Music at the Japanese Embassy

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Ambassador of Japan presents the Ragazze Quartet By Bonnie Klap, Editor in Chief. His Excellency Mr. Masaru Tsuji, Ambassador of Japan, welcomed a number of guests in his residence to attend a concert by the young, Dutch string quartet ‘Ragazze Quartet.’  In his welcoming  remarks Ambassador Tsuji explained the connection between the Dutch string quartet and Japan, being the fact that the four young ladies will be travelling to Japan in May to compete at the prestigious, 8th Osaka International Chamber Music Competition and Festa. The members of the Ragazze Quartet, one of whom told the audience that they are “practicing like maniacs,” played pieces of Joseph Haydn, Claude Debussy and the Japanese  composer Akira Nishimura.

Ambassador’s Farewell

By Abhay K.
 
Farewell Ambassador farewell 
Sad that you are leaving foreign service fold
But thank you for telling your tale
Your parting wisdom is pure gold
Please keep radiating light
Even if you have retired
Share your thoughts day and night
Diplomatic fraternity is 
By Abhay K.
Farewell Ambassador farewell Sad that you are leaving foreign service fold But thank you for telling your tale Your parting wisdom is pure gold Please keep radiating light Even if you have retired Share your thoughts day and night Diplomatic fraternity is never tired The wannabes will closely follow Your path lit up with golden sun-rays Remember,wherever you go Share memories of your diplomatic days Now light the path of your countrymen With your acquired wisdom and acumen.
Abhay K., an Indian poet-diplomat, whose idea of an Earth Anthem has been termed by UNESCO as inspiring that could contribute to bring the world together. He is the lyricist of SAARC Song and the winner of SAARC Literary Award  2013. He has authored seven books including five collections of poetry. 

Connecting Ideas and People

‘Foundation Counterpoint’ – A different take on connecting ideas and people in The Hague… By Eelco H. Dykstra, special contributor Diplomat Magazine, The Hague. On a daily basis, many diplomats are downloading information to the host country they’re posted in – and uploading information from host country to home country. Hoe effective these efforts are can vary considerably and depends in part on the strength of the network you have and the kind of networking you do. So, who are the people you have in your network and how do you reach your intended target audiences? The answers to these questions often determine the quality and the impact of your efforts. In the city of The Hague, compared to other international political capitals such as Washington DC and London, there are surprisingly few truly international and independent ‘think-tanks’. Despite the efforts undertaken by the city of The Hague to profile itself as the city of peace and justice, more can be done to engage and benefit the many international entities and embassies in The Hague. In response to these considerations, a group of approximately 100 professionals from many different disciplines and backgrounds – all with a proven international track record – have come together to form the core of the newly established Foundation Counterpoint.Eelco.Dykstra A resource center and a think tank…. Foundation Counterpoint is a network organization of professionals from government, private sector, knowledge brokers, the media and the population who are committed to international affairs and the use of common sense. The Foundation is about content but does so with a smile and operates in an informal setting: its activities should be enjoyable if not outright ‘fun’ for those who participate in it! In The Hague, The Foundation plans to work closely with other organizations including Diplomat Magazine and the International (Parliamentary) Press Centre ‘Nieuwspoort’ and will function as a combination of a ‘resource center’ and a ‘think-tank’. The general aim is to pro-actively support the quality and impact of information exchange – within and between international entities and national (target) audiences. So, what will this Foundation do? Foundation Counterpoint will assist the diplomatic community in sourcing (local) information for international upload as well as in increasing the local impact of international information by: –          Providing (access to) experts –          Providing information (‘resource center’) –          Researching specific or complex issues (‘in-depth analysis’) –          (Co-)Organizing events and meetings on internationally relevant themes, complex problems and/or current affairs –          Conducting on-line consultation and dialogue sessions. Because the Foundation’s participants are held to the Chatham House rule and can participate while remaining anonymous, the network can also be used to work through confidential and/or controversial issues and assignments. So, what is the ‘thinking’ behind the Foundation as a ‘think-tank’? In its formal deliberations, Foundation Counterpoint uses a 9-step approach[1] by asking the following questions:
  1. What – if any – is the ‘common frame of reference’ here?
  2. What were previous ‘lessons learned’?
  3. What is the functional distance between ‘policy’ and ‘practice’?
  4. What is the level of fragmentation?
  5. Is there a disconnection between ‘before, ‘during’ and ‘after’?
  6. Where lays the focus for investing/solutions?
  7. What is the ‘universal driver’ here?
  8. How is the ‘return-on-investment’ determined?
  9. (How) Are ‘best practice’ and ‘minimum requirements’ defined?
Participants in the Foundation Counterpoint network in The Hague include (former) members of parliament, former cabinet members, diplomats, professors, journalists, captains of industry/business people and a wide range of different experts. Interested? Would you like to know more? Would you like to participate? Simply drop a line to Diplomat Magazine diplomatmagazinenl@gmail.com or to the author at dykstra.disaster.stories@gmail.com

