladesh House to celebrate his country’s anniversary of the declaration of sovereignty in 1971. The actual date was 26 March 2021 but postponed due to the pandemic.
Ambassador of Bangladesh in the Netherlands H.E. Mr Riaz Hamidullah.
The reception was attended by representatives of the government and from the private sector. Among them: Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management Mr. Erik Oostwegel, PUM-Netherlands Mr. Tien Hoang, Private Sector Development Coach Mr. Maarten Verbruggen, Larive Interntional BV Ms. Antoinette Termoshuizen, Deltadesh Ltd. Mr. Mathias Brienen.
Bangladesh@50 Ms.Sazia Ahmed spouse of the Ambassador explained a Bangla dish to a guest.
A cordial ambassador Hamidullah flanked by his spouse Sazia Ahmed, warmly welcome his guests and subsequently treated them to a savoury and authentic Bangladeshi dinner buffet. The dozens of guests were enjoying a relaxing afternoon with food, beverages and the overall excellent vibes.
General Mahamat Déby – Picture by Chadian Presidency
Monday, 5 June 2021, Paris, French Republic: General Mahamat bin Idriss Déby Itno, Chairman of the Transitional Military Council of Chad (i.e. Acting President) paid a visit to the French President Macron, and was welcomed at the Élysée Palace.
Mahamat Déby (born 1 January 1984) is a military man by training, and son of the late Chadian President Idriss Déby. He was proclaimed Acting President of Chad on 20 April 2021 when his father, Idriss Déby was killed whilst action commanding troops in the Northern Chad offensive. This was the first foreign trip to Europe, or rather to France by Chairman and General Mahamat Déby.
The two officials held intense talks concerning the progress of the political transition in Chad. The presidents stressed the need to do everything possible to achieve the objectives of an “inclusive, peaceful and successful” transition within the framework desired by the African Union. To achieve the latter objective, France announced new budgetary aid. Mahamat Idriss Déby had made it known that without support from the international community the maximum 18-month deadline for the transition could not be met.
The security context in the Sahel region was naturally also high on the agenda. France has “specified the objectives of the transformation of the French military in the Sahel,” the statement said, without giving further details. Emmanuel Macron welcomed Chad’s maintenance of “its international commitments, in particular in the framework of the G5 Sahel” as per statement below. The two presidents stressed the need to provide the G5 Sahel joint force with sustainable funding and the passage of this force under Chapter 7 of the United Nations.
The Covid-19 pandemic, the Sourou attack on the Central African border – condemned by President Macron – and the supervision of the departure of mercenaries from Libya were also discussed.
In Paris President Mahamat Déby was also received at the headquarters of La Francophonie by the latter’s Secretary-General Louise Mushikiwabo.
Wednesday, 23 June 2021, U.S.A.: Archduke Leopoldo Francesco (Leopold Franz) d’Absburgo-Lorena, erstwhile Head of the Tuscan branch of the Habsburg dynasty (1984-1993) and great-grandson of Tuscany’s last Grand Duke,Ferdinando IVpassed away after a long illness.
He was the eldest son of the late Archduke Goffredo (Gottfried) and Princess Dorothea of Bavaria, and was born at Leutstetten Castle in Bavaria, where his parents lived, on 25 October 1941. A childhood marked by the war times left him with indelible memories. After the disappearance of his grandparents in 1948, his parents settled in St. Gilgen in the Salzburger Land, Austria.
After his high school years in Austria, he graduated in 1967 in Munich with a degree in mechanical engineering and, following his great passion for research, began working on engine design.
He married Princess Laetitia de Belzunce d’Arenberg in 1965, with whom he had two sons, Sigismondo(born at Lausanne in 1966) and Guntram (born at Montevideo in 1967), and lived in Munich until 1968. A timid and reserved man by nature, with a great deal of charm, who, after the death of his father in 1984, made frequent trips to Tuscany; consolidated and strengthened the profound and unbroken relationship of affection that has bound his dynasty to the beautiful land of Tuscany.
