By Mitesh Mistry . Associate Publisher in London. Syria; once known as a golden metropolis for holy exploration, architectural beauty and its ancient legacy. It now has unfortunately become the epicenter for the bloodiest and most ill-fated conflict in modern history. Having played host to the greatest and oldest civilizations in times gone by, such as the Persians, Arabs and Ottomans – Syria’s beauty was not only a testament to the development of philosophical, political and medical knowledge, the nation-state served as a perfect example for how wealth, culture and education could help instigate and push forward progressive change from civilization to civilization. This graphic of an ancient paradise is nothing compared to the complete atrocity and war-zone that illustrates Syria today. The bloodshed. The violence. The mayhem. Syria gradually more resembles a lingering humanitarian crisis that is endangering the very integrity of the Syrian nation. Rather than a place for cultural and historic voyage, Syria has simply turned into a battleground; one where Government forces seek to retain power via unconventional means whilst rebel opposition seek a more democratic system of government. There is absolutely no plausible way to summarize the scale of the conflict: 1.2 million people displaced, 2.5 million in need of urgent humanitarian assistance and approximately 180,000 Syrians escaping to neighboring countries like Turkey, Jordan and Iraq. This is not even the half of it! The role of the executive branch and Government is to ensure the safety and welfare of civilians. However this responsibility seems to have no place in Assad’s dictatorial regime. His use of chemical weapons is truly outrageous. There is compelling evidence, complied by UN investigators, to verify that President Bashar al-Assad and his Government forces used chemical weapons to fight off rebel opposition groups. Despite this huge violation of international law, President Assad disputes the claims “The whole story doesn’t even hold together. It’s not realistic. So, no, we didn’t. In one word, we didn’t use any chemical weapons in Ghouta.” So what’s next? It’s hard to predict the next course of action. With the events of the Afghan war and Iraqi invasion still fresh, British Parliament has rejected any call for immediate military intervention, whilst US Senators are increasingly becoming reluctant to support intervention. To add to pressures for the West to intervene, Eastern powers such as Iran, Russia and China have stood by President Assad and his regime. There is simply no clear end in sight. With the UN failing to take immediate action against Assad for violating international law and a further threat of terror groups getting their hands on the chemical weapons within the one year deadline Assad has to remove the weaponry, this could be the start of something disastrous. As for the once enormously wealthy and historic land, it is now practically a warzone with most of the countryside a ‘no man’s land’. Syria is far from a ‘holy land.’

  By Peter Knoope This year, 9/11  passed with little attention; almost unnoticed. However, twelve years on it still stands out as a turning point in history. Two years ago, we looked back at ten years of the Al Qaida threat. There was an optimistic tone in the commemorations at the time. With Osama Bin Laden dead and the “Arab spring” alive, we were convinced that we had seen the worst of it. AQ was history. Today the tide has changed. The Al Qaida brand has reinvented itself and has established a stronger basis than before. We are aware of the position and threat of Al Qaida from Yemen, nobody doubts that Al Qaida related actors like Al Nusra are relevant actors in Syria and there is a an increasing number of “Ansar Al Sharia” movements popping up in different countries including the North African post-Arab spring countries like Tunisia. The question “what has happened?” comes to mind and a number of observations are relevant here. The initial blow of the decapitation of Al Qaida and the fact that the organization had no mobilizing power amongst youths – the youngsters that were the engine behind the Arab popular civil uprisings – had a paralyzing impact on the groups’ organizational and operational capacities. But the breeding ground did not disappear. On the contrary, the element of victimization, perceptions of exclusion, the feelings of alienation and collective deprivation were not addressed. These emotions are important elements in the mobilizing power of Al Qaida and the group’s appeal to their interpretation of the need for Jihad. The picture becomes even clearer when you add to this the fact that there was, at least an initial, vacuum in the security sector in post-conflict environments that permit the space for violent organizations to invade. But there is more. We have seen a rise of foreign fighters flocking into Syria over the last year that is unprecedented.  Many young people from Northern Africa and Europe, but also from Asia and the Middle East continue to join the armed struggle in Syria.  For many young people this has meant that the Al Qaida narrative has been extended into real action. From a talk-shop into an active contribution. It offers an alternative to many that have no perspective in life and believe their future prospects are minimal.. This is no longer about theorizing and long discussions in “Tupperware” like gatherings. No, there is a whole new dimension. In Syria you can prove your manhood, your solidarity, your determination and contribute to the Jihad. We will have to accept that decapitation of terrorist organizations that are rooted in a popular support base either found in local grievances or in international solidarity with the suffering of brothers and sisters in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Bosnia or elsewhere, in itself does not work. We will draw lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq where the military approach to the issue that underpins this attractiveness of the Al Qiada ideology and thinking is not the answer. Al Qaida has been attacked and survived. It has reinvented itself and come back stronger. It is indicative of this reinvention that the Al Nusra movement in Syria does not operate under the AQ brand name. The movement has developed from a military organization with affiliates to a school of thought with groups that adhere to the ideology and the thinking but operate under different names.  Drone strikes will not help to diminish the thinking and the feelings of victimization and humiliation that form the basis of these internationally connected and locally rooted groups. We should – after twelve years of looking for the right answer – be aware of this and draw the conclusion that there is a need for a new approach.  Based on understanding and empathy of the local and international drivers for radical groups and political violence. These may vary in different places. At the same time there is an international element to all this that connects the dots.   There is a strong collective identity, based invariably on religion, which transcends national borders. That faith binds individuals together and determines part of the identity and the outlook in life. If the international community does not master the deeply rooted meaning of that collectivity, it will not be able to solve this issue, neither locally nor internationally. Because, if we keep thinking that decapitation alone will give us the answer, the Al Qaida brand will go from 3.0 to 4.0 and beyond.