[1] ©IKP/DIEM (Washington DC/The Hague) ‘Universal Roadblocks Model’
       


[1] ©IKP/DIEM (WashingtonDC/The Hague) ‘Universal Roadblocks Model’

Dutch contributions on Nuclear Forensics to NSS2014

By Msc. Hanna Blomaard, Municipality of The Hague In a world where nuclear terrorism is a potential threat it is important to keep knowledge, policies and techniques in the field of forensics in nuclear security up to date. Nuclear Forensics gained special attention during the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS)2014 in the Hague by presenting the Dutch-led Gift Basket on Forensics in nuclear security. Furthermore, innovations for the future has been presented in the so-called ‘The Hague Innovations Pathway 2014-2019 on Forensics in Nuclear Security’. In the upcoming years towards the final NSS2016 in Washington, the presented innovations will hopefully get further publicity and be used worldwide. In 2010 at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington the Netherlands stressed the importance of forensic investigation in case of nuclear security incidents. After a formal request the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI) conducted a study of global initiatives of involving forensic technical investigations in nuclear security incidents. The results of the study and deliverables proposed in a white paper were adopted by the NSS States and formed the key components of the Dutch-led Nuclear Forensics Gift Basket for the NSS2014. The deliverables include a Nuclear Forensics Lexicon, a survey of good practices and an education and training curriculum supported by a knowledge platform to facilitate international discussion and knowledge-sharing. The NFI has developed these initiatives but due to the rapidly changing field of forensics in nuclear security, regular updates and maintenance of the contents are essential. At the NSS2014 Gift Basket Event “Forensics in Nuclear Security” in January at The Hague, delegations from several NSS States and international experts discussed a variety of possible forensic innovations and the future potential for the Gift Basket in support of the Nuclear Security Summits during the next five years. The outcomes of the recent discussions in The Hague have been used in designing the document Innovations Pathway 2014-2019 which explores the required innovations and the development of examination methods to investigate a nuclear security incident. The selected topics that have been focussed on are innovations towards a national action plan, ‘crime scene’ and laboratory expert methods,  education developments, ideas for more collaboration and knowledge-sharing and the future potential of the Dutch-led Gift Basket. The Innovations Pathway addresses the importance of continuously developing the field of forensics in nuclear security in relation to the NSS including the innovations that need to be developed and validated running up to the NSS2016 and beyond. Signing  a Joint Statement at the NSS2014 is a first step, but further recognition and notification is needed. We certainly encourage your diplomat network in The Hague, in addition to the Dutch ambassadors and networks abroad, to spread the word. For further information on ‘The Hague Innovations Pathway 2014-2019, please contact hanna.blomaard@denhaag.nl .  

OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria

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OPCW to Undertake Fact-Finding Mission in Syria on Alleged Chlorine Gas Attacks At a meeting of the OPCW Executive Council held recently, the Director-General announced the creation of an OPCW mission to establish facts surrounding allegations of use of chlorine in Syria. The Syrian government, which has agreed to accept this mission, has undertaken to provide security in areas under its control.  The mission will carry out its work in the most challenging circumstances. Delegations speaking at today’s Executive Council meeting expressed their full support for this mission.  The UN Secretary-General Mr. Ban Ki-moon has also expressed his support and assured the assistance of the United Nations in meeting the significant security and logistical demands of this mission. The team is expected to depart for Syria soon.

A smile and a thought….