Coat of arms of the erstwhile Grand Duchy of Tuscany.
He was made Honorary Citizen of Pisa and Grosseto during his lifetime. Passionate about motorbikes and motors, and a lover of travel, he often took the young Sigismondo with him, who – just nineteen years old at the time. Both princes stayed in Florence for a few months to deepen their knowledge of the Italian language. Subsequently, Archduke Leopoldo Francesco “abdicated” his position as Head of the former Tuscan Grand Ducal House in favour of his eldest son Sigismondo in 1993.
The latter granted Archduke Sigismondo sovereignty over the Tuscan dynastic orders (i.e., the Order of St. Stephen Pope and Martyr; the Order of St. Joseph). Leopoldo Francesco retired to a rather private life after separating from his wife Laetitia. Thereafter he spent his life between Austria and the USA, where he continued to work designing innovative industrial objects and systems. It was in the U.S.A., Santa Fe, where he passed way, struck down by an incurable disease from which he had suffered for some time.
Chargé d’affaires Woodward “Clark” Price – Picture by State Department, US Embassy in Berlin.
Thursday, 1 July 2021, Berlin, Germany: U.S. Chargée d’affaires a.i. Robin S. Quinville departed Germany alongside her consort, and passed on the embassy’s administration to Minister Counselor Woodward “Clark” Price, who was assigned to the mission expressly for that purpose.
Incumbent Chargé d’affaires a.i. Clark Price arrived in Berlin in June 2021, however, he had already served at the diplomatic mission in the capacity of Minister Counselor in charge of Economic Affairs in Berlin from 2016 to 2019. He had been sent back to Washington D.C. wherein he was the Director of European Union and Regional Affairs within the State Department. Clark is fluent in English, German, Greek and has a working knowledge of Armenian and Hebrew.
Some of his previous assignments include Deputy Chief of Mission in Yerevan, Armenia. Clark likewise served in the Russia Directorate at the National Security Council. Other erstwhile Foreign Service positions include postings in Athens (Economic Counselor), Tel Aviv (Deputy Economic Counselor), Nicosia and New Delhi.
He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Economics from the University of Chicago as well as a Master of Arts in International Relations from John Hopkins SAIS.
The U.S.A. has been represented in Berlin by a diplomatic envoy in Berlin -with various historical interruptions- since 1797 in the then Kingdom of Prussia. The U.S. has had various missions accredited to various German states that today formed a unified Germany since the end of the 18th century. The country’s would be sixth president, John Quincy Adams, served at the time as first diplomatic Minister to Prussia.
The present chancery in Berlin Pariser-Platz was inaugurated in 2008 in the presence of erstwhile President George W. Bush. Thence the U.S. Mission Germany oversees likewise the consulates general located in Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Munich, some offices in Bonn, and other regional offices.
On 2 July the White House announced the nomination of Amy Gutmann, President of the University of Pennsylvania, to the post of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Federal Republic of Germany. The post is deemed as political, and subjected to approval by the U.S. Senate. If approved, Professor Amy Gutmann would be the first woman to hold the ambassadorship.
Jadranka Winbow (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Elena Shekerletova (Bulgaria), Franc But (Chairman -Slovenia), Anne-Marie Descôtes (France), Dr. Snežana Janković (Serbia) and Gordan Bakota (Croatia).
Thursday, 1 July 2021, Representation of North Rhine-Westphalia to the German Federation, Berlin, Germany: The Slovenian Embassy in Germany led by Ambassador-Chairman Franc But celebrated the 30th anniversary of Slovenia’s independence as well as the start of Slovenia’s second EU Presidency with a diplomatic reception in Berlin that gathered his European counterparts.
Ambassador Frédéric Labarrère (Monaco) and Chairman Franc But.