By Paramjit S. Sahai,  former Indian Ambassador and Principal Adviser, CRRID (India) and Faculty Member, Diplo Foundation. The issue of diplomatic immunity to the Italian Ambassador in India, arising out of the case of trial of two Italian Marines in 2013, acquires importance, as it is impregnated with far greater international implications, going beyond the legal issue of immunity of a diplomatic agent. It becomes a test case in determining the domain of national sovereignty, when it criss-crosses with international commitments.  Diverse views have been expressed, depending upon the understanding of the issues involved and the interpretation of relevant rules, including international conventions. Prima facie, the order of the Supreme Court in March 2013 raised a fundamental legal question over the diplomatic immunity enjoyed by a diplomatic agent (Ambassador).  Was this immunity absolute or there were limitations to the enjoyment of the same. It was not only those legal issues that had to be addressed by the parties involved, the governments of India and Italy, but also their ramifications beyond legal frontier.  How would it affect the bilateral relations between the two countries?  Would it affect the whole framework of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR)? Diplomatic immunity is one of the pillars of the VCDR, which respects the principle of inviolability of the person of the Ambassador. A critical situation had arisen, as the Italian Government refused to honour the undertaking given by its Ambassador to India, Daniele Mancini, in a sworn affidavit before the Indian Supreme Court, ensuring the return of the two marines – Massimiliano Latorre, and Salvatore Girone.  These marines were undergoing trial for the killing of two Indian fishermen and were allowed in good faith to leave India for four weeks to Italy, to cast their vote in the national elections.  Peeved at Ambassador Mancini, failing to honour the undertaking for the return of the two marines to India, the Supreme Court had given an order, barring him to leave India till April 4, which was the next date for the hearing of the case.  The last minute decision by the Italian government to ensure the return of the two Marines on March 22, 2013, resulted in this becoming a dead issue. The issue of diplomatic immunity had come into sharp focus, with the Supreme Court categorically stating that Ambassador Mancini had subjected himself to its jurisdiction, having sought its refuge. He was thus fully answerable to any counterclaims, as he was now clearly under breach of his undertaking, given to the Supreme Court. He had thus ‘lost trust’ and non-fulfillment of his undertaking before the Court had resulted in his having “no immunity”. The Supreme Court felt that it was competent and within its sovereign right to inflict punishment to the Ambassador, who was barred to leave India.  The case had acquired larger political overtones engulfing bilateral relationship between India and Italy.  At the Indian end, Prime Minister was forced to make the statement that the Italian behaviour was “unacceptable” and warned Italy to be prepared to face “the consequences”. At the Italian end, it became a domestic issue among different interests, resulting in the resignation of its Foreign Minister. Finally, the Italian Prime Minister took the call to ensure the return of the two marines as he reportedly felt that Italy was likely to be isolated internationally. Let us, first look at the legal issue of immunity as gleaned through various articles of VCDR.  Article 29 categorically states that ‘the person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable’.  It further adds that ‘he shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention’. Article 32, however, provides for waiver of this immunity, while further stating that such ‘waiver must always be express’.  Apart from this, it recognises that a diplomatic agent could be deemed to have deprived himself of immunity for ‘initiating proceedings’ and he could not ‘invoke immunity’ for any ‘counterclaim, directly connected with the principal claim’. Seen in the above context, Ambassador Mancini had voluntarily subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and had thus tacitly accepted the waiver of his immunity and therefore, had to be prepared to face the consequences, arising thereof. The Supreme Court, therefore, was in full right to pronounce its judgement, as deemed necessary by it. Could there be any limitations on the nature of judgement?  Article 29 states that ‘he shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention’. Would the Supreme Court order barring Ambassador Mancini would fall under this category?  Would restraining him from leaving India would impact on his right of freedom of movement, which is also provided for under the same article? A far weightier question also arises, as this was not the case of only passing judgment, but also its execution.  Here, the VCDR provides a two stage mechanism. Firstly, relating to the waiving of diplomatic immunity, prior to trial. Secondly, the need for a ‘separate waiver’ and that too ‘express waiver’ before its execution under Article 32 (4). It would be here that the acumen of the legal community would have been tested, if the Italian government had not ensured the return of the two marines to India. Would it have stayed the test of international jurisprudence as India has ratified VCDR and has thus fully accepted the obligations thereunder? It was not only the legal issue that needed to be resolved, but also its political dimension had to be kept in view. How would it affect India’s bilateral relations with Italy and other EU members?  Prima facie, it was going to hurt, with India already having decided to downgrade the level of diplomatic relations by deciding not to send the new Ambassador to Italy.  It would have also resulted in the downsizing of bilateral economic, commercial and defence links. It would also have its toll on Indian diaspora, which has a sizeable presence in Italy; a large number of whom find themselves in detention centres as undocumented persons. Any talk of diplomatic immunity has to keep in view the spirit of the preamble to the VCDR, that it is to ‘ensure the efficient performance’ of the diplomatic missions and not to be used in a dishonest manner that misleads the highest court in a respected democratic country. The Italians had lit the fire and they extinguished the same before this fire could engulf India-Italian relations further into a deeper inferno.  For the diplomatic community, this case should make an interesting study, how core legal conflict points needed to be addressed.  Should an Ambassador mislead the highest court in making a false commitment?  If so, could he still take recourse to diplomatic immunity? Further, how could the highest court ensure compliance of its judgment against an Ambassador, who enjoys personal inviolability? There is a need to look afresh at the issue of diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction under Article 31, read with Article 41 that relates to the obligations to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state (Art 41).