 Column by Eelco H. Dykstra, MD for Diplomat Magazine
Eelco Dykstra writes a monthly column called “A smile and a thought…” The columns put a playful spotlight on the interface between the Dutch and the International Community it hosts. Yes, his musings may appear at times to be mildly provocative at first sight but they are first and foremost playful – with a little irony thrown in here and there… You be the judge! His columns are intended to give you ‘a smile and a thought’. A smile because perhaps you hadn’t quite looked at something that way and a thought because the column may leave you wondering… Misbehavior diplomats no longer tolerated This headline in the Dutch daily newspaper De Volkskrant of April 24, certainly draws attention – as headlines are supposed to do… So it is time – to read on. The article reports on a cabinet level decision initiated by two ministers (Foreign Affairs and Safety & Justice) to apply pressure on misbehaving diplomats by ‘naming and shaming’ them for not paying traffic fines imposed for illegal parking and speeding. A ‘cabinet level’ decision? Two ministers? Surely we must be talking about an issue with a very high priority, perhaps even an issue of national interest? So it is time – to read on. Applying pressure by ‘naming and shaming’? This is not new – nor news. As the article confirms, a list of the top-10 countries with most transgressions, i.e. unpaid traffic fines, had already been publicly announced by the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September of 2013. On the list were, from top to bottom, the embassies of Russia, China, UAE, Iran, Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, Bosnia I Herzegovina, Ghana and Malaysia. It is well known that under the rules of the Vienna Treaty, diplomats enjoy varying levels of ‘diplomatic immunity’ for these kinds of things, so how effective is this ‘naming and shaming’ method? We don’t know because no information was provided on that one. So it is time – to read on. Misbehaving diplomats? There are about 20,000 diplomats and family members who live in the Netherlands. By their own admission, Dutch government officials confirm that this group of 20,000 people is “in comparison to the average Dutch person, considerably less likely to violate the law”. That being the case, why then single out this group for the ‘naming and shaming’ method? So it is time – to read on. According to sources from within the Dutch government, we’re talking about unpaid traffic tickets totaling € 500,000 over a five-year period. That is the same as € 100,000 per year and divided by the 20,000 people, we arrive at € 5 per person within the group of diplomats and family members. Let us reverse this calculation. Since the diplomats and their family members are less likely to violate the law, let’s put the amount of unpaid traffic tickets for the average Dutch person at € 8. Multiply this with the 17.5 million inhabitants of the Netherlands and we arrive at € 140,000,000 in unpaid traffic fines. 140 million Euro’s? Such an amount is certainly worthy of making this a cabinet-level issue requiring decisive action by more than just two ministries – the Ministry of Finance being one of the firsts… It seems therefore almost certain that, after the ‘naming and shaming’ campaign aimed at diplomats and their family members, we can now equally look forward to a new ‘naming and shaming’ campaign addressed at the Dutch population, wouldn’t you agree? Let us think about how this campaign would work. For instance by listing a top-10 of cities with most misbehavior? Or perhaps by listing the top-10 places where Dutch citizens park their vehicles in spaces reserved and marked with “For use by diplomats only”? “Misbehavior diplomats no longer tolerated”.    Is this a case of ‘playing to the gallery’? Is this a Dutch ‘toneelstukje’? Is this ‘politics as usual’? You tell me. So it is time – to move on.            

ICC’s jurisdiction over Egypt

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A communication seeking to accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or the “Court”)  over Egypt has been dismissed as not presented on behalf of the concerned State. On 13 December 2013, lawyers acting on behalf of, amongst others, the Freedom and Justice Party (the “Petitioners”) lodged a communication with the ICC Registrar seeking to accept the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction pursuant to article 12(3) of the Rome Statute with respect to alleged crimes committed on the territory of the State of Egypt since 1 June 2013. Upon receiving the communication, as per the established internal procedures, the Registry verified with the Egyptian authorities whether or not such a communication was transmitted on behalf of the State of Egypt, as a result of which, the Registrar did not receive a positive confirmation. The Registrar further transmitted the communication in reference to the ICC Prosecutor and consulted with her on this matter. After a careful assessment, the Registrar informed the Petitioners that the communication received cannot be treated as a declaration accepting the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction pursuant to article 12(3) of the Rome Statute given that they lacked the requisite authority under international law to act on behalf of the State of Egypt for the purpose of the Rome Statute. This assessment should in no way be construed as a determination on the nature of any alleged crime committed in Egypt or on the merits of any evidence presented. In accordance with the Rome Statute, the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction extends to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed on the territory of a State Party, or by a national of a State Party.  The State of Egypt is not a State Party to the Rome Statute.  The Court’s jurisdiction with respect to non-States Parties can be triggered if the relevant State voluntarily accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC by lodging a declaration pursuant to article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, or if the United Nations Security Council refers a situation to the ICC Prosecutor. To date, none of these preconditions have been met with respect to the State of Egypt, and therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed in the territory of Egypt.