The selected guests were welcomed by the State Secretary for European and International Affairs, Dr. Mark Speich, Plenipotentiary of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia in Berlin, Ambassador Franc But as well as Miguel Berger, State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office, who highlighted the goals and ambitions pursued by Slovenia during the period of its Presidency of the European Council which is held under the slogan “Together. Resilient. Europe.”
Ambassador Gordan Bakota (Croatia), Franc But (host) and Ambassador Ricardo Martínez (Spain).
Slovenia held the presidency for the first time in the first half of 2008; its current turn is in the second half of 2021.
The key content-related task of the presidency country is to manage the work of the Council, particularly by directing the legislative work of the EU and formulating the joint positions of the Council regarding talks with the European Parliament as the co-legislator, as well as with the European Commission.
The presidency must ensure compliance with legislative procedures and impartially direct harmonisation among the Member States. It is expected to act as an honest and neutral broker that does not emphasise its own national interests but strives for common solutions.
Ambassador Susanne Hyldelund (Denmark) and host Franc But.
As the date of complete withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan nears, more and more often we hear comments in which this withdrawal is compared with the escape of US military forces from the South Vietnam in the seventies of the last century. Even more, as the Taliban, who were the main objective of NATO and (in fact the US) military intervention in Afghanistan are rapidly taking control of all major parts of the country, including the border crossings to several neighbouring countries, for example Iran.
Washington, as could have been expected, rejects such comparisons, although they are very founded and although it is almost certain that the Taliban will gain control over the whole country after the withdrawal is completed. Just as the communist forces from North Vietnam once took over the south, thus uniting the country in today’s Vietnam.
Both in Afghanistan, and in Vietnam the withdrawal of foreign troops was preceded by a yearlong war in which, according to some estimates, more than seventy thousand Afghans and Pakistani were killed, leading to a situation in which today almost 50% of the population of Afghanistan is just surviving below the poverty line.
In Vietnam everyone in the south who have in any way cooperated with the Americans, suffered, if nothing else than being sent for a long-term “re-education” in special camps. In Afghanistan, those who have cooperated with NATO forces, if only as translators, openly fear for their lives in the country under the rule of the Taliban. In the south of Vietnam, hundreds of people floated for weeks on small boats along the coast, in the vain hope that they will be picked up by their American friends, whose warships will suddenly appear on the horizon. They didn’t come.
In Afghanistan, having in mind the example of South Vietnam, people who have worked with foreign forces have no illusions. Thus, a wave of refugees towards neighboring already started, and there is no doubt that this wave will reach Europe as well. The war lasted for twenty years and, the longest war the US waged in its short history. And although President Joe Biden successfully avoids triumphant phrases a typical for George Bush junior, such as: “Mission accomplished,” even his milder variant: “Goals achieved” does not corresponds to the truth.
If the goal was to fight against terrorism and Al Queida, then the target was reached in liquidating Bin Laden and breaking up of this organization, meaning that the time for withdrawal from Afghanistan was during the Obama mandate, when Biden was vice president. If, however, the goal was to destroy the Taliban, then the war in Afghanistan, is a total US failure (it would be wrong to say that Americans are the losers, because the biggest loser the people of Afghanistan). And a failure it was. Not only because the eradication of the Taliban failed, but primarily because the Taliban are “American offsprings” (just like Bin Laden), summoned to life and supported both financially and militarily, only to hamper Soviet troops after their intervention in Afghanistan (1979), with the clear aspiration to turn Afghanistan in some sort of “Soviet Vietnam”.
Yes, the Soviets did militarily intervene after they estimated that the government of the nonaligned Afghanistan could become close to the West. After ten years of fighting they understood that this attempt has no perspective and retreated – organized with a commander-general who was the last to cross the bridge at the border at the rear of his troops (unlike the Americans who escaped by helicopters from the roof of the US Embassy in Saigon and now left Bagram, their largest air base in Afghanistan under cover of night (although they claim to have informed the military forces of the Afghan government which, given the situation on the ground, would be more correct to call the Kabul government, or the government in Kabul.
It is also not true what President Biden claims when he says that the purpose of the American intervention in Afghanistan was not “nation building”. Because a profound reform of the Afghan society was something that was considered to be one of the key tasks of NATO forces, since the Taliban pushed the country back to the Middle Ages (which will probably do again now). At the same time, it is forgotten that Afghanistan until the overthrow of King Mohammed Zahir Shah was a relatively advanced Asian country, with this “advanced” referring primarily to the position of women in society and the education system.
“The inclusion of women in social life, schooling of girls is emphasized as a major success of intervention by foreign forces, as if this never existed before in a country that gave a birth to the ‘Prince of Physicians’ Ibn Sina/Avicenna” – reminds us notable Afghan scholar, prof. Djawed Sangdel. And indeed, it seems as if those forces that have emerged under American greatcoats did not destroyed such Afghanistan. Today, the country is literally devastated by twenty years of war, and the only result of those twenty years, the only thing that has progressed, is the cultivation of poppies, that is, the smuggling of opium.
This author remembers well the conversation of the then Croatian president, Stjepan Mesić with his Afghan counterpart Karzai in which Karzai complained that the Americans are putting him under pressure to destroy poppies farms, arguing that he neither can nor will do this, because in this case half of the country would starve, being stripped of this source of income.
And one more question arises, when we try to analyze the implications of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The intervention in this country which took place soon after the famous attacks on the New York “twins” was conceived as intervention of the Atlantic Pact. And nominally it was. But if one views things, as they really are, it must be admitted that NATO (in this case too) acted as an extended arm of US policy; just as now, as soon as the United States announced its decision to withdraw its troops, and NATO hastily brought the decision to withdraw troops from their member countries too. Pointing up this fact, and it is a fact, that cannot be blurred by any rhetorical figure, we want to say that the member states of NATO, should wisely think twice (at least now, if they have not done this so far), what is the purpose of NATO, precisely what is the purpose of NATO, if it is acting as Washington’s puppet on the string.
We have also in mind the “enthusiastic” sending of troops to the border with Russia, in order to prepare Europe for defense against “Russian aggression”. To whom and what goal serves such a NATO, to whom and to what goal does serve the policy of violent overthrow and / or establishment of regimes in other countries, to whom and to what goal does serve the policy of imposing certain social (and economic) framework to countries that want to go their own way, to whom and to what goal does serve the continuation of the anti-Russian hysteria, especially after Biden – Putin summit, which was supposed to open, or at least ajar new chapter in relations between the two countries?
As for Afghanistan – to come back to the beginning of the story – Biden’s statement that it is “not necessarily inevitable” that Afghanistan will be conquered by the Taliban after the US (NATO) withdrawal, it is simply hypocritical. It won’t be long before reality denies it. But. The US are not giving up their efforts to be present in Afghanistan in the future too. Washington tries “to hire” some allies in the region to take a role in attempt to keep the government in Kabul alive. The term “proxy wars” is nothing new!
To summarize: in Afghanistan, the world will follow a kind of reprise of what happened in Vietnam in the past, so the phrase “already seen” (déjà vu) makes a lot of sense. And secondly, no less important, the United States loses its credibility with such moves, in other words, those who are American allies should consider the price of such a “partnership”, that is, how much it pays off. And if it pays off at all.
About the author:
Tomislav Jakić is one of the most influential Yugoslav and Croatian journalists, who is covering the international relations for over 50 years and who served as Foreign policy Advisor to Croatian President Stjepan Mesic (2000. – 2010.).
The first superpowers summit that, Mr. Jakic personally covered was a Carter – Brezhnev meeting in Vienna 1979.
Five months into the military coup of 1 February, Myanmar is on an increasingly fragile trajectory with clear signs of conflict escalation. World attention tapered off after the first few weeks and shifted to other hot spots, including in the Middle East. Regional ASEAN diplomacy and western sanctions pressure have failed to provide a breakthrough while influential neighbouring countries are locked in competition and preoccupied with the COVID-19 Pandemic.