What Iran Really Wants

 By Mohammad Javad Zarif, Minister of Foreign affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Special contribution for Diplomat Magazine in the Netherlands.

Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era.

Foreign policy is a critical component in the lives, conduct, and governance of all nation-states. But it has become even more significant in recent years as interstate relations have grown ever more complex. The inexorable rise in the number of international players—including multilateral organizations, non-state actors, and even individuals—has further complicated policymaking. Mean- while, the ongoing process of globalization—however conceived and defined, whether lauded or despised—has brought its inescapable weight to bear on the foreign policies of all states, whether large or small, developed or developing. Since its establishment by a popular revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has grappled with these challenges. The post-revolutionary foreign policy of Iran has been based on a number of cherished ideals and objectives embedded in the country’s constitution. These include the preservation of Iran’s independence, territorial integrity, and national security and the achievement of long-term, sustainable national development. Beyond its borders, Iran seeks to enhance its regional and global stature; to promote its ideals, including Islamic democracy; to expand its bilateral and multilateral relations, particularly with neighboring Muslim-majority countries and nonaligned states; to reduce tensions and manage disagreements with other states; to foster peace and security at both the regional and the international levels through positive engagement; and to promote international understanding through dialogue and cultural interaction. IRAN IN THE MULTILATERAL ERA Since the end of the Cold War and the demise of the bipolar world in the early 1990s, the global order has undergone a major structural transformation. But a firm new order has not yet emerged. As was the case during other transitions in the past, the fluid, complex, and un- certain state of international affairs today is extremely perilous and challenging. Previous transitions were usually complicated by military rivalries and even outright war among the dominant powers of the time. Today’s rivalries are similarly quite intense. However, due to a number of factors—the substantially changed global environment, changes in the nature of power, and the diversity and multiplicity of state and non-state actors—competition these days mostly takes a non- military form. The concept of power itself, traditionally measured in terms of military might, has changed substantially. New forms of influence— economic, technological, and cultural—have emerged. Concurrently, changes at the conceptual level have brought the cultural, normative, and ideational components of power to the fore, making power more accessible to a larger pool of actors. Moreover, the gradual rise of multilateralism in the wake of World War II has elevated the importance of international norms and consensus. Despite such substantial changes in the architecture of the world order, remnants and beneficiaries of the old order have tried to salvage the wreckage of the past. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the emergence in the United States of apocalyptic theories declaring “the end of history” or a “clash of civilizations” represented a hasty reaction to the enemy vacuum created by the end of Cold War and to the rising status of Muslims on the global stage. Through a series of subsequent Islam phobic campaigns—sometimes promoted as official state policy and perpetuated systematically in various forms and guises—some in the West tried to depict the Islamic community as a new ideological enemy on a global scale. But rather than experiencing a divergence, the world is now moving toward a state of mutual interdependence. Contrary to the situation in the past, the pursuit of go-it-alone policies by former hegemony or current powers has led to a state of impasse and paralysis. Today, most nation-states, regardless of their size, power, influence, or other attributes, have come to realize that isolationism, whether voluntary or imposed, is neither a virtue nor an advantage. Collective action and Cooperation have become the hallmarks of the era. Multilateralism, the collective search for common solutions to common problems, has proved its desirability and practical efficacy at both the regional and the global levels. Even major world powers have learned the hard way that they can no longer pursue their interests or achieve their particular goals unilaterally. The gradual yet growing trend of coalition-making, at the regional and global levels, both for short- term purposes and for more enduring enterprises, bears witness to the inescapability of collective action. Willful cooperation has gradually developed as a new working pattern of interaction among states; it has come to replace the once predominant and now discredited pattern of confrontation, unconditional subservience, and perpetual rivalry. As an inevitable consequence of globalization and the ensuing rise of collective action and cooperative approaches, the idea of seeking or imposing zero-sum games has lost its luster. Still, some actors cling to their old habits and habitually pursue their own interests at the expense of others. The insistence of some major powers on playing zero- sum games with win-lose outcomes has usually led to lose-lose outcomes for all the players involved. The much-challenged position of the United States in the world today, notwithstanding its preponderance of military power, is a glaring case in point. The actual situation in various parts of the world where the United States is directly involved, most notably in the greater Middle East and in Iran’s immediate neighborhood, points to Washington’s reluctant but unmistakable turn to the path of coalition building with other global powers and even regional