The weakened multilateral system seems unable to respond decisively to growing mass protests and violent repression by the military. Basic levels of protection for civilians and essential services have been eroded amid a resourging COVID-19 Pandemic.
National cohesion in Myanmar has come under severe pressure. Although the country has weathered low-intensity conflicts over the years and state disintegration is a remote scenario, regional stability hinges on peace and prosperity in Myanmar which is located between Chinese and Indian spheres of influence. Democratic transition has remained incomplete in Myanmar since 2011. Inclusive civic dialogue can help reduce tensions through leveraging communications technology for digital grass-roots engagement, especially with Myanmar’s youth.
This might restore a modicum of calm and provide a conducive environment for peace talks. International friends of Myanmar and ASEAN states are well placed to provide critical support, in line with ASEAN commitments. Civic digital dialogue could also boost human capital for addressing longer-term challenges, including the impact of climate change and the Pandemic.
Evolving Conflict Dynamics- Violence Expands from the Center to the Periphery
While renowned National League for Democracy (NLD) party leader Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house arrest, charges of corruption were formalized in June concerning a charitable foundation, in addition to alleged breaches of COVID-19 protocol and communications regulations. After some delay, a court hearing was held on 26 May. Meanwhile, the number of detained civilians grew over tenfold from the first weeks of mass protests to 6,000. On 30 June, the government released 2,300 detainees nationwide, including media and NGO workers who had not committed violent acts. The junta prepared indictments against protesters and 64 persons received death sentences as reported in media in early June.
Some 211,000 persons were internally displaced, according to recent UNHCR figures and the death toll neared 900 persons in late June, according to NGO observer groups. Since the beginning of 2021, the civilian casualties rate in Myanmar is among the highest worldwide, second only to conflicts in Ethiopia and Nigeria. Businesses were severely affected, and several factories were closed; several large international firms divested from Myanmar or are pausing investments. After a general strike in February, anti-junta protests continued in northern Kachin State, southern Dawei, Sagaing region and in the commercial capital Yangon.
A Committee representing the disbanded parliament (CRPH) was formed and a “National Unity Government” (NUG) established in April. The shadow government issued a proclamation for the release of all political prisoners, return of the armed forces to the barracks, ending the violence and accountability for those responsible for atrocities after the coup. The NUG also pledged remedial action for Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslim minority and their rights in Rakhine state of Myanmar where over 100,000 persons had fled to safety in Bangladesh in the 2017 military crackdown against suspected terrorists.
By the end of June, military repression continued unabated. Weapons of war were used against demonstrators and neighbourhood vigilante groups loyal to the authorities targeted protesters. Internet services were frequently blocked since April as the military rolled out a restrictive new cyber security law. The Facebook social media platform which was used by half of the country’s population as ubiquitous news source and messaging service was shut down. independent media outlets were shut down or fined, and over 90 journalists imprisoned. Relatively few defections from the armed forces have occurred, mostly from lower ranking navy and air force members as well as units constituted with former rebels in 2015. Some reports suggest that soldiers melted away to join the Civil Disobedience Movement in an estimated 800 total of cases but it remains unclear how many took up arms again.
In another more serious development, some of the ethnic minority militias in Myanmar’s border areas with long-running insurgencies against the central government have started to mobilize. There were reports that urban dissenters were joining their ranks and new ‘civilian armies’ were constituted as offshoots of the Civil Defense Movement while other protesters just sought temporary shelter among militias. Several of these groups -including the Kachin in the north and the Karen in the east- publicly denounced the coup and stated they would defend protesters in the territory they control. Other ethnic militias appeared to be sitting on the fence about fighting in urban areas. Experts believe that the territorial ethnic armies have widely diverging military capabilities and are unlikely to mount a serious challenge to the armed forces. However, ethnic militia are a possible factor in pan-ethnic solidarity supporting talks and might become ‘king makers’ in the event of a rift inside the Myanmar military forces.
On 22 June, armed demonstrators of the ‘Mandalay PDF’ group engaged armed forces in a sustained urban firefight at Myanmar’s second largest city. In areas bordering Thailand, Karen state saw intensified armed clashes in May when over 100,000 persons were displaced and some sought temporary safety in Thailand. Confrontations were also reported from Chin state bordering India and from northern Kachin and Shan states. Well-informed observers warned about a trend towards generalized revolt. unless regional or international initiatives can manage to stem the escalation. The country may have come close to becoming ungovernable and some analysts warn of impending state collapse and prolonged civil war as in the case of Syria.
International Response Patterns- Sanctions and Regional Diplomacy
The UN Security Council discussed the situation in Myanmar three times since the coup and issued a presidential statement on 10 March. The Council repeatedly called for restraint and restoring democratic transition in Myanmar but its closed meeting on 18 June 2021 fell short of deciding on an arms embargo. The Council demanded that the constitutional order should be respected but did not condemn the military coup outright, due to the position of China and Russia that defended national sovereignty. China publicly rejected sanctions as “inappropriate intervention” on 3 July during the 9th World Peace Forum held in Beijing. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the primary goal was to help Myanmar find a political solution as soon as possible through dialogue and consultation.
The UN Generally Assembly (GA) passed a first non-binding resolution on Myanmar on 18 June, which condemned the coup and called for a stop in the flow of arms to the country and the immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint and other senior civilian officials. The UN Secretary-General reiterated his call for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi on 1 July following mass releases of detainees in Myanmar. He also expressed deep concern over continued intimidation and violence as well as arbitrary arrests. In early July, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights warned of political crisis in Myanmar evolving into a “multi-dimensional human rights catastrophe” with potential for massive insecurity and fallout in the region. The SG’s Special Envoy on Myanmar, Swiss diplomat Christine Schraner Burgener, visited neighboring states of Myanmar but was not permitted to enter the country.
Outside the UN, international responses featured moral appeals, public condemnation and the use of targeted sanctions. The G7 Foreign and Development Ministers Statement of 5 May roundly condemned the coup and called for immediate cessation of violence; the G7 pledged support to ASEAN efforts in conflict resolution. In mid-May, US, UK and Canada imposed a new round of coordinated sanctions which were expanded from a dozen military figures to state enterprises known as significant income earners (gems and timber industries). In early July, the US led additional sanctions measures against 22 members of the regime and close relatives, also targeting three Chinese companies for providing support to the Myanmar regime through business dealings with the sanctioned Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited.
EU sanctions were expanded to include public timber companies from Myanmar, aligning with earlier UK measures. The US and UK placed sanctions on the State Administration Council (SAC), the junta’s governing body while the EU placed sanctions on the Myanmar War Veterans Organization, due to its close connection with the Armed Forces. Japan warned in mid-May that assistance to Myanmar could be frozen beyond a halt of new aid programs decided in February, seeking to use its considerable leverage as a top donor for Myanmar. Canada said it imposed additional sanctions on individuals and entities tied to the Myanmar armed forces, indicating it was prepared to take further steps. New Zealand imposed a travel ban on the Myanmar junta and stopped all aid that could benefit them; effectively suspending all military and high-level political contacts with the country.
Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar’s armed forces Senior General Min Aung Hlaing remained the de-facto leader of the country. Apart from minor changes in the SAC, the junta government stayed in place. Experts assess that the army leader has no intention to curb Myanmar’s economic progress. Unlike during previous military rule in Myanmar in the 1980s, a semi-civilian composition of the new cabinet in the Supreme Administrative Council (SAC) shows that the military is prepared to ride out international pressure and pursue national development. However, analysts based in the region see a risk of Myanmar backsliding several decades and reversing gains from the democratic transition.
ASEAN Regional Leverage vs. Geopolitical Interests
Early regional reactions to the coup in Myanmar were muted, with the notable exception of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Following the ASEAN consensus principle, current ASEAN Chair Brunei appealed for respect of ASEAN’s principles of rule of law, democracy and human rights.