actors. China, India, and Russia are engaged in intense competition, primarily with the Western bloc, in a concerted effort to secure more prominent global roles. However, major powers and emerging powers alike are now loath to use military means to resolve rivalries, differences, or even disputes. This has led to the gradual rise of a revisionist approach to foreign policy. Nation-states, regardless of their current position and power, now seek to enhance their stature and achieve their goals through a carefully balanced combination of cooperation and competition. The deadly rivalries of the past, a function of brute force and hard power, have gradually given way to cultural, normative, and ideational forms of competition. The uncertainty produced by the current transition in global norms and behavior also has a downside. If states miscalculate their own power or misperceive the capabilities and intentions of others, it could prove extremely costly to all involved. The intrinsic riskiness of this state of affairs calls for governments to rely on more objective analysis and to make careful assessments of their own positions and capabilities as well as of the intentions and possible conduct of others. All states can take advantage of this transitional stage to advance their positions and further their interests. Governments must make realistic calculations about their own relative advantages and vulnerabilities and, most important, articulate clear sets of objectives and plans. Over the past few decades, especially since the end of the Cold War, states that have pursued clearly articulated foreign policies have been the most successful in advancing their regional and global positions; those that have lacked an understanding of the global environment and pursued policies based on miscalculations and misjudgments have either lost their previous positions or become marginalized. FULFILLING IRAN’S POTENTIAL As a solid regional power in this era of intense transition in global politics, Iran stands in a unique position. Given its large landmass and unique geographic position along the east–west transit route, Iran, since antiquity, has enjoyed a preeminent position in its region and beyond. Although Iran’s civilization and cultural heritage have remained intact, its political and economic fortunes have fluctuated periodically, depending on, among other things, its governance at home and its relations with the outside world. The victory of the 1979 revolution, a popular, nationwide, antimonarchical uprising with a mixture of republican and Islamic traits, contributed to the establishment of a new revolutionary order in the country. The repercussions were drastic, and the revolution deeply affected the country’s foreign relations, not only in its immediate neighborhood but also throughout the greater Middle East and in the rest of the world. Any objective analysis of Iran’s unique attributes within the larger context of its tumultuous region would reveal the country’s significant potential for a prominent regional and global role. The Islamic Re-public can actively contribute to the restoration of regional peace, security, and stability and play a catalytic role during this current transitional stage in international relations. In light of the increasing importance of normative and ideational factors in global politics, the Islamic Republic is well suited to draw on the rich millennial heritage of Iranian society and culture and the significant heritage of the Islamic Revolution, particularly its indigenously derived and sustained participatory model of governance. Iran can use such strengths to help realize the deeply cherished national aspirations of the Iranian people, including the achievement of long-term development and regional ascendance commensurate with the country’s inherent capacities and stature. Iran also benefits from a number of historical characteristics that could be considered unique sources of opportunity, many of which have not been properly or fully leveraged in the past. For example, Iran has remained independent from outside powers and practiced genuine nonalignment, lending it a particular freedom of action within the existing global order. Iran can also leverage its political traditions. It has successfully established an indigenous democratic model of governance, developing and maintaining a rare religious democracy in the modern world. It has an unmatched cultural identity emanating from its dynamic blend of Iranian and Islamic culture, which it can use to promote its mission and message throughout the entire Islamic world. As an ancient society with a plurality of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities, Iran also offers a model for political inclusion. And the country has achieved all of this at the center of a vital geostrategic region that has witnessed a long history of major- power rivalries, interventions of all sorts, and protracted military conflicts. Finally, Iran has also demonstrated its potent ideational capabilities and universal reach through such initiatives as President Muhammad Khatami’s “Dialogue Among Civilizations” and President Hassan Rouhani’s recent proposal for a “world against violence and extremism,” which was adopted as a resolution by the UN General Assembly last December. Governance in the modern world is challenging for every state, regardless of its size, demographics, form of government, geographic position, level of development, or relations with the world. Iran has been an organized state since antiquity, albeit with some periods of interruption. It has thus had extensive relations throughout history, in war and in peace, with its numerous neighbors and with other con- tending powers. It has accumulated a rich, layered collective memory and a deep reservoir of experiences. Iran borders seven countries and shares access to either the Caspian Sea or the Persian Gulf with 11 countries; both bodies of water are of interest to the littoral states as well as to a host of outside powers. Thus, Iran inevitably has a full plate to