The regional block tried to engage the junta during the 24 April ASEAN Leaders Meeting which the Burmese coup leader, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing attended. Yet he subsequently backtracked stating that stability was an essential precondition for ASEAN peace talks and implementing the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus from the summit. ASEAN followed up with a high-level mission to Yangon in early June to meet the junta leader again and seek his views on a list of nominees for an ASEAN special envoy for Myanmar agreed among ASEAN member states.
The junta’s foreign minister participated in a special ASEAN-China Foreign Minister’s meeting in Chongqing in early June, amid speculations that China was warming up to the military leadership in Myanmar. Chinese officials had issued veiled criticism in the early phase of the coup while parallel Chinese linkages were forged with the civilian NUG. A tuning point occurred in mid-March when protesters injured Chinese workers at a Yangon factory complex which was damaged and looted. In a scenario of widespread instability and key infrastructure under threat, China might resort to pressure NUG and the junta into a compromise, according to regional experts; some analysts point to a recent Chinese troop concentration at the important border town of Jiegao.
China’s southern Yunnan province borders Myanmar where Chin state became one of the recent flashpoints in violence. The area is important for China’s transcontinental Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), through a China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The plan features a high-speed train link from China to the Indian Ocean, alongside gas pipeline projects to Myanmar coastal areas, as well as the Muse-Mandalay highway. China has also pursued a mega-hydro project north of Myitkyina which was stalled in 2011 over environmental concerns and developed an industrial park for the town. In addition, Chinese investors have snapped estate and land in the Yangon area, despite restrictive rules.
China’s President Xi Yiping undertook a milestone visit to Myanmar in January 2020, where he signed 33 agreements. Myanmar’s strategic value in these schemes was recently underscored by the visit of China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi in mid-January 2021 as senior-most foreign official to arrive since November’s election. In military cooperation, China as a traditional ally has taken a relatively low-key approach with Myanmar. Russia appeared more eager to capitalize on arms cooperation with senior visits demonstrating that Moscow is not beholden to western sanctions policies.
Similar to the many economic and investment ties between Thailand and Myanmar, other regional partners have most likely adopted a “wait and see” approach before gradually re-engaging with the junta-led government. However, Thailand voiced concerns of spillover from the violence in Myanmar, after refugees had crossed the long shared border; Thailand considers itself as a ‘front line state’ and has recalled its “quiet and discreet diplomacy” efforts underway.
India as Myanmar’s northwestern neighbor already hosts many refugees from the Christian Chin minority. 15,000 refugees have arrived in northeastern Indian states of Mizoram and Manipur since the coup, according to UNHCR figures. These arrivals remain displaced and are hosted by local communities. Larger waves of refugees from Myanmar would affect the delicate local political and security environment. Myanmar’s military has at times coordinated with Indian security forces to control extremists and “geopolitical intricacy” overrides India’s stand on the current crisis.
Similarly, China does not want to see spillover from Myanmar tensions upset its southern industrialization schemes. It was India that delivered the first 1.5 mln doses of COVID-19 vaccines to Myanmar in mid-January when China’s global vaccine diplomacy took shape. Yet both powerful neighbors of Myanmar are unlikely to come to an understanding how to prevent a worst-case scenario, given their geopolitical antagonisms in the wake of recent US and Quad countries cooperation.
Configuring Innovative Dialogue for 21st Century- Digital Engagement with Myanmar Conflict Parties
In view of the high stakes from ongoing violence and the risk of serious escalation, the time may have come for an alternative approach in Myanmar peace support. Assisted by new technology, digital dialogue at the grass-roots level could provide an opportunity for reflection and connect segments of the population and conflict parties. Such innovative dialogue can also tap into Myanmar’s human capital, especially youth who tend to be tech-savvy and eager to express their views. ASEAN’s supportive and caring posture expressed in its 24 April Leader’s Meeting Communique lays out ASAEAN regional solidarity in a people-centered approach rather than prescriptive intervention. ASEAN is also well placed for assisting with required technology from its industrialized members and influential countries in Asia.
Newly boosted by the global switch to digital in the COVID-19 Pandemic, state-of -the-art communication technology and tools exist to connect hundreds of participants in online dialogue sessions[3]. UN peace missions in Yemen, Syria and Libya have utilized such digital outreach to enrich ongoing negotiations and tapped into AI solutions for evaluating feedback. The work of senior negotiators might become more hybrid with online inputs and analysis, although scholars note a “missing sense of peace” in virtual interactions[4]. On the other hand, benefits exist from greater inclusion, shorter iterative meetings, and equality in interaction. Significant peace constituencies including women, youth and minorities can be included online from the very start than in most traditional mediations.
Myanmar has fertile ground for digital grass-roots dialogue. Younger citizens, including in conflict areas have shown great skill in networked cooperation, providing practical livelihoods advice and psychosocial support for years. In view of restrictions from the junta, protesters have resorted to virtual private network (VPN) solutions to ensure connectivity. Some younger officials and members of the security apparatus may also participate in a “sovereignty enhancing” dialogue aimed at better governance and reforms. The technological challenges including interference from authorities are not insurmountable.
Accompaniment could be provided via inter-regional cooperation between ASEAN and the EU, which remains under-utilized, despite strong shared business interests. The multi-sector dialogue template (“Enhanced Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument” – E-READI) has ample room for configuring the required scaling effects in technical assistance in sectoral policy dialogues concerning Myanmar’s specific situation. Notably, Facebook and Instagram banned Myanmar’s military and military-controlled state media in late February, citing “exceptionally severe human rights abuses and the clear risk of future military-initiated violence in Myanmar”.
Pivot to a New Generation Compact in Myanmar- Tackling Global Challenges
Innovative digital dialogue as an early confidence building process can provide a platform for addressing center-periphery relations in Myanmar which lie at the core of many minority grievances. Myanmar could start developing its “new generational compact” including on regional autonomy and decentralization. The country never managed to forge a “Second Panglong Agreement” after independence and the death of General Aung San in 1948.
Social cohesion and enabling social capital for addressing global challenges of climate change and Pandemic resilience are urgent for Myanmar. The devastating Cyclone Nargis in 2008 showed the country’s vulnerability to extreme weather events in low-lying coastal areas. Myanmar’s Pandemic response also requires joint mobilization, due to rising infection levels nearing peaks of last October. Medical staff were instrumental in launching the Civil Disobedience Movement; work stoppages and insecurity have affected the health sector where recent new COVID-19 restrictions are hampering humanitarian access and response. The impact has been dramatic in interrupting remote outreach on public health prevention and counseling of victims of gender-based violence.
In the absence of consensus among superpowers to find a joint formula for lending ASEAN political efforts additional clout, or tactical convergence between the US and China for stabilizing Myanmar jointly as a middle ground, innovative civic dialogue should be seriously considered. More punitive approaches may end up driving the beleaguered country deeper into the arms of China and exacerbate violent conflict. Grass-roots engagement with critical peace constituencies in Myanmar could prevent transforming the current crisis into a proxy fight between global players and second tier regional powers, including India which has asserted itself in border tensions with China and as part of the US-led Quad group of states to hedge against China’s growing influence in ASEAN and APEC Regions.
About the author:
Matthias E. Leitner – Picture by IFIMES
Matthias E. Leitner has served in international peace and security since 1997, mainly in UN and regional peace operations across Africa and in Southeast Asia/Myanmar as well as the Middle East. His specialization is in the Horn of Africa/IGAD Region and inter-regional cooperation as well as cross-learning including COVID-19 resilience. His academic background from Bonn and Oxford Universities is in languages, history and international law.
This article reflex the author’s views and it has been published first by IFIMES.