deal with when it comes to its national security and foreign relations. Iran also finds itself in a fundamentally crisis-ridden region. The decades- long occupation of Palestine and the ongoing conflict there has taken a destructive toll on the well-being and development of the entire Middle East. The chronic turmoil, instability, and violence in the region have grown worse in recent years due to a series of protracted external military interventions, most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since early 2011, political upheavals in the Arab world and their generally bloody aftermaths—dubbed by some during their initial stages as “the Arab Spring” and by others as “the Islamic Awakening”—have introduced another destabilizing factor to the region. The trend appears likely to continue for quite some time, even though the direction of the process remains extremely uncertain. Given this overall regional picture and the dynamics at work be- tween local and external players—most prominently the United States—Iran today has to grapple with a number of major challenges in its external relations. Needless to say, the long shadow of the decades-old and still ongoing tussle between Iran and the United States, which has been much exacerbated as a result of the nuclear imbroglio, has further complicated the state of relations between Iran and a host of its neighbors. Meanwhile, there has been a recent surge in the activities of extremist and violent non-state actors in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, with a clear and unmistakable anti-Iran, anti-Shiite platform. A well-orchestrated campaign has promoted Islam phobia,  Iran phobia, and Shiite-phobia and depicted Iran as a threat to regional peace and security; extended support to anti-Iran claimants in the region; tarnished Iran’s global image and undermined its stature; armed Iran’s regional rivals; actively sup- ported anti-Iran forces, including the Taliban and other extremist groups; and fomented disagreements between Iran and its neighbors. MODERATION AND HOPE It was within this international context that Rouhani won a decisive victory in the heavily contested Iranian presidential election in June 2013. He won 51 percent of all the votes cast in the first round against five conservative rivals. His political platform of prudent moderation and hope represented a significant turning point in Iranian politics. The fact that voter turnout reached 73 percent suggests that the public had moved past the lingering divisions of the June 2009 election. Rouhani’s pragmatic positions on foreign and domestic issues proved reassuring to the Iranian electorate. Rouhani distinguished his campaign from the murky platforms of his rivals in several key respects: his clear analysis of Iran’s current situation, his lucid and un- ambiguous articulation of the major challenges facing society and the state, and his honest and straightforward approach to problems and possible solutions. In this way, Rouhani managed to mobilize the dis- enchanted segments of the population to take an active interest in the final days of the campaign and to participate in the national vote. Rouhani’s foreign policy platform was based on a principled, sober, and wise critique of the conduct of foreign relations during the pre- ceding eight years under the previous administration. Rouhani  promised to remedy the unacceptable state of affairs through a major overhaul of the country’s foreign policy. The changes he proposed demonstrated a realistic understanding of the contemporary international order, the current external challenges facing the Islamic Republic, and what it will take to restore Iran’s relations with the world to a state of normalcy. Rouhani also called for a discourse of “prudent moderation.” This vision aims to move Iran away from confrontation and toward dialogue, constructive interaction, and understanding, all with an eye to safeguarding national security, elevating the stature of Iran, and achieving long-term comprehensive development. Prudent moderation is an approach based on realism, self-confidence, realistic idealism, and constructive engagement. Realism re- quires an understanding of the nature, structure, mechanisms, and power dynamics of the international system and of the potential and limits of its institutions.  Rouhani’s moderation brings together a profound conviction in the cherished ideals of the Islamic Revolution with an objective evaluation of Iran’s actual capacities, capabilities, and constraints. It demands a deliberate aversion to actions that are insulting, condescending, or self-aggrandizing. It promotes self-confidence   based on an understanding of Iran’s material and moral re- sources, including the collective wisdom of its citizenry. It values accountability, transparency, and honesty in dealing with the populace   and implies a willingness to reform and improve existing policies. Rouhani’s approach entails a delicate balancing act: between national, regional, and global needs, on the one hand, and the available means, instruments, and policies, on the other; between persistence and flexibility in foreign policy; between goals and means; and among various instruments of power in a dynamically changing world. Finally, Rouhani’s commitment to constructive engagement requires dialogue and interaction with other nations on an equal footing, with mutual respect, and in the service of shared interests. It requires that all participants make serious efforts to reduce tensions, build confidence, and achieve détente. A WAY FORWARD Guided by this conceptual framework, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic under the current administration will be based on achieving understanding and consensus at the national level and constructive engagement and effective cooperation with the outside world. Iran’s policies will be guided by the principles of dignity, rationality, and prudence. This overall strategy aims to safeguard and strengthen Iran’s national security, diffuse or eliminate external threats, combat Islam phobia and Iran phobia, elevate the country’s stature, and achieve comprehensive development. With the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving as the central organ for planning and executing Iran’s foreign policy, in close coordination with other government bodies, the Islamic Republic will pursue several key goals moving forward. First, Iran will expand and deepen its bilateral and multilateral relations through meaningful engagement with a wide range of states and organizations, including international economic institutions. Multilateralism will play a central role in Iran’s external relations. That will involve active contributions to global norm-setting and assertive participation in coalitions of like-minded states to promote peace and stability. A second priority will be to de- fend the individual and collective rights of Iranian nationals every- where and to promote Iranian-Islamic culture, the Persian language, Islamic values   and Islamic democracy as a form of governance . Third, Iran will continue to support the cause of oppressed people across the world, especially in Palestine, and will continue its principled rejection of Zionist encroachments in the Muslim world. Given the pressing challenges that it faces today,  Iran will also focus on a number of more urgent aims. The top priority is to diffuse and ultimately defeat the international anti-Iranian campaign, spearheaded by Israel and its American benefactors, who seek to “securitize” Iran—that is, to delegitimize the Islamic Republic by portraying it as a threat to the global order. The main vehicle for this campaign is the “crisis” over Iran’s peaceful nuclear program—a crisis that, in Iran’s view, is wholly manufactured and therefore reversible. That is why Rouhani wasted no time in breaking the impasse and engaging in negotiations with the so-called P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany) to find common ground and reach an agreement that will ensure nonproliferation, preserve Iran’s scientific ac- complishments , honor Iran’s inalienable national rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and end the unjust sanctions that have been imposed by outside powers. Iran has no interest in nuclear weapons and is convinced that such weapons would not enhance its security. Iran does not have the means to engage in nuclear deterrence—directly or through proxies—against its adversaries. Furthermore, the Iranian government believes that even a perception that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons is detrimental to the country’s security and to its regional role, since attempts by Iran to gain strategic superiority in the Persian Gulf would inevitably provoke responses that would diminish Iran’s conventional military advantage. Therefore, the ongoing negotiations over the nuclear issue face no insurmountable barriers. The only requirements are political will and good faith for the negotiators to “get to yes” and achieve the objective established by the Joint Plan of Action adopted in Geneva last November, which states, “The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear program  will be exclusively peaceful.” The unexpectedly fast pace of progress in the negotiations so far augurs well for a speedy resolution of this unnecessary crisis and for the opening up of new diplomatic horizons. Iran will also endeavor to diffuse external threats by resolving out- standing issues with the rest of the world, in particular with its immediate neighbors. Confidence building and cooperation will be the cornerstones of Iran’s regional policy. That is why last year, Iran pro- posed the creation of a security and cooperation arrangement in the Persian Gulf area. As a responsible regional power, Iran will actively participate in combating and containing extremism and violence through bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation with countries in the region and beyond. Moreover, Iran will prudently manage its relations with the United States by containing existing disagreements and preventing further tensions from emerging unnecessarily, thereby gradually easing tensions. Iran will also engage with European countries and other Western states with the goal of reinvigorating and further expanding relations. This normalization process must be based on the principles of mutual respect and mutual interest, and it must address issues of legitimate concern to both sides. Iran will also expand and consolidate its amicable ties with other major powers, such as China, India, and Russia. As the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement until 2015, Iran will reach out to emerging powers of the “global South” and will try to responsibly mobilize their enormous potential for contributing to global peace and prosperity. The Iranian people, with their massive turnout in last year’s presidential election and their decisive choice of assertive engagement, have provided a unique window of opportunity for the new Iranian government and for the world to chart a different and much more promising course in our bilateral and multilateral relations. The Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to vigorously honor its citizens’ choice, which will undoubtedly have a tremendous impact on world affairs. For this endeavor to succeed, it is imperative for other states to accept the reality of Iran’s prominent role in the Middle East and be- yond and to recognize and respect Iran’s legitimate national rights, interests, and security concerns. It is equally important for other states to scrupulously observe the sensitivities of the Iranian nation, particularly regarding its national dignity, independence, and achievements. Westerners, especially Americans, need to modify their understandings of Iran and the Middle East and develop a better grasp of the region’s realities, avoiding the analytic and practical mis- takes of the past. Courage and leadership are required to seize this historic opportunity, which might not come again. The opportunity must not be lost.

A prosperous Ukraine is in everybody ´s interest

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By Barend ter Haar. Eighteen think tanks, varying from the Carnegie Endowment in Washington to the Mongolian Institute for Strategic Studies, made a study of current threat perceptions in their countries. As reported in Diplomat Magazine on  February 2, 2014[1] the report on the Netherlands was prepared by Clingendael. The full Dutch report (in English) and a summary in Dutch can be found on the website of Clingendael[2]. Now all the country reports have been analysed and combined in a joint report. It will be presented to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on April 29 2014. The most surprising outcome is that in most countries domestic and transnational problems are considered to be a far larger threat than any external threat. These problems differ from country to country, but economic problems and growing gaps between rich and poor citizens are widely considered to be worrisome and almost every country mentioned serious concerns about the ability of governments to address today´s main problems. Corruption is mentioned as a major problem in inter alia Albania, Mongolia, Russia and Ukraine. Doubts about the capability of national government to cope with challenges in a coherent manner were expressed inter alia in the US and the Netherlands. The only two governments that rank external threats higher than domestic and transnational problems are Greece and Georgia because of the perceived threat from Turkey respectively Russia. However, also in Greece almost all security professionals that were interviewed expressed their concern about growing unemployment and poverty. Most of the research for the national reports was done in December 2013 and January 2014, so before the Ukrainian crisis. It is very likely that the current crisis will have changed the threats perceptions in countries bordering Russia. However, the outcome of some additional research is that in most countries even now, domestic and transnational challenges are considered to be larger threats than external threats, such as a possible Russian invasion to support Russians living abroad. What conclusions can be drawn from these seemingly contradictory trends? First of all we should admit that Europe has changed less than we might have hoped. We are still confronted with the same two schools of thought that forty years ago were so cleverly combined in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE): the traditional security school that says: “the weaker my neighbour, the better I´m off” and the transnational cooperation school that says: “the stronger my neighbour, the better I´m off”. The current Russian government seems to belong to the traditional security school and to feel most comfortable when it is surrounded by weak neighbours. However, our project makes clear that in all OSCE countries the cooperation school is becoming more influential. According to this school a democratic and prosperous Ukraine with a competent, non corrupt government is in the best interest of both its Eastern and its Western neighbours.

Spring is in the air!

By Bonnie Klap, Editor in Chief. Make  no mistake about it! The Netherlands may be a relatively small country, but there is an impressive array of possibilities to explore it. Now may be the perfect  time as the cold temperatures have finally made way for  lovely spring weather, with trees and flowers  in full bloom. “Carpe Diem,’ as the Latin saying goes, which means ‘seize the day,’  so allow me  to suggest two entirely different ideas for the many Diplomats and their families to explore during this beautiful Spring season. First a ‘must-do’ is of course a visit to the famous “Keukenhof,”which incidentally celebrated its 65th birthday last March! Situated on  15th-century hunting grounds, the Keukenhof is a world famous international flower exhibition, which attracts 800,000 visitors annually. Queen Juliana and her daughters  – then Princess Beatrix and her sisters Princess Margriet and Princess Irene -,  were among the first visitors in 1950. Other dignitaries to visit the Keukenhof include US- Presidents Eisenhower and Carter and Hillary Clinton, when she was First Lady.  In addition to the overwhelming amount of flowers, the  Keukenhof also boasts a sculpture garden, Europe’s most beautiful orchid show and, this year’s  highlight: a flower bulb mosaic depicting an Amsterdam canal scene  with a tulip the size of a canal house My second and entirely different idea for the Spring is to pay a visit to  ‘SLIGRO’ at Forepark. The Sligro, well known  to most international Diplomats, celebrates Spring  by inviting the international community to their ‘Culinary Inspiration Day,’ during which  the patrons of  a number of top-restaurants will give cooking demonstrations  and workshops, in order to inspire the guests to embark  on an exciting culinary adventure, using a wide variety of fresh and organic products. Naturally a vast array of delicious wines can be tasted to complement the dishes prepared by these excellent chefs. With hopefully some  gorgeous Spring weather in mind, Sligro also offers a large selection of top-quality meats and barbecue-supplies.  You are all welcome to experience this Culinary Adventure  at  Sligro Forepark, Linge 2, The Hague,  on May 15th  from 14.00 – 21.00 hrs. Don’t miss it!